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ABSTRACT

The Moral Economy of Ordinary Belarussians and a Critical Examination
and Re-Evaluation of the 2020 Post-Electoral Uprising

by

Geoffrey R. Blank

Advisor: David Brotherton
This study is three studies in one: First, a qualitative study of the moral economy of
ordinary Belarussians based on E.P Thompson’s class-based economic conception of moral
economy, as applied to complex socio-economic systems by Reinarman (1987). Second, a
critical and broad examination and re-evaluation of the August 9, 2020 post-electoral uprising.
And third, an examination of both the West’s hostility toward Belarus’ largely state-owned
socially-oriented economic model (often considered market socialism) and toward President
Lukashenka, and, of the West’s commitment to overthrowing President Lukashenka and Belarus’
largely state-owned socially-oriented economic model, through its sponsorship of color
revolution, “democratization,” regime change, etc. I also explored the question of whether there
was Russian involvement in the 2020 uprising.
The findings of the study were that, despite claims made by some researchers, the moral
economy of ordinary Belarussians has not changed. The ordinary Belarussians in this study
overwhelmingly supported Belarus’ state-owned economy, adamantly rejected its privatization,
and were deeply hostile to neoliberalism and neoliberal ideology. And although this was a
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limited qualitative study, there are reasons to believe that these results are generalizable, and that
these beliefs are widespread.
The examination of the 2020 post-electoral uprising, among other things, showed that the
official results of President Lukashenka’s August 9, 2020 re-election were, in fact, very
plausible; that President Lukashenka won the majority was very likely; and the fact that he won
the election, and that the opposition candidate, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya lost the election, is
almost certain. The examination of the 2020 post-electoral uprising also showed that it was not a
“popular uprising,” but instead mainly a middle-and-upper-class uprising whose ranks were
greatly increased by the participation of the large affluent IT sector.
The third part of this study, which explored the West’s hostility toward Belarus’ largely
state-owned socially-oriented economic model and toward President Lukashenka, showed that
the previous post-electoral uprisings in Belarus, in 2001, 2006, and 2010, which according to the
literature are seen as attempted color revolutions, could also be understood as attempted
Western-imposed neoliberal capitalist counter revolutions—and that overthrowing Belarus’
largely state-owned economic model was a fundamental priority for the West, an agenda separate
from its strategic anti-Russia geopolitical interests in Belarus. The 2020 uprising, unlike Belarus’
previous post-election uprisings, involved a significant segment of the Belarussian capitalist
class, mainly from the IT sector, that, along with other important factors, greatly contributed to
its large size, scope, and duration.
In conclusion, the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians has not changed significantly.
There is still great support for Belarus’ state-owned economy. Ordinary Belarussians adamantly
oppose privatization and neoliberal ideology. Furthermore, this study builds on the work of
other researchers who argue that President Lukashenka and Belarus’ largely state-owned
socially-oriented economy model is a reflection of the moral economy of ordinary
Belarussians—and not the other way around, as some researchers argue. Namely, President
v

Lukashenka does not “impose” Belarus’ socio-economic model on ordinary Belarussians as
some researchers argue, but rather Belarus’ socio-economic model itself is the reflection of the
moral economy of ordinary Belarussians.
Although the 2020 post-electoral uprising was promoted in the Western media as a
“democratic revolution,” against an unelected and unpopular dictator, in reality the 2020 postelectoral uprising is best understood as a neoliberal capitalist counterrevolution against Belarus’
popular, largely state-owned socio-economic model and against President Lukashenka, who is
genuinely popular and democratically elected. Furthermore, beyond merely challenging the
dominant anti-Lukashenka oppositional narratives promoted in the Western media, this study
explores deeper questions about democracy and neoliberal capitalism’s fundamental hostility
toward democracy and majority rule. It is my hope that rather that, as opposed to viewing
President Lukashenka and Belarus’ socially-oriented socio-economic model as a pariah, the
model could serve as powerful counterexample to the currently dominant neoliberal capitalist
ideology and serve to promote socialism or at least more socialistic economic policies in the
West.
Furthermore, this study not only relied on E.P. Thompson’s class-based economic
conception of moral economy as a powerful sociological lens to understand Belarussian society,
but also contained an extensive review and discussion of the moral economy literature in general
and an argument in favor of limiting moral economy solely to Thompson’s deeply insightful
class-based economic conception of moral economy, as opposed to the numerous broader
interpretations, which make the concept merely synonymous with “values.” If not, we risk
losing an important and useful concept, rendering the term moral economy “meaningless”
(Edelman 2012:63). Furthermore, it is my hope that this study promotes the further use of
Thompson’s conception of moral economy in sociology, as Thompson’s conception of moral
economy is unfortunately under-utilized in sociology (Ibrahim 2014:82).
vi
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Chapter 1. Introduction
This dissertation is actually two studies in one—possibly three studies in one. The first part
of this dissertation actually began several years ago when I set out to explore the moral economy
of ordinary Belarussians qualitatively based on 35 in-depth interviews and life-histories (18
workers, 12 middle-class subjects and 5 capitalists). My research questions were:
1) What is the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians?
2) Has the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians changed?
I relied on E.P. Thompson’s (1991, 1971) class-based economic conception of moral
economy and relied on Craig Reinarman’s (1987) societal application of moral economy or statemarket relation as he called it. In general, I explored the moral economy of ordinary Belarusians
and was very interested in seeing whether they still supported Belarus’ socio-economic model. In
particular, I was interested in whether ordinary Belarussians supported Belarus’ very large stateowned industrial sector, or whether they supported its privatization and Belarus’ transition to a
market economy. I wanted to see whether the moral economy had significantly changed as some
insisted it had. Namely, some academic researchers, policy analysts, and opposition leaders
insisted that ordinary Belarussians no longer supported Belarus’ state-economy but supported its
privatization instead and Belarus’ transition to a market economy (see for example Potocki 2011).
Was this in fact true? Had the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians drastically changed?
With these questions in mind, I set out to explore the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians.
The second part of this dissertation is a very broad sociological examination of the August
9, 2020 Belarussian presidential election and the protest movement that followed the election. I
did not plan on including this in my original moral economy study, however, while I was
completing my moral economy study in Minsk, Belarus, during the summer of 2020, the August
9, 2020 presidential election took place in which President Lukashenka was re-elected by a large
1

margin followed by a large protest movement. This was the largest protest movement in Belarus
in recent history, and for the first time in many years included worker protests, even strikes. It
seemed appropriate that I address the August 9, 2020 election and protest movement as well as try
to apply the insights of my moral economy study to them. However, the August 9, 2020 election
and protests raised many important questions that were well beyond the design and scope of my
moral economy study and will be hard to answer definitively. For example, Did President
Lukashenka win the August 9, 2020 election? Are the official election results accurate? Do the
workers still support President Lukashenka?
Furthermore, my examination of the 2020 post-election uprising led to additional important
sociological questions that required further research well-beyond merely looking at the 2020 postelection uprising itself and the literature that directly pertained to it. These inquiries could be
considered a third part of this study. For example: Was the 2020 Post-Election Uprising a Color

Revolution? In Chapter 10, I explored the 2020 post-election uprising within the context of the
broader Belarus Revolution literature, as well within the relevant color revolution literature in
general. In Chapter 12, in order to provide more context for the 2020 post-election uprising, I
explored whether Belarus’ previous post-election uprisings in 2001, 2006 and 2010 were, in fact,
Western-imposed neoliberal capitalist counterrevolutions. To answer this question, I relied on the
literature, various official statements, and other relevant evidence. And, directly related to

understanding Belarus’ previous post-election uprisings as Western-imposed neoliberal capitalist
counterrevolutions, in Chapter 13, I explored whether the West’s neoliberal agenda for Belarus is
an intrinsic goal itself, separate from Western anti-Russia geopolitical strategy.
Overall, the most important question concerning the events of 2020 in Belarus is what was
the nature of those events. Currently, the dominant narrative is that the events of 2020 represented
a democratic revolution (Glod 2020; see also Bedford 2021) or a “democratic uprising” (Way
2

2020:17) or “spontaneous popular revolt” (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:160) against an unelected
brutal dictator (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:160; Bedford 2021; Way 2020;17; Glod 2020;
Bedford 2021). Is this narrative, correct? It is my position that is not correct, and throughout this
study I will be presenting evidence and arguments in support of the position that the 2020 postelection uprising is best understood as an attempted neoliberal capitalist counterrevolution.
My Belarus Study Findings Differ Greatly from Socialist-Hungary Study
In many ways my experience in socially-oriented Belarus was the opposite of Michael
Burawoy’s experience in socialist Hungary in the 1980’s (Burawoy and Lukacs 1992). Burawoy’s
ethnography of socialist Hungary in the 1980’s was the first ethnography of a socialist state and
unfortunately only one of a few ethnographies completed in socialist states. In general, the workers
in Burawoy’s study were deeply cynical about socialism or outright against it (For example P. 35,
128-129). This was not the case in my study and for Belarus in general. The overwhelming
majority of workers in my study supported Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector and truly
believed in it. In my study, there was no equivalent of Burawoy’s concept of painting socialism,
in which workers and managers alike were compelled to participate in an “elaborate game of
pretense” with various “rituals of affirmation”
Painting over the sordid realities of socialism painting of an appearance of brightness,
efficiency, and justice. Socialism becomes an elaborate game of pretense which everyone
sees through but which everyone is compelled to play Socialism calls on us to cover up
injustice and irrationality and to paint a vision of equality and efficiency (p. 129; italics in
original).
Belarus is very different from the socialist system in Hungary that Burawoy described.
According to the literature, state socialism worked well in Belarus during the Soviet era and was
supported by the Belarussian people (Ambrosio 2006:9; Eke and Kuzio 2000:4) and that economic
success in Soviet Belarus “instilled a high level of pride in [its] Soviet achievements” among
3

Belarussians (Ambrosio 2006:9). Eke and Kuzio (2000:17) (who do not support socialism or the
Soviet Union) described “Belarusian Soviet Society [as] a ‘model of socialist reality.’” In general,
my interviews and life-histories strongly supported this.
On a personal level it seems my experience in Belarus was very different from Burawoy’s
experience in socialist Hungary. A line in Burawoy’s study really captures that difference. In the
Acknowledgments section Burawoy thanked the Hungarian university students who helped him
and gave [him] the bearings to negotiate [his] way through Hungarian society.
With wry smiles and benign tolerance they watched a Western Marxist grappling with
socialism on earth (Burawoy and Lukacs 1992: xiii)
Belarus, however, would impress most Westerners, especially Minsk.

Slawomir

Sierakowski (2020), a very harsh critic of President Lukashenka, writing for the National
Endowment of Democracy [NED] (also a very harsh critic of President Lukashenka and Belarus’
socio-economic model) recently described Belarus and Minsk as follows:
For almost everyone entering from somewhere other than Russia, arriving in Belarus can
be a culture shock, or at least a huge surprise. The expectation is that you will see a collapse
of civilization, a prevalence of communist trash. But what you encounter is a modern,
clean, and relatively affluent country that offers practically everything that any other EU
country offers, apart from the principles of liberal democracy. Moreover, in certain areas,
Belarus evokes respect. Indeed, this is true when it comes to matters that are especially
valued in the West: social policy, technological advancement, well-organized public
transportation and motorways, and means of addressing the most pressing social problems.
According to World Bank data, Belarus’s poverty rate of 0.5 percent is lower than the
poverty rate found in any of the EU’s postcommunist countries, and comparable with
figures from the Nordic region. (The average poverty rate across the entire EU is 2.9
percent). The level of inequality in Belarus today is lower than it is in any EU country,
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including the Scandinavian ones. There is no oligarchy, no crime, and no unemployment1
(Sierakowski 2020:6-7).
Anti-Lukashenka Bias and Neoliberal Bias in the Literature
In general, the literature tends to be deeply biased against President Lukashenka and
Belarus’ socio-economic model (Yarashevich 2014, Ioffe 2014, 2004, 2003a). Besides exploring
the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians and the events of 2020 one of the goals of this study
is to try to view President Lukashenka, his supporters, and Belarus’ socio-economic model
objectively and fairly (see Grigory Ioffe’s (2014) book Reassessing Lukashenka in which Ioffe’s
main goal is to encourage readers to analyze President Lukashenka fairly and objectively). I hope
that I inspire my readers to do so as well.

Anti-Lukashenka Bias in the Western Media
The anti-Lukashenka bias in the Western media is pervasive and distorts the perception of
President Lukashenka and Belarus. This bias is so widespread I believe it deserves some
discussion. In the Western media President Lukashenka is constantly referred to “‘Europe’s last
dictator.’” Most (mistakenly) believe the term was originally coined in 2005 by Condoleezza
Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, under President George W. Bush.2
When the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described Belarus
as the “last dictatorship in Europe” back in 2005, she probably did not
realize how popular her statement would become

Though Belarus had practically no unemployment through the 2000’s, in the 2010’s there was an increase in
unemployment (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021). At the time of the Sierakowski’s (2020) article the unemployment rate
in Belarus was 4 percent according to Belta, the Belarussian state press agency (Belta “Unemployment Rate,”
December 2, 2020 (https://eng.belta.by/infographica/view/unemployment-rate-6849/))
1

Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice said, “I would hope that, particularly in Belarus, which is really the last
remaining true dictatorship in the heart of Europe, that you would begin to see some democratic development.”
Condoleezza Rice (CNN: “Rice: Russia's future linked to democracy,” Wednesday, April 20, 2005
(https://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/04/20/rice.dougherty/index.html)).
2
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(Kasmach 2015:124; see also New York Times August 24, 20203).
(Ironically, State Secretary Condoleezza Rice was appointed and served under President
George W. Bush, whose 2000 election was marred with serious election-fraud allegations
(Gumbel 2008).)
Although Secretary Rice is widely believed to have coined the term in 2005, the term,
“Europe’s ‘last dictator” is referred to at least as far back as October 2002 and was already a
cliche by then (Potocki 2002:142). And even before President Lukashenka was labelled
“Europe’s last Dictator,” the Western media, including the New York Times, merely referred to
him as a dictator, at least as far back as 1998,4 and likely farther back.
Today, the term, “Europe’s Last Dictatorship” is absolutely widespread in the Western
mainstream media. It is often written in single quotation marks, for example, the New York Times’
articles titled, “Europe’s ‘Last Dictator,’ Facing Re-Election, Is Increasingly in Peril,” published
on August 7, 2020, right before the election.5 And more recently in the October 4, 2021, televised

CNN President Lukashenka interview titled: “‘Europe’s last dictator’: I have nothing to apologize
for”6 I suppose they believe accusing someone of being a dictator in single quotes, or even full
quotes, makes the accusation objective journalism—though, whom exactly are they quoting?

New York Times, “Belarus Protests Test Limits of Lukashenko’s Brutal, One-Man Rule,” by Andrew Higgins, August
24, 2020 (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/24/world/europe/Lukashenko-Belarus.html).
3

New York Times, “Belarus's Chief Pursues Dream To Revive the Old Soviet Union”
by Michael Wines, Dec. 27, 1998, (https://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/27/world/belarus-s-chief-pursues-dream-torevive-the-old-soviet-union.html).
4

New York Times, “Europe’s ‘Last Dictator,’ Facing Re-Election, Is Increasingly in Peril,” by Ivan Nechepurenko,
August 7, 2020, (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/07/world/europe/belarus-election-aleksandrlukashenko.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article)
5

CNN Exclusive, “'Europe's last dictator': I have nothing to apologize for,”
by Matthew Chance, CNN Senior International Correspondent, exclusive interview with President Lukashenka
October 2, 2021, (https://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2021/10/01/belarus-president-alexander-lukashenkoexclusive-chance-dnt-lead-vpx.cnn)
6
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During the October 4, 2021 CNN television interview, the caption at the bottom of the screen the
mostly read either:
CNN Exclusive
CNN Goes One-On-One With “Europe’s Last Dictator
or
CNN Exclusive
Europe’s Last dictator” Says He Has “Nothing To Apologize For
other captions were used including:
CNN Exclusive
Europe’s Last Dictator” Denies Human Rights Abuse
CNN Exclusive
Europe’s Last Dictator” Praises Putin, Denies Russian influence
Rather crudely, it seems that CNN wants to impress upon viewers that President
Lukashenka is a dictator. Often, when spoken, the mainstream media use passive-voice type

constructions when calling President Lukashenka “Europe’s last dictator,” such as “known as
Europe’s last dictator,” or “considered Europe’s last dictator.” For example, in the beginning of
the October 4, 2021 CNN exclusive interview I have been discussing, CNN Correspondent,
Mathew Chance, refers to President Lukashenka as “dubbed Europe’s last dictator.” However, at
the end of the program, CNN’s Mathew Chance forsakes such journalistic niceties saying,
Europe’s last dictator is prepared to do anything he can to cling to power

Another CNN televised special on August 21, 2021, completely forsook such journalistic
niceties: “Hear stories from the border of Europe’s last dictatorship” by CNN International
Security Editor, Nick Paton Walsh.7 In fact, CNN this time, did not even bother with the customary
single quotes in the phase “Europe’s last dictatorship.” In the special, concerning the migrant

CNN “Hear stories from the border of Europe's last dictatorship” by CNN Editor Nick Paton Walsh
(https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/21/opinions/linas-kojala-belarus-migration-op-ed/index.html).
7
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crisis at the EU/Belarus border, CNN’s Nick Walsh referred to President Lukashenka directly as a
“dictator” four times. Here are two of them, for example:
The dictator of Belarus, across the border, is accused of organizing
this crossing for thousands to here, Lithuania, in the EU, for retaliation
of sanctions
…
This is all about a dictator getting revenge
More recently, on November 17, 2021, ABC News’ Senior Correspondent, Ian Powel,
reporting on the same migrant crisis also referred directly to President Lukashenka as a dictator.8

Western Media’s Biased Coverage of Belarussian Presidential Elections
Not only does the Western mainstream media consistently call President Lukashenka a
dictator, but promotes the image that he is an unpopular unelected dictator who only stays in power

by rigging elections. This is often done very bluntly. For example, the November 14, 2020, New
York Times article, by Ivan Nechepurenko, “‘You Cannot Say No’: The Reign of Terror That
Sustains Belarus’s Leader:”
After nearly three months of protests that began with widespread anger over a rigged
election, Mr. Lukashenko seems to be surviving the challenge to his power.” (Italics
added)9

Like the above examples from CNN, here Nechepurenko and the New York Times have
definitively concluded that the election was, in fact, rigged, and do not need more neutral terms
such as “disputed election” or “allegedly” rigged election. Although I strongly doubt that either

ABC News, “Tensions erupt along the Poland-Belarus border,” November 17, 2021, posted on YouTube,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j0hRs8dTFZI).)
8

November 14, 2020, New York Times article, Ivan Nechepurenko, “‘You Cannot Say No’: The Reign of Terror
That Sustains Belarus’s Leader:” (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/14/world/europe/belarus-lukashenko-protestscrackdown.html)
9

8

Nechepurenko or the New York Times has significant compelling evidence that the August 9, 2020
election was in fact rigged—and they certainly do not have significant compelling evident that the
election was rigged to the point that it would have changed the outcome.
Even when the media uses more neural terms such as “disputed election” or describes
election fraud allegations in an apparently objective way, it still is trying to “frame” the public’s
perception of the legitimacy of Belarus’ elections and President Lukashenka himself. Again, let’s

look at another New York Times article, this time from August 13, 2020 by Daniel Victor10:
After a disputed election, the police cracked down violently on protests. But
demonstrations continued, calling for the longtime president to resign.
…
After the longtime president of Belarus, Aleksandr G. Lukashenko, claimed 80 percent of
the vote in what many Western governments said was a sham election in August, protesters
across the country have continued to turn out in droves, only to be met with a fierce police
crackdown as the government tries to maintain its grip on power.
In spite of some attempts at objectivity, it seems that the writer wants readers to believe
that the vote was rigged. The phrase President Lukashenka “claimed 80 percent of the vote”
(italics added) is rather charged, implying that President Lukashenka stole 80 percent, rather than
80 percent being the result of the election. (I understand that many Westerners, unfamiliar with
Belarus, would be shocked by a victory margin of 80 percent. I will discuss Belarussian elections

at great length in Chapter 8.). Mr. Victor goes on to say:
Mr. Lukashenko, who has often been called “Europe’s last dictator,”
was first elected in 1994 in what outside observers believed was a fair
and free election, but every election since then has been disputed.

10

New York Times, “What’s Happening in Belarus?” August 13,2020 by Daniel Victor

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/13/world/europe/belarus-protests-guide.html
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In spite of Mr. Victor’s use of more objective terms he appears to be framing President
Lukashenka and the elections as illegitimate. Though, at times in the article he abandons subtlety
and resorts to a blunter approach. For example, the section above is titled in bold print:
A long history of falsified elections
Like the previous New York Times article, Mr. Victor is stating a fact that aside from the
first election in 1994, President Lukashenka has falsified every election. Without being too
repetitive, I imagine that Mr. Victor and the New York Times do not have compelling evidence to
prove such a bold claim. Mr. Victor and the New York Times are just repeating an oppositional
anti-Lukashenka Western narrative. Unfortunately, the Western media has forsaken objectivity
when it comes to covering Belarus and President Lukashenka. In this political climate it is even
more important for scholars to strive to be as unbiased as possible and base their findings on
evidence and facts.
Belarus’ Recent Economic Downturn
The Belarussian economy experienced sustained rapid growth until about 2010 (Moshes
and Nizhnikau 2021; Potocki 2011). During next decade Belarus experienced an economic decline
(Allard 2021; Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021). Viktorov considers it economic “stagnation” (Allard
2021). Though I believe that many opposition-oriented researchers greatly exaggerate the extent
of Belarus’ recent economic decline11 and in general greatly exaggerate Belarus’ economic
problems (Ioffe 2014:51, Ioffe 2004:90; Yarashevich 2014; Ioffe and Yarashevich 2011:750),
there is no doubt that there has been an economic decline as evidenced by Belarus’ fall in GDP
(Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021); rise in inflation and massive Belarussian ruble devaluation in the
spring of 2011 (Potocki 2011); Belarus’ rise in unemployment (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021;

11

See Bedford (2021), Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021), and Glod (2020) as examples of those who overexaggerate
Belarus’ recent economic problems.
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Crabtree et al. 2016); and Belarus recent 2017 pension reform, in which retirement ages will be
gradually be raised until they are three years higher: 55 to 58 for women and 60 to 63 for men
(Lisenkova and Bornukova 2017).
In spite of the recent downturn, however, Belarus is still overall providing better living
standards than many other countries in the region, including Russia and the Ukraine.
(Comparisons with Russia and the Ukraine are very useful and appropriate due to the three
countries’ common history and culture as well as the three countries’ similar levels of economic
development at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union (Ioffe 2014; Ioffe and Yarashevich
2011:753-754; see also Matsuzato 2004; Furman 1999). Furthermore, “the most obvious reason
to compare Belarus with these two countries is that Belarusians themselves most frequently
compare developments at home with those in Russia and Ukraine” (Ioffe and Yarashevich
2011:754).) As of April 2021:
Belarus is reported to spend a higher share of its’ GDP on public education,
health care, and pensions. Further, since 1990, Belarus has had the lowest
infant mortality rate and the highest life expectancy, among these countries
[Russia, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan] (Allard 2021).
In spite of the recent economic downturn, direct comparison of Belarus to the Ukraine
today (before the 2022 war) shows a stark difference. Belarussian pensions are higher and more
reliable, unemployment is significantly lower,12 (4.0 percent13 as opposed to 10.5 percent14) GDP
per capita is significantly higher and inequality significantly lower.15 Furthermore:

Take-Profit.Org, “Unemployment Rate and Employment Data in Ukraine”
(https://take-profit.org/en/statistics/unemployment-rate/ukraine/).
12

Belta “Unemployment Rate,” December 2, 2020 (https://eng.belta.by/infographica/view/unemployment-rate6849/).
13

Take-Profit.Org, “Unemployment Rate and Employment Data in Ukraine”
(https://take-profit.org/en/statistics/unemployment-rate/ukraine/).
14

15

Georank, “Belarus vs Ukraine: Economic Indicators Comparison”
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Yuliya Yurchenko, Senior Lecturer in Political Economy, University of Greenwich,
London, commented that in terms of welfare provision there is a sort of envy in Ukraine of
what is going on in Belarus, as Ukrainian state and policy makers have been neglecting its
population. But how did Ukraine go from being highly industrialized and educated at the
time of transition to being one of the poorest countries in Europe?...[a] neoliberal
kleptocracy regime (Allard 2021).
Belarus’ socio-economic model is still doing relatively well in spite of the recent economic
downturn. In fact, the economic downturn shows signs that it might be lifting as Belarus’ economy
has been steadily improving since 201716 and recently has shown very good signs17—and this is
in spite of recent harsh US and EU economic sanctions.
Moral Economy
Besides relying on Thompson’s (1991; 1971) class-based economic conception of moral
economy as the main conceptual framework in this study, I would like to promote this important
and useful concept as “Thompson’s notion of moral economy is relatively under-utilized in
sociology” (Ibrahim 2014:82). And while Thompson’s notion of moral economy is under-utilized,
in general, however, the term “moral economy” is used very broadly, often with little connection
to Thompson’s class-based economic conception. Therefore, another goal of this study is to clarify
Thompson’s conception of moral economy and to defend the importance of limiting the concept
to a strictly class-based economic interpretation. If not, we risk losing an important and useful

(https://georank.org/economy/belarus/ukraine)
16

National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus [Belstat], Belarus in Figures: Statistical Reference
Book 2021, Minsk: Belstat
(https://www.belstat.gov.by/upload/iblock/b49/b49a6306ec95b5c2d851e897490581a3.pdf).
17

Belta, “Belarusian economy in transition from recovery to growth,” April 30, 2021

(https://eng.belta.by/economics/view/belarusian-economy-in-transition-from-recovery-to-growth-139542-2021/).
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concept, rendering the term moral economy “meaningless” (Edelman 2012:63). (There will be a
fairly extensive literature review and discussion of moral economy in the next section.)

Furthermore, in my study, I will use moral economy to contribute to the literature that holds
that Belarus’ socially-oriented economic model was not imposed by President Lukashenka, but
rather is a deep reflection of the values of ordinary Belarussians themselves (See Ioffe 2014; 2004;
Yarashevich 2014). The Belarussian socio-economic model is a reflection of the moral economy
of ordinary Belarussians. Ultimately, moral economy shows, that, to a great extent, ordinary
people play an important role in determining what kind of system they will live under.

The Relationship between Moral Economy and Free-Market Ideology
Besides promoting the use of moral economy, I would like to develop the relationship
between free-market ideology and moral economy. I will be arguing that conceptually, freemarket ideology is inseparable from moral economy. For the workers, moral economy remains
dormant and unconscious, until confronted with free market ideology and “made self-conscious as
a ‘moral economy’” and “summoned into being” in resistance to free-market ideology. (Thompson
1991: 340).18
Among the capitalist subjects (and some of the middle-class) free-market ideology plays
an important role in this study. Their free-market ideology directly supports a vision of neoliberal
capitalism in complete contradiction to the workers’ moral economy. Not only does this freemarket ideology add complexity, but actually helps clarify and define the workers’ moral
economy.

18

Although this concept, that moral economy is a reaction to free-market ideology, is clearly implicit in
Thompson’s work (1991, 1971), I am not sure Thompson ever stated it so explicitly. Though he does say that the
“moral economy is summoned into being in resistance” to “‘free-market’ forces” (1991:340). I will discuss my
position and justify it in greater detail in the next section.
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Furthermore, I will also show that capitalists’ free-market ideology not only supports
capitalist social relations of production, but is in itself, an expression of capitalist social relations
of production.
Non-Economic Hegemonic Ideology
In this study, I will show how other non-economic ideologies serve to bolster capitalist
dominance. Unlike free-market ideology, these non-economic ideologies in themselves are not
directly related to capitalist social relations of production, however, they indirectly reinforce
capitalist relations of production. For example, “democracy,” habitus (Bourdieu 1989), and
linguistic ideology (Woolard 2020). These non-economic hegemonic ideologies will play an
important role in the examination of the 2020 events; however, some of them had already emerged
in my moral economy study. In general, linguistic ideology and habitus will help explain why
much of the middle class supports the neoliberal Belarussian capitalist class’ political interests,
even when those interests are antagonistic to the interests of much of the middle class. Democracy
is the most powerful hegemonic ideology in Belarus and effectively masks what is essentially class
conflict. It appears a segment of the working class has embraced this ideology even at the expense
of their own class interests and moral economy.
As stated previously in the preface, the main goal of this study was to explore the moral
economy of ordinary Belarusians and see whether it had changed significantly. Specifically, my

research questions were as follows as stated previously:
1) What is the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians?
2) Has the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians changed?
I attempted to answer these questions qualitatively, specifically through 35 in-depth
interviews with life-histories. Among the 35 subjects interviewed there were 18 workers, 12
middle-class subjects, and 5 capitalists. I relied on E.P. Thompson’s (1991, 1971) class-based
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economic conception of moral economy and relied on Craig Reinarman’s (1987) societal
application of moral economy or state-market relation as he called it.
In general, I explored the moral economy of ordinary Belarusians and was very interested
in seeing whether they still supported Belarus’ socio-economic model. In particular, I was
interested in whether ordinary Belarussian supported Belarus’ very large state-owned industrial
sector, or whether they supported its privatization and Belarus’ transition to a market economy. I

wanted to see whether the moral economy had significantly changed as some insisted it had.
Namely, some academic researchers, policy analysts, and opposition leaders insisted that ordinary
Belarussians no longer supported Belarus’ state-economy but supported its privatization instead
and Belarus’ transition to a market economy (see for example Potocki 2011). Was this in fact
true? Had the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians drastically changed?

With these

questions in mind, I set out to explore the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians
In spite of the academic researchers, policy analysts, and opposition leaders who claimed
ordinary Belarussians had changed, my moral economy study showed that they had not changed
significantly.

The workers in my study almost universally opposed neoliberalism and the

overwhelming majority strongly supported Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector and adamantly
opposed privatization. Interestingly, these findings were true whether or not the workers supported
President Alexander Lukashenka.

Overall, even the workers who were against President

Lukashenka were also against neoliberalism and strongly supported Belarus’ state-owned
industrial sector and opposed privatization. I did not anticipate such broad support for Belarus’
state-owned industrial sector (and socio-economic model). The moral economy of ordinary
Belarussians had not changed significantly and my findings supported the bulk of the previous
literature on the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians (Yarashevich 2014; Ioffe 2014, 2004;
Leshchenko 2008; Furman 1999).
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My study showed two diametrically opposed worldviews: the moral economy of the
workers, based on support for Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector and an active sociallyoriented state vs. the worldview of the capitalists (and some of the middle-class subjects), based
on a harsh neoliberal free-market ideology supporting mass privatization, disciplining labor and
creating a free-labor market.
Furman (1999) argued that these two opposing worldviews, which represent class conflict,

are at the very heart of Belarussian politics, with President Lukashenka representing the moral
economy of ordinary Belarussians and with the Belarussian opposition representing the neoliberal
ideology of Belarus’ capitalist class, and a significant segment of the middle-class (See also
Yarashevich 2014).
In fact, Furman (1999) saw socially-oriented Belarus as the inverted image of neoliberal
Russia. According to Furman, Boris Yeltsin and Alexander Lukashenka were mirror-images of
each other. Yeltsin, representing the powerful pro-market Moscow elite, was able to overthrow
socialism and impose harsh neoliberal capitalism on ordinary Russians. However, the weaker and
smaller pro-market Minsk elite was unable to consolidate power, and, unlike in Russia, ordinary
Belarussians, united behind President Lukashenka, were able to defeat neoliberalism and the
Minsk elite, establishing Belarus’ socially-oriented economic model, based primarily on Belarus
state-owned industrial sector (See also Yarashevich 2014; see also Li and Yeng 2020).
For Furman, the ongoing battle against President Lukashenka merely represented a
continuation of this class war, in which the Belarussian capitalist class and its middle-class allies
waged a continuous war against President Lukashenka for political supremacy in order to
dismantle Belarus’ socio-economic model establishing a harsh neoliberal order to the detriment of
ordinary Belarussians (See also Yarashevich 2014). In general, this position is widely accepted—
although many researchers would not frame it in a negative light—the basic narrative is the same
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(Veselova 2016; Ioffe 2014 2004; Kulakevich 2014; Manaev 2014; Manaev et al. 22011; Potocki
2011; Leshchenko 2008; Ambrosio 2006; Matsuzato 2004; Savchenko 2002, Eke and Kuzio 2000)
In general, my moral economy tended to support Furman and Yarashevich, though, several
workers in my study did not support President Lukashenka. (Although it is not necessary for every
worker to support President Lukashenka for Furman and Yarashevich to be correct.)
While Furman’s thesis is widely accepted, recently, especially after the 2020 worker
protests and strikes, some have argued that the working class no longer supports Belarus’ socioeconomic model or President Lukashenka (see Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021; Bedford 2021; Glod
2020). Upon completing my moral economy study, however, I can answer with confidence that
the workers still embrace Belarus’ socio-economic model—their moral economy has not changed
significantly. Do the workers still support President Lukashenka? Unfortunately, my moral
economy study was not designed to determine the percentage of workers who support President
Lukashenka. In my examination of the events of 2020, I will explore much of the available
evidence, including examining the worker protests and strikes, however, I will not be able to
answer the question definitively.
Even though “in reality only a small portion of all workers was involved in the protests”
(Melyantsou 2020:9), we still do not know enough about the workers who did not participate. The
opposition narrative is that all of the workers are against President Lukashenka but they are
intimidated. However, there is no compelling evidence in support of this claim. More studies
need to be done to answer this question definitively. I would recommend ethnographies (ideally
participant observation) at the major state plants and firms along with in-depth interviews and lifehistories of subjects when possible. I believe a qualitative approach would be best as many
workers—especially Lukashenka supporters—due to their very conservative and reserved
personalities (Ioffe 2004) will refuse to participate in survey research therefore invalidating the
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findings. Knowing the hesitancy of ordinary workers—especially Lukashenka supporters—to
participates in any research, I believe ethnography would enable researchers to get a better lay of
the land learning about different workers’ politics without the luxury of interviewing them.
To an extent I did ethnographic research at the state-owned grocery store in which I
recruited one of my Lukashenka supporting workers, Oleg. The overwhelming majority of
workers at this store adamantly supported President Lukashenka and voted for him. Still, I hesitate

to make generalizations about all workers—especially high-skilled and semi-skilled industrial
workers based on this data since the literature holds that low-paid workers tend to be the some of
the strongest Lukashenka supporters (Ioffe 2014; Manaev et al 2011; Furman 1999). Since
industrial workers enjoy far greater wages than retail workers it seemed prudent not generalize my
findings about low-paid retail workers in order to reach conclusions about high-paid industrial
workers.
As I said earlier, more research, preferably ethnography along with in-depth interviews and
life-histories, is needed to understand definitively whether or not industrial workers support
President Lukashenka. Although this research is lacking, in this study I will explore this question
to the best of my ability relying on all data that is available to me.
I will also explore the August 9, 2020 election—as well as every Belarusian Presidential
election. Unlike the question whether industrial workers support President Lukashenka, there is
more data available about August 9, 2020, as well as an extensive literature about previous
elections in Belarus.
Dissertation Organization
As previously mentioned, in general in Chapter 2 I will mainly focus on moral economy
as well as ideology. Chapter 2.1 will consist of a fairly extensive literature review and discussion
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of moral economy, beginning with Thompson’s strictly class-based economic interpretation and
then exploring how others have interpreted the concept. I will conclude by arguing in favor of
Thompson’s strictly class-based economic interpretation.
In Chapter 2.2 I will defend Reinarman’s sociological approach or state-market relation, as
Reinarman applies Thompson’s moral economy to social-political systems. I will rely heavily on
Thompson himself to justify Reinarman’s sociological or societal approach.

Chapter 2.3 will explore the inseparable relationship between free-market ideology and
moral economy. I will argue, based on Thompson (1991,1971), that moral economy is evoked or
summoned in resistance to free-market ideology.

Chapter 2.4 Moral Economy and Neoliberal Ideology. In this section, I will discuss the
advantage I have being able to explore the neoliberal ideology of the capitalist subjects in this
study as well as some of some of the middle-class. Introducing their neoliberal ideology as well
as other ideologies, not only introduces complexity to this study but helps clarify the workers’
moral economy.
Chapter 2.5 A Traditional Marxist Analysis of Neoliberal Ideology. Along with Harvey’s
(2005) analysis of neoliberalism and neoliberal ideology, I will also be relying heavily on a
traditional or classical Marxist analysis of neoliberal ideology, (see for example Das 2017a), which
understands neoliberal capitalism as merely the latest stage of capitalism and not fundamentally
different from previous stages. I will show that most of the neoliberal ideology that will emerge
in this study can mainly be divided into two groups: first, the neoliberal ideology that arises directly
from capitalist social relations of production and is actually “personified” in the capitalists in this
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study; as well as neoliberal utopian ideologies that serve to rationalize neoliberal capitalist social
relations of production.

Chapter 2.6 Non-Economic Hegemonic Ideologies. In this section I will introduce some
key non-economic hegemonic ideologies that reinforce capitalist dominance. For example, habitus
(Bourdieu 1989), linguistic ideology (Woolard 2020) and “democracy.” These ideologies will be
especially useful to understand the political actions of the middle class as well as a segment of the
working class during the events of 2020.

Chapter 3. Literature Review. In this section I will discuss the historic background of
Belarus, especially Belarus’ Soviet history and Belarus’ history after the breakup of the Soviet
Union. I will then discuss the literature that specifically addresses moral economy and frame my
research question by showing the gap in the literature: namely, in the past most scholars described
the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians as one based on strong support for Belarus’ stateowned industrial sector, opposition to privatization and neoliberalism, an active state, full
employment and egalitarianism etc. This literature, however, is contradicted by researchers (as
well as policy analysts and opposition leaders) who argue that Belarussians are changing, and no
longer support the state economy, but support privatization and Belarus’ transition to a market
economy. Are these researchers correct? Have Belarussian workers drastically changed? Do
Belarussian workers support privatization of the state-owned industrial sector? Do they reject
Belarus’ current state-centered socially-oriented socio-economic model in favor of a market
economy? As stated previously, my research questions will be:
1)What is the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians?
2) Has the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians changed?
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Besides looking at the literature that directly addresses moral economy, my research
questions have also been informed by the vast literature pertaining to recent changes in Belarus
political economy, which certainly suggest Belarus is changing and moving toward a market
economy. Furthermore, I will also discuss my own personal observations and experiences living
here, which also led me to believe that the moral economy might be changing.
Chapter 4. Methodology and Research Design.

In this section I will discuss the

methodology and research design of my moral economy study in which I which I relied heavily
on Allison’s (1994) phenomenological Narrativization.
Chapter 5 Moral Economy Study: Working-Class Findings. While some of my findings,
such as workers’ support for Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector and opposition to neoliberalism
were fairly straightforward, other aspects of the workers’ moral economy and outlook were
unanticipated, complicated, and nuanced. I will discuss all of my major findings from my moral
economy study in Chapter 5.
Chapter 5.1 The State-Owned Industrial Sector. In this section I will not only discuss the
workers’ support for the state-owned industrial sector but how they see it as a key part of
Belarussian society itself.
Chapter 5.2 “Patience, Optimism, and Faith in the System” is interesting and
counterintuitive. In this section, which supports previous literature, I not only explore Belarussian
workers’ patience, which is fairly well-known, but also their optimism and faith in the system.
Ordinary Belarussians lack the cynicism of their closest neighbors, Russians and Ukrainians, and
truly believe in justice and fairness (Matsuzato 2004:242). According to Matsuzato, this trait
enabled them to unite behind President Lukashenka and defeat neoliberalism as opposed to Russia
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and the Ukraine (see also Furman 1999). This lack of cynicism was widespread among the workers
in this study, and in general helps them withstand economic hardships and other social problems.
Chapter 5.3 Wage and Job Protections.

Not only did the overwhelming majority of

workers support the state-owned industrial sector and adamantly oppose privatization, the workers
in this study almost universally supported wage and job protections preventing a private owner of
a profitable firm from lowering wages in order to increase profits or cutting jobs to increase profits.

Surprisingly, even the four workers who supported gradual privatization supported this.
Chapter 5.4 A Fair Day’s Wage for a Fair Day’s Work. Although the workers in this study
strongly rejected neoliberal capitalism, overall, they are not fundamentally against capitalism and
do not see capitalist social relations of production as inherently exploitive. They did not see wagelabor or the capitalist’s appropriation of surplus value from the worker as inherently exploitive. In
this way their outlook is not Marxist. In general, even the workers who were the most supportive
of socialism and the most hostile to private enterprise did not see capitalist social relations of
production as inherently exploitive. This finding was unanticipated.
Chapter 5.5 Egalitarianism. Another unanticipated aspect of the workers’ outlook was their
view of egalitarianism. Although they did not like extreme inequality, the workers views on
egalitarianism were complicated, contradictory, and paradoxal and unlike their portrayal in the
literature (See Leshchenko 2008). Surprisingly, they rejected the Soviet model of egalitarianism
and they all supported the right to be rich and believed that the state had no right to take the wealth
of rich people.
Chapter 6 Neoliberal Ideology
Chapter 6.1 “A New Neoliberalism.” In this section I will discuss the new neoliberalism
that emerged in this study, which is basically typical neoliberalism in the production sphere
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combined with numerous robust welfare state programs in the social sphere such as guaranteed
state-administered pensions, free education, free healthcare and medicine etc. Typically, under
neoliberalism, these kinds of welfare state programs are highly contested. However, in the sphere
of production the capitalist subjects (and some of the middle-class) embraced a harsh neoliberal
free-market ideology in complete opposition to the workers’ moral economy. I roughly organized
this neoliberal free-market ideology into the following interrelated categories: The Invisible Hand
of the Market, Capitalist Social Relations of Production, Privatization, Shock Therapy, The SelfRegulating Market, and Social-Darwinism
Chapter 6.2 “The Role of the State.” In a way, this section is a summary or conclusion to
my moral economy study. This study showed two opposing visions of society, which ultimately
depend on what role the state should play in society.
Chapter 7: The August 9, 2020 Election Results and Previous Elections.
Initially, I wanted to avoided discussing the August 9, 2020 election itself, since, without
a carefully designed nationally representative survey—which my moral economy study was not—
it is hard to prove any conclusions definitively. However, since the narrative that President
Lukashenka rigged or falsified the results of the August 9, 2020 election is central to the entire
protest movement, I thought that I should at least explore the election, examining everything that
is available to me.
Another important reason I decided to explore the August 9, 2020 election is that I know
that, in general, the public perception and truth about Belarussian elections is deeply distorted by
the neoliberal opposition, Western powers and the Western press.
Overall, the goal of Chapter 7 is to encourage readers to look at Belarus and the August 9,
2020 election openly, honestly and objectively. And though I know it is controversial, I will be
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arguing that it is very plausible that the official results are indeed accurate with President
Lukashenka wining 80 percent. It is even more likely that he won by a massive majority (though
less than the official result). And it is almost certain that he won the election with a clear majority
and that Svetlana Tikhanovskaya lost the election.
Chapter 7.1 “A Critical Review of the 2020 Election Literature.” In this chapter I carefully
reviewed the methodology of the two major surveys cited by Glod (2020) and others, that measured

support for the candidates at the time of the election.
Chapter 7.2 Are the Official Results of Lukashenka winning 80% Plausible? A Broad
Critical Review of All of Belarus’ Presidential Election. I do not believe such a broad and
extensive critical review has ever appeared in the English-language academic literature. More
than anything, the goal of this chapter is to give readers a broader and more accurate understanding
of Belarussian presidential elections and counter the deeply distorted perception of Belarusian
elections created the neoliberal opposition, Western powers and the Western press.

Chapter 7.3 In Spite of the 2020 Protests, Belarussian Society Has Not Changed Drastically
Since 2015—Important Differences Between the 2015 Election and the 2020 Election. In this
chapter I will be arguing against one of the dominant narratives that the unprecedented size and
duration of the August 9, 2020 protest movement represents a fundamental change in Belarussian
society. I will compare important differences between the 2015 election, which had no significant
protests (Crabtree et al. 2016) to the August 9, 2020 election.
Chapter 7.4: Was the Massive August 16, 2020 Protest a De Facto Presidential Election in
Support of Svetlana Tikhanovskaya? Was the Golos Election Verification Platform a Parallel
Election in Support of Tikhanovskaya? In this section I will argue that there is no compelling
evidence that support for Svetlana Tikhanovskaya is very high or that she actually won the election
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based on the size of the largest protest19 and from the number of Tikhanovskaya ballots submitted
to the Golos election verification platform. Furthermore, I will argue that the number of Golos’
verified Tikhanovskaya ballots actually prove Tikhanovskaya lost.
Chapter 8. August 9, 2020 Election Protest Movement.
Chapter 8.1 “Critical Review of the Literature.” In this chapter I will be critically
reviewing two extensive pro-opposition, pro-neoliberal, anti-Lukashenka studies of the August, 9,
2020 election and protest movement: Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021), Glod (2020), as well as
Bedford (2021).
Specifically, in this chapter, (Chapter 7.1), I will be refuting several of their key positions
that they believe are at the root of the August 9, 2020 protest movement. In general, they argue
that the Belarussian people, including the working class, reject Belarus’ socio-economic model
and instead support privatization and a market economy. This position goes against the main
finding of my moral economy study. I will refute their position based on the findings of my moral
economy study as well as by carefully evaluating the methodology of the surveys they relied on.
Furthermore, there are three other positions I will refute in this chapter. Namely, that
President Lukashenka imposed his moral economy on ordinary Belarussian people. This can be
refuted by relying on the literature. Second, I will argue that they greatly overexaggerate the

decline of Belarus’ social contract based on my own findings as well as the literature.
Chapter 8.2 Was the August 9, Movement a Popular Uprising?

New York Times, August 16, 2020 “Belarus Protests Eclipse Rally in Defense of Defiant Leader: Tens of
thousands of people gathered in Minsk to oppose President Aleksandr G. Lukashenko’s declared election victory.”
By Ivan Nechepurenko and Andrew Higgins
(https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/16/world/europe/belarus-protests-lukashenko.html)
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The Middle-Class Composition of the August 9 Movement. In this chapter, relying on
numerous media accounts, I will demonstrate definitively that the August 9, 2020 Protest
Movement was overwhelmingly a middle-class movement.
Chapter 8.3: Role of Industrial Workers in Protests and Strikes Exaggerated. In this chapter
I will demonstrate that the size and extent of the worker protests and strikes at their height were
still relatively small in relation to the large number of workers at these firms. In fact, it appears

that the number of protesting or striking workers was always within the bound of 10 percent
(Svetlana Tikhanovskaya’s official percentage of votes) and at many plants often significantly
lower.
Chapter 8.4 President Lukashenka’s Supporters Begin to Mobilize. In this chapter I
examine the pro-Lukashenka movement that began mobilizing at the height of the opposition
movement.
Chapter 9. What was the Extent and Significance of 2020 Worker Protests and
Strikes? Do my Moral Economy Findings Still Hold? In this important Chapter I discuss the
extent and significance of the 2020 worker protests and strikes. Relying on my investigation of
these protests and strikes as well as the available literature, I conclude that they do not, in fact,
challenge the key finding of my moral economy study. Although more research is needed to
examine President Lukashenka’s support at large industrial enterprises.
Chapter 10. Important Events after the 2020 Uprising. In this Chapter I discuss
important events that have taken place after the 2020 uprising such as the Ryanair incident, 2021
Western sanctions against Belarus, Belarus’ new constitution. This section will in general provide
more context for understanding the 2020 uprising. The discussion of Belarus’ new constitution
directly relates to the moral economy of Belarussian workers.
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Chapter 11. What was the Character of the 2020 Uprising?
Was it a Color Revolution? Here I discus the color revolution literature, especially as it
relates to Belarus and explore whether the 2020 uprising was another color revolution.
Chapter 12. Was the 2020 Uprising Russian-Sponsored? In this Chapter I discuss
whether the 2020 uprising was actually a Russian-Sponsored political maneuver of the Kremlin or
possibly of the Russian capitalist class (oligarchs), independent of the Kremlin.
Chapter 13. All Previous Post-Electoral Uprisings in Belarus Were
Western-Imposed Neoliberal Capitalist Counterrevolutions. In this Chapter I show
that all of Belarus’ previous attempted color revolutions (2001, 2006, and 2010), were WesternImposed attempted neoliberal capitalist revolutions. In part due to the small size and weakness of
the Belarussian capitalist class.

Chapter 14. The West’s Neoliberal Agenda for Belarus is an Intrinsic Goal in Itself,
Independent of Anti-Russia Geopolitics. I argue in this Chapter that overthrowing Belarus’
largely socialist economic model is a fundamental goal of the West and independent of anti-Russia
geopolitics.
Chapter 15. Was the 2020 Uprising a Capitalist Revolution of the Belarussian
Capitalist Class? In this Chapter I discuss the literature concerning the 2020 uprisings, which
consistently describes it as a capitalist revolution—often rather explicitly. I then explore the key
role played by Belarussians capitalists (mainly in the IT sector) concluding they played a very
significant role in the 2020, unlike in previous post-electoral uprisings (2001, 2006, 2010).
Chapter 16 Conclusions.
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Chapter 16 In this section I summarize the findings of my moral economy study as well as
my examination of the 2020 Post-Election Uprising.
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Chapter 2. Moral Economy and Ideology
Chapter 2.1. Moral Economy Literature Review
In this study I relied on Thompson’s (1991, 1971) class-based economic conception of
moral economy to explore the moral economy of Belarussians, especially ordinary Belarussians.
Specifically, I relied on Reinarman’s (1987:7-8) application of moral economy, which is the moral
economy or popular consensus in support of a particular social-political system or their “vision”
of what that social-political system should be. In this study I examined the moral economy of
Belarussians in respect to their support of their social-political system, specifically their beliefs
about the role the state played in the economy—and more generally, their vision of what role the
state should play in the economy or market. Reinarman (1987) called this the “state-market
relation” and argued that every society had a moral economy in support of a specific vision of what
that state-market relation should be (p.7-8). Although this conceptualization of moral economy
has been used by many researchers, it is a specific approach and differs from the way moral
economy has often been applied (Taylor-Gooby 2019; Gotz 2015). Furthermore, the concept of
moral economy in general has been interpreted very broadly (Fassin 2019; Willen 2019; 2014;
Gotz 2015; Edelman 2012). This warrants further review of the moral economy literature.
The concept of “moral economy” was popularized by the British Marxist historian E. P.
Thompson in his famous 1971 article “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth
Century” (Gotz 2015; Edelman 2012; Thompson 1971). Thompson’s (1971) concept of “moral
economy'' grew out of his re-evaluation of the food riots in English towns the 1700’s. At first,
researchers dismissed the “food riots as a direct, spasmodic, and irrational response to hunger”
(p.136). These crowds were seen as “instinctive” and “compulsive, rather than self-conscious or
self-activating” (p.136,76). Thompson, however, argued that these crowds, had a “legitimizing
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notion” and were “defending traditional rights,” were “supported by the wider consensus of the
community” (p.78), and even had support from many authorities (p.95-99,122). These crowds
valued the “public good” over “private gain” and saw traders and millers maximizing their profits
as men “seeking private, and dishonourable gain at the expense of [their] own people” (p.99).
Thompson argued that the crowds’ actions were guided by a “moral economy:” the deeplyheld traditional consensus as to what are legitimate and illegitimate market practices, “grounded

upon a consistent traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the proper economic
functions of several parties in the community” (p.78-79). For Thompson, the crowds’ moral
economy was based on “definite and passionately held notions of the common weal” and they
believed “they were defending traditional rights and customs” that were part of the “wider
consensus of the community (p.78-79). Their moral economy was an expression of continued
support for the older “paternalist” feudal economy (Thomson 1991:337). In general, Thompson

(1991, 1971) believed that a particular moral economy was always grounded in a specific historic
and class context.
For Thompson (1991:340), people are not overtly self-conscious or aware of their moral
economy, which exists as “a tissue of customs and usages until they are threatened by monetary
rationalizations and are made self-conscious as a "moral economy". “In this sense, the moral
economy is summoned into being in resistance to the economy of the "free market" (Thompson
1991:340).
Furthermore, it is my position that not only will actual laissez-faire free-market practices
summon the moral economy, but that the ideology itself, will summon the moral economy (see
Thomson [1971]1991:188)1. Ultimately, moral economy is the moral outrage in response to

Although this relationship between free-market ideology and moral economy is clear in Thompson’s (1991, 1971)
work, I do not believe he ever stated this so explicitly. I will discuss the relationship between free-market ideology
1
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laissez-faire free-market ideology, an ideology that is an “outrage to the moral assumptions” of the
poor (p.188).
The political scientist James Scott (1976) applied Thompson’s class-based economic
concept of moral economy to peasant subsistence economies of South-East Asia.

Scott’s

interpretation stayed fairly close to Thompson’s, however, he tended to focus on producers as
opposed to consumers (Fassin 2019; Edelman 2012). Scott’s peasant moral economy had deeply

held beliefs about “just prices and rents,” access to land, fishing rights, etc. Another important
part of these peasants’ moral economy was their rejection of free markets and their support of the
“patron -client” system in which wealthier peasants protected poorer ones. Scott (1985) also
focused heavily on peasants’ “everyday acts of resistance” as expressions of their moral economy,
as well as larger outright rebellions. Scott’s work on the moral economy of peasants led to the
use of moral economy in vast amounts of research on peasant societies by anthropologists, usually

fairly consistent with Thompson’s conception (Fassin 2019; Gotz 2015; Edelman 2012). For
example, Gorman (2014), van der Ploeg (2008), Wolford (2006), Edelman (2005) and Watts
(1983) and numerous others, as well as food riots in Chile and labor protest in Egypt (Fassin 2019).
Since Scott, Thompson’s concept of moral economy has been “appropriated and adapted”
(Ibrahim 2014:7), “elaborated and reinterpreted (e.g., Daston, 1995)” (Willen 2014:74). To say
the least the term has been broadly applied, especially in anthropology, but in numerous other
fields as well (Fassin 2019; Stoz 2015; Edelman 2012; Thompson 1991).
For example, the moral economy of science (Daston 1995), drug addicts (Bourgois and
Schonberg 2009), marijuana growers (Keene 2015), tort law (Baker 2001), inner-city violence
(Karidinos et al. 2014) state formation (Sivaramakrishnan 2005 and McCarthy 2002), gender

and moral economy in greater detail in Chapter 2.3 and defend my interpretation that free-market ideology summons
the moral economy.
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relations, (Perez 2007 and Afshar 1989), migration (Nare 2011; Fassin 2005; Velayutham and
Wise 2005), food consumption (Jung and Newman 2014 and Goodman 2004), the poll-tax protest
movement (Bagguley 1996), the UK student protest movement (Ibrahim 2014) natural gas in
Azerbaijan (Barret 2014), Russian-speaking miners in Estonia (Keskula 2015) “the Zimbabwean
State, corruption in Niger, entrepreneurs in Nepal, healthcare in Britain, alcoholism among the
Navajo, AIDS in South Africa, racial disparities in health in the United States, ancestor worship
among migrants in China, embryonic stem cells in Europe, astronomical instruments in
revolutionary France, the aquarium in Victorian Britain, and computer file sharing among peers
on the Internet,” (Fassin 2019), Palestinians (Fassin 2019), global migrants in Israel (Willen 2019)
civil society, humanitarianism, and humanitarian organizations (Gotz 2015) and numerous others
including even the moral economy of neoliberalism (Vila-Henninger 2019)
Several scholars are concerned that the concept of “moral economy” is being defined too

broadly (Gotz 2015; Karidinos et al. 2014; Edelman 2012; Zigon 2007; Thompson 1993). Some
even contend the term is has been “hijacked and misinterpreted (e.g., Edelman, 2012; Zigon, 2007)
in ways that risk overuse and ‘banalization’ (Fassin, 2009)” (Willen 2014:74). E.P. Thompson
(1991), himself warned about the danger of defining moral economy too broadly and separating it
from a class analysis. Moral economy would then simply be synonymous with “values.” He
warned that everything then could be considered a moral economy. Thompson thought that moral

economies should be based on economic roles, whose actions are regulated by customary
expectations, that exist “in a particular balance of class and social forces” and never merely
“uncontextual moralistic rhetoric” (Thompson 1993:340-341).
Class conflict was a central part of Thompson’s and Scott’s moral economy (Fassin 2019;
Gotz 2015; Edelman 2012). In fact, the bulk of the literature applies the concept to the poor and
oppressed (Fassin 2019). Thompson and Scott solely applied the term to the poor and oppressed
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(Fassin 2019). However, Fassin argues that this is problematic since it would mean the term has
no opposite, “or if it had one it would be the moral economy of the masters, capitalists, or owners
confronted with the moral economy of workers, proletarians, or peasants (though Thompson never
seems to consider that the dominating groups are also equipped with this system of norms and
obligations)” (Fassin 2019:6). However, Thompson (1991, 1971), himself, clearly seemed to have
rejected Fassin’s position that “masters, capitalists and owners” have moral economies. First,
according to Thompson, masters, capitalists and owners do not have moral economies but rather
free-market economies: moral values do not play a role in their understanding of economy (see
also Thompson 1991:339). Charles Tilly tried to define the term moral economy in a precise way:
[W]hen claimants to a commodity can invoke non-monetary rights to that commodity, and
third parties will act to support these claims – when, for example, community membership
supersedes price as a basis of entitlement. (Tilly, cited in Thompson 1991, 338). (Gotz
2015:154).
However, Tilly warned that “moral economy would lose its conceptual force if it were
merely to mean custom, tradition, or non-market exchange” (Gotz 2015:154). And while both
Thompson and Tilly warned about defining moral economy broadly neither clearly defined the
term’s boundaries (Gotz 2015:154).
According to Edelman, Daston’s (1995) “Moral Economy of Science” is a “major
departure from Thompson’s and Scott’s approach” (2012:55). Daston explored the development
of normative values in science and scientific research. While Edelman thinks Daston’s work is
very good, he is critical of her definition of moral economy as “a web of affect-saturated values
that stand and function in a well-defined relationship to one another.... A moral economy is a
balanced system of emotional forces with equilibrium points and constraints (1995:4)” (Edelman
2012:55). Edelman argues that Daston’s moral economy is no longer a “principle that explains
class conflict” but one that has been transformed into “an element of a functionalist ‘balanced
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system’ with ‘equilibrium points’ that produces ‘stability and integrity’ (1995:4)” (Edelman
2012:55)
Gotz (2015:158) recommends one “steer a middle course” between Thompson’s dominant
food-riot approach and “Daston's revisionist approach that does not consider how ‘economy’ is
understood in present-day language.” For him both approaches are stuck in the eighteenth century
and are either excessively materialist or idealistic and “that prevents them from taking into account

the coexistence and tension between economic and moral types of rationality” (Gotz 2015:158).
Gotz (2015:158) recommends that today moral economy research focus on the “field of welfare,
civil society, and the non-profit sector,” which are Gotz’ main area of moral economy research.
Many researchers have steered a “middle course” between Thompson’s classed-based
approach and Daston’s functionalist approach (Gotz 2015:158; Edelman 2012). Many have
applied the concept “moving away from the narrow focus of class-specific cultures situated in
fields of conflictual class relations (Edelman 2012:60). For example, Lonsdale’s (1993) “The
Moral Economy of the Mau Mau,” in which he applies the concept to the Mau Mau’s notions of
ethnicity and tribal obligations outside of what are typically considered class relations (Edelman
2012:60-61).
Sardan (1999), similar to Daston, used a functionalist approach to understand the “logic of
corruption” in “A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa?” (Edelman 2012:62). Corruption, seen
as legitimate, was part of a larger “gift-giving” culture (Edelman 2012:62). According to Edelman,
the concept of moral economy has clearly drifted toward an “emphasis on the obligation to give
and the obligation to receive, and away from the concern with class tensions and rebellion that
characterized its inception (2012:62). These social obligations, however, can exist “alongside a
class analysis not framed in moral economic terms” (Edelman 2012:62). For example, Philipp
Bourgeois and Jeff Schonberg's (2009) ethnography “Righteous Dope Fiend” (Edelman 2012:62):
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the larger framework of the study relies on a Marxist analysis focusing on the “residual class” cast
off by neoliberal capitalism, these homeless addicts do not expect much from the social elites of
the larger capitalist society, but have among themselves mutual social obligations including the
“moral economy of heroin sharing” (Edelman 2012:62-63).
Like Gotz (2015), Fassin (2019) insists that the concept of moral economy be expanded
beyond its “strictly economic interpretation” and made relevant to analyze immigration, violence,

social exclusion, de-legitimation, and re-establish a “viewpoint from within [that] recognizes the
political subjectivity of those involved. Clearly this is what Thompson intended” (Fassin 2019:19).
Fassin prefers a broader conception of moral economy to analyze these “moral issues and
conflicts” such as uprisings of French immigrants and Palestinian adolescents whose ‘moral
economies’ “are not primarily the ethics of material subsistence” although, “it cannot be reduced
to culture alone or even to sub-cultures, as a reference to values and norms might suggest” (p.47).

Fassin argues that “we must question the articulation of various levels of moral economies at the
global, national, or local level …and we must judge moral economies on their ability to produce
new forms of understanding the world. (p.19).
The medical anthropologist, Sarah Willen (2014), also an immigration and social exclusion
researcher, followed Fassin’s approach.

Willen’s recent works (2019, 2014) on the social

exclusion of migrant workers in Israel relied on the concept of a “local moral economy.” Like
Fassin’s, Willien’s concept of moral economy is also a major departure from Thompson’s concept
of moral economy and does not primarily focus on “‘economy’, but encompasses broader societal
spheres and systems.’ Moral economies thus ‘govern and integrate different spheres – the political
as much as the social, cultural and economic – and imbue them with special moral concerns and
emotional demands’” (Willen 2014:74).
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Willen (2019:20) defines a local moral economy “as a shared matrix of historically and
culturally particular memories and emotions, values and expectations, that outline the parameters
of everyday discourse and collective moral reflection.” Willen’s (2019; 2014) specific description
of Israel’s local moral economy is also a major departure from Thompson’s framework and she
specifically describes Israel’s local moral economy as deeply-held beliefs mainly based on national
inclusion and exclusion: Jewish Israelis ‘belong’ in Israel while the Palestinians are “real” others,
while global migrants are “other” others. It also includes Jewish Israeli’s historical memory of the
Nazi Holocaust, their concern about security, demographic anxiety as well as the secularized
biblical idea for Jews to be fruitful and multiply.
Though Thompson died in 1993 many years before these studies were published, it does
not seem likely that he would appreciate these broader non-economic conceptions of moral
economy (Thompson 1991, 1971; Edelman 2012:63). In fact, Thompson (1991:345) did not seem
to have anticipated such broad non-economic use of moral economy and thought the confusion
would be over the meaning of the term “moral.” Thompson warned about moral economy
becoming “uncontextual moralistic rhetoric” or merely “‘values’” or “‘moral attitudes’” (p.341).
And although Thompson said that he had “no right to patent the term," he also insisted on the
“centrality to the concept of class, morality, and economy” (Edelman 2012:63).
While Fassin and Willen’s moral economy is certainly political and does not threaten
“depoliticizing moral economy” (Edelman 2012:63), however, they have removed the concept
from its previous strict economic interpretation. Thompson would likely find this interpretation
overbroad and see their conception of moral economy as synonymous with “values” (Edelman
2012:63) or ideology.
But if values, on their own, make a moral economy then we will be turning up moral
economies everywhere. My own notion of the moral economy of the crowd in the food
market includes ideal models or ideology (just as political economy does), which assigns
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economic roles and which endorses customary practices (an alternative "economics"), in a
particular balance of class or social forces (Thompson 1991:339-340; see also Edelman
2012:63).
As stated above, of the two words that make up the term “moral economy,” Thompson
(1991:345), was more concerned about the way the word “moral” would be potentially interpreted
and did not anticipate major problems with the interpretation of the word “economy:”
Of the two parts of the term, the "economy" can probably now look
after itself, since it will be defined in each scholar's practice.
It is the "moral" part which may now require more attention (Thompson 1991:345)
It seems that Thompson did not anticipate that some scholars would completely divorce the
“economy” from the concept of moral economy. I believe today Thompson would be baffled by
the non-economic interpretations of moral economy (See Edelman 2012:63). Thompson might
propose what exactly is a non-economic moral economy if not merely values or moral attitudes.
It is not clear to Edelman (2012:63), and would not be clear to Thompson, why it would be
beneficial to forsake such a powerful analytical concept such as the (class-based economic)
conception of moral economy. Edelman’s (2012:63) warning is insightful:
The proliferation of moral economy frameworks and the "banalization" (Fassin 2009) or
broadening of the term into an overly capacious, catchall category run the danger of
rendering it simultaneously clever and meaningless (Edelman 2012:63).
Both Willen (2019, 2014) and Fassin (2019), as well as others, want to expand moral
economy beyond a “strictly economic interpretation” (Fassin 2019:19). According to Thompson’s
class-based economic understanding of moral economy, their conception would be better
described as values, moral attitudes, collective identity, or ideology. Though Fassin (2019) would
argue that his conception of moral economy cannot be reduced merely to “values and norms”
(p.47), (although he does acknowledge “moral issues and conflicts” are at the root of his
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conception (p.19)). However, even if Fassin were correct, that his conception of the collective
identity and subjectivity of oppressed groups cannot be reduced to values and norms, it is still not
clear why he does not choose another term instead of moral economy (such as collective identity)
and not contribute to “banalization” of moral economy and the potential loss of such an important
tool for analyzing class relations.
Willen’s (2019, 2014) conception of moral economy is even more problematic than
Fassin’s. Unlike Fassin (2019), Willen does not apply her conception to an oppressed group such
as immigrants and Palestinians (p.47) but rather to the oppressors. Her conception of moral
economy is synonymous with dominant ideology or the shared ideology of the dominant social
group. Willen has completely and turned Thompson’s moral economy on its head—from an
analytical tool to understand the moral outrage of exploited and oppressed classes when confronted
with harsh free-market ideology—to the shared ideology of the oppressors. This would be too
much even for Fassin (2019), who generally applied his concept of moral economy to the
oppressed to analyze immigration, violence, social exclusion, de-legitimation (p.19) always
recognizing the oppressed’s subjectivity as Fassin argued, “Clearly this is what Thompson
intended” (p.19). However, in all fairness, as discussed earlier, Fassin did argue against Thompson
solely applying the concept of moral economy to the oppressed since that it would mean the term
has no opposite,
[O]r if it had one it would be the moral economy of the masters, capitalists, or owners
confronted with the moral economy of workers, proletarians, or peasants (though
Thompson never seems to consider that the dominating groups are also equipped with this
system of norms and obligations) (Fassin 2019:6).
First, Thompson (1991, 1971) consistently argues that moral economy is the moral outrage
of the poor in response to the market economy, economic rationalization, or free-market forces
(1991:340). Typically, capitalists and owners, are the ones imposing a market economy, economic
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rationalization and free-market forces market on the poor. Therefore, although capitalists might
have values or a system of norms, that would not be a moral economy. Even more telling,
Thompson seems to make it very clear that capitalists, owners and other dominating groups,
regardless of their shared values etc., do not have a moral economy when he argues that pirates do
not have a moral economy.
But where are we to draw the line? Pirates had strongly transmitted
usages and customs: did they have a moral economy” (Thompson 1991:339).
Ultimately, then, Fassin, like Willen, understands moral economy as merely synonymous
with ideology. (Although moral economy is a special kind of ideology or set of ideologies
(Thompson 1991:339-340), it would be a conceptual mistake to consider moral economy as a mere
synonym of ideology. The relationship between moral economy and ideology, especially freemarket ideology, will be discussed more throughout in the next section and specifically in Chapter
2.3).
As previously discussed, Thompson does not have a patent to the term moral economy.
The term will continue to be “interpreted and reinterpreted” often in a way far broader than
Thompson had intended (Willen 2014:74; Fassin 2019; Gotz 2015; Edelman 2012). While it
seems many of these non-economic conceptions of moral economy could be synonymous with
values, ideology or collective identity, there is something about the term moral economy that
attracts researchers in a way the others don’t (Fassin 2019). It seems the term can capture so much
at once in a way that values, ideology, or collective identity cannot. This non-economic use of
moral economy not only describes “who” a people are, but “how” those people will act in the
world and how their identity will shape those actions (Willen 2019; 2014; Fassin 2019)
While many researchers have reinterpreted moral economy very broadly (Willen 2019,
2014, Fassin 2019; Gotz 2015; Karidinos et al. 2014; Edelman 2012), many continue to stay fairly
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close to Thompson’s original conception (Gotz 2015; Karidinos et al. 2014; Edelman 2012). For
example, Curly (2019) stayed very close to Thompson’s conception of moral economy when he
explored the moral economy of Navajo coal miners. Curly found that the Navajo miners’ moral
economy was rooted in their traditional moral economy based on subsistence and hard work. Curly
also had to understand the miners’ moral economy in the wider historic context of colonialism
faced by the Navajo.
Keskula (2015) stayed close to Thompson’s class-based conception in her ethnography of
Russian-speaking shale oil miners in Estonia. Keskula examined the miners’ moral economy,
based on their “Soviet outlook,” hard work, and egalitarianism, and opposition to neoliberalism,
within the context of their racialized ethnic social exclusion.
Ibrahim’s (2014) “Moral Economy of the U.K. Student Protest Movement” was heavily
grounded in Thompson’s work, as well the moral economy literature in general. Ibrahim saw the

student protest movement not merely as a reaction to rising tuition cost but as a reflection of the
students’ “defense of an embedded tradition- affordable higher education” and that the students
were “politically motivated [to protest] by what they consider to be an entitlement violation” (p.2).
While Ibrahim admits that being deprived of affordable higher education is not at the same lifeand-death level as being deprived of bread, he still thinks Thompson’s moral economy framework
applies (p.27-28). He argues that the students are being deprived of an entitlement and that

represents a violation of their moral economy. He supports his position by relying on Thompson’s
(1991:340) understanding of “entitlement” as central to a moral economy, as well as resisting freemarket reforms (1993:340) (Ibrahim 2014:7). Ibrahim also relied on Bagguley’s (1996) “The
Moral Economy of the Anti-Poll-Tax Protest.” Bagguley’s study was very similar to Ibrahim’s.
Bagguley also relied on Thompson’s moral economy to explain the broad-based and consistent
support for the British anti-poll tax movement in the 1990’s.
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Chapter 2.2. Reinarman’s Sociological Approach. The State-Market Relation: The Moral
Economy of Social-Political Systems
The American sociologist Craig Reinarman (1987) directly applied Thompson’s concept
of moral economy to social-political systems. Reinarman argued that, just as Thompson’s preindustrial English crowd had a popular consensus as to what are legitimate and illegitimate
economic practices at the marketplace, each industrial society also has a popular consensus as to

what role the state should play in relation to the economy or market, specifically, what level of
state intervention into the market was legitimate. As previously stated, Reinarman called this the
“state-market relation.” Namely, each society would have a “moral economy” in support of a
particular state-market relation. And researchers could explore the moral economy of a society
and see whether there is a popular consensus for a particular social system and more generally
learn the popular “vision” of what the state-market relation should be.

In this section I will be arguing that Reinarman’s sociological application of moral
economy was not only appropriate, but thoroughly grounded in Thompson’s conception of moral
economy. In fact, Thompson (1991:271) himself, even considered calling moral economy “a
sociological economy,” and always stressed the political aspect of the concept of moral economy:
That, indeed, is as much, or more, "political" than is "political economy", but by usage the
classical economists have carried off the term” (p.271; see also Fassin 2019:1)
Specifically, I will argue that Reinarman’s sociological approach is at least implicit—if
not explicit—in Thompson’s work: both his original study (1971) and his later reexamination of
the concept of moral economy (1993). Furthermore, I will discuss how Reinarman’s conception
has been applied by many scholars more recently.
I do not believe that Thompson was aware of Reinarman’s study or what his thoughts were
about Reinarman’s state-market relation or societal approach of moral economy. I also believe
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that Thompson had died before European researchers began using the same approach as Reinarman
(See Taylor-Gooby et al. 2019).
Reinarman’s approach is already implicit in Thompson’s original research (Fassin 2019;
Edelman 2012: Reinarman 1987; Thompson 1991, 1971). While it is clear Thompson’s preindustrial crowd was not overtly political or fighting for a modern welfare state, the moral economy
of Thompson’s (1991, 1971) crowd, however, was not merely local but societal (Fassin 2019;

Edelman 2012; Reinarman 1987). Fassin (2019:6) even summarized Thompson’s analysis as
“society vs. the market,” which entailed a “confrontation between the two economic models.” The
moral economy of Thompson’s (1971) crowd was shaped by the larger “paternalistic” feudal
economy and was an expression of continued support for the older “paternalist” feudal economy.
Often the rioters even had support from authorities (1971:95-99,122). The rioters were not merely
outraged by individual acts of greed but were defending laws that regulated the marketplace and

forbid many market practices. Their moral economy was in direct opposition to the growing
economic liberalism that was promoted by the political economists who demanded that these laws
be repealed, among them Adam Smith, who called for the “[u]nlimited, unrestrained freedom” of
traders (Thompson 1971:89). The political economists were against “intrusive moral imperatives”
into the economy and believed that “supply and demand” would regulate the market for everyone’s
benefit (Thompson 1971:90).
While it is true the rioters were not fighting for a modern welfare state or socialism, they
were defending state intervention into the market—Reinarman explicitly argues this (1987:7-8).
Although the crowd was not an overt political movement, they believed in the laws regulating the
marketplace, were fighting to defend those laws—and were outraged when the laws were broken.
Edelman (2012:58) argued that in today’s terms the crowds were fighting “de-regulation”.
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It seems clear that their moral economy was not merely a local but also societal. In
Thompson’s original research there is at least implicit—if not explicit—support for Reinarman’s
applying moral economy at the societal level.
Reinarman’s approach is also at least implicit in Thompson’s later work (1993).
Thompson (1991:341) did acknowledge that moral economy could be appropriately applied to
modern-day anti-capitalist/free-market conflicts but warned against losing the focus of moral

economy and turning it into “uncontextual moralistic rhetoric” (p.341). For Thompson, just like
his pre-industrial crowds, in modern times “the moral economy is summoned into being in
resistance to the economy of the ‘free market’” (p.340). And Thompson recognized that the “Great
British miners’ strike of 1984” was a “moral economy” since it was an act of resistance against
the “free market” (p.340). However, by recognizing that the “Great British miners’ strike of 1984”
as a “moral economy,” isn’t Thompson tacitly supporting Reinarman’s state-market relation or

societal approach to moral economy?
According to Ibrahim, Thompson saw the miner’s strike as a “moral economy since it was
political resistance against ‘free market’ reforms including pit closures, which threatened to take
away the miners’ entitlement to a livelihood, a tradition that they had had for generations” (Ibrahim
2014:7). However, besides striking to protect their “livelihoods,” clearly the miners’ “vision” of
society played a major role in the strike.
All sides saw the strike as more than just another industrial dispute. It was used to debate
the basic issue of how Britain should be run (Reicher and Hopkin 1996:357; See also
Towers [1985]).
The miners were fighting to defend their ‘socialist’ vision of Britain as opposed to the
neoliberal vision Thatcher and the British ruling class were trying to impose (Harvey 2005).
Besides jobs, the miners were fighting to defend a nationalized mining industry against
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privatization and ruin (Harvey 2005). The strike was just as much about Reinarman’s “statemarket relation” rather than merely about jobs. The strike was over what role the state would play
in the British economy (Harvey 2005). The miners wanted the state to continue to play a central
role in the market or economy, and Thatcher and the British ruling class wanted it to play a much
smaller role (Harvey 2005). The miners’ “vision” of society was just as much part of their moral
economy as stopping pit closures—as if the two could be separated. Clearly Thompson was aware
that the miners’ ‘vision of society’ was an important part of the strike—surely that is not
“uncontextual moralistic rhetoric” (1991:341). Anyone who studies the strike will see that
(Harvey 2005; Reicher and Hopkins 1996; Towers 1985). If for Thompson the British miners’
strike was a moral economy since it was resisting free-market reforms, doesn’t it automatically
follow that the miners’ vision of society was also part of their moral economy? Therefore, by
acknowledging the miners’ strike as a moral economy isn’t Thompson tacitly affirming
Reinarman’s societal approach?

Reinarman’s state-market relation: the negotiation of class conflict
Reinarman saw the state market relation as the central aspect to every society in a similar
way to the centrality of Marx’s understanding of “class conflict.” Marx eloquently captured the
centrality of class conflict in his famous line at the beginning of the Communist Manifesto: “The
history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles.” Reinarman described the
role the state-market relation plays in society in a similar, albeit less polemical, way:
Whether we look at the world before [Adam] Smith and Rousseau or after the 1980
presidential election, I want to suggest that politics was and is centrally concerned with
negotiating the nature of the state-market relation (Reinarman1987:7; see also Thompson
1991:344-345)
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Reinarman’s state-market relationship is tightly bound with Marx’s class conflict.
Reinarman’s societal conception of moral economy is an attempt to give moral agency to modernday workers, just as Thompson (1971) gave moral agency to the eighteenth-century English
crowds. Reinarman argues that the state-market relation is at the root of most social conflict
whether they be food riots as far back as the pre-industrial thirteenth century or the many conflicts
in industrial society (1987:7-8). Both Thompson and Reinarman saw moral economy as “the way
in which class relations are negotiated” (Thompson 1991:344-345). Reinarman, however, focused
on the broader societal aspects of that conflict and how they too are expressions of the workers’
moral economy.
Reinarman (1987) saw the welfare state as the culmination of bitter class contention in the
laissez-faire industrial societies over what the state-market relation should be). Eventually this
conflict led to the development of welfare states in Western Europe and then later, though not as

developed, in the United States (Reinarman 1987). According to Reinarman, the welfare state2 is
supported by a moral economy. This view is supported by numerous researchers as well (TaylorGooby et al. 2019; Sayer 2018; 2007; Sachweh 2012; Svallfors 2006; Booth 1994; Mau 2003).
And broadly speaking Reinarman’s approach applies to any social-political system.
Reinarman’s approach also has significant support in the literature, although Reinarman is
never named (Taylor-Gooby 2019; Gotz 2015). Many researchers have applied moral economy
to study welfare-state attitudes (Booth 1994; Mau 2003; Svallfors 2006; Sayer 2000; Sachweh
2012; Taylor-Gooby et al. 2019). And Reinarman’s approach has been applied to several countries:
the United States (Reinarman 1987), Germany, Norway (Taylor-Gooby et al.2019) and the United
Kingdom (Taylor-Gooby et al.2019)

Along with the term welfare state, the terms “welfare system” and “welfare regime” are also used throughout the
literature (Aspalter 2019).
2
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Like Reinarman, Martin Kohli “released” the concept of moral economy from preindustrial society and argued that industrial society, as opposed to having a moral economy based
on consumption, “has a new moral economy based on labor that has been institutionalised in the
welfare state” (Gotz 2015). Stefan Svallfors’ conception of moral economy is also very close to
Reinarman’s (Gotz 2015). Svallfors, like Reinarman, “reframed moral economy to signify the
public's opinion of the welfare state...as the result of an ongoing clash of norms... as the outcome
of a democratic class struggle and a consensus about welfare state regimes (Gotz 2015). Steffen
Mau has a similar outlook (Gotz 2015).

Chapter 2.3. The Relationship Between Free-Market Ideology and Moral Economy
Earlier I introduced the concept that moral economy is summoned in response to freemarket ideology itself, and not merely in response to actual free-market practices. Although this

concept is clearly tacitly supported throughout Thompson’s (1991, 1971), I am unaware if
Thompson ever stated this so explicitly. I believe this understanding of the relationship between
moral economy and free-market ideology is correct.
First, Thompson’s (1991) “‘free market’ forces,” that summon the moral economy into
being (p. 340), cannot be separated from free-market ideology: free-market forces and free-market
ideology are an inseparable duality. And just as Thompson (1991:340) said, “the moral economy
is summoned into being in resistance to the economy of the ‘free market’”
In the same way, the “‘free-market’” economy (p. 340) is also inseparable from the
ideology of the free-market economy. This is obvious. How else could we interpret “characteristic
pamphlet[s]” in Thompson’s study “indignantly” condemning the “supposed liberty of every
farmer to do as he likes with his own” as the “liberty of a savage” (p.198). The pamphlet harshly
condemns such a farmer and such supposed (free-market) liberty:
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It cannot then be said to be the liberty of a citizen, or of one who lives
under the protection of any community; it is rather the liberty of a
savage; therefore he who avails himself thereof, deserves not that
protection, the power of Society affords. (Thompson [1971]:198)
Clearly, Thompson’s workers rejected the ideology of the free-market. In fact, not only
did the workers in Thompson’s ([1971]:197-198) study adamantly reject free-market ideology,
they likely saw it more as an ideology than we do today, since we (Westerners) assume free-market
ideology as “inevitable and ‘natural’” (p. 197-198). However, Thompson’s workers bitterly
rejected this ideology and did not see it as natural, angrily dismissing supposed free-market liberty
as the pamphlet says the “liberty of a savage” (p. 198). To say the least, free-market ideology was
completely alien to Thompson’s workers,
Second, Thompson (1991) is always clear that moral economy is not based on hunger,
(although many in the crowd might have been hungry) (p.266, 262; see also Ibrahim 2014). And

he does not require an “actual deprivation,” but all that is needed is an “outrage to these moral
assumptions” (([1971]:188; see also Ibrahim 2014). Therefore, it is the “idea” of the free-market
practice (the ideology) that evokes moral outrage (See also Ibrahim 2014).
Furthermore, throughout Thompson’s (1991, 1971) work he is fairly clear that moral
economy is a rejection of laissez-faire free-market ideology: the moral economy against political
economy (1991:303), ultimately ending with the “long-drawn-out” “death of the old moral
economy” (Thompson [1971]:253) and the “triumph of the new ideology of political economy”
(p. 250; italics added)
In this next passage Thompson is fairly explicit that moral economy is rejection of freemarket ideology: describing both moral economy and free-market ideology as “two differing
discourses.”
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Nothing has made my critics angrier than the notion that a food rioter might have been
more ‘moral’ than a disciple of Dr Adam Smith. But that was not my meaning …I was
discriminating between two different sets of assumptions, two differing discourses, and the
evidence for the difference is abundant” (Thompson 1991:271).

Moral Economy is Unconscious until Summoned by Free-Market Ideology
This was an important concept for Thompson: namely the moral economy lies hidden,
dormant and unconscious until summoned into being by free-market ideology:
[M]any ‘economic’ relations are regulated according to nonmonetary norms. These exist
as a tissue of customs and usages until they are threatened by monetary rationalisations and
are made self-conscious as a ‘moral economy’. In this sense, the moral economy is
summoned into being in resistance to the economy of the ‘free market’ (Thompson
1991:340).
This unconscious aspect of moral economy can also clearly be seen in contemporary moral
economy studies based on in-depth interviews and life-histories and is clear in Reinarman’s
(1987:161) study. Note, that Reinarman uses the term “social charter” as synonymously with
moral economy (p.18).
What I have been calling the social charter is not a clearly definable or understood concept.
It is not a bounded body of beliefs that is easy to identify, nor even a part of the currency
in social science such as party identification. To the extent that my subjects could be said

to perceive a social charter, then, it was generally tacit in nature, a construct whose features
must be culled inferentially from the moving targets of values, beliefs, and behaviors.
Indeed, the purpose of the social charter construct is precisely to give some order to this
culling and inferring process. Clearly, even if asked, most people would not say, ‘My sense
of the social charter is…’ My hope, then, has been that by asking specific questions about
issues and policies that bear upon the state-market relation, and by giving my respondents
room for discursive detailed answers, I could elicit form them a more explicit sense of how
they see that relation (Reinarman 1987:161 see also p. 7)
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And although Reinarman does explicitly state that free-market ideology is the force that
awakens or summons moral economy it is clear through his entire study. First, like Thompson,
Reinarman’s study also takes place in the context of the rise in ascendency of free-market ideology
in the 1980’s during the Reagan Revolution. In fact, the very first line of the study is:
The logic of laissez-faire, or the ‘free market’ we are told with increasing frequency is the
answer (Reinarman 1987: vii).

And just like in Thompson’s study, there had been an older moral economy that rejected
free-market ideology: the so-called “new moral economy” based on the New Deal and the welfare
state. With the rise of free-market ideology, Reinarman wanted to explore whether workers had
forsaken the older moral economy based on the welfare state and a rejection of free-market
ideology. He wanted to see whether old “moral economy is being renegotiated” (p.14) and “what
those changes look lie at the level of lived experience” (p.15; italics in original).
Again, while Reinarman does not explicitly state that free-market ideology is what
summons moral economy, it is clear throughout the work it does—and in the context of interviews.
By “probing” (p.18) Reinarman is actually introducing free-market ideology to his subjects
through questions and by playing devil’s advocate. Through this process Reinarman elicits their
moral economy—and actual moral outrage. And although Reinarman often omits the original
interview question in his published study, it is clear that there was such a question—and often the

question is not omitted.
Reinarman: “Doesn’t democracy depend fundamentally on free enterprise?”
Karen Mullavey: “The two have nothing to do with each other necessarily; you can have
social democracy where individuals have rights and institutions are democratic” (p.118).
Reinarman: “But wouldn’t spending cuts and deregulation improve the economy and thus
provide jobs?”
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Kurt [Wilson] said that this was a ‘bullshit’ theory designed to conceal a policy that
redistributes national wealth both upward to big business and into ‘war industries,’ which
exist to protect the ‘interests of the corporate capitalist class’ abroad (p.124).
Reinarman: “I offered the argument that economic decisions are best left to the market:”
Marc Driscoll: “Oh, that’s crazy. That’s stupid. I’m idealistic but I am not an ostrich.
There are people out there that aren’t that nice! I think we need some basic protections;
that’s what government is for. Otherwise we’d have a Hobbesian society. That’s not
civilization” (p. 135-136).

In each of these examples Reinarman introduced free-market ideology evoking his
subject’s moral economy and synonymously moral outrage. This can be seen in other moral
economy studies based on interviews and ethnographies (for example Keskula 2015; Ibrahim
2014; Bagguley 1996). This was a very important feature in my study.
When I introduced free-market or neoliberal ideology in my study, I too evoked the moral
economy of the workers in my study often eliciting harsh moral outrage –even anger. Once
exchange with Oleg, a 62-year-old worker stands out:
Q: (94) “Why should an employer be forbidden from laying-off workers if that is more
profitable?”
Oleg: Why should they fire people if the company is profitable? If people work well, why
should they be fired?
Q: “For example it would be more profitable to cut those positions.”
Oleg: “ It is against the law! We have laws—labor laws. You just can’t fire someone.

There must be a reason!”
Angrily, Oleg questioned me:
“Do you agree with that? You think people who are working hard and doing their jobs
well should just be fired for no reason?”
Q: “I’m just posing the question.”
Oleg: I can’t believe that someone who is working hard doing his job well would be fired
for no reason.
Q: “The reason would be economical. It would be more profitable to get rid of him.”
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Oleg: “That is ridiculous! That is completely ridiculous! What you are saying is someone
can come to my store and fire me even though I am doing my job well, working hard,
coming to work every day. That is unfair. I am completely against that!”
In many ways, Oleg’s moral economy (and the other Belarussian workers in this study) is
closer to the moral economy of the workers in Thompson’s ([1971] 197-198) than the typical
Westerner reading my study. Like Thomson’s workers, Oleg completely rejects as alien basic
free-market (neoliberal) ideology that many Westerners assume as “inevitable and ‘natural’” (p.
197-198). And Oleg certainly was not alone. Not only did neoliberal ideology evoke moral
outrage among the other workers in this study, but often was met with utter dismay, bafflement
even shock. I am not exaggerating when I say that many key aspects of neoliberal ideology were
so utterly alien to these workers, it was as if this ideology were from another planet. In fact, the
moral economy of the workers and the neoliberal ideology of the capitalist (and some of the
middle-class) subjects at time seem to be from different planets. Their worldviews are completely
antagonistic with each other.

Workers’ Deeply-Held Moral Economy as opposed to their Superficial Ideology
Although I have never read this in the moral economy literature, it seemed that, in general,
when the workers did accept aspects of free-market ideology, they only embraced them rather
superficially unlike their moral economy, which is deeply held and summons moral outrage when
confronted. For example, although every single worker in this study thought that there should not
be any limits on one’s wealth or property, most of the study was spent discussing—in great
detail—exactly how one’s wealth and property should be limited (for example, the owner of a
profitable firm, should not be allowed to lower wages to maximize profits further). It seems that
on some level the workers accept some key aspects of free-market ideology superficially; however,
when I delved deeper, confronting them with the harsh realities of neoliberal ideology (maximizing
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profits etc.), I evoked their moral economy—and its attendant moral outrage. (In general, the same
thing happened with the question “Should private owners be free to run their business as they
choose?”) Ultimately, the distinction between workers’ superficial acceptance of some aspects of
free-market ideology as opposed to the workers’ deeply-held moral economy can be useful to
distinguish between mere ideology and moral economy. Mere ideology will not evoke moral
outrage; however, moral economy will not only evoke moral outrage, but will contradict the very
ideology the worker had previously supported.

Chapter: 2.4. Moral Economy and Neoliberal Ideology
As discussed earlier, free-market or neoliberal ideology evokes moral economy. Moral
economy is made self-conscious by free-market ideology and summoned in resistance to freemarket ideology. In moral economy studies based on interviews, the researcher directly evokes

subjects’ moral economy through questions (see for example Keskula 2015; Reinarman 1987).
This aspect obviously played a major role in my study. However, unlike Reinarman and Keskula,
I had the advantage to be able to conduct life-histories and interviews with middle-class subjects
and even subjects who were capitalists—real Bonafede capitalists. (And some of the middle-class
subjects also strongly embraced neoliberalism.) And while it is difficult to make generalizations
based on such a small number, the contrast their ideology provided not only added complexity to

this study, but allowed me to clarify the workers’ moral economy more fully. By comparing the
capitalists’ neoliberal ideology—rather harsh neoliberal ideology—to the workers’ moral
economy I got a much fuller picture of the workers’ moral economy and the bitter class conflict
which provides the context for their moral economy as ultimately “moral economy” is “concerned
with the way class relations are negotiated” (Thompson 1991:344; see also Reinarman 1987:7). I
have roughly organized the neoliberal ideology that emerged in this study into the following
52

categories The Invisible Hand of the Market, Capitalist Social Relations of Production,
Privatization, Shock Therapy, The Self-Regulating Market, and Social-Darwinism.

These

neoliberal ideologies (or categories of ideologies) will stand in stark contrast to the workers’ moral
economy.

Chapter 2.5. A Traditional Marxist Analysis of Neoliberal Ideology
To analyze the neoliberal ideology that emerged in this study I will be using a traditional
Marxist approach (Das 2017a, 2017b).
[F]or Marxists, neoliberalism features nothing new, only intensifications of capital’s
ravenous, ravaging and ideologically deceptive ways” (Brown 2016:3).
Like other more traditional Marxists, I will ground my analysis of neoliberal ideology, and
neoliberalism in general, in Marx’s mode of production that “situates neoliberalism as one phase
in capitalism’s long history” (O’Conner 2010:692) and understand neoliberal capitalism as "the
neoliberal capitalist mode of production (Maisuria 2018: 436) with important differences from the
previous Keynesian or Fordist capitalist mode of production, however, not fundamentally different
(Sculos 2019; Maisuria 2018; Das 2017; Brown 2016; Baily 2015; O’Conner 2010 Harman 2007).
In fact, some Marxists believe we should not even use the term neoliberalism, but focus on
capitalism (see also Sculos 2019; Das 2017a, 2017b). Although I generally agree with them, the
term is widespread in the Belarus literature and ultimately, the workers in my study generally did
not oppose capitalism but opposed by neoliberal capitalism.

I will approach the Belarussian capitalists with the analogy of the original capitalist class
that emerged from feudalism in mind (Marx and Engels 1947). Although far from perfect, this
seems to be the best analogy. As the original capitalist class developed the capitalist mode of
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production, capitalist social relations of production became dominant. Capitalist property relations
replaced feudal property relations and the capitalist class became dominant politically. This seems
fairly analogous to the Belarussian situation, in which the Belarussian capitalist class is striving to
become dominant economically as well as politically (Wilson 2020).

In this study, I will especially focus on the capitalist social relations of production as this
was the foundation of the neoliberal ideology that emerged in my study. In general, two main
kinds of neoliberal ideologies arose from the capitalist social relations of production: first, the
ideology representing the actual capitalist social relations of production (Das 2017a) and, second,
utopian ideologies that served to rationalize the actually capitalist social relations of production.

Capitalist social relations of production exist as a duality of the actual social relations and
the corresponding ideology or “property relations” that “arise” from the actual social relations of
production. Marx explains:

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations,
which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given
stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these
relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation,
on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms
of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general
process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that
determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.
At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into
conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing
in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have
operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn
into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic
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foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure
(Marx 1859)
In this study, in general, the ideology of the capitalists was a generalization of actual
capitalist social relations of production. Martin (2015) explains Marx’s concept nicely:
Thus ideology is a generalization of social relations; it is the ideal form of the actual
relations, seen from the perspective of one position in this set of relations, but
universalized, idealized and abstracted. Marx and Engels, thinking at the largest scale,
were of course concerned specifically with the general relations of production in a social
world—those that, seen sociologically, appear as class relations, and that, seen juridically,
appear as property relations. (Martin 2015:18).
Therefore, capitalist social relations of production, exist as the “economic structure of
society, the real foundation” but also expresses itself ideologically “in legal terms” as a “property
relations” (Marx 1859). In fact, for Marx, beyond mere ideology, the capitalist himself, represents

the “personification of capital” the “personification…of the relation between capital and labour”
(Das 2017:341). This will be very clear as we explore the very words (or ideology) of the
capitalists, themselves, in this study.
Capitalist social relations of production is the basic relationship between the owner and
the worker under capitalism. The worker sells his labor-power, in a free-labor (competitive)
market, to the owner, in return for or a wage. The owner, then, by virtue of owning the means of

production, then appropriates the surplus value that the worker creates, the value created by the
worker above his wages and other necessary expenses. (Though the capitalist must realize the
surplus value in the market. Most people call the surplus value the profit.) Neoliberal capitalist
social relations of production often include abandoning full employment policies (Harvey
2005:92), creating unemployment to “undermine the power of labor” to drive down wages and
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“permit capitalists to make easy profits” (p.59, 76), the creation of flexible and compliant labor
markets (53, 92, 161,167,)
This ideology, in support of capitalist social relations of production was one of the most
important neoliberal ideologies that emerged in this study. All of the capitalists, without exception,
adamantly embraced it, as well as some of the middle-class subjects.
I want to clarify that, in general, the workers in this study did not completely reject the
market and most generally accepted the basic format of capitalist social relations of production.
They were not Marxists, and generally accepted wage-labor and the owner’s “right” to appropriate
surplus value. In this way, they were like Thompson’s (1991:303) workers, who also did not reject
the market. However, just like Thompson’s workers strongly believed in a “fair price” ([1971]
1991:253), the workers in this study also strongly believed in a “fair wage,” and like Thompson’s
workers, they adamantly opposed “profiteering:” maximizing profits, at an already profitable firm,
by lower wages or eliminating jobs. Nearly universally, the workers’ rejected this. Of course, this
means the workers’ moral economy rejects the basic foundation of both laissez-faire free-market
ideology and neoliberal ideology.
Privatization and Shock Therapy, are two other important categories of neoliberal ideology
in this study, however, both are really extensions of Capitalist Social Relations of Production.
Privatization, or the ideology in support for privatization, is the extension of capitalist “property
relations,” into realms of society dominated by non-capitalist property relations (Harvey 2005:11,
65, 159). In general, this is a tendency of all capitalist classes (Marx 1847, 17, 20) and aspiring
capitalist classes (Harvey 2005). Furthermore, privatization is not merely the extension of
capitalist social relations of production, but under neoliberal capitalism, privatization also serves
as an intensification of capitalist social relations of production including: abandoning full
employment policies (Harvey 2005:92), creating unemployment to “undermine the power of labor”
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to drive down wages and “permit capitalists to make easy profits” (p. 59, 76), and the creation of
flexible and compliant labor markets (p. 53, 92, 161, 167). The capitalists in this study were very
candid about this.
It is not surprising that the capitalists in this study adamantly supported privatization, and
more than likely Belarussian capitalists in general, support privatization of the Belarus state-owned
industrial sector.

And since shock therapy is merely a rapid, more aggressive version of

privatization (King 2003), it is therefore, like privatization in general, merely an extension of
capitalist “property relations”
Privatization was the second most contentious issue in this study. Again, all of the
capitalists adamantly supported privatization as well as some of the middle-class subjects. A few
even supported shock therapy— one openly and explicitly advocated it! In complete contrast, the
overwhelming majority of workers adamantly opposed privatization—even some of those who are
against President Lukashenka—as well as those who voted for the opposition candidate Svetlana
Tikhanovskaya (one even attended several opposition protests)
I recently said that most of the workers in the study are not against the market or private
enterprise. Most did accept private enterprise at least reluctantly—however, they still defended
Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector and wanted it to stay under state control. Unlike the
capitalists, these workers thought Belarussian society would be far better served keeping these
industries under state control. Some even explicitly argued that these factories belong to the
Belarussian people. Some of the workers not only defended the state-owned industrial sector, but
were against private enterprise in general, since the private owner would be motivated by greed
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and would violate workers’ rights with impunity.3 All of the workers agreed with this, even those
who supported a mixed economy.
As with wages, there is no way to reconcile the neoliberal ideology in support for
privatization and the workers moral economy that adamantly opposes privatization. The workers’
moral economy is based on a fundamentally different worldview than neoliberal ideology.

Neoliberal Utopian Ideology
I have been discussing the neoliberal ideology that directly represents actual neoliberal
capitalist social relations of production. Other important utopian ideologies emerged in this study,
however, that indirectly support or serve to rationalize neoliberal capitalist social relations of
production. I will be relying heavily on David Harvey’s (2005) useful analysis of these utopian

ideologies, which he refers to as utopian rhetoric (p.19)
Harvey argues that utopian neoliberal ideology serves to mask the “successful [neoliberal]
project for the restoration of ruling-class power,” (p.203) “primarily work[ing] as a system of
justification and legitimation for whatever needed to be done to achieve this goal” (p.19).
The Invisible Hand of the Market and The Self-Regulating Market are both important
examples of neoliberal utopian ideology that emerged in this study. In general, neoliberal utopian
ideology draws specifically on the “free market principles of neoclassical economics that had
emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century” (Harvey 2005:20) and, on the “utopian

3

A common example, in the study was only paying workers minimum wage on the books and paying the rest of the
salary off the books (or as they would say in an envelope) to avoid pension contributions etc. I know the practice is
widespread in Belarus. In fact, the capitalist subject, Stas, a shampoo factory owner, actually did this practice at his
factory for many years. Furthermore, as I also learned from some of the workers, sick leave and workman’s
compensation would only be based on one’s official salary.
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vision” of economic liberalism of “individual freedom and liberty for all guaranteed by an
economy based on private property rights, self-regulating free markets and free trade…” (Harvey
2019).
An important part of neoliberal utopian ideology is Adam Smith’s invisible hand described
as “the hidden hand of the market [that] was the best device” for providing the greatest social and
economic good “for the benefit of all” including the working class and poor (Harvey 2005:20).

According to Harvey neoliberalism’s utopian ideology can be summarized as follows:
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes
that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private
property rights, free markets, and free trade (Harvey 2005:2).
…
Continuous increases in productivity should then deliver higher living standards to
everyone. Under the assumption that ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’, or of ‘trickle down’,
neoliberal theory holds that the elimination of poverty (both domestically and worldwide)
can best be secured through free markets and free trade (Harvey 2005:64-65)
All of the capitalists, as well as some of the middle-class subjects adamantly embraced the
invisible hand ideology and used it, among other things, to justify privatization. Even a few of the
workers embraced it and supported gradual privatization, however, their faith in the invisible hand
was much more limited.
Closely related to the invisible hand, the self-regulating market was another utopian
neoliberal ideology that emerged among these subjects. In fact, among some middle-class and
capitalist subjects, their faith in the self-regulating market or market fundamentalism, was so
strong that they opposed any state intervention into the market, including anti-monopoly/restraintof-trade laws. They did not believe that monopolies or trade restraints were even possible since
the market’s self-regulating feature would always find a healthy equilibrium that would benefit
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both buyers and sellers alike. However, like the workers in Thompson’s study, all of the workers
utterly dismissed the notion of a self-regulating market as delusional.
Social Darwinism is a harsh dehumanizing neoliberal rationalization (Harvey 2005:157;
see also Giroux 2011; Leyva 2009; Ruff 2005) and was fairly widespread in this study.
If conditions among the lower classes deteriorated, this was because they failed, usually
for personal and cultural reasons, to enhance their own human capital (through dedication

to education, the acquisition of a Protestant work ethic, submission to work discipline and
flexibility, and the like). Particular problems arose, in short, because of lack of competitive
strength or because of personal, cultural, and political failings. In a Darwinian neoliberal
world, the argument went, only the fittest should and do survive (Harvey 2005:157; see
also Giroux 2011; Leyva 2009; Ruff 2005).

Chapter 2.6. Non-Economic Hegemonic Ideology
In this study, I will show how other non-economic ideologies serve to bolster capitalist
dominance. Unlike free-market ideology, these non-economic ideologies in themselves are not
directly related to capitalist social relations of production, however, they indirectly reinforce
capitalist relations of production. These non-economic ideologies are different from the neoliberal
utopian ideologies I have discussed, as the utopian ideologies are economic rationalizations (The
Invisible Hand, The Self-Regulating Market). The non-economic hegemonic ideologies focus
mainly on culture and politics.

An important example of this kind of hegemonic ideology in this study and in the Belarus
literature, is the powerful tendency for the middle class to be oriented toward the Belarussian
capitalists class’ “values, ideology, and lifestyle, haughtily condescending to provincials and
striving to consolidate their privileged positions” (Furman 1999:2). Furman (1999:2) referred to
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Minsk, with its hegemonic ideological gravitational pull as a “special environment” or “‘local
subculture.’” For Furman, not only would the middle class be oriented toward the capitalist class
ideologically, but would be mobilized politically in defense of the capitalist’ class interests. This
position is widely accepted in the literature (for example, Moses and Nizhnikau 2020; Glod 2020;
Ioffe 2014) and the 2020 movement was no exception (Moses and Nizhnikau 2020; Glod 2020).
And I will show in this study that, whatever role workers played in 2020, there is no doubt that the
protests were overwhelmingly middle class

Another important and related ideology that appears throughout this study is the harsh
denigration of President Lukashenka as an illiterate peasant, in Russian kolkhoznik, which literally
means collective farm worker (Ioffe 2014, 138), due to his peasant background, mannerisms and
speech (Ioffe 2014:166, 2004:104-108). Denigrating President Lukashenka based on his peasant
accent is an example of a linguistic ideology, which serves to bolster the natural superiority and
dominance of the capitalist class (Woolard 2020).

Along with linguistic ideology, all of these ideological features are well-established in the
general sociological literature. Bourdieu (1989) would refer to Furman’s (1999:2) “special
environment” or “‘local subculture’” as a “social space.” Bourdieu (1989) saw the embodiment
and internalization of class as one’s habitus (speech, mannerisms, habits sensibilities, etc.). In
Belarus, President Lukashenka’s rural accent and mannerisms are not only despised and denigrated
by the elite, but are despised and denigrated by everyone aspiring to share the elites’ highly-valued
social, cultural, and symbolic capital, even aligning themselves politically with the elite against
President Lukashenka—even though that would be against their own economic interests (See
Furman 1999). (This appeared throughout my original study and is rampant in Belarussian
society.) Bourdieu (1990, 2000) calls this phenomenon misrecognition. Although the Belarussian
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capitalist elite possess real capital the bulk of the middle class and aspiring young people are
content with merely sharing the elites’ symbolic capital against their own economic interests:

Symbolic capital is thus denied capital, recognized as legitimate, that is, misrecognized as
capital (Bourdieu 1990:118).
Bourdieu’s concept of misrecognition, however, is subtle and not well understood (James
2015). According to James (2015:101), misrecognition does not rely on “‘duping people’ [or]
flooding them with propaganda, or even persuading them,” but “usually involves at least some
sense of largely below-conscious complicity on the part of those subjugated.” In this study, and
in general, this aspect of misrecognition involving complicity was obvious as subjects strove to
garner cultural capital and a sense of superiority.
In general, these non-economic hegemonic ideologies are prevalent among the middleclass and had little traction among the working-class—even among workers who were against
President Lukashenka and even among those who supported Svetlana Tikhanovskaya.

“Democratic-Revolution-against-the-Dictator” Narrative as a Non-Economic Hegemonic
Ideology

One of the main goals of this study is to show that framing opposition to President
Lukashenka as a dictator is the most powerful non-economic ideologies that serves to bolster
capitalist domination. This ideology was the dominant and unifying narrative of the 2020 protest
movement. All economic and non-economic ideologies were united behind this one. This
ideology also has the advantage over the other non-economic hegemonic ideologies discussed
above in that it does have traction among (some) members of the working class. This was already
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clear in my moral economy study as well as my examination of the of the 2020 worker protests
and strikes.
In general, this “democratic” ideology masks the class nature of the 2020 uprising, though
for many protestors the class character and class interests of the uprising is obvious: for them,
opposition to President Lukashenka is inseparable from dismantling the “Soviet” socio-economic
model. For the workers who joined the struggle, however, this “democratic” ideology is truly a
non-economic hegemonic ideology, as these workers, in general, still support Belarus’ socioeconomic model, especially its state-owned industrial sector. This was clear from my original
moral economy study, as well as my examination of the worker protest and strikes, including
strikers’ published interviews and the strikers’ demands. This “democratic” ideology seems to
have “overpowered” their class interests and even overpowered their own moral economy. These
workers, embracing the ideology of democracy, misrecognize their class interests (Bourdieu 1990).
It is safe to assume that workers’ living standards would significantly decrease—if not
drastically—if President Lukashenka is overthrown. This is obvious; even Yury Drakakhrust, a
key opposition leader, admits it (Ioffe 2014:189-190). Workers, however, have embraced political
ideology that is against their class interests in similar situations, for example, Poland in the 1980’s
(Rek-Wozniak et al. 2017). And in general, researchers have been trying to answer the question
why workers embrace political ideology that is against their class interests (for example see
Hochschild 2016; Reinarman 1987: Lane 1962).
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Chapter 3. Background, Literature Review and Framing the Research Questions
Chapter 3.1. Historic Background
In this section I will discuss the history of Belarus providing a general background. I will
also focus very heavily on the literature that relates to this study. I will then also discuss the limited
literature that specifically addresses key aspects of Belarus’ moral economy. This literature can
be divided into two unequal parts. Briefly, the first part, which represents the bulk of the literature
holds that Belarus’ moral economy is “socialist,” (Potocki 2011:1; Manaev et al 2011:94;
Ambrosio 2006:12; Shushkevich 2002; Eke and Kuzio 2000) “collective,” preferring state
ownership to private enterprise (Yarashevich 2014:16; Leshchenko 2008) and can be described as
a “Soviet mentality” (Yarashevich 2014; Eke and Kuzio 2000:4). The other literature, however,
holds that Belarussians forsook the state-owned industrial sector in favor of a market economy
(Kulakevich 2014:893; Potocki 2011:7) and are becoming “less Soviet” (Manaev 2014:217-218;
Potocki 2011:7 Manaev, Manayeva, and Yuran 2011; White, McAllister and Feklyunia 2010).
This second literature, along with the literature that argues or implies Belarus is changing, taken
with my own observations of changes in Belarus as well as the insistence of opposition activists
that Belarus has changed led to my research questions:
1)

What is the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians?

2)

Has the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians changed?

Historic Background
The word Belarus literally means “White Rus” or “White Russia” and has been transcribed
as Byelorussia and Belorussia in the past as well (Ioffe 2003b:1244; Vakar 1956:1). The term first
appeared in chronicles toward the end of the fourteenth century (Ioffe 2003b:1244). It is not clear
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where the term comes from (Ioffe 2003b:1244; Vakar 1956:1) and there are several theories that
attempt to explain the term1. For a deeper understanding of Belarus, I would recommend Vakar
(1956) for a comprehensive study of Belarussian history, as well as Ioffe’s (2003a) study of the
Belarussian language and Ioffe’s (2003b) study of the Belarussian identity.
The land roughly associated with modern Belarus was inhabited by East Slavic tribes in
ancient times (Vakar 1956:37-38). East Slavs also lived in what today is the Ukraine and the

European part of Russia (Vakar 1956:40). Over time the East Slavic language developed into what
linguists call Old Russian, although in ancient times the language was usually referred to as
Russian (Ioffe 2003a, 2003b; Vakar 1956). The eastern version of that language, spoken in what
is today European Russia, evolved into what today is known as Modern Russian, while the western
version of Old Russian, spoken in what is today known as Belarus, evolved into Belarussian, and
the southern version of that language, spoken in what today is known as the Ukraine, evolved into

Ukrainian (Ioffe 2003a, 2003b; Vakar 1956)
Eastern Slavs were known as Rus, for example Kievian Rus, Mosckovite Rus, and Polotian
Rus (Vakar 1956:40). Western Russia, before it was known as “White Russia” was known as
“Polotian Russia” named from Polotsk, which by the Middle Ages was “the strongest and most
advanced principality” in the region (Vakar 1956:40). And today, Polotsk is the oldest city in
modern Belarus, and was “mentioned in the Scandinavian Sagas” and by a Kievian Rus chronicler
in the eleventh century (Vakar 1956:39) and dates back at least to the ninth century (1956:40).

1

Such as the white clothing worn by people in the region, or due to their white skin or from the white snow that
covered the land from October to April (Vakar 1956:1). One of the two most accepted explanations is that White
Rus were the lands not required to pay tribute to the Tartars, as opposed to Black Rus, which was required to pay the
tribute (Ioffe 2003b:1244; See also Vakar 1956:2-3). The other explanations are that ‘White Rus’ means ‘West Rus’
as opposed to “Malaya Rus” (Little Rus [located in today’s Ukraine] “the ancestral Russian land” and “Velikaya Rus”
(Great Rus) the expanded Russian lands which expanded from their ancestral Little Rus (Ioffe 2003b:1244-45).
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Polotsk, as well as Vitebsk and other cities, were eventually overtaken by “illiterate and
uncouth” Lithuanian conquerors (Vakar 1956:43). Polotsk, however, regained its independence
for a while but was then conquered by “German hands” (1956:43). However, when the Germans
tried “to impose the Roman Catholic faith on the Orthodox population” Polotsk “turned to the
pagan Lithuanians for assistance” and the Lithuanians conquered Polotsk from the Germans”
(1956:43). And although what happened immediately after that is not clear2, all of Polotsk “was
completely annexed to the “Lithuanian-Russian State” by the end of the fourteenth century (Vakar
1956:43). This Lithuanian-Russian State is usually known as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania [GDL]
1253-1569 (Marples 2005:899; Ioffe 2003b:1246; Vakar 1956:44).
The Grand Duchy of Lithuania at its height from 1350-1430 “stretched from the Baltic Sea
to the Black Sea, and the easternmost Lithuanian posts were situated only sixty-five miles from
Moscow (Vakar 1956:43). And included cities that are today important Belarussian cities such as

Minsk, Mogilev, Vitebsk, and Grodno as well as Kiev, Vilna, Smolensk and Tula (Vakar 1956:43).
The Grand Duchy of Lithuania, although it did not refer to itself or its language as
Belarussian, is seen by Belarussian nationalists as the forerunner of the modern Belarussian state
(Ioffe2003b:1264). Belarussian nationalists see themselves as “descendants of the Grand Duchy
of Lithuania and that Russian colonialism prevents them from rediscovering their true self” (Ioffe
2003a:1011). In fact, staunch Belarussian nationalists would even reject the very notion of

It is claimed by Belarussian historians that “the western Russian principalities united with Lithuania of their own
free will… to protect themselves ‘from their restless and greedy eastern neighbors’” (Vakar 1956:43). According to
Vakar, it is unclear whether this is indeed true and it certainly is not the “whole truth,” however, he thinks that West
Russian emigrants and refugees, “who were better educated and more experienced in military matters, [may have]
actually aided in the unification and construction of the Lithuanian power” (1956:43). [However, on several occasions
Vakar says that the “Lithuanian princes were excellent military leaders as well as shrewd politicians (1956:44, 43)]
Be that as it may, Vakar argues that the rapid growth of the Lithuanian State seems unlikely without this assistance
due to “primitive culture of the Lithuanians and their lack of numbers as “Lithuanians constituted only ‘one-fifth of
the whole population of the state’” (1956:43-45).
2
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“Belarus” as a “colonial fabrication of Moscow,” as they “are separate people, ancient, different
from Russians, [and] are successors of the great Duchy of Lithuania” (Ioffe2003b:1245).
The Grand Duchy of Lithuania serves as a foundational myth and “Golden Age” for
Belarussian nationalists (Ioffe 2003b:1264; see also Marples 2005; Ioffe 2003a: Ioffe
2003b:1264). The Grand Duchy’s western version of Russian is considered the forerunner to
modern Belarussian, even retrospectively referred to as “Old Belarusian” (Ioffe 2003:1264)

although residents of the Grand Duchy simply referred to their language as ‘Russian’ (Vakar
1956:52).
In Moscow, [the language of the Grandy Duchy was called] Lithuanian, in order to
distinguish it from their own form of Russian. In the Ukraine, its written form was known
as Russian, and the vernacular as Lithuanian. The Poles referred to both by either name.
The term Lithuanian, of course, referred to the geographical location of the idiom, which,
in fact, was Russian3 (Vakar 1956:52).
The original Lithuanian conquerors “constituted only ‘one-fifth of the whole population of
the state’” (1956:43-45). “Eventually, [West] Russian lands constituted nine-tenths the territory of
the Grand Duchy. In order to manage this vast Slavic world, the Lithuanians themselves adopted
‘[West] Russian culture and the [West] Russian Language” (Vakar 1956:44).
The importance of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania has also affected the neoliberal
opposition, for example it has adopted the nationalists’ two main symbols: the white and red coatof-arms of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Pahonia or pursuit) depicting a knight on a horse as well

3

It might be more useful for people to understand the language of the GDL as West Russian (Ioffe 2003a). This was
the version of Russian developing in the west as opposed to the version developing in the east. (Ioffe 2003a). The
eastern version developed into what is called Russian today (Ioffe 2003a). The western version led to Belarussian and
the south-western version led to Ukrainian (Ioffe 2003a). All three modern languages, Russian, Ukrainian and
Belarussian developed from Old Russian, which developed from East Slavic (Ioffe 2003a).
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as the white-red-white flag4 of the Belarussian National Republic of 1918 created under German
occupation (Ioffe 2003b:160). Both symbols were widespread during the protests after the August
9, 2020 election.
Often, Belarus’ neoliberal opposition shares the nationalists’ anti-Russia pro-Western
outlook5 as well (Ioffe 2003a; Ioffe 2003b; Ioffe 2004), however, there are pro-Russian opposition
leaders such as Victor Babaryka, former director Belgazprom Bank and presidential candidate

currently in jail having been convicted of bribery and corruption charges.
The Grand Duchy of Lithuania moved its capital from Novogrudek to Vilna in 1323.
(Vakar 1956:44). The capital was multi-ethnic including Russians, Lithuanians, Germans, Jews
and Tartars and this reflected the multi-ethnic character of the larger state (Vakar 1956:44).
Belarussian historians “insist that ‘our ancestors, the most advanced element in the city, occupied
a prominent place in the political and economic life of the country.’ They even believe that ‘the
ruling class of the state was not native Lithuania, but rather was descended from those Russian
princes who, [earlier] fled to Lithuania to avoid the confusion which prevailed in Polotian Russia
at that time’ (Ihnatouski [1927]” (Vakar 1956:44). According to Vakar, however, there is no doubt
that “Russian was the official language of the Lithuanian state, that Russians had political equality
with Lithuanians and that Grand Duke Olgerd called himself Rex Litvinorum Ruthenorumque”
(1956:44).

4

This flag and coat-of-arms was also used by the Nazi collaborationist government during World War two
(2003b:160) and both become official symbols in 1992 until being replaced after the 1995 referendum in which
“83.3% of voters rejected the white-red-white banner and the Grand Duchy-based national seal and opted for the return
of the Soviet symbols of Belarus (Ioffe2003b1262).
5

During the August 9, 2020 election protest movement, the opposition and Western media tried to frame the protests
as neither anti-Russia nor pro-Western. However, looking at the aid and support the opposition has received from the
West calls that into question. For example, former-presidential candidate and opposition leader Svetlana Tikhonova
is protected by Lithuanian state security forces and financially supported by the Lithuania state.
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It seemed that Russia was at the time growing west, not east of the Muscovite border.
‘Russian letters and arts were blooming in Vilna, and peace and freedom reigned there’ –
while Kiev lay in ruins, Novgorod was torn by internal dissensions and Moscow still
struggled under the Tatar yoke. The state was Lithuania ‘in name only. (Vakar 1956:44).
The “Golden Age” of West Russian language and culture (Ioffe 2003b:264) did not last.
By 1385 the Eastern Orthodox Grand Duchy of Lithuania was beginning to form closer ties with
Catholic Poland (Vakar 1956:57; Marples 2005:899) and was “becoming more Polish in their

manners and speech (Vakar 1956:57). In 1569 the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was formally merged
into a union with Poland to counter threats from Russia [Muscovite Rus] (Marples 2005:899) in
the “Union of Lublin.” (Vakar 1956:56). The union was also known as the “Polish Lithuanian
Union or Rzecz Pospolita” (Vakar 1956:67) or the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth. However,
even more important was the “Brest Union” of 1596, in which the Orthodox Church of the Grand
Duchy would break away from the Eastern Orthodox Church and “accept the dogmatic innovations

of the Roman Church and pledge allegiance to the supreme authority of the Pope (Vakar 1956:56).
Those “Orthodox who accepted the Union” would be known as “‘Uniates.’ Those who rejected it
were to be considered ‘schismatics,’ their churches closed and services prohibited cities and towns,
though still tolerated in rural communities (Vakar 1956:56). At this time Catholic churches opened
throughout the Grand Duchy and Catholic missionaries aggressively spread the Catholic faith
(Vakar 1956:57). And since the missionaries were Polish, “Polish language and manners”

infiltrated the Grand Duchy along with “the spreading of the Roman [Catholic] faith” (Vakar
1956:57). Catholic homes switched from the Russian language to Polish (1956:57-58). The
“conversion to Catholicism became an initiation into a higher form of civilization and a mark of
distinction” (Vakar 1956:57). The West Russian dialect of the Grand Duchy was becoming seen
as a vulgar rural peasant dialect as urban dwellers and elites abandoned the language for Polish
(Vakar 1956:64).
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By the end of the sixteenth century little indeed distinguished the Lithuanian Russian
gentry from their Polish counterparts. Fighting against political absorption of the state,
they became the most effective agents of its Polonization…the upper classes abandoned
their native church and disassociated themselves from the people; they moved even closer
to Poland in religion and culture, and began to forget their national character (Lappo)
(Vakar 1956:58).
The West Russian language continued to give “way to Polish and was officially banned
from courts and offices in 1697 by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Ioffe 2003b:1255). By
1795 the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth was conquered and divided by Austria, Prussia, and
Russia, and ceased to exist as a political entity; the “whole territory of the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania and a sizeable part of Poland” were under Russian control (Vakar 1956:65-66). Much
of modern-day Belarus’ was included in the what the Russian authorities called the “‘Belorussian
Government General,’” however, the term “Belorussian was only used in a geographical or
historical sense” (Vakar 1956:66). No one was considered ethnically Belarussian: Catholics and
Uniates were considered Polish and the Orthodox were considered Russian (Vakar 1956:66).
Interestingly, Belarussians have continued to describe themselves this was way: “Catholics tended
to identify with the Poles, whereas Orthodox identified with the Russians, effectively leaving no
room for Belarussians” (Ioffe 2003b:1248).
Things remained largely the same under Russian occupation until the Polish uprising of

1831 (Vakar 1956:65-70) after the uprising the Russian authorities banned Polish from local courts
and administration just as the Polish authorities had banned Russian in 1697 (Vakar 1956:69). The
terms “Belorussia and Lithuania were discarded and replaced by Severo-Zapadnyi kraj”
(Northwestern Province) (Vakar 1956:69) and although the Belorussian masses played no role in
the Polish uprising, they suffered the most including the abolition of the Uniate Church (Vakar
1956:69). “The [Russian] imperial government was not taking any chances…anyone who was not
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Orthodox in faith and Russian in speech was an actual or potential enemy of the empire (Vakar
1956:69). However, things soon began to normalize for the Polish and for Catholics, that is until
the Polish Insurrection of 1863 (1956:69).
The abolition of serfdom in the Russian empire (1861) shook the ground under the feet of
the local [Polish] gentry and loosened their hold on the country. Once more the Poles rose
against the empire. The revolt surprised the Russians and made even the liberals angry
with the Poles (Vakar 1956:70)
Once again, the peasants were not active in the uprising and did not support the Polish
rebels; this fact did “not pass unnoticed” by the Russian authorities (Vakar 1956:73). The Russian
authorities paid closer attention to the Belarussian peasants and discovered that although many of
them were “Catholic or Uniate,” they “were not ethnically Polish. They were in fact ‘Russian’
and that was the reason they did not follow the Poles in the insurrection” (Vakar 1956:73). In fact,
Russian linguists reexamined the local vernaculars and determined that they were “‘dialects of
Russian’ not of Polish” as they had thought a hundred years ago (Vakar 1956:73). Great scholarly
interest was taken in the region including its folklore and customs and again it was discovered that
it was in fact closer to Russian and Ukrainian than to Polish (Vakar 1956:73).
Measures were taken to arouse the natives to the fact that they were truly ‘younger brothers
of the Russians.’ After three centuries of Polonization, the populations now had become
subject to Russification (Vakar 1956:73).

The Russian imperial response to insurrection was harsh: “Poles were completely
eliminated from administration in the Northwestern Provinces” and were seen as alien to the native
population; Polish was banned from schools and only allowed at home; Catholic monasteries were
closed and clergy; peasants were freed from obligations to Polish landlords and land reforms
instituted (Vakar 1956:73-74). Just as the gentry and intelligentsia of the Grand Duchy had
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forsaken Russian in favor of Polish, now they rapidly forsook Polish in favor of Russian; they were
also forsaking Catholicism for Orthodox (Vakar 1956:74).
Not only was Russian the language of administration, education and law; like Polish in the
earlier age, it had had become a mark of cultural and social distinctions (Vakar 1956:74).
However, the “Russian-educated class” did not try to uplift the “mass of people over to a
higher culture.” In fact, the country had the “highest illiteracy rate in the European part of the

empire.” The peasants were left to their “local customs and beliefs” and “were losing their national
memory” (Vakar 1956:74).
During the 1800’s Belarus saw a growth in Belarussian—mainly by intellectuals in Vilna
(Vakar 1956:79-92). However, the first Belarussian grammar textbook was not written until 1918
(Ioffe 2003a:1014). Belarus remained part of the Russian empire until World War I when it was
annexed by Austro-German forces. It was during this time, under Austro-German occupation and

with their assistance, that the Belarussian People’s Republic [BPR] was created in 1918 (Vakar
1956:103-106). Though short-lived, March 25-December 1918, the BPR is very important for
modern Belarussian nationalists and is seen as the first independent modern Belarussian state (Ioffe
2003b; Vakar 1956:105-106) and as discussed earlier in this section, its red and white coat-of-arms
of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its white-red-white flag are very important nationalist
symbols which have been adopted by the neoliberal opposition as well.
With the defeat of the Austro-German forces the BPR fled Minsk in December 1918 and
Minsk was occupied by the Red army of Soviet Russia—created only one year earlier in October
1917 during the Bolshevik October Revolution (Vakar 1956:96-107). However, as the Red Army
advanced westward it was stopped at Grodna by the Polish army as Poland wanted to regain
Belarus as its southeastern province:
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Warsaw …declared that Belorussia…belongs to Poland and is an inalienable part of the
Polish state (Vakar 1956:109-110).
Poland was trying to expand eastward while Soviet Russia was trying to expand westward:
both Soviet Russia and Poland had a bitter war, each side at one time had driven far into the other’s
lands; the war was finally ended with the 1921 Treaty of Riga—without any Belarussian
participation—in which Belarus was divided in half between Poland and Soviet Russia (Vakar
1956:116-117).
The western part was annexed to Poland and the Belarussians there were treated harshly as
colonial subjects; efforts were made to Polonize the populations, and Belarussian nationalism
brutally suppressed (Vakar 1956:122-136). The eastern part of Belarus was organized into the
Belarussian Soviet Socialist Republic and in 1922 became one of the fifteen republics of the newly
formed Union of Soviet Socialist Soviet (Vakar 1956). The Soviet authorities, at first, actively
encouraged “Belorussification” (the development of Belarussian language, culture and
nationalism); this program served a few key purposes: attract support to the Soviet system from
those who were not attracted to communism; to integrate Belarussian nationalism into “world
revolutionary forces” and to help foment socialist revolution in Polish occupied regions (Vakar
1956:139, 145). However, in 1927 the Kremlin drastically changed its approach: with the passing
of the “‘revolutionary situation in Poland’” and with the Soviet Union forsaking world revolution
and now “building ‘Socialism in One Country,” Belarussian nationalism was seen as a future threat
(Vakar 1956:145-146).

The nationalists were purged and by “the fall of 1929, the whole

Belorussian nationalist leadership found itself behind prison walls” and though it is not clear,
“testimonies” however “abound” that the Soviet purge from 1929 to 1933 was “immeasurably
more ruthless than” the Polish repression of Belarussian nationalists had been (Vakar 1956:146).
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In the western part, under Polish control, a “free economy continued its traditional path,
and the social class structure remained more or less the same.” As opposed to the Soviet eastern
part in which “all economy had been subject to state planning and regimentation, and the private
sectors reduced to proportions never known before” (Vakar 1956:150): “Large landed estates,
industry, banking, and trade were nationalized” (Vakar 1956:143). There was a large increase in
industry (Vakar 1956:152); however, that increase would pale compared to the level of post-war
industrialization (Ioffe 2004). The achievements in agriculture were however “spectacular” in
which “‘838,000 individual farms [had] been organized into 9,650 kolkhozes [collective farms]
which cover 97 per cent [sic] of the total sown area of the republic…and “Each Kolkhoznik
(farmer) owns a cow” (Vakar 1956:151). It seems that this level of collectivization was achieved
following a “policy of caution” without harsh methods or with abuses of small peasants6 (Vakar
1956:166).

In 1939 German and Soviet troops invaded Poland and partitioned it (Vakar 1956:156).
And while the Soviet invasion of Poland was harshly criticized by many (Vakar 1956:156) and
continues to be criticized the
Soviet press has acknowledged that the USSR ‘only recuperated such non-Polish territories
that were torn away by Poland in the war of 1920-21, and before.’ As a matter of historical
record, the Soviet-German agreement did restore the northwest boundary of 1795 (Vakar
1956:156)
In addition, “the Soviet-German demarcation line followed [in general] the Curzon line
suggested in 1920 by the Great Powers as a permanent Polish Soviet border” (Vakar 1956:156).

At the time, in the 1920’s), eastern Belarus might have been dominated by “Large landed estates (Vakar 1956:143)
so collectivization might have been achieved without much repression of the peasantry as they did not own the land
that was collectivized. This was not the case in western Belarus after it was annexed by the Soviet Union (Vakar
1956:166).
6
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Eastern and western Belarus were re-united; Belarus was a “full-sized nation at last.”
(Vakar1956:156).
The Soviet authorities nationalized industry and collectivized farms in the west:
In 1940, the peasantry received 1,062,530 acres of land expropriated from landlords, Polish
colonists, and kulaks (rich peasants) (Vakar 1956:166).
However, unlike in the eastern portion, “[t]he policy of caution, first urged in
collectivization efforts, was abandoned” (Vakar 1956:166). For example: “Farmers owning more
than one horse and one cow were classified as kulaks, and deported”; middle-class professionals
were arrested, deported or forced to move to the countryside often replaced by people from Russia;
“The Jewish population, being engaged in ‘non-productive activities, mainly trading and peddling,
suffered most” (Vakar 1956:163-166).
On June 22, 1941 Germany attacked the Soviet Union, invading Belarus, which was
completely overrun in about three weeks (Vakar 1956:170). Belarus was occupied by Germany
for three years until the summer of 1944. The death and destruction Belarus suffered is hard to
fathom, possibly the “most devastated territory in the world” (Vakar 1956:209). It is estimated
that one fourth of all Belarussian were killed during the war (Ioffe 2004: 86), that is over two
million; the Jewish population was practically annihilated, 80 percent of Minsk was destroyed
[Gomel also suffered at least 80 percent destruction Ioffe 2004:86]. Other cities fared even worse
such as Vitebsk, in which 95 percent was destroyed; “rural areas were turned into a wasteland.
The Nazis completely devastated 9,200 villages” and wrecked Belarus’ agriculture and destroyed
85 percent its industry (Vakar 1956:208-209). Most of the Belarus’ towns and regional centers
were demolished (209 out of 270) (Ioffe 2004:86).
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Not only did the Soviet Union rebuild Belarus after the war, but, due to the increased sense
of security created by the buffer-zone of the Eastern Bloc, Soviet authorities heavily industrialized
Belarus (Ioffe 2004:86). “From the 1950s on, Belarus was emerging as one of the major Soviet
manufacturing regions” (Ioffe 2004:86). The Soviet Union founded many giant industrial firms
in Belarus, which are still operating today as state firms (Ioffe 2014;21; Yarashevich 2014:1731;
Veselova 2016:502) such as “MTZ [Minsk Tractor Works], MAZ [Minsk Autoworks: truckmaker], Gomsel’mash (Gomel; harvesting combines, mowers, and sowing machines), MZKT
(Minsk; an offspring of MAZ; heavy-duty [military] tractor trailers), and BELAZ [Belarussian
Autoworks, located in] Zhodina, Minsk region; heavy trucks for mining operations) (Ioffe
2014:21). The Soviet Union also built two large oil refineries “NAFTAN, based in Novopolotsk,
Vitebsk region, and Mozyr NPZ in Mozyr, Gomel region. NAFTAN is the largest refinery in
Europe” (Ioffe 2014:21-22) as well as Belarus Potash (Belaruskali) in the Saligorsk district in the
Minsk region that mines potash and other salts, which is still running today (Ioffe 2014:22).
Television and electronics production was also an important part of Soviet industrial development
in Belarus including “the Minsk-based [Horizont],” which today is “the largest producer of TV
and radio sets in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)” (Ioffe 2014:22). The Soviets
also developed factories in Belarus that produced “metal-cutting lathes, synthetic fibers, semiconductors and microchips. Much of Belarus high-tech industry was military oriented” (Ioffe
2004:86).
Belarus’ industry was the most technologically advanced in the entire Soviet Union… [and
its] specialization was on R&D and assembling high-tech products …[and] almost all of
the personnel for R&D were trained in Belarus…The quality of Belarussian institutions of
higher learning was among the highest in the USSR (Ioffe 2004:88 emphasis in original)
…
A country of dismal workshops and unproductive wetlands at the beginning of the
twentieth century, Belarus 70 years later was dominated by large-scale industry and vastly
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modernised agriculture. In the 1980s more than half of the industrial personnel of Belarus
worked for enterprises with over 500 employees…[And] Despite the ingrained flaws of the
Soviet model of economic development, was an undeniable Soviet success story (Ioffe
2004:88).
…
Despite the serious economic problems throughout the rest of the Soviet Union during the
Gorbachev period, the Belarusians emerged in the best shape of all the former Soviet
republics (with the exception of the Baltics). This installed a high level of pride in Soviet
achievements and further reinforced the connection between Soviet and Belarusian identity
(Ambrosio 2006:9)
Some critics argue that Soviet Belarus’ success “was only possible because of artificially
low energy prices” for Russian oil and gas, however, Ioffe argues that the low energy prices still
do “not belittle Belarus’ achievement” (2004:89).

Today, critics of Belarus make similar

arguments about Belarus (Kulakevich 2014:890-891; Potocki 2011:3; Ambrosio 2006:7,14). In
fact, these criticisms are often harsher claiming that Russia “prop[s] up the Lukashenka regime”
with cheap oil and gas (Ambrosio 2006:7; See also Potocki 2011:3).
The Soviet Union developed industry and agriculture in Belarus in line with its Soviet
socialist model (Ioffe 2004; Vakar 1956). Industry was state-owned and controlled (Thomas 2006)
and farms were divided between Kolkhozes (collective farms) cooperatively owned by the
collective farm members and Sovkhozes (state farms) in which the state owned and operated the

farms and those who worked the farms were employees: private agriculture did not exist in Soviet
Belarus (Engelking 2013; Engelking 2001).
Soviet socialism (the Soviet socio-economic system), however, has been highly-criticized
by Marxists as a “bureaucratically degenerated workers’ state”, “state capitalism” and
“bureaucratic collectivism:” these are the three main traditions of the Marxist critique of the Soviet
Union (Thomas 2006). Other Marxists are also critical of the Soviet system such as Michael
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Burawoy (2009) who saw the Soviet Union, and other socialist states as “state socialism” as
opposed to “workers’ socialism”
While these Marxist critiques all have important differences, they all share in their view of
the Soviet system as an undemocratic exploitive system dominated by a privileged bureaucratic
elite who exploited workers; furthermore, these passive workers did not have any control of the
production process or political process (Gabriel et al. 2008; Burawoy 2009; Thomas 2006;

Burawoy 2009; Burawoy and Lukacs 1992).
Trotsky argued that the Soviet Union was a “bureaucratically degenerated workers state”
(Thomas 2006). Namely the Soviet Union, began as a “workers’ state” with the 1917 October
Revolution, and nationalized the means production. In the beginning, power and control was in
the hands of the workers through their “workers’ councils” (soviets), however, a centralized
bureaucratic elite usurped the workers’ power and began to dominate the working class. Trotsky,
however, still considered the Soviet Union a “workers’ state” though “bureaucratically
degenerated. He called for “proletarian political revolution” to oust the bureaucracy and return the
power to the workers’ councils (Trotsky 1933; 1936). And while Trotsky acknowledged that
bureaucracy can be brutally harsh to the workers, he also recognized that the bureaucracy was
constrained by the fact that their power and privileges rested on the nationalized economy. He
argued that they did not represent a true “class” in Marxist terms but only had a parasitic role and
the Soviet system did not represent a new mode of production in Marxist terms (Trotsky 1933).
(Burawoy’s (2009) “state socialist” overall has much in common with Trotsky’s critique.)
State capitalists agree with much of Trotsky’s critique; however, they argue that at some
point the Soviet Union was completely transformed into capitalism, a new form of capitalism in
which the ‘state’ itself is the main capitalist (Gabriel et al. 2008; Thomas 2006).
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Bureaucratic collectivists’ critiques are very similar to state capitalists; yet they saw the
Soviet system as representing a new “form of exploitation” in which the bureaucrats, based on
their administration of the nationalized economy, had become a new ruling class over the workers,
creating an exploitive system that “resembles feudalism to a certain degree” (Thomas 2006:225).7
Notwithstanding the numerous critiques of Soviet socialism, according to the available literature,
ordinary Belarussians supported Soviet socialism and the Soviet Union in general (Rees and
Miazhevich 2009; Manaev et al. 2011; Ioffe 2004; Eke and Kuzio 2000). This is a stark contrast
to the cynical and anti-socialist Hungarian workers in Burawoy’s ethnography of socialist Hungary
(Burawoy and Lukacs 1992).
There was no mass opposition to socialism or the Soviet Union in Belarus during the Soviet
era despite Perestroika (Eke and Kuzio 2000:4; see also Rees and Miazhevich 2009; Manaev et al.
2011; Ioffe 2004; Ioffe 2003a; Eke and Kuzio 2000). This is in stark contrast to the anti-Soviet

and anti-socialist opposition in the Baltic states (Rees and Miazhevich 2009; Ioffe 2004;
Savchenko 2002), the Ukraine, Russia itself (Ioffe 2004; Furman 1999), Poland (Burawoy and
Lukacs 1992), and Hungary (Burawoy and Lukacs 1992).
Soviet Belarussian society was a “‘model of socialist reality’ [and] was profoundly
unprepared for reform when Gorbachev began his campaign of perestroika and glasnost’” (Eke
and Kuzio 2000:17). Soviet Belarus has been referred to as the “Vendee of Perestroika” (Ioffe
2003a:1031). Motyl, who wrote a book on Soviet dissent in 1987 said that “‘The Belorussian
contribution to dissent has been virtually nonexistent’” (Ioffe 2003a:1031) and “Ludmila

Sapir also compared bureaucratic collectivism to feudalism: “feudal-type fiefdoms” (Thomas 2006:237). This
analysis of the Soviet as a kind of “neo-feudalism” will fit later non-Marxist analyses of Soviet society very well (Ioffe
2004; see also Engelking 2013; 2001).
7
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Alexeyeva’s impressive [1985] study of Soviet Dissent included no chapter on the Belarusian
national movement” (Eke and Kuzio 2000:4).
In a March 1991 referendum, 83% of Belarussians voted to preserve the Soviet Union
(Rozic 2015:89; Eke and Kuzio 2000:5; Furman 1999:7). This was the highest outpouring of
support for maintaining the Soviet Union anywhere outside of Central Asia (Eke and Kuzio
2000:5).

And according to Lyavon Barachevsky, a Belarussian politician, the majority of

Belarussians even supported the August 1991 coup (Ioffe 2004:108)—however, at that time
Lukashenka did not support the August 1991coup (Ioffe 2014).
And Belarussian nationalism was not very strong (Rees and Miazhevich 2009; Ioffe 2004).
Most Belarussians were not anti-Russian (Ioffe 2003a, 2003b, 2004). Belarussians speak Russian8
as their native language and have deep cultural ties to Russia (Manaev et al. 2011; Ioffe 2003a,
2003b).
Notwithstanding the referendum, in December 1991 the USSR was abolished and Belarus
became an independent country, began to liberalize economically, and become more capitalistic,
with privatizations of some former-state-owned companies and banks (Ioffe 2004).
After 1991 there was widespread chaos in Belarus because of the collapse of the formerSoviet industrial network, which led to loss of wages, unemployment, inflation and a rise in crime
and alcoholism (Ioffe 2004). Belarussian factories ran idle: the main economic problem was the
loss of industrial suppliers and customers (mainly Russian companies) (Ioffe 2004).

8

Russian is the language Belarussians speak: An in-depth discussion of the status of the Belarussian language is
complicated and beyond the scope of this dissertation (Buhr et al. 2011; Ioffe 2003a).
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Chapter 3.2. Post-Soviet Belarus and the 1994 Election of President Lukashenka
This time of economic chaos and uncertainty led to the election of President Alexander
Grigorovich Lukashenka in 1994, a political outsider who ran on a campaign of “Market
Socialism” and against corruption (Manaev, Manayeva, and Yuran 2011:99; Ioffe 2004; Furman
1999). Lukashenka won the 1994 presidential election by a “landslide”, winning 81.1% of the
vote (Eke and Kuzio 2000:17), beating the Belarussian Prime Minister Viachaslau Kebich (Silitski

2005:3) in an election that was widely considered “relatively free and fair” (Manaev 2014:208;
Silitski 2005:3; Eke and Kuzio 2000:16-17; Furman 1999:13), even among some of Lukashenka’s
harshest critics such as Manaev (2014:208), Silitski (2005:3), Eke and Kuzio (2000:16-17),
Furman (1999:13-14).
In 1994 Alexander Lukashenka’s campaign promises such as “‘let’s get the factories
going’” resonated deeply among most Belarussians (Eke and Kuzio 2000:17)—a promise

President Lukashenka “made good on”—as by 1996 “most industrial giants had resumed full
capacity (Ioffe 2003:90). Lukashenka preserved the bulk of Belarus’ former-Soviet state-owned
industries, especially heavy industry (Yarashevich 2014:1731; Veselova 2016:502; Ioffe 2004).
Lukashenka also promised economic stability and that
he would freeze prices, beat inflation, provide jobs for everybody. He pledged more
Government support to the elderly and to [put a] break on privatization (Kulakevich
2014:890).
These promises also resonated deeply with most Belarussians and President Lukashenka
delivered on these promises (Kulakevich 2014:890) and “satisfied public expectations” (Manaev
2014:208).
[President Lukashenka] rebuilt the Soviet-style command economy and isolated Belarus
from the economic chaos that encompassed the rest of the USSR in the mid-1990s. By
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reducing the unemployment level to below 1 percent and providing moderate, but stable
economic growth, he satisfied public expectations (Manaev 2014:208; see also
Yarashevich 2014).
President Lukashenka’s commitment to improving living standards and battling
unemployment was not a short-term promise. In the first ten years of reform, Belarus had the
lowest unemployment of any former-socialist country as well as the highest real-wage dynamics
(Yarashevich 2014:1711). According to Potocki, a harsh Lukashenka critic, going into the 2006
elections:
Belarus had experienced a decade of uninterrupted growth and surpassed its retransition
GDP level by nearly 30%. It was a leader of ex-Soviet states in terms of growth, with GDP
rates outpacing even its western neighbors (It also had the ex-Soviet world’s most generous
pensions) …In the year prior to the 2006 election, real wages grew by 21 percent…the
disparity between rich and poor was among the lowest in the word. In 2006, Belarus spent
13 percent of its GDP—more than Russia did or Lithuania—on social programs; these
benefits reached almost two-thirds of the country’s households. Spending on healthcare
and education hit record levels. Between 2002 and 2006, the official poverty rate fell from
31% to 11 percent. From 2003 to 2005 unemployment was halved to 1.5 percent. In 2006,
inflation fell to single digits for the first time. By election day in March of that year
Belarussians were more prosperous than they had been at any time in their history (Potocki
2011:2-3; Italics added).
As of 2014 Belarus not only had the lowest unemployment in the region but might have

the lowest unemployment in the world (Yarashevich 2014:1711). Belarus today, in spite of the
worldwide Covid recession, still has very low unemployment with a rate of only 4 percent and this
is one of the lowest unemployment rates in the region (lower than both Lithuania 9.8 percent and
Latvia 8.4 percent).9

9

Belta, “Unemployment Rate,” December 2, 2020, (https://eng.belta.by/infographica/view/unemployment-rate-6849/)
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By 2014 Belarus had the least poverty, the lowest social inequality and lowest
unemployment in the former-USSR and has high levels of social security (Yarashevich
2014:1704). Currently Belarus’ enjoys a low poverty rate and has seen it drop by nine times over
the last twenty years “from 41.9% in 2000 to 4.8% in 2020” while Russia’s poverty rate today is
significantly higher at 13.3%.10
Belarus avoided the mass layoffs and shock therapy that affected other former socialist
states and former Soviet republics such as Hungary, where for example, the lighting company
Tungrams laid off 25,500 and Russia where Uralmash (a heavy-machinery maker) laid off 50,000
(Yarashevich 2014:1704). Mass layoffs and shock therapy were also the rule in other formersocialist (and former-Soviet) states like Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (Atas 2018 Aidukaite 2014;
2011; 2009; 2003:216; Woolfson 2010; Reardon 1996); Estonia (Madariaga 2017; Keskula 2015;
the Ukraine (Klimina 2015; Yarashevich 2014; Maksymiuk 2003 Kramer 1995), Russia (Kulmala
et al. 2014; Yarashevich 2014; Maksymiuk 2003; Burawoy 2001; Furman 1999; Burawoy and
Krotov 1992) Poland (Rek-Wozniak 2017; Pozniak 2013; Shields 2012; Kowalik 2012; Kramer
1995) and not only were tens of thousands of industrial workers and managers laid-off but were
also shut out of the political process, unlike in Belarus where they became an important
constituency for Lukashenka (Savchenko 2002).
Lukashenka was adamantly opposed to “neoliberalism” and “shock therapy;” he
renationalized several companies and banks, and would not let the state-owned industrial sector
be privatized haphazardly (Yarashevich 2014; Ioffe 2004; Savchenko 2002). Lukashenka rejected
the neoliberal policies of the World Bank and IMF and has called neoliberalism “an ideology of
social injustice, profiteering, and individualism… not applicable at all to us, to our people, with

Belta, “Poverty rate in Belarus drops 9 times over 20 years,” March 22, 2021
(https://eng.belta.by/society/view/poverty-rate-in-belarus-drops-9-times-over-20-years-138525-2021/).
10
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our tolerance and mentality” (Yarashevich 2014:1704) (Emphasis added).

Yarashevich

(2014:1724) Yarashevich argues that Lukashenka’s opposition to neoliberalism has led to his
being criticized as a “populist” (for example see Matsuzato 2004 and Furman 1999), however
Yarashevich (2014:1724) argues that Lukashenka’s policies and presidency cannot be considered
“populist” upon careful examination and that the term “populist” is being incorrectly applied
synonymously for his opposition to neoliberalism.

Lukashenka’s 1994 election and his subsequent popularity represented a popular uprising
against privatization, neoliberalism, and elites (Yarashevich 2014:1718; Ioffe 2004; Furman 1999)
that reflected the values and “mentality” of most Belarussians: Lukashenka understood their need
for economic security and stability (Yarashevich 2014:1718).
By denying neo-liberal reforms pushed elsewhere in the region, Lukashenka denied the
whole concept of the market-based democratic order. But at the end of the day he has done
so because most Belarusians, represented by workers and other non-entrepreneurial
groups, apparently do not want to bear the social costs of the transformation—all too
obvious in neighboring Russia, Ukraine, and elsewhere in the region (Yarashevich
2014:1731; emphasis added).
Since 1994, Belarus, under the leadership of Lukashenka, has been unlike any other
former-socialist country or former-Soviet Republic (Yarashevich 2014; Ioffe 2004). It has rejected
the two main transitional models: the “neo-liberal model” and “gradualist model” (Yarashevich

2014:1731). Belarus has clearly rejected the neo-liberal model based on “shock therapy.” Belarus
has also rejected the gradualist model since it is trying to maintain a significant “Soviet-style”
state-owned economic sector (Yarashevich 2104:1731). In fact, though some of the important
state-enterprises have been privatized (about 20 out of 140), most have not, and Belarus is trying
to deal with its economic problems without privatizing most of its state-owned enterprises
(Veselova 2016:502).
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Culturally, Belarus is also charting its own course. Belarussians are far more “Soviet” than
other former-Soviet republics—the Belarussian identity itself was developed as the Soviet Union
was being formed and has a “soviet element” (Rees and Miazhevich 2009:53; Ioffe 2004). It is
also the only former-Soviet republic to replace both its new post-independence national flag and
coat-of-arms with its previous Soviet-era ones—doing so through a 1995 referendum with 83.3%
support (Ioffe 2003b:1262). That same referendum11 changed Belarus’ Independence Day from
July 27, the day Belarus declared independence from the Soviet Union, to July 3, the day Minsk
was liberated from Nazi Germany in WWII, passing by 88% (Matsuzato 2004: 247). No other
former-Soviet republic has consistently rejected its post-independence national symbols in favor
of its Soviet ones (Ioffe 2003b).
President Lukashenka is often criticized as “authoritarian,” (Bedford 2017; Manaev 2014;
Ioffe 2014; Potocki 2011; Leshchenko 2008; Ambrosio 2006; Silitski 2005; Ioffe 2004; Eke and

Kuzio 2000; Shushkevich 2002; Furman 1999); in fact, Lukashenka does not deny that he is
authoritarian (Ioffe 2014).

Lukashenka has also been criticized by the United States as a

“‘tyrant’…who should be removed from power”; Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called
Belarus an “outpost of tyranny” (Marples 2005:895) and “as the last true dictatorship in the center
of Europe” (Fagan 2012:7). Some scholars argue that Belarus is a “dictatorship” (Miazhevich
2015; Kulakevich 2014:887; Fagan 2012; Potocki 2011; Silitski 2006; Shushkevich 2002; Furman

1999:12). Eke and Kuzio (2000) consider Lukashenka a ‘sultan’ and describe Belarus’ system as
“Sultanism” as well as “authoritarian populism.”

Eke and Kuzio (2000:3) also describe

Lukashenka as an “authoritarian president with [a] near-dictatorial executive style.” Matsuzato
(2004) also sees Lukashenka as a populist. Bedford (2017:382) describes Belarus’ system as

11

The 1995 referendum also re-established Russian as an official language winning by 83.3% (Ioffe 2003a:1014).
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“electoral authoritarianism,” which is an authoritarian state that holds “elections that appear
democratic, but through systematic and extensive violations of fundamental liberal democratic
rights and freedoms, they manage to strip the vote of all credibility.” Shushkevich sees Belarus’
system under Lukashenka as “neocommunism” and even “totalitarian;” though he admits that
“‘compared with the classically totalitarian states, totalitarianism in Belarus is limited in nature’
and the ‘Belarussian authoritarian regime tolerates elements of civil society’” (Ioffe 2004:101).

Along with the Lukashenka’s concentration of executive power (which will be discussed
in greater detail shortly), many scholars have focused on Lukashenka’s suppression of opposition,
including arresting street protestors (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021; Kulakevich 2014; Fagan 2012;
Potocki 2011; Ambrosio 2006:18; Silitski 2006 2005) as well as arresting opposition leaders
(Silitski 2005:9). By far the strongest allegations against Lukashenka are that he “disappeared”
five political opponents (Ioffe 2004:96; See also Silitski 2006). Interview transcripts are available

in which Lukashenka directly addresses these accusations (Ioffe 2014:237-241).
Although Lukashenka’s concentration of executive power is undeniable, some scholars
argue that Lukashenka is not judged fairly by the West as the West’s views of Belarus are shaped
today by Belarus’ “pro-Western and neo-liberal opposition, who have rather limited support inside
the country” (Yarashevich 2014:1731), and traditionally the West has viewed Lukashenka and
Belarus though a Cold War lens (Ioffe 20031:1011). And many scholars have allowed their social
and political preferences to dominate their research (Yarashevich 2014:1726; Ioffe 203a:1011).
Quite a few Western and liberal Russian writers who cast Belarus as inherently backward,
wretched and dependent are on a mission to rebuke Lukashenka, ‘the last dictator in
Europe’. Besides being on a mission, some of them have not done their homework on
Belarus (Ioffe 2004:90 see also Ioffe 2014).
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Careful “[s]cholarly analysis…of Belarus is overdue” (Ioffe 2003a:1011) and this problem
is even worse in the “English-language literature on the country, which is instead dominated by
arguments about the populist and corrupt nature of Lukashenka’s presidency” (Yarashevich
2014:1719).
As discussed above there is no question President Lukashenka has greatly expanded
executive power. Lukashenka did so through constitutional referendums in 1995 and 1996 that

won by large majorities: 77.7 percent in 1995 and 70.45 in 1996 (Furman 1999:7-8). In the 1995
referendum there were “few allegations of irregularities” however, the legitimacy of the 1996
referendum results of 70 percent have been questioned (Silitski 2005:5). Furman (1999:8),
however, argues “there is no doubt that that Lukashenko won” the 1996 referendum and Silitski
(2005), a very harsh critic of Lukashenka, said that although “[i]ndependent postelection polls
discovered signs of poll-rigging, [they] also suggested that cheating had actually changed the

results by only a few percentage points (Silitski 2005:5)
The 1995 and 1996 Constitutional referendums gave President Lukashenka considerable
executive power. For example, the 1995 referendum gave the president the power to disband the
parliament (Matsuzato 2004:245) and the 1996 referendum “concentrated power in the hands of
the presidency” and greatly shifted power away from the legislature. For example, “Presidential
decrees were given the status of law, meaning they would supersede acts adopted by the legislature
(Silitski 2005:5). The 1996 referendum also transferred the power to appoint Constitutional Court
(Supreme Court) justices and the Central Election Commission from the parliament to the
presidency (Silitski 2005:6). The 1996 referendum also preserved the president’s power to appoint
provincial governors rather than having them elected by the residents of each province (Silitski
2005:14; Matsuzato 2004:247). The president appoints provincial governors and the mayor of
Minsk and then each provincial governor then appoints the mayors of the cities in each province
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as well as the county executives “coordinating the candidacies with the president (Matsuzato
2004:250).
Ioffe (2014) acknowledges that the concentration of executive power in Belarus is
unacceptable by Western standards—even if created democratically through constitutional
referendums. Ioffe (2014), however, urges Westerners not to judge Belarus by Western standards
as Belarus is not a Western country. He argues that Belarus’ highly centralized vertical power

structure suits the Belarusian people who want a strong leader who can get things done. This is
preferable to a system—though procedurally more democratic with institutionalized checks and
balances—that is constantly mired with in-fighting and inaction. (See also Matsuzato 2004;
Furman 1999.)

Ioffe’s Peasant Commune and Peasant Archetype (2004)
To understand why Ioffe (2014) does not think Belarus is a Western country and why the
typical Western model of representative democracy does not suit them, we must explore an
interesting literature about the archaic peasant foundation of Belarussian society.

Ioffe’s

(2004:105-108) peasant commune and peasant archetype is based on a larger literature about the
social forces that shaped the Soviet Union. According to the theory, the Soviet Union was not
based on Marx and Engels, but rather on the Russian peasant commune. For centuries in Russia
the feudal lords rented their lands to the entire village communally. The shift from the village
commune to the Soviet collective farm (kolkhoz) was not a big change. The Soviet Union’s
ideology was not shaped by Marxism but by the peasant’s “primitive communal instincts and
redistributive ethos” (Ioffe 2004:106).
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Ann Engelking (2013), an anthropologist who studied contemporary Belarussian peasants
(collective farm-workers or kolkhozniks) for twenty years, provides empirical support for Ioffe’s
theory.
As a result of the petrifaction of the old model of the feudal estate by the Soviet kolkhoz
system, we encounter in today’s Belarusian countryside probably one of the last remnants
of premodern mentality and social identity still extant in Europe (Engelking 2013:276).
And even today the Belarussian collective farm has preserved the feudal arrangements of
the lord (the collective farm director) and the serf (the peasants—collective farm workers).
[Kolkhozniks] perceive the contemporary socioeconomic context of their own existence as
a specific continuation of the ancient manor estate, in which…. the kolkhoz president plays
the role of a former landowner while they, the kolkhozniks, take the positions of former
serfs or farmhands. The kolkhozniks’ collective identity is a continuation of peasant or serf
identity from the era of the feudal manor (Engelking 2013:264).

It was clear to Engelking that the mindset of modern-day Belarussian collective farm
workers was not at all “Soviet” (or Marxist) but a “living embodiment of archaic” religious
premodern mindset (Engelking 2013:276).
According to Ioffe (2004:107), under rapid Soviet urbanization, these “archaic peasant
masses gush[ed] into the cities” which led to a “Soviet type of development [that] led as much the
ruralisation of the urban places as it did to the urbanisation of rural villagers (Ioffe 2004:107).
The archaic rural culture came to dominate the entire [Soviet] urban milieu (Ioffe
2004:107).
Just as the premodern feudal relations were reproduced in the Soviet Union’s rural
collective farms, with rapid industrialization and urbanized industrialization, these premodern and
feudal relations were reproduced in Soviet factories. This theory is supported by the Marxist
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bureaucratic collectivist critiques that saw the Soviet industrial system as “resemble[ling]
feudalism to a certain degree” (Thomas 2006:225) and as “feudal-type fiefdoms” (Thomas
2006:237).
Soviet socialism’s most “essential features” where attributed to “Russia’s oriental
affinities, not to Marxism” (Ioffe 2004:107).
[Soviet socialism] was essentially a reincarnation of the Russian peasantry’s traditional

arrangements now extended over the entire society under a smokescreen of Marxist
symbols (Ioffe 2004:107).
And this theory applies even more to Belarus as its industrialization and urbanization “was
even more delayed than in Russia and even more precipitate” (Ioffe 2004:108) since “in 1940 only
21% of Belarus’ population lived in cities and towns, compared with 34% in Russia and Ukraine
(Ioffe 2004:86,108). By 1970 the urban population of Belarus had more than doubled to 43% and

continued rapidly increasing (Ioffe 2004:108).
According to Ioffe (2004:105-108), the Soviet Union did not collapse due to a rejection of
communism but occurred when the Soviet Union sufficiently urbanized or rather became
sufficiently cosmopolitan, primarily in Moscow. Ioffe argues that Lukashenka’s success is rooted
in his similarity to this peasant archetype:
Lukashenka’s popularity is due to the fact that ‘his rhetoric, behaviour, and politics match
a Belarusian peasant archetype particularly his habit of thrashing members of his
government in front of TV cameras to a communal peasant ethos (Ioffe 2004:105).
Furthermore, other key aspects of Ioffe’s peasant archetype are “a cult of patience” (107),
“an aversion to inequality due to personal ingenuity and the labour ethic” (Ioffe 2004:106) as well
as “authoritarianism” (108):
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A cult of a strong leader who would make decisions for the rank and file and thus relieve
them from making personal choices (2004:106-107).
President Lukashenka is known as “father” (bats’ka): this connotes “the presence of the
family unit of the Russian village” (Ioffe 2004:104). Again, Engelking’s ethnography shows how
modern-day Belarussian peasants view President Lukashenka as the father and provider.
Engelking’s subject explains:

In spite of these concerns about the uncertain future, it seems that as long as Alaksandr
Lukashenka, a former sovkhoz [state-farm] director, remains the president of Belarus, there
can be no serious threat to the kolkhoz: Lukashenka takes care of the people, to let them
live. You know, without Lukashenka the kolkhozes here would be destroyed; there would
be no order, the land would not be plowed, and the hunger would come. Instead, we have
the kolkhozes and they provide, and they feed, and they house, and everything is done. In
Lithuania they have no kolkhozes and there is no order there (Engelking 2001:76).
The Belarussian peasant archetype includes seeing things in black and white or “a
Manichaean world view” in which “the utmost evil wages a perennial tug of war with the utmost
virtue” without anything “whatsoever between those poles.” This aspect can still be seen among
the collective farmers today (Engelking 2001; 2013). This peasant archetype also values “abiding
by moral reasoning rather than by legal norms” (Ioffe 2004:107). For Ioffe this aspect is critical
to explain the Belarussian political-legal system and the political style of President Lukashenka.
The archetype also includes a “cult of patience” (Ioffe 2004:107). Engelking’s (2001; 2013)
research revealed that this cult of patience is still an important part of the Belarussian peasant
culture although it is more than merely patience but a sense of “fatalism” (Engelking 2001:70).
Patience is also characteristic of all Belarussians not only peasants (Ioffe 2003a:1022)
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Class Warfare
Furman (1999) explicitly sees Lukashenka’s rise to power as an expression of “‘class
warfare’” (1999:12) in which working-class, poor and rural Belarussians were able to defeat the
pro-capitalist “Minsk elite” in the ‘electoral uprising’ of 1994 (Furman 1999:8). For Furman,
Lukashenka was the mirror image of Yeltsin (1999:9). Yeltsin represented the anti-communist
pro-capitalist elite, based primarily in Moscow, that was able to destroy the Soviet Union and

subjugate the vast majority of ordinary Russians to harsh and brutal neoliberal reforms and shock
therapy. When the democratically elected Russian Parliament resisted in 1993, Yeltsin disbanded
it in a bloody coup d’etat (Furman 199:11-12), attacking the Parliament with tanks “in the worst
street violence in Moscow since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.”12
Furman argues that Lukashenka’s situation was similar, only Lukashenka’s policies were
“based on real majority support” (1999:12) which represented a popular uprising against the procapitalist Minsk elite (Furman 1999). When the democratically elected Belarussian Parliament,
representing the interests of the pro-capitalist Minsk elite, resisted Lukashenka’s popular
initiatives, Lukashenka relied on constitutional referendums to disband the Parliament and
Constitutional Court in 1996 (Furman 1999:11-12). By relying on constitutional referendums,
Furman considers Lukashenka’s 1996 disbanding of the Parliament as a “bloodless” coup as
opposed to Yeltsin’s bloody coup (1999:12).
According to Furman (1999) both Yeltsin (in 1993) and Lukashenka (in 1996) emerged
from these crises with nearly unlimited power. Yeltsin used this power to “pursue radical policies
[such as] (‘shock therapy’) and privatization” (Furman 1999:13) in the 1990’s, in which “Russia

The Atlantic, “20 Years Ago, Russia Had Its Biggest Political Crisis Since the Bolshevik Revolution”
October 4, 2013, by Mikhail Sokolov and Anastasia Kirilenko,
(https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/10/20-years-ago-russia-had-its-biggest-political-crisissince-the-bolshevik-revolution/280237/).
12
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went through [a] virtually uncontested and non-negotiated welfare state liberalization that has no
equivalent in democratic systems (Kulmala 2014:540), for which it is “difficult to overstate the
social crisis that emerged as a result of the Russian transition from a socialist system to a market
economy (Kulmala 29014:523). Lukashenka, on the other hand, did the opposite of Yeltsin. As
previously discussed, Lukashenka resisted neoliberalism, preserved much of the Soviet industry,
and made stability and decent living standards for ordinary Belarussians a priority.

Belorussia represents ‘the people’s victory over the elite’ (Furman 1999:9).
Furman’s (1999) research is also important as he shows the ongoing battle between the
Belarussian opposition and President Lukashenka is essentially a class conflict between Belarus’
opposition representing the pro-market neoliberal capitalist elite and President Lukashenka
representing ordinary Belarussians (Kassabov 2020; Yarashevich 2014; Furman 1999). Belarus’
neoliberal opposition (Kassabov 2020; Yarashevich 2014; Furman 1999), however, frames itself
as “democratic” in its fight against President Lukashenka, whom it frames as a “dictator”
(Kassabov 2020; Kulakevich 2014; Yarashevich 2014; Leshchenko 2008; Ioffe 2004). This
conflict has continued since Lukashenka’s 1994 election, and is usually most pronounced during
presidential elections (Kulakevich 2014:895; Ioffe 2004), including the large and sustained protest
movement after last summer’s August 9, 2020 presidential election (Kassabov 2020; moshes and
Nizhnikau 2021).
Furman’s (1999:2) research is also important since it shows how the Minsk capitalist elite
“create a special environment, a local subculture’” in Minsk that “shapes” the ideology and culture
of those within it.
The point is that the concentration of wealth and power benefits everyone, including those
inhabitants of the capital who do not themselves belong to the elite but who are nonetheless
oriented toward the elite and its values, ideology, and lifestyle, haughtily condescending to
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provincials and striving to consolidate their privileged position (Furman 1999:2; See also
Bourdieu 1984).
This local subculture in Minsk will especially shape the culture, values and ideology of the
ambitious young university students, middle-class professions, and aspiring professionals, as
opposed to the working class, the uneducated and the old (Furman 1999:2). The dominant13 culture
of Minsk has always been the center of anti-Soviet and anti-communist sentiment in Belarus and
“nowadays, ‘anti-Russian and anti-Lukashenko’” sentiments (Furman 1999:8). For Lukashenka,
“Minsk is an almost completely hostile environment” (Furman 1999:9).

Socially-Oriented Market Economy
Although the preservation of the former-Soviet state-owned industrial enterprises is the
main foundation of President Lukashenka’s socio-economic model and Belarus’ socio-economic

stability (Veselova 2016; Yarashevich 2014), after his election in 1994 Lukashenka began to set
up a “socially-oriented market economy … based on market economic principles but provides …
a high degree of social security and an active state role in regulating socio-economic processes
(National Bank of the Republic of Belarus 2001, pp. 9– 10)” (Yarashevich 2014:1704) (Emphasis
added). This is a market economy, based on private-ownership and profits (Leshchenko
2008:1430), but in which private owners must always act in the “public good” over individual

economic interests (Zlotnikov 2016, Veselova 2016 Yarashevich 2014; Leshchenko 2008). By
law the public good in Belarus overrides the rights of individuals, as opposed to Russia wherein
the opposite is true (Zlotnikov 2016:507). In Belarus, before a company is privatized, the new
owner must promise to modernize the factory, pay set wages and not lay off workers, as well as

13

The dominant culture does not necessarily mean the majority of people have this culture, but that this culture
‘dominates’ Minsk.
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invest in the community, such as building recreation centers (Veselova 2016; Yarashevich 2014;
Potocki 2011; Lukashenka 1998). For example, Motovelo, a motorcycle and bicycle maker, was
re-nationalized in 2016 on charges that the owners “harmed public interest” by “capital and
equipment withdrawal” (Belarus-in-Focus 2016a). Belarus’ economic model is “a kind of welfare
state” that is based on elements from the former-USSR combined with market principles in both
the economic and social spheres (Yarashevich 2014:1704; Gugushvili 2015:722).

Chapter 3.3. The Literature on Moral Economy of Belarus
So far, I have discussed Belarus’ history and the background literature that would help one
understand my research.

Now I will discuss the limited literature that directly addresses

Belarussians’ moral economy. There is no research that deals directly or specifically focuses on
the Belarussian moral economy. (I do not believe the term ‘moral economy’ was ever used once
in reference to Belarus, although the somewhat related term “social contract” is often used (Moshes
and Nizhnikau 2021; Potocki 2011:7). Overall, I have gleaned what is available on the Belarussian
moral economy mainly from studies of political economy, political science, activism and other
scholarly articles about Belarus.
In Soviet times ordinary Belarussians had a moral economy that supported the Soviet
Union and Soviet socialism (Manaev et al. 2011; Rees and Miazhevich 2009; Ioffe 2014, 2004;
Eke and Kuzio 2000:17). They were collective and egalitarian (Rees and Miazhevich 2009;
Leshchenko 2008). Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, in general, ordinary Belarussians have
continued to support Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector and have strongly opposed its
privatization (Yarashevich 2014:1718; Manaev 2014; Manaev et al. 2011:96; Leshchenko 2008;
Savchenko 2002); however, the opposition strongly supports privatization (Manaev 2014:218; see
also Yarashevich 2014; Furman 1999). Ordinary Belarussians, not only support Belarus’ state95

owned industrial sector but are opposed to a market economy (Yarashevich 2014:1718; Ioffe
2014:190; Leshchenko 2008:1422-23) and see the market economy as “nationally alien” to them
(Leshchenko 1422-23) and “are generally scared by democracy-and-free-market ideology that they
identify with the insecurity” of the 1990’s and the social inequality in Russia and the Ukraine (Ioffe
2014:190). And they do not support private business and dislike entrepreneurs (Yarashevich
2014:1718).

[T]he country’s economic assets should belong to the nation as a whole rather than
individuals… ‘Belarusian citizens do not feel separated from the products of their labour,
because these products cannot be seen as belonging to some external force. Everybody
thinks of Belarusian tractors and fridges as “our” tractors and fridges’ (Leshchenko
2008:1422-23).
In general, ordinary Belarussians support a “fair distribution of prosperity” (Manaev
2014:218; Manaev et al. 2011:95) and “social security” (Kulakevich 2014:890). They support

“egalitarianism” and oppose “substantial material stratification of the population” (Leshchenko
2008:1423) or “extreme social inequities (Ioffe 2014:189). They support “collectivism” and
oppose individualism and egocentrism (Rees and Miazhevich 2009; Leshchenko 2008:1423) and
adamantly reject neoliberalism, shock therapy, and profiteering (Yarashevich 2014:1731; Ioffe
2014, 2004; Ambrosio 2006:15; Furman 1999).
Ordinary Belarussians “want full employment” (Ioffe 2014:189) and are deeply opposed
to “unemployment” (Leshchenko 2008:1423; see also Yarashevich 2014) and “value low but
steady [earnings] over high but unsteady earnings’” (Yarashevich 2014:1718) and in general
strongly value “economic security” (Yarashevich 2014:1718; see also Ioffe 2014:189; Kulakevich
2014:890), “stability” (Kulakevich 2014:890; Miazhevich 2007:1334) and have a deep “fear of
instability” (Miazhevich 2007:1334), and “risk” (Yarashevich 2014:1718). In general, ordinary
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Belarussians want an active state (Ioffe 2014:190) and trust the “visible hand of the government
(instead of the invisible hand of the market)” (Ioffe 2014:190; see also Yarashevich 2014).

Is the Belarussian moral economy changing?
Four things have led me to question whether the Belarussian moral economy is changing.
First, there are a few significant things in the literature that directly state that the moral economy
is changing. Second, there is even more in the literature showing that Belarus’ political economy
is moving away from socialism and toward a market economy. Third, my own observations of
Belarus and informal discussions with Belarussians over the last 13 years, since 2008. Fourth, and
last, the accounts of the Belarussian opposition, the West, and Western media, that insist that
Belarus has changed

Changes in Belarus’ Moral Economy.
The most important change of the Belarussian moral economy is that support for a market
economy has “grown immensely” (Shraibman 2019; see also Kulakevich 2014:893; Potocki
2011:7). According to Potocki (20112:7), as early as the year 2011, 42 percent of Belarussian
already supported a market economy. And according to Shraibman (2019):
Independent surveys conducted in 2019 indicate that all demographic groups, from young
to the elderly, from rural dwellers to Minsk residents, consider private business more
effective than SOEs [state owned enterprises] … Support for privatization has been
growing for years, while support for state paternalism has declined (Shraibman 2019; see
also Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021 and Glod 2020).
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Is this in fact true? Have Belarussians forsaken the state-owned industrial sector? Do they
now support privatization? Are these changes also reflected among working-class Belarussians?
According to Shraibman (2019) these changes are seen among “all demographic groups.” As
discussed above, popular support for Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector was a key part of the
moral economy of ordinary Belarussians as well as a vital part of Belarus’ social economic model.
Has the moral economy of ordinary Belarusians changed that drastically? Answering these
questions will be a central part of this study. And not merely answering yes or no but exploring
the question discovering how Belarussians understand the state-owned industrial sector: how they
see it and what role they see it playing in Belarussian society and Belarus. If they support it, why
do they support it and if they are against it why are they against it.
The literature that says Belarussians prefer a market economy and reject the state-owned
industrial sector would represent a radical change in the Belarussian moral economy. Is this in

fact true? There are other changes of the Belarussian moral economy reflected in the literature;
however, these changes are not nearly as critical. Although they might show a potential general
trend in the direction the Belarussian moral economy might be changing. For example, according
to the literature there has been a significant “mindset change” in Belarus (Potocki 2011:7) as
Belarussians are becoming less “Soviet” (Manaev 2014:217-218; Potocki 2011:7 Manaev et al.
2011:95; White, McAllister and Feklyunia 2010) and are significantly less likely to support

restoring the Soviet Union and more likely to oppose restoring it (Manaev 2014:217-8; Manaev et
al. 2011:95). Belarussians are also becoming more European (Potocki 2011:8; Korosteleva and
White 2006), and support for joining the European Union has significantly increased (Kulakevich
2014; Potocki 2011:8)14.

These concepts, such as what is meant by ‘Soviet’ or ‘European’, are very vague and will require careful attention
in this study as to what respondents actually mean by them. Furthermore, even if it is true that Belarussians that many
(or even most) Belarussians do not favor of restoring the Soviet Union, this in itself does seem to demonstrate a radical
14
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Changes in Belarus’ Political Economy
Although changes in Belarus’ political economy do not necessarily mean the moral
economy is changing, it might be an important sign that it is changing (Reinarman 1987).
Furthermore, if there are significant changes in political economy, we should be able to see
whether there is support for these changes (Reinarman 1987). The following changes to the
political economy, combined with the changes to the moral economy cited in the literature (as well

as other factors such as my observations and opposition and Western political statements) lead me
further to question whether the Belarussian moral economy is changing,
Belarus political economy has changed significantly: Belarus is no longer socialist and
neither ruled by a socialist party nor is its state ideology socialist—in fact the “state ideology is
distinctly non-communist” (Leshchenko 2008:1430). Furthermore, the “economy is not fully
planned, [it] is money based” (Leshchenko 2008:1430). It is clear that “Belarus has [slowly]
moved away from its Soviet past,” toward a market economy (Yarashevich 2014:1731; see also
Veselova 2016). The private sector has grown significantly (Shraibman 2019) and occupies 3040% of the economy (Veselova 2016; Manaev 2014). The economy is slowly liberalizing
(Kulakevich 2016; Yarashevich 2014). According to Shraibman (2019) Belarus’ state-owned
industrial sector is significantly shrinking:
From 2012 to 2019, the number of employees working for Belarusian state-owned

enterprises (SOE) has decreased by over a quarter, from 1.71 million to 1.28 million
people. With the further deterioration of Belarus’s economic relationship with Russia and
change in the moral economy and sociologically little can be inferred by it. Furthermore, the Soviet Union broke up
in 1991 almost 30 years ago and there has been nothing in the political realm since about restoring the Soviet Union—
even Lukashenka did not say he would restore the Soviet Union. The only thing possibly close to that would be more
integration with Russia and with the Eurasian Economic Union. Both a far cry from restoring the Soviet Union. Be
that as it may, a general trend of moving away from the Soviet Union is important to recognize and might be an
indication of deeper changes to the Belarussian moral economy. And although the term “European” is vague, it seems
the researchers are implying support for a Western democratic market economy by it (See Yarashevich 2014; and
Leshchenko 2008). Therefore, the literature that shows Belarussians are becoming more European is further evidence
that the Belarussian moral economy might be changing.
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with continued private business development, the state-run sector will continue to shrink.
The government itself admits that the state sector has for years now been, on average, 1.5
times less productive than privately owned companies, which drive economic growth while
SOEs generally drag the country’s economic indicators downward (Shraibman 2019).
There is more foreign investment in Belarus now (Veselova 2016; Kulakevich 2014:894).
Laws regulating private businesses were liberalized in 2008, making it easier to open private
businesses (Kulakevich 2014:893-894). By 2013 Belarus was already ranked 11 out of 26
European and Central Asian countries for “Doing Business” in a World Bank survey—twice as
high as Russia and Ukraine (2014:893-894).
In the past, most jobs had lifetime appointments; however, this has been changing due to
fixed-duration labor contracts in all economic sectors (Yarashevich 2014:1718). New labor laws
are beginning to tip the scale in favor of employers; social spending has been cut; and price-setting
regulations on most goods have been removed (Veselova 2016:501). And the pension retirement
age is increasing15
Furthermore, entrepreneurs, officially denigrated in the past, are now promoted by the
government and the government is much more accepting of the private sector (Yarashevich
2014:1705-1710). Some major neoliberal principles have become more important as well: such
as competition and self-responsibility (Yarashevich 2014:1705).
Personal Observations
At the same time as I was carefully reading the literature, I noticed Belarus was changing
with my own eyes. For example, since my first visit to Minsk in January 2008 there had been a
massive proliferation of advertisements on the street and in the subway, as well as an increase in
Western fast-food chains. Many private Western-style shopping malls were also built; as well as

Belta, “Belarus raises retirement age,” January 3, 2017, (https://eng.belta.by/society/view/belarus-raisesretirement-age-97644-2017).
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many very large private supermarkets. For example, since first visiting Belarus in 2008, Euroopt,
a private supermarket chain, has come to dominate retail throughout Belarus with 459 stores
(operating in 297 cities and towns16) with over 33,000 workers making Euroopt the largest
privately-owned company in Belarus.17 In 2016 Euroopt’s net sales were $1.83 billion and that
“was 4.5 times more than its nearest competitor” with net sale growth rate of 58 percent, more than
two times greater than leading Russian supermarket chains.18 Furthermore, the company’s worth
has been estimated at 2 billion dollars19 and has sold $350 million in bonds through the Irish Stock
Exchange after being positively rated by Fitch and S&P20”
Euroopt, with its innovative management and marketing, competitive pricing, private
labels, free delivery and online sales is an absolute paragon of capitalism21 and a far cry from “neocommunism” (Shushkevich 2002), “neo-Socialis[m]” (Ambrosio 2006:12), a “Soviet-throwback”
(Potocki 2011:1); “stuck in a neo-Soviet time warp”; with a “Soviet-style command economy”
(Manaev et al 2011:94); with an “unreformed socialist economy” and “entrenched Soviet
mentality” (Eke and Kuzio 2000). Euroopt, has literally transformed the very landscape of
Belarus—and not just Minsk, as it operates in 292 cities and towns. (As I write, Euroopt has
recently taken over two landmark supermarkets in downtown Minsk: Stalichny (Capital) and
Tsentralny (Central). Stalichny will feature a McDonalds as well.) Watching this transformation

BelarusFeed, “10 Most Famous People From Belarus In Business,” March 26, 2019, posted in UDF.BY
(https://udf.name/english/economy/189825-10-most-famous-people-from-belarus-in-business.html).
16

Bne Intellinews, “Belarus’ retail king Euroopt goes on the road,” July 5, 2017 by Ben Aris,
(https://www.intellinews.com/belarus-retail-king-euroopt-goes-on-the-road-124801/).
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Ibid.
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https://ir.eurotorg.by/about-company/milestones/

Bne Intellinews, “Belarus’ retail king Euroopt goes on the road,” July 5, 2017 by Ben Aris,
(https://www.intellinews.com/belarus-retail-king-euroopt-goes-on-the-road-124801/).
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right before my eyes, and knowing the literature, it was hard not to question whether Belarus was
changing and whether the Belarusian moral economy was changing as well.
From 2008-2017 I also had numerous informal conversations and the Belarusians I spoke
with were very business-oriented and were not supportive of Lukashenka, Belarus’ state-owned
industrial sector or its socialist model. They were pro-capitalism and believed in the logic of
capitalism. They not only did not support Lukashenka; they did not know anyone else who did.
Admittedly, I was exposed more to middle-class Belarussians—and this is especially true once I
moved here to live year-round when I opened my English school in 2013. And while I could not
come to any sociological conclusions based on my informal conversations due to their selection
bias, I did think it was important to investigate this question carefully.
The Opposition, the West and the Western Press
The Belarussian opposition was also proclaiming that the Belarussian moral economy has

changed. It was very outspoken and making strong assertions that no one supports President
Lukashenka and that no one supports the Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector or his “Soviet
system.” For example, before the August 9, 2020 election, opposition supporters insisted and
believed that President Lukashenka only had support from 3 percent of the electorate (“Sasha 3%”)
(Melyantsou 2020:3; Zahorski 2020:3; Sokolov 2020; Sasha is the Russian nickname for
Alexander) and that they had 97% (Sokolov 2020). Furthermore, the opposition’s outlook tends

to shape the West’s view toward Belarus and the way things are framed in the Western media
(Yarashevich 2014) as well as by many academics (Ioffe 2004). Knowing that the opposition was
also claiming that the Belarussian moral economy had changed, I considered this another important
reason to focus on whether the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians has changed. The two
main research questions of this study are:
1.

What is the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians?

2.

Has the moral economy of ordinary Belarusians changed?
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Chapter 4. Methodology and Research Design
Reinarman’s Qualitative Approach
In this study I not only relied on Reinarman’s state-market conception of moral economy,
but also relied on Reinarman’s qualitative approach to explore the moral economy of Belarus.
Like Reinarman, I relied on key elements of grounded theory and analytic induction (p.18). I also
relied heavily on narrative analysis and narrativization, especially Allison’s (1994)
phenomenological narratization approach. I will discuss in greater detail the methodologies I
relied later in this chapter in the section Coding and Analysis.
Brief Overview of Reinarman’s Qualitative Approach
Reinarman was interested in examining whether the moral economy of American workers
had changed in the 1980’s in the context of the Reagan Revolution. Specifically, Reinarman was

interested in learning whether American workers still supported the welfare state: Did they want
less state intervention into the economy? Had there truly been a transformation of the New Deal
moral economy? Specifically, in the context of the Reagan Revolution, was their vision changing?
Reinarman wanted to explore their visions of the welfare state. He was particularly focused on
government regulations, inequality, taxation, welfare and other social programs. To answer these
questions, Reinarman chose a qualitative approach based on life-histories and in-depth interviews.

In total, he interviewed 12 workers: 6 private sector workers from a large national delivery
company in California (most likely UPS), and 6 public sector workers from a California welfare
office.
Reinarman argued that a society’s moral economy will be “ineluctably local,” (p.19) part
of ordinary people’s “belief systems,” “embedded in [their] specific life histories” (p.14) and
“practices of everyday life” (p.241), and that one can decipher this embedded state-market relation
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through life-histories and in-depth open-ended questioning about the legitimacy of state regulation
of the market, spending preferences, and other political principles and policy preferences. This
questioning, however, must delve far deeper than surveys. It must uncover their underlying
beliefs, ideas, values, and “get at their visions of what is and what is not legitimate” about the
state-market relation: the moral economy (p.18). Through this deep “probing” one can elicit
workers’ unconscious or dormant moral economies. This approach also strives? to get past the
dominant political and social narratives that are shaped by elites. This framework transcends the
political system or welfare system (Aspalter 2019), which often reflect the interests of elites—and
uncovers the moral economy of the vast majority of society or relevant subset of it (p.13-15).
The framework is useful whether the society and moral economy being investigated is
relatively stable or whether it is undergoing a transformation, since, if “the moral economy is being
renegotiated,” those changes should be reflected in the “consciousness of individuals” and

sociologists should be able to see what those “changes look like at the level of lived experience”
(p.14-15). (I will Reinarman’s approach further later in this chapter)
I adapted Reinarman’s approach to Belarus and Belarus’ socio-economic system, since the
welfare state represents a fairly moderate degree of state intervention into the economy, especially
the American welfare state (Aspalter 2019; Reinarman 1987). Belarus’ socio-economic system is
far more socialistic than the socio-economic systems of the United States or Western Europe
(Veselova 2016; Yarashevich 2014; Ioffe 2014, 2004; Leshchenko 2008). I adapted Reinarman’s
study to Belarus’ unique socio-economic system, with a very high degree of state intervention and
involvement in the economy, especially its large state-owned industrial sector that it has preserved
from the Soviet Union (Veselova 2016; Yarashevich 2014 Ioffe 2014, 2004; Leshchenko 2008;).
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Research Design
Like Reinarman, I have also chosen a qualitative approach to explore moral economy and
have also focused on life-histories and in-depth interviews. In total I interviewed 35 subjects: 18
workers, 12 middle-class subjects, and 5 capitalists. I had been living year-round in Belarus for
seven years at the time this study formally began (and had many extended visits for the five years
before that, summers and winters). This enabled me to be embedded in the society fairly well (for

a foreigner) and develop a vast number of contacts. Between my contacts and my position here I
was able to recruit subjects from a broad range of fields and walks of life, drawing upon workers,
professionals, managers, and capitalists. I interviewed subjects who work(ed) at both public and
private firms from diverse economic fields: industrial, retail, service, transportation, I.T.,
education, health-care, etc. Though this sample is not statistically representative, every effort was
made to choose subjects broadly to create a solid theoretical sample.
The subjects were mainly over 40 years old and many were 50 and older. In general, I
focused on older subjects to see whether the system was truly changing, as it is assumed that the
younger generation will be more likely to reject the older moral economy (Furman 1999). If the
moral economy of Belarus were fundamentally changing, as some researchers believe it might be,
those changes should be reflected in the moral economy of older subjects as well (Reinarman
1987). Furthermore, the Belarussian opposition and various neoliberal think tanks insist that
ordinary Belarussians not only no longer support President Lukashenka, but reject the former
“Soviet” “paternalistic” moral economy based on state ownership (for example, Moshes and
Nizhnikau 2021; Glod 2020; Potocki 2011). This oppositional viewpoint often shapes Western
media coverage of Belarus and political discourse (Yarashevich 2014; Ioffe 2104,2004). Bearing
this in mind, it was important to focus on older subjects, especially older workers, to explore
whether these deep changes had actually taken place. Moreover, older subjects having lived, and
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often worked, in the Soviet Union have much insight about the Soviet system and have perspective
about how Belarus has changed since the Soviet era.
Most of subjects in this study live and work in Minsk, as well as other Belarussian cities:
Maladechna, Baranovichy, Zhodina, and Barisov. A few subjects lived in affluent suburbs just
outside the city. In general, I chose to focus on urban subjects as opposed to rural ones since the
literature was not claiming there was a major change of the moral economy of rural Belarussians

(Manaev et al. 2014:96; Engelking 2013, 2001). Even the recent scholarship of the August 9, 2020
Election Protest Movement does not claim that rural Belarussians have changed significantly
(Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021; Manaev 2020).

In fact, Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021:60)

specifically stresses the “urban nature of this ‘spontaneous popular revolt.’” Roughly the same
number of men and women subjects were recruited for the study among the working class and
middle class. Unfortunately, I was not unable to recruit any women capitalists.
Based on Hochschild (2016), I mainly relied on 8 of the workers in this dissertation of the
total 18 workers in the study. Following Hochschild (2016), I chose the 8 workers who best
represented the other workers in the study. I featured 4 workers who supported President
Lukashenka: Lena, a 65-year-old retired fabric factory worker; Masha, 55, year-old electronics
factory worker; Yury, a 50-year factory worker; Oleg, 62-year-old former factory worker who has
been working at a state-owned grocery store for the last 20 years. I also featured four workers who
did not support President Lukashenka: Tanya 50-year-old retail worker, Dennis a 45-year-old
electrician, Svetlana, 41-year-old automotive parts factory worker, and Sasha a 40-year-old
shampoo factory worker.
In general, Pro-Lukashenka workers are very conservative, reserved, and not very “open”
(Manaev 2020; Ioffe 2014, 2004; Furman 1999). Knowing this fact, it was not surprising that they
were far less likely to agree to participate in the study. To deal with this, I reserved roughly half
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of the sample of workers for pro-Lukashenka workers and reserved the other half for the subjects
who were not.
I recruited 12 middle-class professionals and featured 6 in this dissertation. Yan, 54-yearold IT manager: Olga 54 yea-old former teacher who now workers as an administrator at a public
hospital; Nina a 52-year-old economist; Dima a 42-year-old independent tractor trailer driver;
Anna 62-year-old private food -processing factory manager; and Boris, a 48-year-old IT manager.
While a few of my middle-class subjects passively supported President Lukashenka, I was
unfortunately unable to recruit any middle-class subjects who were strong supporters of the
president at the time of my interviews (although, interestingly, at least one became a strong
supporter of President Lukashenka before the August 9, 2020 presidential election).
I also interviewed 5 capitalists and featured 4 in this dissertation. Again, I was unable to
recruit any women capitalists to participate. I was also unable to recruit any capitalists who
supported President Lukashenka. I featured Ivan, a 51-year-old owner of a small printing company
with about 10 fulltime workers; Pavel, a 50-year-old owner of 3 clothing stores and a warehouse
with over 100 workers; Vlad, 48-year-old automotive parts factory owner with over 600 workers;
and Stas, 63-year-old shampoo factory owner with over 1,500 workers.

Subject Recruitment and Potential Confirmation Bias
In order to minimize the risk of identification of any subjects who were critical of President
Lukashenka, I cannot reveal the details of how they were recruited. Even if I changed their names,
which I have, it would be easy to identify any of them if I included the details of their recruitment.
I do, however, have much more leeway discussing the recruitment of the subjects who supported
President Lukashenka. In fact, for many reading this study, these subjects are of much more
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interest since their social, economic and political views are much closer to my own personal
beliefs. A critical assessment of this study would require exploring any potential confirmation
bias in choosing these subjects. For example, I might have unconsciously chosen these subjects
since they agree with me or I might have chosen subjects that were accessible in my social
networks in which there would be a higher likelihood of their sharing my beliefs. Although as a
Marxist I am very sympathetic to the workers in this study, and share many aspects of their outlook,
the truth is I do not have any close relationships with any Belarussian workers in general and I am
not close with any of the workers in this study.
The workers in this study who supported President Lukashenka who are featured heavily
in this dissertation were recruited as follows: Yury a 50-year factory worker was found by one of
my contacts who was assisting me in finding workers with little education. Yury only has a basic
9-year education. At first Yury was hesitant, but only agreed when my contact said I would pay

him 50 rubles for the interview (roughly $25 dollars at the time of the interview). Upon meeting,
Yury insisted that I pay him 50 rubles an hour, which I did. We met four times each time for one
hour.
I met Oleg, 62-year-old former factory worker who has been working at a state-owned
grocery store for the last 20 years at the grocery store in which he works that I often frequent. We
developed a rapport over a few years. Like Yury, Oleg also only has 9 years of basic education.
Oleg was also very hesitant to be interviewed. He eventually agreed only if I bought him a bottle
of high-end cognac. I interviewed him twice.
I met Masha, 55-year-old electronics factory worker at the pool I swim at, in which she
worked part-time in the coatroom. Masha and I developed a friendly report over the last few
seasons and she readily agreed to be interviewed without any preconditions.
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Lena, a 65-year-old retired fabric factory worker lives nearby and I often chatted with her
outside in the courtyard. Like Oleg and Masha, I developed a report with her over a few years and
she agreed to be interviewed without any preconditions. However, it would not be true to say we
were friends. The extent of our relationship is chatting in the courtyard. I have never been invited
inside her home and likely never will.

Interviews
The interviews were usually 2 - 4 hours, though some were even longer, and were done at
the subjects’ convenience. If more time was needed subjects were asked whether they would be
willing to meet again. The interviews were in Russian and/or English. All subjects participated
voluntarily and provided written informed consent (in Russian or English). Most interviews were
audio-recorded and were translated and transcribed for further analysis. Only subjects’ first names
were used in interviews. Fake names were used in transcripts and other identifying facts changed
ensuring little chance of identification.
These interviews included both life-histories and semi-structured questions designed to
reveal subjects' experiences of the changes taking place in the country from the time it was part of
the Soviet Union until now. Subjects discussed their lives and experiences in the Soviet Union, as
well their thoughts about the Soviet system. They also talked about how Belarus has changed since
then. I asked subjects about President Alexander Lukashenka and the role he has played in Belarus
and the role he plays now. From there I focused very heavily on subjects’ views of Belarus’ stateowned industrial sector in general; whether they supported
privatization.

it or whether they supported its

I also asked about subsidizing it to prevent unemployment and many other

questions.
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Belarus’ Socially-Oriented Privatization Program was a major focus of the interviews as
well. The socially-oriented privatization program requires, among other things, that before a statefirm is privatized the new investor must guarantee to maintain the current wages and number of
workers.

I was interested in exploring subjects’ views about these specific wage and job

protections at newly privatized state-firms. Although initially I was focused on the specific wage
and job protections of the socially-oriented privatization program, this inquiry led to a much
broader discussion of fair wages and profits: whether it was “fair” for private owners, in general,
to lower wages or cut jobs in order to increase profits at already profitable firms. Through this
inquiry it appeared that most workers in the study supported wage and job protections for all
private sector workers not merely for former state firms that were privatized.
Initially I did not plan on exploring Marx’s concept of surplus value or his critique of
capitalist social relations of production as inherently exploitive since they are based on the

capitalist’s appropriation of surplus value from the worker. However, as the study progressed, it
was becoming more apparent that the workers do not share Marx’s fundamental critique of wage
labor (appropriating surplus value). Overall, the workers did not see capitalist social relations of
production as inherently exploitive but merely defended the worker’s “right” to a “fair wage.” The
workers also, almost without exception, accepted the owner’s “right” to make profits. Eventually,
I began explicitly questioning subjects about Marx’s theory of surplus value using everyday

language and contacted the subjects who had been previously interview to see whether they would
agree to additional questions.
Besides the state-owned industrial sector, the Belarussian state is very involved in the
economy and directly intervenes into the economy for more than Western countries. For example,
in 2016, Motovelo, a motorcycle/bicycle manufacturer, after being privatized was re-nationalized
and its owner arrested on the grounds that the new owner was “withdrawing capital” and “harming
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the public interest” (Belarus-in-Focus 2016a). I explored subjects’ views about the legitimacy of
the state intervention at Motovelo, or other similar examples, (real or hypothetical) if subjects were
not aware of what happened at Motovelo.
I also explored an interesting topic that I called “neoliberal practices” such as “killer
acquisitions” (buying a competitor merely to shut it down eliminating competition and cornering
the market) and “asset stripping,” which “is the process of buying an undervalued company with

the intent of selling off its assets to generate a profit for shareholders” without regard for the
company’s future viability1 and obviously of its workers. I also brought up the example of selling
a large productive and profitable factory (with many workers) to real-estate developers (this could
be seen as an example asset stripping as well). Through discussing these examples, I explored
subjects’ views on neoliberal ideology and whether there should be limits on the free market and
private property rights.
Another important inquiry during the interviews was exploring subjects’ views about
“egalitarianism” and “inequality.” Would subjects like to see inequality decrease significantly?
What level of inequality was acceptable? What efforts could be taken to decrease inequality etc.
In this section I also asked several questions about progressive taxation and taxation in general as
a means of decreasing inequality. I also explored how subjects interpret terms like “socialism,”
“capitalism” and “Soviet” themselves and what kind of system Belarus is today. I also asked
which system: socialism or capitalism, was closer to their value system. Every subject was also
questioned about a broad range of public programs and spending preferences.

Investopedia, “Asset Stripping,” June 29, 2021, by James Chen,
(https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/assetstripping.asp)
1
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Eliciting Worker’s Moral Economy
Like Reinarman, the key challenge of this study was to ask questions that would elicit my
subjects’ moral economy even though moral economy is often unconscious and dormant. This
important “unconscious” or “dormant” feature of moral economy was discussed in detail in
Chapter 2 from a theoretical perspective. Namely that moral economy lies dormant until awakened
by free-market ideology. However, this key aspect of moral economy is not only important
theoretically, but also of great importance methodologically—especially for qualitative
researchers trying to elicit subjects’ moral economy. Allow me to quote Reinarman’s very
insightful passage on this issue again:
What I have been calling the social charter [moral economy2] is not a clearly definable or
understood concept. It is not a bounded body of beliefs that is easy to identify, nor even a
part of the currency in social science such as party identification. To the extent that my
subjects could be said to perceive a social charter, then, it was generally tacit in nature, a

construct whose features must be culled inferentially from the moving targets of values,
beliefs, and behaviors. Indeed, the purpose of the social charter construct is precisely to
give some order to this culling and inferring process. Clearly, even if asked, most people
would not say, ‘My sense of the social charter is…’ My hope, then, has been that by asking
specific questions about issues and policies that bear upon the state-market relation, and by
giving my respondents room for discursive detailed answers, I could elicit from them a
more explicit sense of how they see that relation (Reinarman 1987:161 see also p. 7)
I discussed in Chapter 2 that although Reinarman did not explicitly focus on confronting
his subjects with free-market ideology (in order to awaken their moral economies) there was no
doubt that a key aspect of Reinarman’s “probing” questions (p.18) was in fact confronting his
subjects with free-market ideology. In Chapter 2 I cited three illustrative examples of these kinds
of questions. I will reproduce one of them again to illustrate this point:

2

Note, that Reinarman uses the term “social charter” synonymously with moral economy (p.18).
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Reinarman: “I offered the argument that economic decisions are best left to the market:”
Marc Driscoll: “Oh, that’s crazy. That’s stupid. I’m idealistic but I am not an ostrich.
There are people out there that aren’t that nice! I think we need some basic protections; that’s what
government is for. Otherwise we’d have a Hobbesian society. That’s not civilization” (p. 135136).
While some aspects of my subjects’ moral economy were fairly straightforward (for
example support the state-owned industrial sector) many others required Reinarman’s “probing”
approach. Namely, I also confronted subjects with free-market ideology and elicited their moral
economy in the form of moral outrage, indignation, disbelief.
In Chapter 2 I discussed an exchange with the Oleg, a 62-year-old worker. Oleg reacted
with moral outrage—to say the least—when I asked him about an owner laying off workers to
increase profits. Allow me to reproduce this exchange in this section:
Q: (94) “Why should an employer be forbidden from laying-off workers if that is more
profitable?”
Oleg: Why should they fire people if the company is profitable? If people work well, why
should they be fired?
Q: “For example it would be more profitable to cut those positions.”
Oleg: “It is against the law! We have laws—labor laws. You just can’t fire someone.
There must be a reason!”

Angrily, Oleg questioned me:
“Do you agree with that? You think people who are working hard and doing their jobs
well should just be fired for no reason?”
Q: “I’m just posing the question.”
Oleg: I can’t believe that someone who is working hard doing his job well would be fired
for no reason.
Q: “The reason would be economical. It would be more profitable to get rid of him.”
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Oleg: “That is ridiculous! That is completely ridiculous! What you are saying is someone
can come to my store and fire me even though I am doing my job well, working hard,
coming to work every day. That is unfair. I am completely against that!”
When confronted with free-market ideology Oleg reacted harshly with moral outrage and
though this might have been the strongest reaction in the study, every worker in the study (and
most of the middle-class subjects) reacted to free-market ideology with moral outrage, indignation
and utter disbelief. Lena, a 65-year-old retired worker would not even entertain my hypothetical
questions about privatization: “I am categorically against privatization!” Here is an example of a
worker, Tanya, a 51-year-old woman reacting with disbelief when confronted with free-market
ideology.
Q: Should unprofitable state firms be allowed to fail?
Tanya: Maybe not to fail--So you are saying if it a state factory doesn’t make any profits it
is better to close it? --

Q: Yes
Tanya: …. We should not close them since people will lose their jobs…we do not need
unemployment—it is horrible!
Along with moral outrage, subjects reacted with disbelief throughout the study when
confronted with free-market ideology and just like Tanya, they often repeated or re-phrased my
question. Here is another example, from Dennis a 45- year-old worker. Like Tanya, Dennis
reacted with disbelief and also rephrased my question:
Q: Should Belarus’ state-owned factories and firms be privatized?
Dennis: You mean sell to private hands?
Q: Yes
Dennis: I am against that. Because there are risks. Private owners could ruin the factory
and the government will not be able to help you…. I think that all large companies must be
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controlled by the government…In private hands the director of the factory is a Tsar or God without
any control by the government. The government must control the factories.”
Throughout the study workers reacted with moral outrage, indignation, and disbelief—
demonstrating their moral economy had been elicited. And, on the other hand, most of the
capitalists and some of the middle-class subjects responded with similar moral outrage and
especially indignation when confronted with a moral economy. For example, Boris, a middle-

class manager at large tech firm bitterly rejected the wage and job protections of Belarus sociallyoriented privatization program as “crazy!” and “not fair, obviously!” Boris indignantly and
defiantly opposed protecting wages and jobs, in general, even at profitable firms:
Boris: “Of course [the owner] should be allowed to cut the number of workers to increase
his profits.”
Q: The factory was already profitable though.
Boris: “Then it will be more profitable!
Pavel, a capitalist with about 100 workers reacted even more harshly when asked a similar
question:
It’s none of the worker’s damn business how much money the factory owner makes!
…
He agreed to a contract that says how much money is paid for this kind of work. It is not
a collective farm! When I hire a worker, he needs to do the work and go home and it is
none of his business how much profits I am making or what I plan on doing with the profits.
He either agrees or disagrees with the wages that I am offering for the work.
(In the next section I will also discuss the capitalist, Stas, and his harsh condemnation of
Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector and his praise for Lithuania’s neoliberal model in the context
of narrativization analysis (Allison 1994).)
In Chapter 2 I discussed the relationship between moral economy and free-market ideology
and that the neoliberal ideology of the capitalists in this study not only adds theoretical complexity
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but methodologically helps clarify workers’ moral economy. In this sense, methodologically, my
study had a tremendous advantage over Reinarman’s. Reinarman only interviewed two different
groups of workers (private sector and public sector). His study did not include any middle-class
or capitalist subjects. Reinarman was limited to confronting his workers with the dominant freemarket narratives in the media at the time of his study. He did not, however, have the opportunity
to explore the actual free-market ideology of the capitalists. In my study, however, I had the
luxury of comparing and contrasting the moral economy of the workers with the free-market
ideology of the capitalists (and some of the middle-class subjects). I could look at the same
question or issue from both opposing perspectives or narrativizations at the same time. (I will
discuss narrativizations in greater detail in the next section). Recall, moral economy only exists in
relation and opposition to free-market ideology. This is not only important theoretically but of
great importance methodologically, since both the moral economy and free-market ideology
elicited in this study are both simply antagonistic mirror-images of each other: confronting the
workers with free-market ideology will evoke their moral economy and confronting the capitalists
with moral economy will evoke their neoliberal ideology and a harsh condemnation of the moral
economy. Therefore, by comparing and contrasting my moral economy findings with the freemarket ideology of the capitalists in this study, I can be confident that my findings were valid.
Taking both outlooks, I could see subtle nuances and flush out the workers’ moral economy more
fully than merely having interviewed workers. Furthermore, not only did the free-market ideology
of the capitalists in this study provide a methodological safeguard to ensure my findings about the
workers’ moral economy were accurate, they also gave me insight into the workers’ moral
economy even when aspects of their moral economy remained largely unspoken and unconscious.

116

Workers’ Deeply-Held Moral Economy as Opposed to Superficial Ideologies
Before going on I want to reiterate an important methodological concept that arose in this
study that was discussed in Chapter 2. Namely, there was a clear difference between the workers’
moral economy and their superficial ideologies. Moral economy evoked moral outrage while
superficial ideologies did not. These superficial ideologies are easily contradicted when they come
into conflict with one’s moral economy. There were numerous examples of this throughout the
study. An example of this concept from Chapter 2 was the question:
Should private owners be free to run their business as they choose?
Almost every worker in this study rather matter-of-factly answered “Yes,” without any
strong emotions, moral outrage, indignation or disbelief. Although they answered “Yes,” they all
went on to discuss in great detail numerous restrictions on private business owner—including
restricting the owner from laying off workers or lowering workers’ wages, even if doing so would
increase profits. It seems obvious that workers in this study clearly do not believe that private
owners should be free to run their business as they choose.
The moral economy qualitative methodology literature is not well-developed — and, as
discussed previously, in general, “Thompson’s notion of moral economy is relatively underutilized in sociology” (Ibrahim 2014:82). Be that as it may, however, it is clear from the existing
literature that moral outrage is a vital part of moral economy—in fact, as discussed in Chapter 2,
for Thompson moral outrage is synonymous with moral economy. Therefore, methodologically,
the qualitative moral economy researcher can readily distinguish between superficial ideologies
and moral economy based on subjects’ emotional response. When eliciting workers’ moral
outrage, indignation, and disbelief, researchers can be sure they are eliciting the workers’ moral
economy. And, like the example above, methodologically, seeming contradictions can be resolved
when examining which concept elicited an emotional reaction. In this way we can distinguish
methodologically between one’s deeply-held moral economy and superficial ideologies.
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Coding and Analysis
In this next section I will focus on coding and analysis, however, much of the previous
discussion in this chapter (as well as parts of Chapter 2) could easily sit in this section. For the
brevity’s sake I will not repeat them. In this section I will mainly focus on the established
qualitative methodologies I relied on for coding and analysis and how I approached coding and
analysis in this study. Like Reinarman (1987:19), I also relied on key elements of grounded theory

and analytic induction in my coding and analysis:
[O]ngoing comparisons, constant searches for the negative case, continuous revision of the
hypothesis generated and attention to quibbling qualifications and subtle variations
(Glasser and Strauss 1967; Katz 1982). This method, too, then is capable of identifying
links between the local and the world beyond it. It is capable, if used well, of providing
what Howard Becker (1970) has called a touchstone for theories grand and otherwise—
capable, that is, of showing us how well our abstract ideas about social life work in
accounting for concrete social lives (For grounded theory see also Patton 2015;
Hammersley 2010; Burck 2005; Glaser and Strauss 1967), and for analytic induction see
also Patton 2015; Hammersley 2011; 2010; Denzin 2017; Burck 2005; Katz 2001; Becker
1953). (Grounded theory and analytic induction will both be discussed in more detail
shortly).
Furthermore, I relied heavily on key elements of narrative analysis and narrativization in
my coding and analysis (Forchtner 2021; Fitzgerald and Douglas 2020; Herman and Vervaeck
2019; Cada and Ptackova 2017;; Presser and Sandburg 2015; Ragan 2013; Reisman 2008; Phibbs
2007; Burck 2005; Kane 2004; Park-fuller 1995; Allision 1994; Sperling 1994; Sommers 1992;
Steinmetz 1992; White 1981; Labov and Waletzky 1967), especially Allison’s (1994)
phenomenological conception of narrativization (see also Fox 2013; Park-Fuller 1995).
Though Reinarman did not explicitly discuss the literature of narrative analysis and
narrativization in his methodology section, it is clear he also relied heavily on these concepts.
118

First, his study was based on comparing workers’ narratives. Second, he explicitly states that he
“tried to get at [his subjects’] visions of what was and was not legitimate about the state vis-à-vis
the market” (p.18; emphasis added). There can be no doubt that his subjects’ visions of what is
legitimate are narrativizations (Fox 2013; Park-Fuller 1995; Allison 1994). And last, in general,
moral economy itself is a kind of narrativization. (I will discuss this specific concept in greater
detail later in this section).
In my study, narratives in general played a very important role in in organizing and
structuring my coding and analyzing of the data. Like in Reinarman’s study, during the coding
process itself each subject’s life-history/in-depth interview (containing the subjects’ narratives)
was re-written as a narrative or template (Patton 2015:797). In other words, I compiled a narrative
from each subjects’ transcripts (raw data). While I attempted to be as objective as possible during
this process there is no doubt that these narratives that I constructed from each subject’s transcripts
were influenced by my subjective ideologies (Kane 2004; Reinarman 1987) and, in general, boiling
down several of hours of interview transcripts into a neat 10-15-page narrative summary
accurately is always done at great risk. Reinarman explains the inherent risks of this process well:
[M]y sketches are attempts to summarize in a few pages interview transcripts of about one
hundred pages each, which were themselves attempts by my subjects to summarize their
biographies and beliefs in a few hours. So, although I have sought to preserve the
particularity of these people, I cannot claim to have avoided reductionism and
oversimplification. I can only claim that I made every effort to summarize faithfully the
unique configurations of concerns, values, and opinions expressed to me (p. 39-40).
Compiling a relatively compact (and manageable) narrative for each subject was a crucial
part of my coding and analysis. These templates were more accessible for comparison (Patton
2015:797) and furthermore, the content of these narrative templates (which again consist of
narratives) was carefully coded and analyzed. In this sense, I “turn[ed] narrative into data…linking
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the story form to the [theoretical] map” through the “commonly mobiliz[ed] techniques of
qualitative data collection and analysis” (Kane 2004:306).”
The narratives that I constructed from the raw data (life-history/in-depth interview
transcripts) began with the subject’s early life-history and (in most cases) impressions and
experience of the Soviet Union and Soviet socialism. This narrative also included the subject’s
experience and understanding of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the 1994 election of
President Lukashenka and continued to the present time focusing on many key aspects of Belarus’
unique socio-economic system and with great attention on their views of Belarus’ state-owned
industrial sector as well as capitalist social relations of production. In general, the workers in the
study strongly supported the Soviet Union, Soviet socialism and Soviet egalitarianism. They
strongly believed in the goals of Soviet society and saw them as legitimate. The narrative of the
capitalists (and some of the middle-class subjects), however, was the opposite. They strongly
rejected Soviet socialism and egalitarianism and saw Soviet society as fundamentally flawed,
running against human nature and individuals’ desire for self-improvement and development.
In general, according to the workers’ narratives President Lukashenka was the leader who
“saved” Belarus, and who saved Belarus’ state-owned factories, agriculture, government services,
etc. The electronics worker Masha captured this well:
Belarus was a nightmare [in the early 1990’s]! The garbage was not being picked up from
the buildings. The stores had nothing. We needed coupons to buy basic necessities. There
were no TVs to buy; no shoes to buy; no refrigerators. Nothing was working. MAZ [Minsk
Autoworks] and MTZ [Minsk Tractor Works] were just sitting there
Masha credits President Lukashenka for saving Belarus:
President Lukashenka inherited a completely ruined country in complete chaos
The narrative of the capitalist subjects (and some of the middle class), is however, in
complete opposition. Stas captures this stark contrast very well.
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Stas did not credit President Lukashenka for “saving” Belarus but for “ruining” it.
Q: “Didn’t Lukashenka save the state factories?”
Stas: “No, he did not save them, he kept them in the same bad condition.”
Q: “But in other republics, like the Baltic state, the factories were all privatized or closed?”
Stas: “No, uncompetitive factories were closed. They were closed since they were not
competitive with international firms. They could not compete and had to be closed. [Now]
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia all have higher standards of living than Belarus. Their
pensions are much higher. Their salaries are much higher. The average Lithuanian salary
is 600 Euros a month! Lukashenka mesmerized Belarussians with this propaganda that
destroying non-competitive companies is wrong. No! It is a good thing. It is development.
Belarussians look at this [closing factories] as a tragedy, when in reality it is an opportunity
to grow and develop. It is a challenge.”

Narratives and Narrativization
Relying heavily on Allison’s (1994) phenomenological conception of narrativization, a

critical part of my coding and analysis was distinguishing (and discovering) my subjects’
narrativizations from their narratives (Fox 2013; Park-Fuller 1995; Allison 1994).
[N]arration (the act of telling) is a basic act that is always embedded in an ongoing
narratization. A narratization is the lived narrative configuration of an extended temporal
event that has not yet achieved closure, yet its end, sighted in advance, serves as the basis
for selecting actions (including verbal actions) to achieve that end. Narrating, then, is one
strategy among many for achieving the envisioned end of a narratization (Allison cited in
Park-Fuller 1995:62-63)
…
Allison’s phenomenological approach gives the subject’s
…
[L]ived experience a temporal frame (a beginning, middle, and projected end) … taking on
the roles of the teller and protagonist (framing and shaping the story as we live it) ParkFuller 1995:62).
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Allison’s phenomenological conception of narrativization is, in fact, very similar to what
other theorists have called “meta-narratives” or “grand narratives (Gonzalez 2020; Young 2011;
Boon 2005; Lyotard 1979). Meta-narratives are narratives of narratives:
Narratives are considered ‘meta,’ when they ‘structure many specific narratives, both
fictional and nonfictional’ (Shumway 2014). (Gonzalez 2020:590)
Simply put:
[A meta-narrative] is a theory that tries to give a totalizing, comprehensive account to
various historical events, experiences, and social, cultural phenomena based upon the
appeal to universal truth or universal values3
There is a growing body of literature on strategic narrative analysis (Flaherty and Roselle
2018:54; see also Xin and Mathewson 2018; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2017). This
analysis “focuses particularly on grand narratives, such as the Cold War or globalization.” (Xin
and Mathewson 2018:4250-51).

In general, strategic narratives are similar to Allison’s

phenomenological narrativization:
Strategic narratives are a means by which political actors attempt to construct a shared
meaning of the past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behavior of
domestic and international actors (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2017:6).
I have chosen, however, to rely heavily on Allison’s narrativization for my coding and
analysis as opposed to strategic narrative analysis. No doubt the general concept of a strategic
narrative is an important part of my coding and analysis (Generally speaking, Allison’s
narrativization relies on strategic narratives), however, the formal strategic narrative literature
tends to focus too heavily on macro-level discourses and “international relations” (Flaherty and
Roselle 2018:54), to be well-suited for my research study that focusses on the micro-level.

3

New World Encyclopedia, “Metanarrative,” (https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Metanarrative).
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Furthermore, the strategic narrative analysis literature focusses too heavily on what makes a
strategic narrative successful as opposed to discovering them, analyzing their meaning and
underlying belief systems:
The analytic problem they [strategic narratives] identify is partly one of how consensus is
fostered around shared meaning and of how those claims to consensus are negated or
contested (Xin and Matheson 2018:4250)
Moreover, strategic narrative analysis, in general, focuses too heavily on media and
communication theory to be relevant to my study:
The growing field of strategic narratives helps conceptually tie together international
relations and communication theory by formulating ways of analyzing the messages actors
send through the new media system as they attempt to structure the international system
(Flaherty and Roselle 2018:54)
I have also chosen Allison’s narrativization for coding and analysis as opposed to a

qualitative analysis based more generally on meta-narratives or grand narratives as coding
categories (see for example Gonzalez 2020; Polletta 2006, 1998). However, in many ways the
distinction between narrativization and meta-narrative is purely semantic.

Furthermore,

throughout this study I do refer to subjects’ neoliberal narratives. And my often-used term
neoliberal outlook clearly implies a neoliberal meta-narrative. This kind of categorization fits
neatly into a meta-narrative analysis. Though this kind of meta-narrative analysis is well-suited to

analyze well-established narratives or grand narratives such as neoliberalism, focusing specifically
on grand narratives, the analysis “risks remaining somewhat disconnected from the specifics of
the symbols and texts that reference those narratives” (Xin and Matheson 2018:4250-51).
Therefore, I chose narrativization analysis since it would be more sensitive to the subject’s
personal and unique narrativizations (Fox 2013; Kane 2004; Park-Fuller 1995; Allision 1994).
Narrativization analysis was especially important for coding and analysis since the meta-narratives
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of the workers in this study, as opposed to the capitalists, could not be easily categorized based on
any existing literature. Choosing narrativization analysis as opposed to meta-narrative analysis
gave my coding and analysis the sensitivity and flexibility needed to deal with the workers’ metanarratives (moral economy) that do not fit neatly into any well-established categories in the
existing literature.

Allison’s Phenomenological Conception Narrativization
Allison’s phenomenological conception of narrativization was crucial for me when coding
and analyzing the data. However, this approach differs greatly from other conceptions of
narrativization.
Phenomenological explanations of narrative are significantly different from the oftcelebrated structural interpretation of narration championed by rhetorician Walter Fisher.
According to Fisher (1984), people make sense of the world and share a common reality
by projecting an arbitrary narrative structure—complete with temporal relationships,
heroes, and villains—on chaotic phenomena …[only] after we have experienced a series
of disordered events. Phenomenologists, on the other hand, claim that humans are
‘‘storylivers’’…or that temporal expectations of a story shape the very way we perceive
phenomena, regardless of whether or not we know the beginning of a tale or have witnessed
its conclusion (Allison, 1994) (Fox 2013:191-2; italics in original).

When coding I always kept in mind that “narratization is a means of structuring
experience” (Park-Fuller 1995:63; see also Kane 2004) and looked for the narrativizations behind
my subjects’ narratives. For example, earlier in this section I discussed my subjects’ impressions
and experience of the Soviet Union and Soviet socialism. Overall, the narratives between the
workers and capitalists differed greatly. Underlying those different narratives were opposing
narrativizations that stood in stark contrast and represented vastly different ways of seeing the
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world, the role of the state and social priorities. When coding, the same phenomenon could be
seen when discussing Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector. No doubt the workers and capitalists
had very different narratives about the state factories. Recall the passages I quoted from the
subjects Natasha and Stas earlier in this section. Not only does Natasha support the state-owned
industrial sector—this is obvious from her narratives—but has an underlying narrativization that
sees state ownership as beneficial for society. In fact, at one point during our interview she
basically says this directly:
I am against privatization! It is better for a company to stay owned by the state since the
director will be more responsible. The private owner will only care about himself!
[The overwhelming majority of workers in this study completely agreed with Natasha’s
sentiment and made similar statements—and practically every worker in this study believed that
the private owners must be heavily regulated and restrained.]
Stas’ above-cited passage clearly shows a narrative against state ownership and
diametrically opposed to Natasha’s.

The narrativization behind Stas’ narrative is clearly

neoliberal. Overall, the other capitalists (and some of the middle-class subjects) said very similar
things, which I argue derive from their neoliberal narrativizations.
Many other narratives in this study were practically narrativizations in themselves and
required little interpretation. This was true among the workers and capitalists. Stas’ above-cited
passage is a good example among the capitalists in this study. Stas clearly supports neoliberal
economic development and sees Lithuania’s successful neoliberal transformation as a model and
vision for Belarus. Among the workers let’s look at Yury, who strongly supported Belarus’ stateowned industrial sector:
Most factories are government owned….it is the major part of the economy for most
people. It is the biggest part of life of the republic of Belarus….
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The worker Oleg also had narratives that were practically narrativizations in themselves:
These factories are supposed to be owned by the government. The government should
control them so that no one rob or steal these companies. These companies are owned by
the people of Belarus. This is part of our

history and culture. These factories belong to

the people of Belarus, themselves—not the president, not the government but the
Belarusian people themselves. The government has to protect them [state-factories]. Of
course, the government has to protect them more than privately-owned factories because
the government must protect the people.
Oleg’s narrative clearly conveys a narrativization that not only supports state ownership of
the major factories, but that state-ownership of the major factories is a fundamental part of the
fabric of Belarussian society.

An Envisioned End of a Narrativization
An important part of Allison’s phenomenological conception of narrativization is that the
narrativization has an envisioned end that has not yet been achieved and that the process of
narrating itself “is one strategy among many for achieving the envisioned end of a narratization”
(Allison cited in Park-Fuller 1995:62-63; compare with strategic narratives Flaherty and Roselle
2018:54; Xin and Mathewson 2018; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2017). In this study,
this envisioned end can clearly be seen by the subjects whom I categorized as having a neoliberal
narrativization. Again, relying on Stas as an example, it is clear that he clearly envisions a
neoliberal future, including mass privatization and free-labor market etc. Although I had six hours
of interview with Stas, just in the short passage quoted earlier it is clear that he sees President
Lukashenka’s actions (preventing privatization of state plants) as a hinderance to Belarus’ socioeconomic development. (This narrative was widespread among the capitalists and some of the
middle-class subjects in this study).

Stas contentiously proposes the narrative (or counter
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narrative) of Lithuania—a supposed neoliberal success story—as a strategy toward achieving his
goal of an envisioned future neoliberal society. (The idea of a “contentious narrative” is wellestablished in the general literature Flaherty and Roselle 2018; see also Gonzalez 2020 who refers
to “contentious story telling” or “anti-story” (p.589).) The narrative or counter-narrative of
Lithuania as a successful neoliberal society was widespread in this study among the capitalists and
some of the middle-class subjects and I will discuss it in more detail in a later section. I will even
explore whether or not it is true, however, whether or not it is actually true is entirely irrelevant
for the purpose of narrativization and achieving an envisioned goal through narrating.

Narrativization and Moral Economy
Earlier in this section I discussed the similarities between narrativization and metanarratives. A similar comparison can be made between narrativization and moral economy.
Ultimately, moral economy is a kind of narrativization and certainly narratizing is a major part of
moral economy. Furthermore, throughout this discussion the term moral economy could have
easily been used instead of narrativization when referring to the workers. No doubt narrativization
is far broader than moral economy and deals with issues much broader than strictly economic
issues, such as coping with breast cancer (Park-Fullerton 1995), prostitution in Lima, Peru (Lane
2004:305), criminology (Lane 2004) stereotypes about homosexuals (Fox 2003), etc.
The notion that phenomenological narrativization “is a means of structuring experience”
(Park-Fuller 1995:63) and “shape[s] the very way we perceive phenomena… (Allison, 1994)” (Fox
2013:191-2) fits very well into concept of moral economy.

However, the conception of

narrativization including a “beginning, middle, and projected end” (Park-Fuller 1995:63) does not
always fit neatly into the concept of moral economy. For example, although the capitalists clearly
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had an unfulfilled projected end, most of the workers in this study, however, did not. This nuance,
however, seems to be explained by the fact that overall, Belarus’ socio-economic system tends to
be more of a reflection of the workers’ moral economy than of the capitalists’ neoliberal outlook.
Moral economy, therefore, does have an envisioned end, when it is threatened with freemarket forces. And it is clear from my study and the Belarus literature in general that after the
breakup of the Soviet Union, Belarussian workers’ narrativization clearly had an unfulfilled

envisioned end.
In the early 1990’s, the workers clearly rejected neoliberalism, privatization, and shock
therapy in favor of a different vision of society (Kulakevich 2014:890; Yarashevich 2014; Ioffe
2014, 2004; Ambrosio 2006:15; Furman 1999). Manaev et al. (2011) specifically referred to
“restoring ‘fairness’” (p.99; see also Matsuzato 2004:242) and the “fair distribution of prosperity”
(p.95). In the early 1990’s an unfulfilled projected end was clearly part of Belarussian workers’
narrativization. Today, if threatened with market-forces, a projected end would emerge again.
And, in my study, I was able explore that potential projected end by confronting the workers with
free-market ideology.
In spite of some nuances, moral economy does appear to be a kind of narrativization.
Specifically, moral economy is a narrativization about what is fair and what is not fair within the
economic sphere. These narratives, mobilized by the workers against economic relations that they
believed to be illegitimate, played a crucial role in Thompson’s formulation of the concept of moral
economy and are present throughout his research. For Thompson (1971), these very narratives
made it clear that the workers’ militant actions and food riots were not “instinctive” (p.136),
“compulsive” (p.76), “direct, spasmodic, and irrational response to hunger” but rather “selfconscious” and “self-activating” (p.136) and that these crowds had a “legitimizing notion” (p.78).
All of these are very close Allision’s concept of narrativization. Furthermore, as discussed in
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Chapter 2, Thompson explicitly described moral economy as a set of assumptions and as a differing
discourse. Ultimately, moral economy, with a few nuances, appears to be a kind of narrativization.
Nothing has made my critics angrier than the notion that a food rioter might have been
more ‘moral’ than a disciple of Dr. Adam Smith. But that was not my meaning …I was
discriminating between two different sets of assumptions, two differing discourses, and the
evidence for the difference is abundant (Thompson 1991:271).

Grounded Theory and Analytic Induction
Throughout this section on coding and analyzing, I have been focusing on narrativization,
however, narrativization analysis requires the common “techniques of qualitative data collection
and analysis” (Kane 2004:306). In this respect, I relied on key elements of grounded theory as well
as analytic induction. The reason I stress key elements is that I employed a modified version of
grounded theory, as opposed to a strict interpretation of the theory as it was originally proposed:
Although Glaser and Strauss (1967) proposed that it was both possible and necessary to
approach text without any prior hypotheses, I agree with more recent grounded theory
researchers such as Henwood and Pidgeon (1996) and Charmaz (1995) that this is an
impossibility – researchers’ implicit hypotheses and theoretical interests will always have
an influence. Borrowing therefore from techniques developed in systemic therapy, it seems
important as a researcher to attempt to make explicit one’s hypotheses, often developed
from personal and professional experience and the literature (Burck 2005:245).
Though I could not apply a strict interpretation of grounded theory due to the nature of my
study, key aspects of grounded theory were, however, invaluable to my coding and analysis. The
basic premise of grounded theory—that theories be systematically grounded in the actual data—
was absolutely crucial for me.
“Grounded theory” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) emphasizes becoming immersed in the data—
being grounded—so that embedded meanings and relationships can emerge... The analyst
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becomes implanted in the data. The resulting analysis grows out of that groundedness
(Patton 2015:792).
Grounded theory’s focus on working systematically was also critical for my coding and
analysis:
By systematic, I still mean systematic every step of the way; every stage done
systematically so the reader knows exactly the process by which the published theory was
generated. …Grounded theory produces a core category and continually resolves a main
concern, and through sorting the core category organizes the integration of the theory
(Patton 2015:857).
Grounded theory’s constant comparison method was also absolutely crucial for my coding
and analysis. Patton (2015) explains:
Grounded theory emphasizes steps and procedures for connecting induction and deduction
through the constant comparative method, comparing research sites, doing theoretical
sampling (Morse, 2010), and testing emergent concepts with additional fieldwork. …It
strives to ‘provide researchers with analytical tools for handling masses of raw data.’ It
seeks to help qualitative analysts ‘consider alternative meanings of phenomena.’ It
emphasizes being ‘systematic and creative simultaneously.’ Finally, it elucidates ‘the
concepts that are the building blocks of theory.’ Glaser (1993) and Strauss and Corbin
(1997) (p.184)
…
And if an incident comes his way that is new, he can humbly through constant comparisons
modify his theory to integrate a new property of a category (p.857)
One of the “core technique[s] of grounded theory development” according to Straus and
Corbin is “comparative analysis” (Patton 2015:859). This was critical in my coding and analysis:
Making theoretical comparisons—systematically and creatively… ‘raising questions and
discovering properties and dimensions that might be in the data by increasing researcher
sensitivity’ (p.859).
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I did not merely look for patterns in the data but for “variations in the patterns… in the
data” and “how that pattern varies dimensionally, which is discerned through a comparison of
properties and dimensions under different conditions” (p.859). Concepts were turned “‘inside out’
or ‘upside down’ to obtain a different perspective” (p.859). This process enabled me to develop
higher level theories from my data:
Data go to concepts, and concepts get transcended to a core variable, which is the
underlying pattern. Formal theory is on the fourth level, but the theory can be boundless as
the research keeps comparing and trying to figure out what is going on and what the latent
patterns are. (Glaser, 2000, p. 4) (p.859).
Though I could not say I approached this research without any preconceptions,
“Preconceived questions, or problems” (Patton 2015:857), during the process of interviewing,
coding, and analysis I attempted to allow concepts to “emerge” freely “through the course of the
inquiry” in line with grounded theory (p.857). And although I structured the raw data of each
subject into relatively compact narratives or “templates” that were structured theoretically to
answer specific questions, throughout this process (p.797), however, I still relied on “‘open coding’
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 223), to emphasize the importance of being open to the data” (p. 792).
Through open coding and generally being open to new emerging ideas, several completely
unanticipated hypotheses emerged adding complexity and nuance to this research. A good
example of this was my finding that the workers did not have a Marxist outlook and adamantly
rejected Marx’s concept that capitalist social relations of production (wage labor) were inherently
exploitive. Namely, Marx saw the capitalist’s appropriation of surplus value from the worker as
inherently exploitive. Almost universally, however, the workers in this study rejected Marx’s key
concept of surplus value and that the capitalist’s appropriation of surplus value was inherently
exploitive. In fact, with only one exception, the workers defended the right of the capitalist to
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appropriate surplus value from the worker—and, most, adamantly defended the capitalist’s right
to appropriate surplus value, utterly and dismissively rejecting Marx’s concept of surplus value.
I actually had no intention of exploring Marx’s concept of surplus value or whether the
workers in this study saw the capitalist’s appropriation of surplus value as inherently exploitive.
What I initially set out to do was to explore the subjects’ views on Belarus’ Socially-Oriented
Privatization Program. Namely, before the government privatizes a state-owned company it
requires that the new owner guarantee the workers’ wages and current employment levels. In other
words, under the socially-oriented privatization program, the new investor is neither free to lower
wages in order to increase profits nor free to lay off workers to increase profits. It was from this
limited inquiry into the wage and job protections of the socially-oriented privatization program
that two important concepts emerged. The first concept to emerge was that not only did the
workers, almost universally, support the wage and job protections of the social-oriented
privatization program, they also believed these protections should exist for private-sector workers
in general, especially at large firms. The second concept actually emerged very subtly and
implicitly from the first one. Namely, that the workers did not see capitalist social relations as
inherently exploitive. I will explain.
During my discussion of the wage and job protections of the socially-oriented privatization
program it appeared that the workers believed in the right to a “fair wage.” However, implicit in

the concept of the worker’s right to a fair wage is the owner’s right to a “fair profit”. In fact,
almost universally, the workers believed that private owners “should be free to maximize their
profits,”—however, not at the expense of the workers. As a Marxist, however, this position was
puzzling, since for Marxists all profits are at the expense of the workers. However, the workers
did not appear to see it that way, but seemed to believe in the ideology of a “fair wage.” It reminded
me of the famous line in Marx’s (1865) Value, Price and Profit:
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Instead of the conservative motto, ‘A fair day's wage for a fair day's work!’ they ought to
inscribe on their banner the revolutionary watchword, ‘Abolition of the wages system!’
Clearly, a new hypothesis was emerging. It appeared that the workers did not have a
Marxist outlook and did not see capitalist relations of production as inherently exploitive.
Although I did not focus on this issue at the start of my research. In fact, initially I had assumed
implicitly, based on the literature, that the Soviet (and pro-socialist) mindset of Belarussian
workers, would entail a Marxist outlook in which capitalist social relations of production would
be seen as inherently exploitive. However, this assumption was contradicted throughout my
interviews. A new hypothesis was clearly emerging: namely the workers do not have a Marxist
outlook on the question of appropriation of surplus value. I then began exploring this hypothesis
directly, discussing the topic of the appropriation of surplus value using everyday terms. In fact,
I contacted the subjects I had already interviewed and asked them additional questions about this
topic.
Through the use of key elements of grounded theory, this important concept (that the
workers do not have a Marxist outlook as well as many others), emerged freely from the data—in
spite of my own preconceptions. As discussed earlier in my discussion of grounded theory, this
“emergent concept [was tested] with additional fieldwork,” explored using the “constant
comparison method” (Patton 2015:184), turned “‘inside out’ or ‘upside down’ to obtain a different

perspective” (p.859), each case explored for subtle variation and patterns and how each “pattern
varies dimensionally” (p.859) “trying to figure out what is going on and what the latent patterns
are. (Glaser, 2000, p. 4)” (p.859). Ultimately reaching a theoretical conclusion grounded in the
data.
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Incomplete Theorizing (Theory Bits or Ungrounded Theory)
While coding and analyzing the data I was aware of the potential of merely generating what
Glaser called “theory bits” or “low-lever theorizing without completing the job” (p.859).
According to Glaser, one of the two main sources of “theory bits” comes from
[G]enerating one concept in a study and conjecturing without generating the rest of the
theory. With the juicy concept, the conjecture sounds grounded, but it is not; it is only
experiential (p.860).
In other words, a “theory bit” is an ungrounded theory as opposed to a grounded theory.
It was critical for me to avoid this pitfall during the process of coding and analysis. According to
Glaser, theory bits also come from
a generated substantive theory. A theory bit emerges in normal talk when it is impossible
to relate the whole theory. So, a bit with grab is related to the listener. The listener can then
be referred to an article or a report that describes the whole theory (p.860).
…
[Theory bits] are applied intuitively, with no data, with a feeling of ‘knowing’ as a quick
analysis of a substantive incident or area. They ring true with great credibility. They
empower conceptually and perceptually. They feel theoretically complete (“Yes, that
accounts for it.”). They are exciting handles of explanation. They can run way ahead of the
structural constraints of research. They are simple one or two variable applications, as
opposed to being multivariate and complex…The danger, of course, is that they might be
just plain wrong or irrelevant unless based in a grounded theory (p.860).
Another important issue for me related to theory bits or incomplete theorizing was
confirmation bias. Although confirmation bias is not the same thing as theory bits, confirmation
bias could lead to theory bits or incomplete theorizing if the researcher places to much emphasis
data and patterns that confirm his biases and ignore other data and patterns that contradict them.
No doubt this would lead to theory bits and an incomplete description of the social phenomena
being studied—if not a completely inaccurate description of it. Avoiding this pitfall was very
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important to me, especially—as I discussed previously in section, as a Marxist I am very
sympathetic to the workers. Furthermore, I am very sympathetic to Belarus’ socially-oriented
economic model society, especially its state-owned industrial sector and personally opposed to
capitalism, especially, neoliberal capitalism. With my own biases in mind, I was aware of the
tendency to put too much emphasis on the subjects and data that confirmed my biases. I tried to
avoid this dangerous tendency and constantly re-examined emerging hypotheses to see whether I
was actually working toward developing theories (as opposed to mere theory bits) that described
social reality, or merely confirming my own biases—proposing polemics—instead of engaging in
social research. The fact that numerous hypotheses freely emerged in this research that contradict
my own personal outlook give me confidence that I was not engaging in confirmation bias. For
example, the fact that the workers rejected Marx’s fundamental critique of capitalist social
relations of production as inherently exploitive. Another good example of this is my findings
concerning egalitarianism.
The workers conception of egalitarianism was complicated, contradictory and paradoxical.
The workers’ conception of egalitarianism did not fit into most conceptions of Marxism, socialism,
or communism.

For example, none of the workers in the study supported Soviet-style

egalitarianism—this was true even among the workers who supported Soviet-egalitarianism
during the Soviet era. As discussed previously, every worker in this study defended the right of
an individual to be rich and that it was wrong to put any limits on their wealth. No doubt, as
discussed earlier, this data is contradictory and complex, and requires careful analysis and
interpretation, however, this data (or preliminary findings) certainly does not represent Marxist or
Soviet stereotypes. It is highly unlikely that such data that contradicts Marxism represents
confirmation bias of a Marxist researcher. Besides serving toward refuting confirmation bias, this
example also shows, in line with key elements of grounded theory, that through open coding and
being open to the data, new unanticipated hypotheses were able to emerge freely from the data.
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Analytic Induction
Along with key elements of grounded theory I also relied on key elements of analytic
induction in my coding and analysis—especially “disconfirm[ing] emerging hypotheses through
negative case analysis” (Patton 2015:863-4).

In general, analytic induction, unlike (strict)

grounded theory, begins with hypotheses:
In analytic induction, researchers develop hypotheses, sometimes rough and general
approximations, prior to entry into the field or, in cases where data already are collected,
prior to data analysis. These hypotheses can be based on hunches, assumptions, careful
examination of research and theory, or combinations. Hypotheses are revised to fit
emerging interpretations of the data over the course of data collection and analysis.
Researchers actively seek to disconfirm emerging hypotheses through negative case
analysis, that is, analysis of cases that hold promise for disconfirming emerging hypotheses
and that add variability to the sample. In this way, the originators of the method sought to
examine enough cases to assure the development of universal hypotheses (Patton
2015:863-4).
Many researchers today, however, rely on “modified analytic induction”:
de-emphasized[ing] universality and causality and have emphasized instead the
development of descriptive hypotheses that identify patterns of behaviors, interactions and
perceptions (Patton 2015:863-864)
In general, many aspects of my research study were in line with analytic induction as I
approached this research with several hypotheses—both explicit and implicit—and actively tried

to disprove them with negative case analysis. Furthermore, throughout my interviews and coding
process, new hypotheses emerged in which I relied on negative case analysis to attempt to
disprove. One example that stands out, was discussed in the previous section on grounded theory,
namely that the workers do not have a Marxist outlook and do not see capitalist social relations of
production as inherently exploitive. Besides using key elements of grounded theory to build this
concept, I also used negative case analysis in an attempt to disprove this emerging hypothesis.
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However, upon careful examination, the only negative case (Lena), actually substantiated the
emerging hypothesis. Lena admitted she had “learned somewhere” Marx’s theory of surplus value
and believed that most Belarussians do not think in those terms.
Another important example in which I relied on negative case analysis was exploring the
hypothesis that the workers in this study supported wage and job protections for all private sector
workers. Interestingly, of the 18 workers in this study, the worker Yury was the only exception.

Yury’s outlook was complex and often appeared contradictory. Although he opposed this
regulation (protecting wages and jobs of private sector workers) he adamantly defended Belarus’
state-owned industrial sector—in fact, he wanted to see it expanded. He also believed that the
state had the right to nationalize any private company if it were in the interest of the Belarussian
people. At first, I found Yury’s positions puzzling, baffling, and contradictory. How could it be
that Yury, who had one of the most radical moral economies in this study, rejected wage and job

protections for private sector workers—on the grounds that it was not fair to the private owner?
It was not until careful negative case analysis of all of Yury’s positions and their underlying moral
economy that it became clear that Yury does not anticipate private companies playing a pivotal or
strategic role in Belarus’ economy.

Furthermore, Yury believed the state was justified in

nationalizing any private company that harmed the public interest. Yury was explicit when he said
that the government should nationalize and directly control any company in the interest of the

public good, rather than opposing regulations on a private owner. (This was actually fairly
widespread in this study). Though on the surface Yury’s rejection of private sector wage and
protections seems to reflect free-market neoliberal ideology, in truth, however, it is part of a larger
underlying moral economy that fundamentally rejects neoliberal ideology and the sanctity of the
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free-market. In general, Yury supports socialism4 as opposed regulated capitalism. In conclusion,
although Yury rejected private sector wage and job protections, he strongly supported the
underlying moral economy in support of such regulations.

Rather than disconfirming the

underlying anti-neoliberal beliefs in support of private-sector wage and job protections, Yury’s
negative case actually served to bolster it.

Yury, like the rest of the workers in this study was complicated. I am not making light of Yury’s support for freemarket ideology or aspects of free-market ideology. Yury, like most of the workers in this study adamantly rejected
Marx’s critique of capitalist social relations of production. He fiercely defended the private owners right to
appropriate surplus value. In this sense Yury, like most of the workers in this study supports key aspects of freemarket ideology (Thompson’s workers did as well). Yury’s socialism is not based on Marxism or Marx’s critique of
capitalism, but rather on the public good. And though he believes the state ownership in general will best serve the
public good he has no problem with private companies as long as they serve the public good: providing jobs, protecting
workers health and safety, paying taxes…Yury explicitly stated this. The fact that the owner appropriates surplus
value from the workers is not a problem for Yury in fact Yury believes that the owner has the right to appropriate
surplus value from workers since the owner invested the capital, developed the company and provides the worker with
a job. Though Yury’s defense of the capitalist’s appropriation of surplus value embraces key aspects of free-market
or neoliberal ideology, Yury’s faith in the market and his belief in the sanctity of the market is much more limited
than a free-market ideologue. Like Thomason’s workers, Yury’s support for free-market ideology is quickly forsaken
when it threatens the public good. And, in general, Yury, as well as most of the workers in this study, strongly believe
the public good is best served through state-ownership of the major means of production or commanding heights of
the economy.
4
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Chapter 5. Moral Economy Study: Working-Class Findings
Chapter 5.1. The State-Owned Industrial Sector
Overwhelmingly, the workers in this study adamantly supported Belarus’ state-owned
industrial sector and adamantly opposed its privatization. Of the eighteen workers I interviewed
only four supported privatization (4/18) and insisted that it be done very gradually. It is also
significant that there was strong support for the state-owned industrial sector among both workers
who supported President Lukashenka and those who did not—including those who were strongly
against him.

Even the majority of middle-class subjects supported the state industries.

Interestingly, there were no women workers in my study that opposed the state-owned industrial
sector or supported privatization. All of the woman workers in this study adamantly opposed
privatization (This might not be a coincidence).
The overwhelming majority of workers, however, adamantly supported the state-owned
industrial sector (14/18). In fact, these workers did not merely support the state-owned industrial
sector but saw it as an integral and inseparable part of Belarussian society—belonging to the
Belarussian people themselves. Let’s briefly discuss some of the workers who were Lukashenka
supporters, followed by those who were not Lukashenka supporters. They see the state-owned
industrial sector in the same way. I will begin by focusing heavily on Oleg, a 62-year-old worker
who, although a strong supporter of President Lukashenka, is tolerant of the private sector, and is
not against people becoming rich, as long as they are “honest” and pay workers “fairly.” Although
Oleg was a strong supporter of the Soviet Union and Soviet socialism during the Soviet-era today
he eschews labels like “socialism.” However, he still adamantly defends the state-industrial sector
and best captured the belief that Belarus’ factories “belong to people of Belarus” and are a central
part of Belarussian society.
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These factories are supposed to be owned by the government. The government should
control them so that no one robs or steals from these companies. These companies are
owned by the people of Belarus. This is part of our history and culture. These factories
belong to the people of Belarus, themselves—not the president, not the government, but the
Belarusian people themselves. The government has to protect them [state-factories]. Of
course, the government has to protect them more than privately owned factories because
the government must protect the people.
Although Oleg did not like labels, including the label “socialism,” it seems clear that his
understanding of Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector was shaped by Soviet socialism and the
Soviet moral economy. And although today, Oleg tolerates private capitalism, he still adamantly
defends the state-owned industrial sector as the central part of Belarussian society that
distinguishes Belarus from other countries.
Q: Should the state-owned industrial sector be privatized?
No, no, no! Who would buy them? America? Russia? China? If they buy them, we would

have nothing!
We cannot live like our neighbors. We have our way and we live this way!
Oleg, like most of the other workers in this study, sees Belarus’ state-owned industrial
sector as a major source of Belarus’ economic prosperity and a source of stability for millions of
workers and their families. Oleg was deeply concerned about unemployment and thought that
providing jobs should be a key priority of the government and that the state-owned industrial sector

provided millions of jobs.
Oleg: “Is Everything privately-owned in America?”
Q: “Yes”
Oleg: “I watched the news yesterday. Guess how many Americans are unemployed?
Millions! That is private ownership. We don’t have that here!
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And like most of the other workers in this study Oleg had a very positive attitude toward
the state-owned factories and believed the ones that are not doing well can be improved.
The government will have to find a solution. It is easy to close them down rather than find
a solution.
Oleg, like most of the other workers in this study, believed that money-losing state firms
should be improved, however, until they are solvent the government must subsidize them in order

to prevent unemployment.
Oleg, like most of the others, rejects the neoliberal critics of Belarus’ state-owned industrial
sector:
Who are these economists? Why don’t they go on TV—say a group of 5 or 10 of them—
and talk to our president and show that our factories do not work and show a solution?
Q: “Their solution is to privatize the state factories.”
So, we will not survive—that’s it!
We cannot live like our neighbors. We have our way and we live this way.
Yury, 51-year-old worker also linked the state-owned industrial sector to Belarus itself:
Most factories are government-owned…it’s the major part of the economy for most people.
It is the biggest part of life in the Republic of Belarus…. In our country the government is
better than our neighbors since the government supports the factories…
Lena, a 65-year-old retiree, explicitly understood the state-owned factories in terms of
“socialism” in which “We work for ourselves,” as opposed to private owners and that the “The
profits go to the Belarussian people and not to some private individual or who knows where.” In
fact, Lena, was so adamantly opposed to privatization that she would not even discuss it
hypothetically.
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Masha, a 50-year-old worker, not only adamantly defended the existing large state
factories, but opposed the closing and/or privatization of the small and medium-sized factories
(like the one she works in). It seems the state does not seem interested in keeping them.
Although all four workers who supported privatization also were opposed to President
Lukashenka, several workers in this study who did not support Lukashenka still supported the
state-owned industrial sector and adamantly opposed privatization. For example, Tanya, a 50-

year-old retail worker who voted against Lukashenka and voted for Svetlana Tikhanovskaya in the
2020 election:
Q: What are your thoughts about the state-owned industrial sector in Belarus?
I think it is alright. In principle you cannot know what would happen if they were not stateowned. We have work. There is stability. We have pensions. We have salaries.
Not only did Tanya support the state-owned industrial sector, she thought that it should be

expanded as that would mean “There would be more jobs. That would be a good thing. It would
be useful for us and the country will have more innovation…higher standard of living”.
Like the Lukashenka supporters, Tanya was against privatization:
I think that could it [privatization] be bad because if the government sells these companies
the new owner might fire people. Or might divide the companies into smaller parts and
close some of the factories. I think the government should protect the state-owned
factories. Our economy depends on them a lot. The government should play a big role
protecting the state-owned factories so that the people who work there know they are safe
and protected.
…
I am against this [privatization]. I am not sure why but I don’t think it is a good idea. If
they privatize them, you don’t know what will happen next. If they [private investors] buy
these companies, they will do whatever they want. They will set up new rules. They can
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fire people. They can change the schedules, change [workers’] specializations and people
will have to do two jobs for the same money. This can be really bad for the workers.
Tanya’s support for the state-owned industrial sector was not superficial and was very
nuanced. She supported innovation and wanted to see the state industrial firms make high quality
goods and market them effectively. She also wanted them to make careful business plans and
produce goods that are likely to be sold. Tanya supported fiscal responsibility; however, she did
not want to see state factories shut down and was deeply concerned about Belarus’ industry and
the workers at these plants. Here she differs greatly from many of the middle- and upper-class
respondents in this study.
Q: Should unprofitable firms be allowed to fail?
Maybe not to fail. —So, you are saying if it [a state factory] doesn’t make any profits it is
better to close it? —
Q: “Yes”
So maybe change the products they produce—change the factory’s specialization. We
should not close them since people will lose their jobs. We should change these factories’
specialization to make things that are needed more. For example, if there are things, we are buying
from abroad we should make them here instead.
Tanya even supported subsidizing money-losing state firms to prevent unemployment.
However, she thought it would be better to change the specializations of these factories rather than
to have to keep subsidizing them. All of the workers in this study believed this.
Q: Is it worth subsidizing unprofitable firms to prevent unemployment?
Of course, we do not need unemployment—it is horrible! It is better to subsidize these
companies to prevent unemployment.

However, it would be better to change the

specializations of these factories.
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Dennis, adamantly opposed to President Lukashenka (although he does not support the
opposition), also supports the state-owned industrial sector and talked about it in the same way as
the Lukashenka supporters, especially Oleg:
Q: Should the state-owned industrial sector be privatized?
Sell to private hands?
Q: “Yes.”
I am against that. Because there are risks. Private owners could ruin the factory and the
government will not be able to help you…. I think that all large companies must be controlled by
the government…In private hands the director of the factory is a Tsar or God without any control
by the government. The government must control the factories.
Dennis also saw the state-industrial sector as important for maintaining the country’s
technological base since after graduating from technical institutes students could get valuable

hands-on experience at one of the state factories.
Svetlana, like Dennis, is also adamantly opposed to President Lukashenka. However,
unlike Dennis she voted against Lukashenka and voted for Svetlana Tikhanovskaya. Furthermore,
unlike Tanya, Svetlana participated in opposition rallies and protests after the election. In fact,
Tanya was actually turned off by the protests and stopped supporting the opposition.
Svetlana’s views are very nuanced. She is concerned about drinking and thinks the
government should do more to prevent workers from drinking on the job. She is also concerned
that the government simply pours money into factories without requiring innovation and initiative
and that the state industry “does not develop in the right way.” In this way she was more like the
pro-market middle-class and capitalist subjects in this study.

However, when it came to

privatization and unemployment, she was like the other workers I have discussed in this section,
and absolutely defended the state industrial sector, wanted to maintain it at its current size, and
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adamantly opposed privatization.

Though she did not support expanding the state-owned

industrial sector like Tanya did, she was definitely against making it smaller not only “because [of
the loss] of people’s jobs” but it would “damage the economy and the government itself.”
Svetlana was also against privatization and feared privatization would lead to many
workers being fired unfairly and arbitrarily. And though she never used the word “despotism,”
that seemed to be at the heart of her fears as she talked about one of the large private enterprises

in her city in which the director is always firing workers baselessly.
[M]any people believe that government companies are more stable since they cannot fire
you without a good reason…simple workers cannot be fired without any basis.
Svetlana also feared privatization would lead to much more corruption as the private
owners will “find ways around the law” while “government companies follow the law more
carefully without dark spots.”
Like the other workers in this study, Svetlana supported subsidizing money-losing state
firms to prevent people from losing their jobs. However, also like the others, she preferred to
“change how these companies work on the inside.”
Svetlana’s defense of state-owned industrial firms and jobs was forceful and diametrically
opposed to the neoliberal outlook:

Q: "Should unprofitable firms like these be allowed to fail? Explain."
No! No! No! Jobs! And not only this. These companies have a big influence on our
economy too.
Svetlana went even further, saying that the government’s duty is “to provide people with
stability” and that, “The government is the people in this country.” What is interesting about this
statement, said without irony or sarcasm, is that it sounds almost the same as the state mottos
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attributed to President Lukashenka and his social program that can be seen throughout Belarus on
large billboards:
Belarus: The Government for the People
We are Belarus
Belarus—Together
For Belarus
Typically, though, these state mottos are criticized by the West and in the academic
literature as part of an attempt to mobilize “people behind the president through the endorsement
of social unity….it proposes the subordination of individual interests to the collective will and
interest” (Leshchenko 2008:1424; see also Miazhevich 2007:1334). Could it be, however, that
these slogans actually do reflect the social solidarity of Belarussians and are not merely attempts
to marshal the population behind the president? The fact that Svetlana, who is no supporter of the
president believes the same thing leads me to believe these state slogans might reflect a strong
sense of social solidarity among Belarussians.
All four workers who opposed the state-owned industries and supported its privatization
were against President Lukashenka. This is certainly not a coincidence. These workers tended to
support the logic of capitalism; namely, that private owners will be more competitive and efficient,
since they have a direct stake in the companies they own. Sasha made this point clearly:

[If a company] were private, the owner has an incentive to make the company profitable.
If a company is state-owned, the manager has no incentive to improve the company. He
makes his salary either way.
These workers believed that the state-firms only continued running due to continued
government subsidy which has “devastated the country's budget,” Sasha also said:
The government companies are unprofitable and only survive from subsidies…. Without
this support everything will collapse…The products from China are better and cheaper.
146

Warehouses are full of things [Belarussian products] we do not need and no one wants to
buy.
These workers also thought that capitalism was superior. This was obvious to them and
they a had examples of state firms they had worked for were run inefficiently. For example, Sasha
had worked for a few state firms before settling at the private shampoo factory. None of the state
firms were run as efficiently as the shampoo factory. He always has the tools and supplies he
needs to do his job, while the state firm at time had shortages. Sasha does complain, however, that
he is not paid enough and that the owner takes advantage of the fact that the plant is in a smaller
city in which workers do not have as many opportunities.
The workers who supported privatization also all believed that workers in capitalist
countries enjoyed higher standards of living, especially in the United States and Germany. They
were sure of this, and they were also sure that capitalism is what enabled these workers to have

higher living standards. They were unhappy with their living standards and in this way, they
differed greatly from the other workers in this study, who, overall were satisfied with their modest
living standards. The workers who supported privatization tended to be more cynical and similar
to the cynical workers in Burawoy’s ethnography on workers in socialist Hungary (Burawoy and
Lukacs 1992). For example, Sasha would constantly ask what were the salaries of different
occupations in the United States.

The workers who supported privatization and the logic of capitalism had much in common
with the pro-market middle-class and capitalist subjects. However, their faith in markets and trust
in private owners was more limited. Although they supported privatization, unlike the pro-market
middle-class and capitalist subjects, they also believed in strict regulation of wages and jobs. (This
will be discussed in the next section.) For these workers, capitalism (or regulated capitalism) was
merely a means to an end: higher living standards for everyone. However, the pro-market middle147

class and capitalist subjects in this study (although they too obviously agreed with the logic of
capitalism) believed in capitalism ideologically and saw capitalism as an end in itself—a
fundamental expression of freedom—and adamantly opposed most regulations.

Discussion
The workers in this study overwhelmingly supported the Belarus’ state-owned industrial
sector. They even saw it as belonging directly to the Belarussian people and part of Belarus and
Belarus’ history. Bigger than the state-owned industrial sector is the role of the state and the role
the state should play in society and the economy. In this way the workers’ vision of society
drastically differs from neoliberal outlook of some of the middle-class and upper-class
respondents. The workers believe the state should provide for the people and play a very active
role in the economy. They completely reject the neoliberal notion of the laissez faire state or the
state as a night watchman playing a minimal role guaranteeing economic prosperity and good
living standards.
By providing for the people, they mean providing jobs and full employment. None of the
workers were interested in handouts—they were interested in jobs. The state should give healthy
people an opportunity to work and provide for themselves rather than rely on welfare state benefits.

Although this study is not representative, based on how widespread support for the stateowned industrial sector was, I would fairly confidently predict most ordinary workers support it in
general.
My findings contradict much of the literature which claims Belarussians reject the stateowned industrial sector, supporting privatization and a market economy. I believe the reason for
this discrepancy is that these studies overrepresent the middle-class and underrepresent the
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working class. I will discuss this at great length in Chapter 5 when I analyze surveys during my
discussion of the most recent scholarship concerning the August 9, 2020 Protest Movement.
In general, most researchers, coming from a neoliberal perspective, view Belarus’ stateowned industrial sector very negatively. They see it as very inefficient and assume it would be
better if it were privatized. Many however, merely assume this and do not go into detail. One
researcher, Leshchenko (2008), focuses heavily on the state-owned industrial sector.

Her

assessment of it is incredibly negative.
Leshchenko not only links President Lukashenka and the state-owned industrial sector but
argues that the “state-owned economy” is an important pillar for him to keep the “population in
direct economic dependence on the government, and hence, the president” (2008:1423).
Leshchenko goes farther saying that the “State-owned economy: the collective humbles the
individual,” that the “notion of national ownership also gives people an illusive share in the state’s
assets (2008:1422-23), and that the “state-economy itself is made possible through its justification
in terms of collectivist interests” (2008:1430).
I disagree with Leshchenko, and my findings did not show her understanding to be true.
First, Leshchenko argues that President Lukashenka has manipulated Belarussians into supporting
the state-owned industrial sector through his social economic policies (2008:1423). My study has
shown me that support for the state-owned industrial sector is deeply-rooted in Belarus’ Soviet
past and support for it is very widespread and far broader than President Lukashenka himself. At
least four of the workers in my study who adamantly supported the state-owned industrial sector
were also adamantly opposed to President Lukashenka. Two of those subjects, Dennis and
Svetlana, were featured in this dissertation and their support for the state-owned industrial sector
can be clearly seen. Furthermore, the support for the state-industrial sector among workers was
not noticeably different among Lukashenka supporters, those who were neutral, and those who
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were against him. Moreover, Leshchenko’s assessment is contradicted by the literature that shows
the Belarussian people supported the state-owned industrial sector long before Lukashenka did
(Ioffe 2014).
Second, Leshchenko argues that the “state-owned economy” is an important pillar to keep
the “population in direct economic dependence on the government, and hence, the president”
(2008:1423). I did not find that in my study. As discussed above, there was widespread support

for the state-owned industrial sector among politically diverse workers in this study and even
among most of the middle-class subjects.
Third, “State-owned economy: the collective humbles the individual.” This critique is
somewhat vague. It seems that Leshchenko is arguing that the state-owned industrial sector
overwhelms the individual making him feel like a meaningless cog in a great wheel and unable to
resist dictatorial rule. Maybe Leshchenko means the state-owned industrial sector hinders the
development of private enterprise, because it discourages entrepreneurship. That might be true
but Leshchenko’s complaint is far broader than that:
We do not dispute the fact that the centralised economy remains an essential impediment
to the development of liberal and democratic Belarus (Leshchenko 2008:1430)
Leshchenko also says that Belarus’ ideology:
[P]recludes the idea of individuals forming and advancing their own interests, which lies
at the heart of democracy and the market economy (Leshchenko 2008:1424)
Leshchenko clearly and exclusively identifies liberalism and democracy with private
enterprise and entrepreneurship. However, I do not see why a centralized economy cannot also be
democratic. Also, if a centralized economy creates a more egalitarian society, I don’t see why that
would not create a more liberal and democratic society. Furthermore, I would argue that the market
economy is inherently undemocratic (Giroux 2015, 2011; Harvey 2005) and that Leshchenko has
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an unexamined neoliberal bias built in to her assumptions and analysis, which is common in the
Belarus literature (Yarashevich 2014).
Fourth, Leshchenko argues that the “notion of national ownership also gives people an
illusive share in the state’s assets” (2008:1422-23). Based on my interviews, however, it appears
that Belarussians truly see the state-owned industrial sector as belonging to Belarus. This can
clearly be seen in Oleg’s interview.
According to Leshchenko, it might be a bad idea that Belarussians support the state-owned
industrial sector.

However, it is clearly their idea, not President Lukashenka’s.

In fact,

Lukashenka is following them and not the other way around. Lukashenka actually began his
political career as a pro-Gorbachev market reformer (Ioffe 2014). It was not until later that
Lukashenka abandoned pro-market ideology and began following the Belarussian people who
adamantly opposed market reforms and privatization. Leshchenko, however, like many other antiLukashenka researchers, creates a Stalinist caricature of Lukashenka as the pied-piper of Hamlin
manipulating the pro-market Belarussian masses into abandoning shock therapy and mass
privatization in favor of supporting the state-owned industrial sector.

Chapter 5.2. Patience, Optimism and Faith in the System of Ordinary Belarussians

In this section I will show that Belarussian workers are not only patient but are optimistic
and have a lot of faith in the system. This makes them more able to withstand economic hardship
and makes them immune to neoliberal narratives in support of privatization.
It is well known that patience or even perseverance is an important trait in the Belarussian
national character (Ioffe 2003a:1022 See also Engelking 2013, 2001). However, less well known
is ordinary Belarussians’ “optimism,” lack of cynicism or faith in the system and future (Manaev
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et al 2011:97; Matsuzato 2004:242). The “optimism” of ordinary Belarussians is in stark contrast
to the cynical and “pessimistic” outlook of oppositional Belarussians (Manaev et al. 2011:97) who
tend to be from the middle and upper class (Manaev 2011:96; Furman 1999).
This sense of optimism was present throughout the last section. The workers who
supported the state-owned industrial sector believed it could overcome any problems. For example,
like most of the other workers in this study Oleg had a positive attitude toward the state-owned

factories and believed the ones that are not doing well can be improved.
The government will have to find a solution. It is easy to close them down

rather

than find a solution.
This sense of optimism was seen among all of the workers who supported the state-owned
industrial sector, whether they voted for Lukashenka or not. For example, Tanya:
Q: Should unprofitable firms be allowed to fail?
“Maybe not to fail. —So, you are saying if it [a state factory] doesn’t make any profits it
is better to close it? —
Q: “Yes”
So maybe change the products they produce—change the factory’s specialization. We
should not close them since people will lose their jobs. We should change these factories’
specialization to make things that are needed more. For example, if there are things we are
buying from abroad, we should make them here instead.

I was utterly surprised by the workers’ optimism and their why not outlook. Their
optimism, especially about the potential of the state-owned industrial sector, was diametrically
opposed to the deep cynicism of the neoliberal subjects in this study among the capitalists and
some of the middle-class subjects.
The well-known Belarussian character trait of “patience” or “perseverance” was obvious
throughout the study. And helps them deal with the economic hardships Belarus is currently
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facing. For example, I asked Oleg about his pension and salary which at the time each were about
$180 a month. I assume Oleg’s pension is too low since he is continuing to work full time even
though he collects a pension.
Of course, I would like to make more money and get a bigger pension, but what can you
do?” he said “This is the way it is. We don’t have oil or gas or gold or other minerals besides salt.
Q: “The opposition wants to raise pensions though”

Ha. You believe that! When they are through, we won’t have any pensions!
When I asked about the rising retirement ages, he said the same thing. even though Oleg
was forced to retire a year and a half later at 55½, due to the recent pension reform. Oleg also is
continuing to work fulltime and plans to keep working into the future. Lena’s responses were
similar to Oleg.
We are pensioners. We are very comfortable. We are alright.
Q: “Some, however, complain that the pensions in Belarus are too low?”
And how do they know how much the pensions should be? Have they counted all of the
money in the state budget?
Like Oleg, Lena also was not fazed by the recent pension reforms raising retirement. She
said, “The government is doing what it can.” There is no doubt that the Belarussian characteristic
‘patience’ plays a big role in the Belarussian workers’ acceptance of austerity (Engelking 2013;

2001; Ioffe 2003a:1022). Oleg’s response was “but what can you do? This is the way it is” was
even typical of the Belarussian peasants in Engelking’s ethnography (2013, 2001). Be that as it
may, I also believe that the Belarussian workers’ optimism and ‘faith’ in the system play a key
role in maintaining stability. Those who support President Lukashenka have faith in him and in
the system. This faith helps them cope with these problems. Interestingly, those in my study who
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did support President Lukashenka surprisingly still have great faith in the system—even in the
government.
This faith in the system was clear when I talked about Belarus’ short-term labor-contract
system. Overall, they did not see it as something negative or potentially repressive. They did not
agree with Yarashevich, and many others’ criticism of the new fixed-term labor contract system
as a way to exert political control over workers (2014:1718). For example, Oleg, whose response
was typical, did not have a problem with the labor-contract system and did not see it as a means
for social or political control.
If I am doing my job well why wouldn’t the director renew my contract?
And the contract system affects Oleg more than others, since, being officially retired, he is
only allowed a one-year labor contract and must renew it every year.
Q: But couldn’t the contract system be used to ‘fire’ you for political reasons?
Oleg: “No! It can’t! If I am doing my job well my contract will be renewed.”
This faith in the system is almost a blind faith and appears naive.
Although Tanya and Dennis had enormous faith in the potential of the state-owned
industrial sector, one could, however, argue that Belarussians are truly cynical since both Tanya
and Dennis did not trust the government’s ability to use taxation to reduce the income gap. For
example, Dennis said,
It is a fantasy. The government might take the money from the rich people but will never
give it to the poor people.
However, notwithstanding Dennis and Tanya’s views on income redistribution through
taxation, I would argue that both had incredible faith in the system and the government. First both
believed in the government’s ability to revitalize any poorly-performing state firm. And in general,
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both have great faith in the government’s ability to run the state-owned industrial sector, pay all
of the salaries, buy all of the raw materials etc. Tanya even wanted the government to expand the
state-owned industrial sector. They also have faith in the government’s ability to regulate the
economy effectively and even establish new laws protecting wages and jobs for private sector
workers. Furthermore, they also both have faith in the government’s ability to arrest and prosecute
corrupt businessmen as well as collect the established taxes and distribute social benefits—which
both were satisfied with.
In general, the workers in this study were not big supporters of income distribution through
taxation. As I have discussed, they have a more ‘socialist’ outlook and want the government
directly to create good paying jobs through the state-owned industrial sector as opposed to a
welfare state in which the private sector creates inequality that the welfare state tries to mitigate
through progressive taxation and other means.
In spite of Tanya and Dennis’ cynicism about reducing inequality through taxation, I would
argue that Belarussians, especially ordinary Belarussian are optimistic and have great faith in the
system. This combined with their patience helps them withstand economic hardships. Therefore,
the recent austerity measures and other negative changes don’t seem to have had much effect on
their moral economy. As long as ordinary Belarussians have faith in the system, they will tolerate
austerity. Furthermore, I believe, based on my study, that the researchers (Moshes and Nizhnikau
2021; Glod 2020) who claim that the Belarussian working class reject the current social contract—
or believe the government can no longer provide for the workers are deeply wrong. I think these
researchers, who are adamantly opposed to Lukashenka and Belarus’ socio-economic model, are
guilty of wishful thinking. These issues will be discussed further in Chapter 5.

155

Chapter 5.3. Wage and Job Protections
While the overwhelming majority of workers in this study supported the state-owned
industrial sector (14/18); support for worker wage and job protections was practically universal.
Even the four workers who supported privatization strongly supported wage and job protections
for workers in the private sector. What is interesting about this finding is that currently no law
exists protecting workers’ wages and jobs in the private sector. What does exist is a policy for the

government to require investors, buying state-firms, to guarantee the firm’s current wage levels
and number of jobs. I refer to this as the socially-oriented privatization program, which all but one
worker, Yury, supported. (Technically, Lena did not support the program, however she strongly
opposed any privatization for any reason. In fact, she refused to discuss privatization even
hypothetically.)
It was through my discussion of the Socially-Oriented Privatization Program, which is fairy

radical by Western standards, that it started to become clear to me that the workers in my study
(and most of the middle-class) thought all private-sector workers should have these protections.
And, interestingly, they were not concerned about the state-firms lowering wages or cutting jobs
in order to increase profits.
The only worker who did not support the wage and job guarantees of the socially-oriented
privatization program was Yury. However, Yury is not really an exception: First, Yury strongly
supported the state-owned industrial sector. Recall from the last section how he sees the stateindustrial sector as “the major part of the economy for most people. It is the biggest part of the
life of the republic of Belarus.” In fact, for Yury, the state-industrial sector not only provides jobs
and stability but good jobs:
The government creates jobs for everyone who wants to work.

The pay is

good…There are many jobs. Lukashenka gives people the opportunity to work.
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Yury thinks the system, based on the state-owned industrial sector, is working well. For
him, our discussion of the socially-oriented privatization program was rather a moot point since
he was adamantly opposed to privatization and believed President Lukashenka would never
privatize any firms that were vital to Belarus’ economy.
If our president controls these factories, he will not sell them. If these factories help
the country, why should we sell them? These factories provide many jobs, help the
economy. Why should we sell them?
And Yury not only would like to see the state-owned industrial sector expanded, he
believes that the state has the right to nationalize any private company if that would be in the
public’s interest—especially if the owner is not paying taxes, or violating workers’ rights (not
paying them, not paying for vacations, etc.). However, Yury believes that if the government
decides to sell (privatize) a company, which is not vital to Belarussian society, the new owner
should be free to run the company as he sees fit. He believes that if the state is concerned about
the way the new owner will run the company, then it should not sell it. Once it sells it, however,
the new owner should be free to run it accordingly:
The government has a right take the factory, but not to run it
Meaning, the government has a right to nationalize or renationalize any factory, if that is
in the public interest, but the government does not have a right to interfere with a privately-owned

factory. In other words, the state should either nationalize the factory and run it itself or leave it
alone and not interfere with it.
Ultimately, my discussion of Socially-Oriented Privatization with Yury was a moot point.
For Yury, the main engine of economic prosperity in Belarus was the state-owned economic sector
whose most important firms would never be privatized. And even if the state did decide to
privatize some insignificant companies and the new owner did lower wages or laid off workers
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(paying severance pay, etc.)—these workers would easily find new high-paying jobs in the
(generally) expanding state-owned industrial sector.
So, although Yury technically opposed wage and job protections for private-sector
workers, overall based on his outlook, he really should not be considered an exception, especially
when compared to other more pro-market subjects (middle-class and capitalist) who adamantly
supported privatization of the state-owned industrial sector and opposed wage and job protections

for the private sector. In general, these pro-market subjects would like to privatize the stateindustrial sector making the former state-workers (who were relatively financially secure) into
private-sector worker without any significant wage and job protections.

Wage and Job Protections

Now that we have discussed the only ‘exception’ now let’s turn to the workers who
supported wage and job protections for workers in the private sector. Sasha, by far is the most
interesting example. Sasha was by far the most pro-capitalist worker: “I like capitalism more.”
(Recall his pro-capitalist critique of the state-industrial sector). After discussing the failings of
socialism and state-owned enterprises for some time I was rather surprised when he defended the
wage protections of the socially-oriented privatization program. I then asked him directly whether
private entrepreneurs should be free to set wages and run their businesses as they see fit without
government interference.
It is too risky to let private owners manage everything—especially if we are talking
about the main factory of a town! The new owner can lower the wages since the
workers have no other choice. The government must set the wages and have the
workers share a percentage of the profits. Maybe the government should set the
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minimum salary or the maximum salary but it should not let the new owner control
the wages!
Although Sasha considers himself a strong supporter of capitalism, many would not
consider a system in which the government sets the wages at private businesses to even be
capitalism.
Sasha was not as concerned about protecting jobs at newly privatized firms since: “to be

honest, we most likely do not need so many workers” at many of these state firms.

He

acknowledged it would be “painful” for the workers who are laid off but it would make the
“compan[ies] more profitable and “will be better for the overall economy.” Sasha believes the
number of workers at many state plants is much too high and that they should be reduced to the
appropriate level.

Here Sasha’s thinking was more aligned with the pro-market—even

neoliberal—middle-class and capitalist subjects in this study. However, Sasha’s thinking diverged

diametrically from theirs when I asked about an owner of an already significantly profitable firm
cutting jobs in order to increase profits further. He not only thought this was “unfair” but thought
it should be forbidden:
Q: Why should an employer be forbidden from laying-off workers if that is more
profitable?
It is not good for the workers. There should be some institute that controls the situation.
A third party should regulate it.
Sasha, although he considers himself very pro-capitalism, also related to this practice
(cutting jobs at a profitable firm to increase profit further) very personally:
No, it is not fair! I am a worker as well and I can be in this situation and I can easily lose
my job. So, I do not think it is fair!

159

Sasha went on to discuss ways this problem could be regulated and that the labor unions
might play a role in preventing unjustified layoffs:
We have unions that should do this [protect workers from unnecessary layoffs] and make
sure the workers are protected but I am not sure these unions are working effectively today.
What is interesting is that another worker in this study, Vladimir, said the same thing and
also believed that the labor unions should regulate lay-offs. Both Sasha and Vladimir believed

that employers seeking to lay off workers would have to demonstrate to the union1 that these
layoffs are “economically necessary” due to low sales, an economic recession, etc. The lay-offs
would not be approved, however, if the company were already profitable and merely sought to
increase profits further by making fewer workers do more work at the same pay.
Sasha’s conception of capitalism is a heavily-regulated radical social democracy. It is still
capitalism since the means of production would be privately owned and there would be marketbased competition, however, wage-labor would be de-commodified to a significant degree. The
following question captures Sasha’s conception of capitalism:
Q: Should private entrepreneurs be free to maximize their profits?
Yes, but the workers should not suffer. The workers should keep the same standard of
living and conditions. The owner should maximize his profits but without hurting the
workers.

In fact, most of the workers in this study answered this question the same way—practically
with the same words. The three other workers who supported privatization also answered this

1

Interestingly, Vladimir’s conception of this union would be an administrative agency that works in partnership with
management. This labor union would cooperate with management and the two would ‘rationally’ evaluate the firm’s
financial situation and budget and come to an agreement that best satisfies management’s interests as well as the
workers. Vladimir’s labor union is an objective “arbitrator” that “finds a balance between the interests of the workers
and the owners” and not an independent representative of the workers. This is the Soviet model of labor unions (Atas
2018). Sasha, however, envisioned this union as completely independent representative of the workers: “The union
should be 100% controlled by the workers but it should give reports to the government.”
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question the same way. Overall, they were very similar to Sasha although not as pro-capitalist as
he was.

For example, two of them supported the job protections of the socially-oriented

privatization program without any qualification. (Recall Sasha thought many state-firms have too
many workers and would have to be reduced). These two workers both adamantly opposed any
layoffs. For example, Vadim, a long- distance truck driver said:
It doesn’t matter who bought the [state] company. The salary and number of workers
should stay the same…I am against laying-off any workers.
These workers, although they supported privatization, thought the workers should remain
the center and priority of society. Vadim said that private investors should not be free to maximize
profit,
Maximizing profits should not be the highest goal. People should be the core of our society.
The most important thing is the workers’ standard of living and salaries. Extra profits
should be secondary. You should not think about profits until your workers are satisfied….
Everything should be for the workers.
The other worker, Misha, a security guard, who supported privatization in principle, joked
that social-oriented privatization requirements were President Lukashenka’s way of avoiding
having to privatize any state firms: “so no one agrees to buy these factories.” He thought it “would
be better if the government just did this itself” rather than making all of these unrealistic
requirements for new investors.
Although Misha supported privatization in principle, he did not think Belarus was “ready
to privatize” and that in “our situation it is better to preserve [the state-firms] then to privatize
them…since it would be harmful and painful for Belarus, [since] a lot of people work there and it
would be a disaster.” Misha did agree with wage and job protections for private sector workers
but thought they should be administered fairly for the owner as well. For example, during a
161

recession the owner should be allowed to reduce wages or cut jobs. However, he agreed strongly
that the owner should never reduce wages or cut jobs in order to increase profits

Chapter 5.4. A Fair Day’s Wage for a Fair Day’s Work (Karl Marx’s Theory of Surplus
Value)
In this section I will show that in spite of workers’ moral economy they do not embrace
Marxism or Marx’s fundamental critique of capitalist social relations of production, wage-labor,
or capitalist appropriation of surplus value. They do not see capitalist social relations of production
as inherently exploitive.
In the last section we discussed that almost all of the workers in this study supported wage
and job protections for workers in the private sector, especially at major privately-owned firms.
This was a fairly radical aspect of their moral economy. However, although they demanded that
the worker be paid a “fair wage” they accepted the owner’s “right” to make a profit. Recall Sasha
from the last section:
Q: Should private entrepreneurs be free to maximize their profits?
Yes, but the workers should not suffer. The workers should keep the same standard of
living and conditions. The owner should maximize his profits but without hurting the
workers.
This outlook was widespread throughout this study and was also supported by workers who
supported the state-owned industrial sector (and opposed privatization) such as Masha, Oleg,
Tanya, Dennis and Svetlana.
For example, Dennis said:
You should not increase your profits by lowering [workers’] wages.
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Tanya said the same thing:
Q: Should private investors be free run the firm as they see fit and re-invest as to maximize
their profits?
So, if it is going to be more profitable without harming anyone else then yes: the owner
will profit and the workers will get fair salaries. If there is harm then no—only the owner
profits and no one else.
Even Masha, who not only supported the state-owned industrial sector but supported
socialism (and in general opposed private enterprise) shared this same conception of “fair profits”
and “fair wages.” Overall, I found the idea of the owner profiting without ‘harming’ the workers
or ‘decreasing’ their wages deeply troubling from a Marxist perspective since from a Marxist
perspective ‘profits’ are unpaid wages—profits increase by decreasing wages. The workers’
conception of “fair profits” and “fair wages” reminded me of Karl Marx’s famous line from Value,
Price and Profit:
Instead of the conservative motto: “A fair day's wage for a fair day's work!” they ought to
inscribe on their banner the revolutionary watchword: “Abolition of the wages system!
(Marx 1865).
It appeared to me that the workers do not see capitalism as inherently exploitive or in other
words do not see the capitalist’s appropriation of surplus value as inherently exploitive. I began
to ask more questions during interviews and recalled the subject to ask additional questions. It

became clear that the workers, overall, do not see capitalism as inherently exploitive and do not
see the capitalist’s appropriation of surplus value as inherently exploitive. Let’s look at my
discussion of surplus value with Oleg, Yury and then of Masha. All three were strong supporters
of President Lukashenka, the state-owned industrial sector and strongly opposed privatization.
Masha, furthermore, supports socialism and in general opposed private enterprise. All three
discussions of surplus value were, overall, very typical of the other workers in the study as well.
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When I discussed Marx’s concept of surplus value with Oleg, I relied on making stools as
a hypothetical example in which Oleg made 10 stools a day and it took him 1 hour to make each
stool. The owner (played by me) sold the stools for $20 each and Oleg made $200 worth of stools
each day. The owner paid Oleg $20 for the day (the cost of the first stool: one hour’s labor time).
The value of a second is needed to cover the cost materials, tools, transportation etc. This leaves
additional eight stools that Oleg is making for the next 8 hours that the owner takes from Oleg.
The value of these stools is the owner’s profit (Marx’s surplus value):
Q: “After being paid the value of only one stool I am taking another eight stools from you
that you are not being paid for.”
But I was paid for the work and if I am paid fairly, of course [feel free to] take it [the 8
stools]
Q: “Is that fair? To only pay you the value of one stool but take eight stools from you and
not pay you for them?
Yes, it is fair!
Q: “But if I am taking the eight stools from you without paying you for them.

Isn’t that

stealing? Doesn’t that make me a thief?
No, you are not a thief! If you pay me well, I will be more than happy to let you take the
stools!
Q: “But in truth aren’t you working for free?”
No, I am not working for free. I am being paid a percentage of each stool for each stool
($2)
Q: “But isn’t it the same analogy [I meant to say, “ratio”]? Instead of looking at the whole

workday and seeing that you are only paid for one hour but are working an additional 9
hours and producing 8 more stools for free. Now you are looking at each hour in which
you are only paid for the first 6 minutes but working an addition 54 minute for free.”
I am not working for free! Why can’t you understand this? You don’t

understand

business very well.
I hada very similar exchange about surplus values with Yury in which he concluded:
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How is that exploitation? The owner is the one who gave you a job! He built the company;
he bought the equipment with his money; pays the rent, the utility bills, and buys all of the
materials need[ed]. If you think the salary is too low, you are free to find another job.
Although Masha supported socialism, supported greatly expanding the state-owned
industrial sector, and adamantly opposed privatization, and private enterprise in general she shared
Oleg and Yury’s conception of surplus value:
Q: “Does a private owner have a right to hire workers?”
Yes, why not?
Q: “These workers will produce a lot of value but their wage will be much lower than the
value they produce. Is that fair?”
Yes, it is fair since the owner paid for the overhead, the machinery, the materials, the taxes.
That has to be considered.
Q: “Yes, you are right. But after we account for all of those expenses the worker is still
producing much more value than he is getting paid in wages.”
So?
Q: “Suppose I made this couch, which is worth $200 and it takes me 10 hours to make it,
but my pay for the day is only $20. Is that exploitation?
No, it is not exploitation. It is hired labor.
Q: “Is hired labor exploitation?
No, because he agreed to it. He agreed to make $20 a day!
Q: “But does he really have a choice?”
Yes, he can find another job!

It is clear that Oleg, Yury and Masha do not see capitalist social relations of production as
inherently exploitive—they do not see the capitalist’s’ appropriation of surplus value as
exploitation. Almost all of the other workers in the study had the same understanding of surplus
value. Can I simply conclude that the workers in this study do not see capitalism as inherently
exploitive? There was one exception though, Lena and it would be important to discuss her first.
Another worker, Svetlana, should also be discussed.
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Of the 18 workers in this study, Lena was the only worker who agreed that the
appropriation of surplus value was exploitation. After explaining the theory of surplus value, I
asked Lena whether it was exploitation and she agreed that it was:
It is exploitation of someone else’s labor for your own purposes
Q: “Is wage-labor a kind of slavery then?”
It is not slavery. [Under] Slavery you are not paid at all. This is capitalism. You get paid
pennies. ‘Horse radish is no sweeter than radish.’2 You are getting rich off my work.

Q: “But the worker agreed to the contract?”
You need to work. You have no choice!
It seems that Lena understands Marx’s theory of surplus, certainly better than the other
workers in this study. Does this invalidate my potential finding that the workers in this study do
not see capitalism as inherently exploitive? It might. Lena might also be the exception that proves
the rule. The fact that Lena was by far the most radical worker in the study is important since my

study might have underrepresented the most radical workers. Possibly there are numerous other
workers who share Lena’s outlook. However, after questioning Lena further, it seems that her
understanding of Marx’s surplus value does not invalidate my general finding that the workers in
my study do not see capitalism as inherently exploitive.
Q: It is very interesting to me that you see capitalism as inherently exploitive. You were
the only worker in my entire study that understood capitalism in that way.
Lena: “That does not surprise me at all. I don’t think most Belarussians understand
capitalism in that way. I can’t remember when I learned this theory, but I definitely learned
it some point in my life. It is funny because I have never read any Marx or Engels, nor
have I ever been a member of the Communist Party. Anyhow, at some point I learned this
theory.

2

A Russian saying meaning the second choice is no better than the first choice. (Хрен редьки не слаще)
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This seems to be a strong indication that my initial findings: that the workers in this study
do not see capitalist relations of production as inherently exploitive is likely valid. They are critical
of capitalism since it is based on private ownership and the private owner’s greed will corrupt the
system. In fact, this was even Lena’s critique of capitalism when asked generally about capitalism:
Private owners will pay the lowest salaries and will not contribute into your pension funds
by paying you off the books. Look at my son Vanya for example. He works for a private
company. His pay is very low and he gets paid off the books so the owner can avoid
contributing into his pension fund. He works long hours, 12-hour shifts, three days on but
only two days off. He can’t complain! There is no union! The problem is the private
sector!
In fact, Lena’s critique of capitalism was the same as Masha’s even though Masha did not
see capitalism as inherently exploitive nor have a critique of the appropriation of surplus value.
Masha also thinks:
The private owner will only care about himself!
Masha, like Lena also complained that private owners pay workers off the books to avoid
taxes, pension contributions, sick leave, sick pay, and workman’s compensation. Masha also
discussed an example of a “young man, a truck driver who was in an accident [while working] and
injured badly. The private owner did not pay any sick leave and made him pay for the damage to
the truck. Since the young man could no longer work his family had to pay for the damages.”
Although the government paid for his medical bills the private owner would not pay his
salary (sick leave or workman’s compensation) while he was injured and could not work. Masha
said that now “the government forces companies to pay sick leave or workman's compensation”
but private owners can circumvent the law by only paying workers minimum wage, on the books
and paying the rest of their salary off the books (in Russian they say “in an envelope”). “Since the
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official salary is so low the companies only have to pay that [low] amount” for sick leave or
workman’s compensation etc. This practice might be fairly widespread as it came up in this study
numerous times and I have also heard about the practice in general many times. In fact, Stas, the
richest capitalist in this study, who will be discussed in a later section, ran his company this way
for many years in the past even though Stas’ firm already had several hundred workers.
Svetlana’s response was also interesting. She understood surplus value intuitively. This

first became clear to me after she answered the following question
Q: “So owners must pay workers well?”
Yes, sure. Actually, they make him successful by their work. (Emphasis added).
I asked to interview her again and explore this question more. After discussing it at length
it was clear that Svetlana believed, that although the workers create the wealth, the owner has a
right to take that wealth as profits. It is only exploitation when the “division is not fair” and the
workers’ share is too small.
Q: “Does the owner have a right to make a profit?”
Yes, he has a right. But he needs to be fair too
Q: “But isn't the owner's profit produced by the workers?
Yes. So? Each of them does his own work and has his own responsibilities. So, they need
to share the profit in a fair way
Q: “Does the owner have a right to take a portion of the wealth the workers produce that is
the profit?
Yes
Q: “So this is not in itself exploitation?
Right
Q: “So it becomes exploitation when the share the owner takes becomes very big and leaves
little for the worker?”
Yes. When division is not fair.
168

Svetlana thought that splitting the profit 50/50 between the owner and the workers was fair
and complained of her previous boss, the owner of a commercial newspaper “who split the profit
80%/20%” between himself and each of the workers. She also thought that “70/30 was unfair.”
Bear in mind, however, that this ‘proportion’ or ‘percentage’ is between the owner and all of the
workers. The owner takes half of the profits and the other half is divided among all of the workers
at the firm. We could also look at each worker’s workday. The worker’s productive labor time
would be divided in half. Half would go toward the worker’s wages and the other half (the surplus
value) would become the owner’s profits. However, even using Svetlana’s ‘fair’ 50/50 rate, at a
large business with many workers the owner will be making thousands of times more than each of
the workers, which Svetlana believed “is fair, as long as he values his workers and gives them
good wages.”
Svetlana truly captures the concept of a “fair profit” and fair wages.” Though Svetlana, on

some level intuitively grasps Marx’s concept of surplus value, ultimately her conception is exactly
what Marx was criticizing. She, and overall, the rest of the workers in this study, accept capitalist
relations of production as fundamentally fair, even natural, although they believe that the worker
deserves a “fair wage.”

Discussion
Why didn’t the workers in my study see the wage-labor or capitalist social relations of
production as inherently exploitive? First, although Belarus has elements of socialism it has been
a market economy for thirty years since the break-up of the Soviet Union and Soviet Socialism.
Marx argued that inherent in market economies is the ‘commodification’ of labor power (Marx
1865, Marx 1867, Lukacs 1923). Workers sell their labor power to owners in a labor market for
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wages. The owners, having bought the labor power outright, then appropriate the surplus labor
and the value of that surplus labor, which is the surplus value, though ordinarily called profits. In
a market these social relations of production appear ‘natural’ to the workers.
Second, even before the breakup of the Soviet Union and the implementation of a market
economy, the ideology of Soviet socialism did not emphasize concepts of “surplus value” and class
heavily.
Concepts of class and surplus [value] had been successfully banished from the
consciousness of most Soviet citizens in part because they had been expunged totally from
officially sanctioned discourse. (Satya et al 2008: 546).
It is clear that this aspect of their moral economy, that workers deserve “fair” wages, is a
product of the Soviet moral economy; this concept was promoted and reinforced throughout Soviet
society (Satya et al 2008: 545). Though the Belarussians believe in fair wages, they do not,

however, see wage-labor and the appropriation of surplus value as inherently exploitative. This
aspect of their moral economy also is a product of the Soviet3 moral economy. The legitimacy of
Soviet socialism was not based in its critique of capitalism as inherently exploitive due to
capitalists’ appropriation of surplus value, but rather its critique of private ownership.
The USSR was depicted as having achieved socialism because it had collectivized the
ownership of means of production (by dispossessing the former private owners), made the
state – as the workers’ representative – the owner and operator of productive enterprises,
and because the state’s central planning replaced markets. Workers’ wages were said to be
their fair share of the collective output (Gabriel et al. 2008:545).

3

This discussion is related to the Marxist analysis of Soviet socialism and whether the Soviet system was truly socialist
(Thomas 2006). There were “three traditions” in this criticism first that the Soviet Union was a “bureaucratically
degenerated worker’s state”; second it was ‘state capitalism; and third, it was a new form of exploitive society namely
“bureaucratic collectivism” (Thomas 2006). So, what was the nature of Soviet socialism? This question is very
complicated (Thomas 2006), and for my purposes right now it is not necessary to solve this problem since the three
systems have much in common and all describe common features of the Soviet economic system which I will use to
understand how they shaped Belarus’ moral economy.
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Soviet socialism was legitimate:
[B]ecause the goals of society “were public rather than private,” and the “surplus,” in line
with the socialist state, was used to achieve “a substantial degree of equity through full
employment and state provision of social benefits for all (Laibman 1978:25; Klimina
2015:418).
This conception of Soviet socialism was obvious throughout my study. The workers in my
study who supported socialism did so since they opposed private ownership. Even the majority of
workers, who were more tolerant of private business, adamantly wanted to keep the state-owned
industrial sector under public ownership and out of “private hands” (Dennis).
Related to this critique of Soviet socialism is Ioffe’s (2004) peasant commune. According
Ioffe’s theory, Soviet socialism was shaped far more by Russian feudalism than by any theories of
Karl Marx. The collectivism in Soviet industry was an extension of the collectivism of the Russian
feudal manor. The Soviet moral economy, based on egalitarianism, collective ownership and fair
wages, was not shaped by Marx but was merely an extension of the moral economy of Russian
feudalism manor. Concepts such as a critique of ‘surplus value’ had nothing to do with it.

Chapter 5.5. Egalitarianism
Although the workers in this study tended to dislike extreme inequality, overall, my
findings on the question of egalitarianism were paradoxal and complicated. For example, every
worker in this study, including Lena, believed that people had the right to be rich and that the
government had no right to take anyone’s wealth. They all adamantly rejected the egalitarianism
of the Soviet Union. While it is true that the Belarussian workers in this study did not like extreme
inequality as seen in Russia; they also were not very committed to wealth redistribution or even
progressive income taxation. These workers would rather the state directly provide stable jobs
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(through its large industrial sector) and give workers a chance to earn a decent living on their own,
than for the state to play a smaller role in the economy and focus on taxation to redistribute the
wealth to the poor and working class. In this way they were more socialist than social democratic.
Though ordinary Belarussians still dislike extreme income inequality, the workers in this
study have forsaken the Soviet vision of egalitarianism (even though they accepted that vision
during the Soviet era). Even Lena and Masha, who strongly supported the Soviet Union, who still

strongly support socialism and oppose private enterprise, no longer support the Soviet vision of
egalitarianism. Lena said:
The income does not need to be equal, since some people work harder. If someone works
harder, then he should be paid more… [For example] The president is responsible for the
entire country and his pay should be higher. It doesn’t make sense to have everyone’s
salaries the same…. I don’t think there will ever be a society where everyone is paid the
same.
Masha agreed with this, and also opposed any kind of radical egalitarianism.
Q: “Do Belarussians support the idea that everyone’s income should be equal or at least
closer to equal?
Masha: “I don’t support that.”
I do not support equal salaries. If one person works and the other sits around and drinks,
why should he get the same pay?

This rejection of a radical egalitarianism based on equal or close to equal incomes was
universal throughout this study—without exception. They also rejected the level of equality
achieved by the Soviet Union—even though the workers who lived in the Soviet Union embraced
Soviet egalitarianism at that time. For example, Lena supported Soviet egalitarianism:
Everyone was on the same level. There were no rich or poor. There were no bums or
homeless people. We never complained. We were not rich, but we were not poor.
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Yury also explicitly supported Soviet egalitarianism: “No rich people, no poor people, all
people were equal, good salaries, the working-class had good jobs, good salaries.” As well as
Oleg:
My father worked at the collective farm. He was comfortable with his salary. There was
no arrogance among the management as there is now. Then everyone lived well. There
were no rich people…. People were friendlier in the Soviet Union. The relationship
between people was more united.
Tanya also supported Soviet egalitarianism:
In the Soviet Union we were all equal; we did not have millionaires…Now everything has
changed. There are poor people, middle-class, rich and very rich.
The workers’ embrace of Soviet egalitarianism, however, starkly contrasted with the
capitalist subjects’ view. For example, Stas, the shampoo factory owner was strongly opposed to
Soviet egalitarianism even during the Soviet-era said. He saw it as a “stifling” society that did not
reward creative people. Vlad, the owner of an automotive parts factory said:
Salaries were the same. It was not good… We had an idea about equality but the idea was
very horrible that the salaries had to be the same. In the Soviet Union all of the salaries
were the same from 100 rubles to 200 rubles.
In general, the contrast between the workers’ and capitalists’ view of Soviet egalitarianism
was sharply opposed. As opposed to the capitalists, the workers supported Soviet egalitarianism,
however, they have moved away from it and some outright reject egalitarianism.
Lena, the most radical worker in the study has moved away from Soviet egalitarianism,
however she is still very egalitarian, believing that income inequality should be made smaller and
that the difference between richest and poorest should only be “10 times more.” Lena is still very
egalitarian, and the only worker to give an actual number (10 times) representing “fair” income
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differences. Be that as it may Lena had many inconsistences as far as egalitarianism goes. For
example, Lena supported the ‘right to be rich’ and opposed any limits on personal wealth:
Why wouldn’t someone have the right to be rich? If he works hard, he has the right to be
rich. If his business is legal and he pays taxes, why shouldn’t he have the right to be rich?
Please, go ahead, be rich!
[Limits on wealth?]
If someone works hard, how can you put any limits on it?
It is unclear how income inequality could possibly be limited to where the richest only
makes 10 times the poorest without putting some “limits” on personal wealth. (It should be noted
that the “right to be rich” and that there should be “no limits on personal wealth” were completely
universal in this study among every subject including all of the workers.) Lena was ambivalent
about relying on taxes to raise living standards of the poor and making Belarus more egalitarian.
Lena also did not support progressive taxation. Though to be fair, Lena, like many other subjects

in this study, did not believe private companies would actually pay their taxes.
Yury’s transformation was rather extreme. He went from strongly supporting Soviet
egalitarianism to completely forsaking egalitarianism—even a moderate reduction in income
inequality and progressive taxation. Instead, he justified inequality:
Different people have different abilities, talents, they will naturally make more money and
be more successful. That is natural. Everyone will not be on the same level.
Not only does Yury reject Soviet egalitarianism: He now sees income inequality as a
positive force in society and “natural”. Yury and I continued:
Q: "Would most Belarussians like to see the difference between the richest and poorest
Belarussians smaller? (Would you?)"
Rich people open firms and work more, and make more money. This is natural. This is
fair. Rich people give poor people jobs and salaries. (Italics added)
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Notice how Yury twice said that income inequality is “natural.”
Oleg’s transformation was not as radical as Yury’s. However, he too has abandoned Soviet
egalitarianism; although he does support moderate wealth redistribution through moderate
progressive taxation:
Q: “In the Soviet Union you supported income equality?”
Yes, of course. In the Soviet Union everyone was equal.

Q: “No you do not support income equality, though. When did you change?”
I don’t know. I have never thought about it.
Q: “Did it change after the Soviet Union broke up?”
It must have. I have never thought about it before. It must have been a gradual change. I
was not even aware of it happening.
Oleg, like the other workers in this study, rejects the idea of income equality but supports
the idea of moderately reducing the income gap between the rich and the poor:
Q: "Would most Belarussians like to see the difference between the richest and poorest
Belarussians smaller? (Would you?)"
Not big, but there must be a difference but not very big. Everyone must pay taxes...and the
amount of taxes should be different: if your income is higher, you should pay more taxes.
Tanya was similar to Oleg; however, she still values Soviet egalitarianism to a certain
extent, explicitly talking about the social transformation from Soviet egalitarianism to capitalist
inequality. Notice her use of the phrase “Probably, it must be this way,” like Yury’s “This is
natural.” These phrases are demonstrating the result of reification (Lukacs 1923).
We have rich people; we have poor people and we have the middle class. In the Soviet
Union we were all equal; we did not have millionaires…Now everything has changed.
There are poor people, middle-class, rich and very rich.
Q: Are you against this?
No, I am not against it. Probably, it must be this way. But in my time, it was not like that.
(Italics added)
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Q: "Would Belarussians support efforts by the government to make Belarus more
egalitarian? (Would you?)"
Probably, yes. I don’t know what to say—Equality—As for me equality was always good.
But now everything has changed…. There should not be poor people, only middle-class
and rich people—and there should not be any very rich people.
Though Tanya would like to create a society without any “very rich” people it is not clear
to her how this could be done. She does not trust the government with taxation.
Q: Would you like the government to act like Robin Hood?
I don’t know. I don’t know whether our government is Robin Hood. You cannot get it to
share the money. The government is rich and does not want to share it. This new tax will
affect the middle class. The poor cannot pay anymore and the rich won’t pay anymore.
(As discussed previously, Tanya’s distrust of the government’s ability or willingness to
implement taxes contradicts her support for enormous state intervention into the economy,
as well as her trust that it can regulate the economy effectively to protect wages and jobs.)

Dennis’ views on egalitarianism were similar to Tanya’s. He too wanted to reduce the
income gap:
The director and the worker must earn different salaries, but the gap between them should
not be very big. Now the gap is too wide.
Dennis, like Tanya, was also very wary of taxation being used to redistribute wealth and
used as means of lessening the income gap. This was very surprising to me considering how much

government intervention into the economy he supported throughout our interview, as well as how
strongly he opposed the income gap.
Q: "Would Belarussians support an additional tax that would be used to raise the income
of poor to make Belarus more egalitarian? (Would you?)"
It is a fantasy. The government might take the money from the rich people but will never
give it to the poor people.
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Although Svetlana did not like the fact that the income gap had “widened through the
years” since the collapse of the Soviet Union, she did not support wealth redistribution. Rather
than promoting economic egalitarianism, she wanted to promote the dignity of all workers:
…each person has his own talent and his own job that is no less important

than any

other. Every person and every job is valuable. We should not put down people because
we think our job or talent is more important.
Svetlana did not want to see the abuses that took place after the October Revolution in the
name of ‘equality’.
Q: “What if the government took more careful steps to try to reduce the gap between the
rich and poor?”
I don’t know. People should have equal rights. People should have respect for each other
despite their jobs or wages.
Though Svetlana does not like the income gap in Belarus she does not support

redistribution of wealth through taxation or a progressive taxation system.
I think that our government should concentrate on its own factories, to

develop

these

factories. Not depend on people’s taxes.
In this way, Svetlana is more of a socialist than a social democrat. She believes in socialism
more than the welfare state. This is especially interesting as Svetlana was the most oppositional
worker in the study. She not only opposed President Lukashenka and voted for Tikhanovskaya,
but attended several protests. Though Svetlana might be an outlier, based on this study, I think
she demonstrates how broad the workers’ moral economy is.
Sasha was rather ambivalent about egalitarianism. He thought that the “idea” of reducing
the income gap “is not bad”; however, he adamantly opposed raising taxes on the rich: “they pay
enough,” and thought that taxes on the rich should be lowered. He also adamantly opposed
progressive taxation: “The percent should be fixed.”
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Q: "What efforts, if any, would Belarussians support to make Belarus more egalitarian?
(What would you support?)"
I don’t know if it is possible.

Discussion
Overall, the respondent’s views appear to reflect the notion in the literature that
Belarussians do not like extreme inequality; however, I found their views about egalitarianism
inconsistent, paradoxical, and that they are not deeply committed to reducing income inequality.
It seems the problem is that their outlook is still socialist in that they believe the state, through its
control of industry should provide full employment and good wages for everyone who wants to
work. This outlook is deeply opposed to social democracy, that allows capitalism to create low
wages and inequality that, in turn, the welfare state tries to mitigate—especially through
progressive income taxation. Currently, however, Belarus has a flat-rate personal income tax of
only 13 percent4 and a corporate income tax of only 18 percent.5 Surprisingly, Belarus’ tax rates
are very low. Though I am sympathetic to the workers’ outlook, preferring socialist development
rather than a welfare state, it seems that if private sector is going to continue developing in Belarus,
which it looks like it will, Belarus will have to rely on progressive taxation to mitigate inequality.

Trading Economics, “Belarus Personal Income Tax Rate,” (https://tradingeconomics.com/belarus/personal-incometax-rate).
4

National Agency of Investment and Privatization of the Republic of Belarus, “Tax System,”
(https://www.investinbelarus.by/en/tax-system/)
5
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Chapter 6. The New Neoliberal Ideology of the Capitalists and Segment of the
Middle Class
Chapter 6.1. A New Neoliberalism
You keep asking me whether something is ‘fair.’ It is not a question of ‘fairness’; it is just
a question of business.

--Ivan, 51, printing business owner
The workers in this study adamantly rejected neoliberalism—even the workers who
supported privatization and competition still adamantly rejected neoliberalism. However, some of
the middle-class subjects in this study and most of the capitalists in this study in general supported
neoliberalism—or at least a kind of neoliberalism. The kind of neoliberalism that emerged among
some of the middle-class and most of the capitalists in this study does not fit neatly into the

literature. It was basically neoliberal market fundamentalism in the sphere of production (mass
privatization, disciplining labor, etc.) combined with Soviet welfare state programs such as free
healthcare and medicine, free education, public pensions, public transportation, etc. However,
welfare state programs like these are usually highly contested by neoliberals (Hopkins 2018;
Giroux 2015, 2011; Karger 2014; Harvey 2005). For example, Karger (2014) described the
neoliberal attack on public pensions that took place in Europe, especially in the Eurozone after the

2008 crisis, decreasing public pensions significantly and raising retirement ages. Healthcare and
medicine programs also are facing a neoliberal attack (Hopkins 2018:855). Bearing this in mind,
I have called the neoliberalism that emerged during this study a new neoliberalism for lack of a
better term. Also, bear in mind that whenever I refer to neoliberalism in the context of Belarus, I
am implying this new neoliberalism that combines laissez-faire free-market capitalism with
welfare state programs. Before delving into what is new about the neoliberalism that emerged in
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this study, let’s first establish what is old about this neoliberalism. And before we do that allow
me briefly to talk about the relationship between neoliberal ideology and moral economy.

Neoliberal Ideology vs. Moral Economy
As I discussed in Chapter 2, I had a great advantage over other moral economy researchers
(for example, Keskula 2015 Reinarman 1987) since I had an opportunity to interview capitalist
and middle-class Belarussians whose ideology was neoliberal.

This not only introduced

complexity to this study but allowed me to clarify the workers’ moral economy.
In general, the outlook of the capitalists in this study was neoliberal and some of the middleclass subjects were neoliberal as well. The neoliberal ideology that emerged among these subjects
was in stark contradiction to the workers’ moral economy. And while I did my best to evoke the

workers’ moral economy, by confronting them with neoliberal ideology, we now have the unique
opportunity to explore the neoliberal ideology of the capitalist and some of the middle-class
subjects directly. This will provide more perspective and a deeper understanding of the workers’
moral economy.

What is Old about this New Neoliberalism?
In this section, I will specifically discuss the neoliberal ideologies that emerged in this
study that I have categorized as The Invisible Hand, Capitalist Social Relations of Production,
Privatization, Shock Therapy, Extreme Market Fundamentalism, and Social Darwinism. With the
exception of a few workers, who supported very gradual privatization (the overwhelming majority
adamantly opposed privatization), these ideologies were completely alien to the workers’ moral
economy—there was nothing close to it.
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On the issue of Capitalist Social Relations of Production there were no exceptions among
the pro-market subjects in this study. (Anna, Ivan, Pavel, Boris, Vlad, and Stas were the promarket subjects featured in this dissertation). All of the pro-market subjects adamantly defended
capitalist social relations of production.

On the issue of Privatization there was only one

exception, Anna. She believed that the major factories should remain under state control. On the
issue of Shock Therapy, there were two clear exceptions: obviously Anna as well as Ivan, who,
although he adamantly supported privatization, truly believed it should be done very gradually and
without creating social dislocation. Boris, however, openly supported Shock Therapy and Pavel
and Vlad, though ostensibly against shock therapy clearly support it. Stas also said he was against
shock therapy; however, he praised the shock therapy in Lithuania and Latvia and acknowledges
Belarus’ transition from socialism to capitalism will be very painful for the working class. On the
issue of Extreme Market Fundamentalism (Monopolies), Vlad was an important exception,
however Stas and Boris adamantly opposed any anti-monopoly/restraint-of-trade legislation and
had complete faith in the “self-regulating market” (Polanyi 1944).

Social Darwinism
Among the six pro-market subjects featured in this dissertation, Social Darwinism was
mainly espoused by Stas, the richest, oldest, and most successful capitalist in the study (Stas owns
a shampoo factory with 1,500 workers), although others in the study, though not featured in this
dissertation, had similar beliefs. And although making broad generalizations about Social
Darwinism based on such little data is ill-advised, the emergence of this ideology, however, stands
in stark contradiction to the workers’ moral economy providing illustrative contrast.
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The Invisible Hand
The neoliberal utopian ideology of the invisible hand was universal among the capitalists
in this study as well as some of the middle class. This ideology was used to justify both capitalist
social relations and privatization. Vlad (the owner of an automotive parts plant with over 600
workers) in his argument in support of privatization sums up the basic concept of the invisible
hand fairly well.
I think when the government owns factories it makes them very inefficient because
[private] owners make companies more efficient because all of the profits belong to the
private owner. But a state factory has a director who has other interests then a real owner.
And for Vlad, not only will privately owned factories be much more efficient, but once
Belarus fully privatizes the state-owned industrial sector and embraces the “free market,” than
“everything will be all right.”
David Harvey’s (2005) understanding of the ideology of invisible hand as a rationalization
for capitalist domination, however, can be seen in Vlad’s interview. Although Vlad is rather
optimistic about Belarus’ future after privatization, he openly describes the extremely harsh reality
and social dislocation the workers will have to face during this transition. This will be discussed
in the section on shock therapy.
The invisible-hand ideology was universal among all of the capitalists and many middleclass subjects. Anna, (a 58-year-old private food factory manager), however, eloquently relied on
the invisible-hand ideology to justify inequality in a way almost identical to actual neoliberal
adherents.
Rich people, when they work in an economically healthy environment with clear laws,
create many job opportunities. If rich people are getting richer helping poor people to
become rich as well — that’s great, even if the gap between them is getting bigger.
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And they believe capitalist development will not only lead to higher wages, and better
worker living standards but will uplift the entire society increasing the tax base benefiting the poor,
improving hospitals etc. Stas explained:
The richest investors are not coming to Belarus now. The policy should be ‘come and earn
whatever you want and whatever you earn will be yours.’ That would be better for the poor
in the future. They [the investors] will pay taxes for good hospitals, schools, etc. The
state should struggle for these investors and they should be from every country. No pain,

no gain!
Anna and Stas both articulated the trickle-down economic theory very well. According to
Harvey (2005---) the ideology of trickle-down economics and the rising-tide-lifts-all-ships are
merely variations of the neoliberal utopian invisible-hand ideology—all of which serve to
rationalize capitalist domination.
The utopian invisible-hand ideology also manifested itself in the narrative that living
standards rise for everyone if only Belarus embraced a neoliberal free-market transition. This
concept can be clearly seen in Stas’ and Anna’s statements above, and was widespread among the
capitalist subjects in this study as well as some of the middle-class subjects. Vlad was also very
explicit about this narrative of a prosperous future following neoliberal transition:
This is what Belarus will have to do to grow and develop

And once Belarus develops, “follow[s] the market” and privatizes the state enterprises
“everything will be alright.” Boris was very similar (I’ll focus specifically on Boris in the
privatization section). Directly linked to this narrative was the notion that if Belarus would only
embrace neoliberal transition, then Belarussian workers could also enjoy the high living standards
that workers in the Baltic states enjoy, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—especially Lithuania. This
narrative was absolutely widespread among the capitalists in this study as well as some of the
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middle class. The narrative, that post-transition Lithuania was some kind of neoliberal workers’
paradise was widespread among these subjects and was explicitly stated.
Q: “But in other republics, like the Baltic states, the factories were all privatized or closed?”
Stas: “No, uncompetitive factories were closed. They were closed since they were not
competitive with international firms. They could not compete and had to be closed. [Now]
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia all have higher standards of living than Belarus. Their
pensions are much higher. Their salaries are much higher. The average Lithuanian salary

is 600 Euros a month! Lukashenka mesmerized Belarussians with this propaganda that
destroying non-competitive companies is wrong. No! It is a good thing. It is development.
Belarussians look at this [closing factories] as a tragedy, when in reality is an opportunity
to grow and develop. It is a challenge.”
This narrative is another neoliberal utopian ideology and serves as a powerful
rationalization for neoliberal reform.

It is directly related to the invisible-hand ideology.

Basically, it holds that since Lithuania embraced neoliberal reform the invisible-hand is now at
work in Lithuania providing Lithuanian workers with much higher wages and living standards than
what Belarussian have. Later in this chapter, I will demonstrate, that, in spite of Lithuania’s
seemingly high wages the narrative is false.
The overwhelming majority of the workers outright rejected the invisible-hand ideology,
however, the four workers (who supported (gradual) privatization) embraced, to some degree, the
invisible-hand ideology. In general, this ideology was also their justification for privatization.
However, their embrace of the invisible-hand ideology as well as the free-market was far more
limited than the capitalist and middle-class subjects being discussed in this section. First, although
they supported privatization, they were adamant about it being done very gradually—one even
though that it could not be done now and would have to wait a long time. They also supported
strict regulations protecting wages and jobs that were universally rejected by the capitalist and
middle-class subjects in this section. For these workers, capitalist social relations of production
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must have moral restraints—and cannot be left to the whim of the free-market. In this way, these
workers do not actually embrace the invisible-hand ideology as the ideology maintains that, with
very few exceptions, when all moral imperatives are taken out of the economy and when economic
actors are guided only by personal profit in a competitive environment, all of society would benefit.
These workers, however, still want to see the visible hand of the state regulating the private sector
and imposing moral imperatives.

Capitalist Social Relations of Production
While overall, the workers in this study did accept the basic format of capitalist social
relations of production, they also strongly believed that owner must pay the worker “fair wages.”
Without exception, the capitalists and a significant portion of the middle-class subjects in this
study completely rejected this notion. They do not believe in any worker’s right to a “fair wage.”
For them, workers are only entitled to wages based on the market rate for that particular labor in
that particular labor market. And among these pro-market subjects there was no ambiguity. They
all adamantly believed the owner should have complete control over the workers’ wages and jobs
and have the right to hire and fire as he sees fit.
I will now focus on the least radical of the pro-market subjects featured in this dissertation
to demonstrate their absolute commitment to capitalist social relations of production, which were
shared by all of the pro-market or neoliberal subjects in this study. Let’s begin with Anna, 58, a
middle-class private factory manager, who, although a strong believer in market discipline does
support maintaining a significant portion of the state-owned industrial sector. However, Anna
believes that, “The market should determine everything...” This was true for Anna not only in
regards to the private-sector but to the state-sector as well. Anna also said,
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The owner should set his own rules on how to run the factory. He must decide the wages
to pay and he is free to lay off workers to increase profits if he chooses.
Ivan, 50, owner of a printing company with about 10 full time workers had a similar outlook
(Although Ivan strongly supports privatization, he is not as radical as some of the others in this
study as he is more concerned about social stability.)
Q: Is it fair if an owner lowers workers’ wages to increase profits?
Yes, …If the workers agree to accept low wages, then it is fair. There
is a contract between the owner and the worker’. If the worker agrees then it is fair
The concept of “free individuals” and a “freely-made contract” came up numerous times
in this study while interviewing the capitalists. Ivan continued,
Q: Should an owner be allowed to lay off workers to increase profits?
Yes. Who allows the owner? The owner is the owner! I don’t understand ‘who’ is allowed
to decide for the owner how to run his business. The owner is the owner…and he controls

the business!
You keep asking me whether something is ‘fair.’ It is not a question of ‘fairness’; it is just
a question of business.
Pavel 50, owner of a small clothing store chain and warehouse, with over 100 workers,
although in general more radical than Anna and Ivan, gave responses that were very insightful.
When I asked about factory owners lowering the workers’ wages in order to maximize profits, he
responded angrily:
It’s none of the worker’s damn business how much money the factory owner makes!
They agreed to a contract which says how much money is paid for this kind of work. It is
not a collective farm! When I hire a worker, he needs to do the work and go home and it is none
of his business how much profits I am making or what I plan on doing with the profits. He either
agrees or disagrees to the wages that I am offering for the work.
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Pavel, and many others, stressed the concept of the ‘free individual’:
Yes, it is possible to cut salaries to increase his profits. Both are free individuals. If the
owner does not pay enough the worker can leave for a different owner. Everyone is free.
This is not a problem
This concept of ‘fairness’ or ‘moral’ vs, economics or the law came up numerous times in
this study. For example, Boris said:

It doesn’t matter what is moral it is only an economic question!
Vlad said:
…the law and fair are different things.
This captures the essence of the study as the workers’ moral economy is based on what is
moral or fair while the capitalists reject the notion of ‘fairness’—all that matters is the market.

Some might not consider Anna and Ivan ‘neoliberal’. Anna truly supported maintaining a
significant portion of the state-owned industrial sector. This outlook came from the Soviet Union.
And Ivan, though he strongly supported privatization, was committed to doing it gradually,
maintaining social stability. Ivan’s approach would usually be characterized as “gradualism” (Atas
2018; Yarashevich 2014). However, when it came to the relationship between workers and
owners, both wanted to see a resurgence of capitalist social relations of production, and of the

owners’ dominance over wage-labor, which is a central aspect to neoliberalism (DePhillips
2015:822-823; Harvey 2005). On this question their ideology was identical to the more radical
pro-market subjects in this study, who would typically be categorized unambiguously as
neoliberal.
Beyond merely establishing unfettered capitalist social relations of production in which
questions of wages and employment are solely determined by the owner (see DePhillips 2015:822187

823), other important aspects of capitalist social relations of production were articulated fairly
explicitly, such as Marx’s reserve army of labor (Das 2017b). (The reserve army of labor is Marx’s
term for the reserve of unemployed workers that under capitalism must be kept in order to maintain
capitalist social relations of production. Basically, employed workers constantly face threat of
replacement and are forced to accept low wages. The effect of strikes is also diminished as striking
workers risk replacement. The reserve army of labor is a precondition for a free-labor market or
the complete commodification of labor power. Ultimately, the reserve army of labor is a necessary
precondition for the complete realization of realize capitalist social relations of production.) The
reserve army of labor will be discussed in the next section on privatization as it arose in the context
of justifying privatization in order to create a reserve army of labor.

Privatization
Notwithstanding some exceptions, privatization was another key aspect of the
neoliberalism that emerged in this study. The invisible hand was an important ideology justifying
privatization. Recall Vlad’s justification of privatization in the section on the invisible hand:
I think when the government owns factories it makes them very inefficient because
[private] owners make companies more efficient because all of the profits belong to the
private owner. But a state factory has a director who has other interests then a real owner.
This outlook was universal among the capitalists in the study. Stas, obviously agrees, and
specifically argues that it is not the proper role of the state to own or control industrial companies:
The state should not have industrial companies because

they cannot effectively manage

them. The role of the state is to get taxes not to manage companies itself.
(This outlook was also universally accepted by the capitalists in this study.)
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Some of the capitalist and middle-class subjects in this study justified privatization beyond
mere utopian ideologies such as the invisible hand, but saw privatization itself as a necessary
precondition for establishing capitalist accumulation.

In general, this concept was implicit

throughout most of the interviews being discussed in this section, especially Stas’, and was
explicitly stated by Boris and fairly explicitly stated by Vlad. Boris explicitly justifies privatization
as a necessary stage to create the conditions for capitalist accumulation (Marx’s primitive
accumulation Das (2017b). Similarly, Vlad justifies privatization, fairly explicitly, to increase
unemployment (Marx’s reserve army of labor Das 2017a, 2017b) thereby intensifying capitalist
exploitation.
Even though both Boris and Vlad strongly embrace neoliberal utopian ideologies such as
the invisible hand, their support for privatization based on the fundamental logic of capitalist
accumulation appears to contradict their neoliberal utopian ideology that privatization will lead to

higher living standards for workers.
Like the others, Boris strongly embraced neoliberal utopian ideology such as the invisible
hand and self-regulating market. However, he also clearly and explicitly justified privatization as
a necessary precondition for the creation of capitalist social relations of production. Though Vlad
did not use Marx’s term, primitive accumulation (Das 2017b), he was clearly and explicitly
referring to this concept.
Marx’s PA [primitive accumulation], an important method of the origin of capitalist
accumulation… included the following processes which should not be separated one from
another: the rise (and expansion) of the working class consequent to the direct producers
being dispossessed of their property, and the rise of the capitalist class from a “protocapitalist class,” and the concomitant conversion, into productive capital, of the property
that is separated from the direct producers, with such capital being involved in the
exploitation of the working class (Das 2017b:600).
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Boris sees the privatization that took place in Russia in the 1990’s as an example of
primitive accumulation, which created the very conditions to make capitalist accumulation
possible.1 Boris believes that Belarus must also follow Russia’s successful example. He believes
that Belarus must privatize its state-owned industrial sector allowing Belarus to go through a stage
of primitive accumulation, that will create the conditions for capitalist accumulation. (Boris’
conception of primitive accumulation will be discussed more in the next section on shock therapy.)

Vlad, like the others, also justified privatization based on neoliberal utopian ideology,
however, he also justified privatization since it would lead to more unemployment, which would
actually be good for the economy, especially for his automotive plant: “Now I have a very serious
problem. I can’t find any staff: workers, engineers, managers.” Vlad was clear that privatization,
and the layoffs it would certainly entail, would free thousands of workers, some of whom would
have little choice but to accept jobs at Vlad’s plant at the wages he is offering. Although Vlad

never used the term, he is actually referring Marx’s reserve army of labor (see Das 2017a, 2017b).
It is prerequisite for capitalist social relations of production and creating a flexible free-labor
market.
Certainly, Vlad would have no trouble filling any vacant positions if he offered
significantly higher wages, however, that would mean significantly lower profits. The driving

1

Scholars are still debating what exactly happened in Russia in the 1990’s and whether the conditions for capitalist
accumulation where actually created. For example, Kagaritsky (2002:5) argued “There are no grounds whatever for
maintaining that the money and property accumulated by the ‘New Russians’ during this period became capital in the
full sense. The distinguishing feature of capital is its ability to grow, and of the capitalist enterprise, its capacity for
expanded reproduction (which distinguishes it from a feudal undertaking). Nothing of the sort was to be observed in
Belovezhskaya Russia. Private property had triumphed, but not all private property is capitalist (Kagarlitsky 2002:5;
italics added). This non-capitalist aspect of Russia’s transition has been noted by several scholars, for example:
Melkonian (2011), Simon (2010:445), Harvey (2005), and “Kotz (2001) [who] noted the absence of key features of
capitalism; Burawoy (2001) [who] referred to it as ‘transition without transformation’; and Ericson (2001) termed it
‘industrial feudalism’” (Simon 2010:445). Burawoy (1992) has also referred to it as a return to mercantilism.
Harvey (2005, 2003) actually formulated a new concept of “accumulation by dispossession” which, he believes,
dominates capitalism under neoliberalism in response to crisis of profitability and has replaced capital’s expanded
reproduction. Das (2017b), and other traditional Marxists, however, are very critical of Harvey’s concept of
accumulation by dispossession and in general his abandonment of key aspects Marxist theory.
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force of capitalism, however, is to increase profits (Das 2017a). Privatizing Belarus’ state-owned
industrial sector, and creating thousands of unemployed workers would solve Vlad’s economic
problems much more efficiently and profitably.
Interestingly, although Vlad was a very harsh critic of Belarus’ state-owned enterprises, in
a way, ironically, his support for the reserve army of labor, tacitly gives support to the state
enterprises. It seems clear that these state enterprises’ wages are competitive enough to retain their

workers, thereby preventing Vlad from hiring the workers he needs (this also contradicts Boris and
the others who complained about the low wages at state enterprises.) Also, these state firms’ wages
seem to be too competitive for Vlad to offer higher wages or even to match. The fact that Vlad
can only compete with state enterprises for qualified workers by forcing lay-offs of thousands of
workers at newly privatized state firms seem to betray Vlad’s faith in the inherent greater
efficiency of privately-owned firms.
Theoretically, both Boris and Vlad’s views are very insightful.

They both justify

privatization as a prerequisite of capitalist accumulation (or at least the intensification of capitalist
accumulation). Their ideology is in line with the scholarship of capitalist transition of formersocialist states, and the importance of privatization in order to establish capitalist accumulation
(King 2003).
Both Boris and Vlad strongly embraced neoliberal utopian ideology as a justification for
privatization since they believe capitalist property relations are overall far superior to state
ownership —even for the workers. However, careful examination of other their ideologies, based
on the logic of capital accumulation, seems to tell a different tale. Though Boris ostensibly
believes private firms will provide workers with much higher wages, he explicitly acknowledges
that privatization will not lead to higher wages but to lower wages, unemployment, social
dislocation (this will be discussed more in the next section on shock therapy). For Boris only in
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the distant future, once Belarus makes it through this disaster of primitive accumulation, will
workers enjoy higher wages and living standards. Then, and only then, according to Boris, will
Belarussian workers enjoy the high wages and living standards of Lithuanian workers who already
went through this process. (I will discuss Lithuania and whether Lithuania workers actually enjoy
these high wages and living standards later in this chapter).
Although Vlad, like Boris, also believes in the radiant future awaiting Belarussian workers

and capitalists alike after privatization, during Vlad’s interview he specifically focused on the
importance of privatization for creating a reserve army of labor—in order to suppress wages, not
increase them. This clearly contradicts the invisible-hand and other neoliberal utopian ideologies
and demonstrates that they merely serve as rationalizations for capitalist domination (see Harvey
2005).
Shock Therapy
Although I discussed privatization of the state-owned industrial sector in general, I
specifically asked all of my subjects about shock therapy or the rapid privatization of stateenterprises in order to transform a socialist economy into a market economy (King 2003).
Although shock therapy as a successful transition model has been discredited by numerous
scholars (Ioffe 2014:45; see also Yarashevich 2014), I thought it was important to ask subjects
about anyway since resisting shock therapy was a crucial aspect to Belarus’ socio-economic policy
since the breakup of the Soviet Union (even before President Lukashenka (Ioffe 2014))—and that
policy of resistance to shock therapy was a direct reflection of the moral economy of ordinary
Belarussians (Yarashevich 2014; Ioffe 2014, 2004). Furthermore, since I would be interviewing
capitalists—whom I assumed would support privatization in general—I thought it would be
important to explore the topic of shock therapy, although I did not anticipate anyone would openly
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or explicitly support it. Boris openly supported shock therapy and others, though ostensibly
claimed to be against it, actually appeared to support it.
Pavel, 50, owner of a small clothing store chain and warehouse, with over 100 workers,
initially he claimed he was against shock therapy, and seemed to be similar to Anna in that he said
that a significant portion of the state-owned industrial sector should remain under state control,
though some firms should be privatized and others simply liquidated. However, when I asked him

to specify which plants should be liquidated, he listed most of Belarus’ major firms such as Minsk
Tractor Works, Minsk Autoworks, Minsk Motor Works, (maker of tractor and truck engines),
MZKT (military vehicles) and possibly Belarus Autoworks (mining vehicles). It seems Pavel,
unlike Anna, does not actually support Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector at all, but supports
public ownership over mineral extraction, forestry, oil refineries, and transport. (Many countries
have this model).
Though Pavel, supported public ownership of key strategic spheres, the fact that he wanted
to liquidate—not even privatize—most of Belarus’ major state firms seems to put him squarely in
the neoliberal camp—even a supporter of shock therapy.
Boris, a 50-year-old manager at a large IT firm would unambiguously be considered
neoliberal since he not only was the most opposed to the state-owned industrial sector but
unabashedly advocated ‘shock therapy’—very rapid privatizations as was seen in Russia in the
1990’s.
I support [shock therapy]. Why not? Yes, there were many problems, [however] on the
other hand it will be a cemetery [if we do not privatize everything]
Q: “Wasn’t it a disaster in Russia?”
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It was. [However], The first capital2 was gained unlawfully in America too. The same for
the former-Soviet republics. I think it is alright. It will be hard but we need to do it.
I tried to explore Boris’ neoliberal shock therapy more. He admitted that it will be very
hard but “that is the only one way to do it”. During their shock therapy “Belarussians would have
to leave and move to Russia and the Ukraine” to find jobs3. These hardships would be worth it in
the end as Belarus’ economy and workers’ living standards would be much better:

The experience of our neighbors shows us, [shock therapy will be worth it], the Baltic
states, the Ukraine, Russia, Poland …especially the Baltic states and Poland.
Boris was very committed to neoliberalism and thought that the government should let
major industrial factories fail: “Minsk Autoworks and Minsk Tractor Works should close if they
are not profitable,” even though each of these plants has over 16,000 workers. And he adamantly
believed that the state should not subsidize firms to prevent unemployment: “No, it is not worth

it! It is better to be unemployed than to make 200 euros a month!”
Although Stas and Vlad4 ostensibly opposed shock therapy or very rapid privatization, they
both used the terms like painful to describe Belarus’ future transition to capitalism. And while
they both said they wanted to avoid shock therapy both Stas and Vlad praised the shock therapy
that took place during the Baltic states’ transition. For example, I asked Stas:

Boris is talking about Marx’s concept of the ‘primitive accumulation of capital’ or the social dispossession of wealth
that allows the capitalist class to develop and allows for the creation of a propertyless working class (Das 2017b).
Boris is arguing that in Russia in the 1990’s, the rapid privatization of state properties and the accumulation of this
capital in the private hands of the oligarchs, was a necessary stage in the development of capitalism in Russia. This
rapid accumulation of state properties in private hands is needed to transform the former-socialist economy into a
capitalist one—also known as ‘shock therapy’ (King 2003).
2

3

Vlad, a business owner in the upper-class section also supported the need for Belarussians to migrate abroad to find
work.
4

Although Vlad said that the privatization process should be done gradually, he did not express any concern for the
workers or the hardship or social dislocation they would face but only said that privatization must be done gradually
to ensure that we “get a good price for our government companies and factories” and to deal with “the bribery that
might happen during that process.” Not a word about the workers at these plants.
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Q: “But in other republics, like the Baltic states, the factories were all privatized or closed?”
No, uncompetitive factories were closed.

They were closed since they were not

competitive with international firms. They could not compete and had to be closed. [Now]
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia all have higher standards of living than Belarus. Their
pensions are much higher. Their salaries are much higher. The average Lithuanian salary
is 600 Euros a month! Lukashenka mesmerized Belarussians with this propaganda that
destroying non-competitive companies is wrong. No! It is a good thing. It is development.
Belarussians look at this [closing factories] as a tragedy, when in reality is an opportunity

to grow and develop. It is a challenge.
Vlad unambiguously described Belarus’ harsh future transition in the exact same way Boris
did. He envisioned loss of work, social dislocation, migration abroad to find work. Exactly what
happened in the Baltic states (Atas 2018). According to Vlad, during the transition Belarussian
workers must be willing to go abroad to find jobs. So, for example, in our interview we discussed
what would happen to the 16,000 workers if Minsk Tactor Works were to shut down:
Q: “So the 16,000 workers would be able to find new jobs?”
Inside or outside the country. The young workers will be able to find jobs outside the
country in Poland and Russia. It will be more efficient. They will get higher salaries and
their families will live more comfortably.
This theme came up several times in the interview. For example, when discussing wagelabor, I asked if the worker were truly making a free choice since the worker must eat and keep a

roof over his head (Weber’s “whip of hunger.”)
The worker has a choice because he can choose another job or move to another country to
find a new job.
Vlad like Boris, supports shock therapy. Vlad’s vision of privatization will also create
massive dislocation and a decrease in living standards — as he even admitted. This will force
thousands (millions?) of workers to go abroad to find work. Vlad did not mince words:
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The market must be free…. The market determines everything….
We only have one king. That is the market.
What is ironic, if not contradictory, is that Vlad is very patriotic about Belarus. He wants
to preserve the Belarussian language and culture, and what it means to be Belarussian.
We [Belarussians] don’t have our own native language. No one speaks Belarussian. We
don’t have a national identity — I regret!

It would seem that a Belarussian identity would at least mean that a Belarussian should be
able to live and work in Belarus. However, a few times during our interview Vlad said that
Belarussian workers must be willing to go abroad to find work—and this is especially true for
young workers! Whatever Vlad’s commitment to a Belarussian national identity or patriotism
might be, it is quickly sacrificed to neoliberalism and the international capitalist labor market.
Q: “You think Lithuania and Latvia are better than Belarus. But many people had to

migrate abroad? For example, 37% of Latvians have left?
That is their choice. They are making more money and enjoying higher living standards.
This is what Belarus will have to do to grow and develop.
Q: “What about the right of Belarussians to live in Belarus their homeland?”
We have to develop. We have to follow the market. The market determines everything.

The Self-Regulating Market (Extreme Market Fundamentalism)

All of the capitalist subjects and a significant segment of the middle-class subjects
embraced the neoliberal utopian ideology of the self-regulating market to a great degree (as
opposed to the workers who utterly rejected the notion). This section, however, will focus on Stas
and Boris’ conception of the self-regulating market. Their market fundamentalism was very
extreme—more extreme than the others. Both strongly opposed any anti-monopoly/restraint-oftrade legislation. Although Vlad has enormous faith in the market and firmly believes that “the
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market must be free,” he did draw the line when it came to monopolies and trade restraints.
However, both Stas and Boris supported monopolistic practices and restraint of trade. For
example, neither Stas nor Boris were phased by the example of a private firm buying its
Belarussian state-owned competitor in order to shut it down to gain monopoly control over the
market. These “killer acquisitions” are forbidden in the U.S. by the Clayton Act of 1914, which
prohibits mergers and acquisitions whose effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly”5 and is also forbidden by Belarussian law.6 For example, let’s say
Caterpillar wanted to buy the state-owned Belarussian Autoworks (that makes similar large quarry
mining vehicles). Caterpillar would be buying the plant just to kill its competition and gain more
control over the market. Say the Belarussian government got wind of Caterpillar’s plan. Should
the government sell the plant anyway? Stas did not have a problem with it:
If the state sells [the factory], the state will get money, the workers will get unemployment
insurance, sooner or later this [private] company would strangle the state firm anyway
[Emphasis added]
Stas’ justification for this seems unconvincing:
The assets will be sold and new businesses will open. There will be new jobs and new
taxes.
Stas and Boris believe in what Polanyi (1944) called the “self-regulating market.” (Vlad

also believes in it but recognizes but opposes monopolies). For Stas and Boris, no monopolies or

Federal Trade Commission [FTC], “Start-ups, killer acquisitions and merger control – Note by the United States,”
June 4, 2020, Published by the Ooganization for Economic CoOperation and Development. “This document
reproduces a written contribution from the United States submitted for Item 2 of the 133rd OECD Competition
Committee meeting on 10-16 June 2020.”
(https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/us-submissions-oecd-2010-present-other-international-competitionfora/oecd-killer_acquisiitions_us_submission.pdf).
5

Ministry of the Economy of the Republic of Belarus, “Anti-monoploy Policy,”
(https://www.economy.gov.by/en/national-competition-policy-in-the-rb-en/).
6
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trade restraints could ever limit this self-regulating feature of the market. In my interviews with
Boris and Stas they explained how the market would easily deal with these so-called trade
restraints. Boris had the best example of the self-regulating market:
Today you ate bread. It doesn’t matter what kind of wheat it was made from or whether
that wheat came from Russia, America or Canada. If one factory closes other factories will
supply the product.
Boris had great faith in the market’s ability to self-regulate. This also applied to the labor
market. If a company paid low wages workers would look elsewhere. If wages in one country
were low, workers would go abroad to find higher-paying jobs. If a major factory closure affected
the market by creating a condition in which there were fewer of a particular product on the market
that “is not a problem [since] other businesses will produce more.” He was not concerned about
the monopolization and its effect on supply chains and again had great faith in the self-regulating
market.
Stas also had great faith in the self-regulating market, and tried to answer my concerns
about monopolistic practices that would harm society (the workers). Overall, however, Stas’
arguments, such as the one above, allowing Caterpillar to buy and shut down its Belarussian
competitor (Belarussian Autoworks or Belaz) were not very convincing—at least convincing that
the self-regulating market would benefit the working class. However, Stas’ orientation is not

toward benefiting the working class:
Stas: “We are only talking about what is fair for workers, but what about investors?
Neoliberalism as Social Darwinism
Social Darwinism was fairly widespread in this study among capitalists and the middleclass. Several times when discussing surplus value, these subjects either implied and explicitly
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stated that the workers lack the intelligence to run a successful business. Vlad seemed to be
implying it,
If the workers think they are being exploited, then let them open their own business and
we would see just how successful they would be.
However, Boris was more explicit,
You really think ordinary workers have the intelligence to run a successful business on
their own? They don’t. Trust me. I know these people better than you do
Stas also exhibited Social Darwinism as well Economic Darwinism.

When discussing

economic competition, I noticed the imagery Stas used:
If the state sells [the factory], the state will get money, the workers will get unemployment
insurance, sooner or later this [private] company would strangle the state firm anyway
(Italics added).
Stas’ imagery of “strangling” seemed insightful and seemed to portray Economic
Darwinism (Giroux 2011; Harvey 2005). While discussing this very example Stas also said:
I see the market environment—The strongest will win!
Stas went further than this however, and said harsher things that are more in line with
Spencer’s Social Darwinism (Leyva 2009; Ruff 2005; Harvey 2005). Throughout the interview

Stas was very elitist and harshly judgmental against the working-class. For example, when I asked
about the word “Soviet” he said:
A meeting of workers. These people are illiterate and they only decide what they can take
or divide. They only think about getting money how they can divide…. When a worker
owns a share of a joint stock his culture does not allow him to control it effectively.
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Stas seems to believe in Social Darwinism (Vila-Henninger 2019:240-41; Giroux 2011:591
Leyva 2009; Ruff 2005; Harvey 2005). The workers are not merely in a lower economic class but
are actually in a lower caste due to some cultural inferiority, a “‘pathological condition’ rather than
a reflection of structural injustice –a ‘pathological dysfunction’ of those who are poor, rather than
the structural dysfunction of an economic system that generates and reproduces inequality’
(Bauman, 2010:66)” (Giroux 2011:591).

Is Lithuania a Neoliberal Workers’ Paradise?
In spite of Lithuania’s gross or before-tax minimum wage being 607 Euros a month7, at the
time of our Stas’ interview; it is far from obvious that Lithuania is a neoliberal worker paradise.
First, citing Lithuania’s gross or before tax wages is very misleading as Belarussians only discuss
net wages after taxes or take-home pay. Therefore 607 Euros or $6758 would only be roughly 430
Euros or $480 a month.9 There is no doubt that 430 Euros ($480) is still significantly higher than
the Belarussian minimum wage, which today is only 417 rubles10 or roughly 145 Euros or $163,11
however, a direct comparison of wages is not accurate way of comparing living standards. A much

Grant Thornton “Minimum monthly salary (MMA) rises to 642 EUR”
10 Nov 2020 https://www.grantthornton.lt/en/insights/minimum-monthly-salary-mma-rises-to-642-eur/; Check in
Price “Average and Minimum Salary in Vilnius, Lithuania”
April 9, 2021 by Jon Stotz
(https://checkinprice.com/average-minimum-salary-vilnius-lithuania/)
7

Check in Price “Average and Minimum Salary in Vilnius, Lithuania”
April 9, 2021 by Jon Stotz
(https://checkinprice.com/average-minimum-salary-vilnius-lithuania/)
8

9

I roughly estimated after-tax or net wages by assuming they would be 71 percent of the gross or before-tax wages as
they are in the latest Lithuanian minimum wage legislation (LRT English October 13, 2021 “Lithuanian cabinet
approves minimum wage rise to 730 euros,” (https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1519999/lithuanian-cabinetapproves-minimum-wage-rise-to-730-euros).
Statistica “Monthly minimum salary in Belarus from July 2016 to September 2021”
(https://www.statista.com/statistics/1270752/monthly-minimum-wage-belarus/).
11
Belarussian National Bank“ Official Exchange Rate of the Belarusian Ruble Against Foreign Currencies and the
Cost of a Currency Basket as at 29/11/2021 (https://www.nbrb.by/engl/statistics/rates/currbasket).
10
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better standard for comparing Lithuania and Belarus would be purchasing power parity [PPP] “on
the basis of the real purchasing power of the currencies over a common basket of goods and
services, rather than on the basis of market exchange rates” (Grewal and Sheehan 2005:337). This
is critical as the cost of living is significantly higher in Lithuania than in Belarus.12 For example,
a loaf of bread is almost twice the cost in Lithuania than in Belarus ($0.93 vs $0.43); a monthlypublic-transit pass costs 2.6 times as much in Lithuania ($31.63 $12.34); and even a bottle of CocaCola—the very symbol of capitalism—costs 2.5 times more in Lithuania than in Belarus ($1.47 vs.
$0.58).13
Unfortunately, there are not a lot of statistics available that directly compare Lithuanian
and Belarussian workers’ wages, pensions, and living standards—however, statistics on the
poverty levels between the two countries is readily available. According to the World Bank, today
“20.6%” of the Lithuanian population live in poverty, while in Belarus only “4.8%” of the

population live in poverty.14 The fact that over thirty years into Lithuania’s neoliberal transition
20.6 percent of the population lives in poverty is a strong indictment of neoliberalism’s failure to
lift people out of poverty and the various neoliberal utopian ideologies. This failure is even more
stark, when compared to Belarus, who, rejecting neoliberalism, has, according to the World Bank,
astonishingly, decreased its poverty level from 41.9 percent in 2000 to 4.8 in 2000.15 And while
there is a lack of direct comparison of Belarus and Lithuania, there is no shortage of criticism of

Lithuania’s harsh neoliberal order in the literature. For example, Atas (2018:44) called Lithuania
welfare system a “neoliberal archetype,” an “aggressive” “straightforward neoliberalism” as

My Life Elsewhere “Cost of Living Comparison” (https://www.mylifeelsewhere.com/cost-ofliving/lithuania/belarus).
12

13

Ibid.

World Bank, (2020) “Poverty head-count ratio at national poverty lines (percent of population) Belarus and
Lithuania” (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC?locations=BY-LT)
14

15

Ibid.
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opposed to less severe “‘embedded neoliberalism’ (a softer social-liberal model of economic
development)”:
Lithuania’s welfare state is characterised by low welfare spending, predominant meanstested welfare entitlements, modest benefits, low levels of decommodification and high
levels of poverty and income inequality (Atlas 2018:741).
…
Lithuania remains one of the poorest countries in Europe. In 2013 around 30% of the
population (over 900 thousand people or every third person) in the country was
experiencing risk of poverty and social exclusion (Eurostat, 2013). In the heat of the Greek
bailout turmoil, it was brought to the public’s attention that Lithuania was significantly
‘Poorer than Greece’ (Rerniauskas and Raudseps, 2015). Indeed, even during the best times
people in Lithuania were poorer than their Greek, and many other European, counterparts.
The residents of the country have been receiving astonishingly low levels of employment
related earnings. In fact, Lithuania has some of the lowest wages and pensions in the whole
of the EU, which only exceed the rates of the younger European members, namely
Romania and Bulgaria (Figure 1). To make matters worse, Lithuania also has one of the
highest proportions of low-wage earners in the EU. Such socio-economic conditions
largely reflect the dominating ideological discourse and policies implemented in the
country during the last two decades (Atlas 2018:729; see also Aidukaite 2014; 2011; 2009;
2003; Woolfson 2010; Haynes and Husan 2002; Stiglitz, 1999; Reardon 1996).
Unlike the capitalists, and some of the middle-class subjects in this study, Atas (2018), and
the others, paint a very different picture of Lithuania’s neoliberal transformation:

In a relatively short period of time, one part of the population lost their essential life-long
security and were pushed into poverty, while the other financially thrived on the ruins of
the former system, benefiting from a distorted process of privatization (Atas 2018:735736; see also Aidukaite 2014; 2011; 2009; 2003; Woolfson 2010; Haynes and Husan 2002;
Stiglitz, 1999; Reardon 1996).
According the literature, Lithuania’s transition rather than benefitting the working class
and poor was at their detriment—certainly no workers’ paradise. The situation in Latvia is
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similar—if not worse (Kesane 2021; Dzenovska 2020; Ozolina 2019, 2016; Aidukaite 2014, 2011,
2009, 2003; Juska and Woolfson 2015; Sommers and Hudson 2013; Woolfson 2010).
Under neoliberal transformation both Lithuania and Latvia have seen a massive decrease
in their populations. Lithuania is becoming known as a “country of emigration” (Atas 2018:740).
Since independence over 600,000 people have left the country, quite a significant number
for a state with a total population of 3 million (Atas 2018:740).
Lithuanians are leaving due to poor labor market conditions, low wages, “poor working
conditions, limited career opportunities, lack of justice and social security, low self-realisation
opportunities and generally difficult living conditions” (Atlas 2018:741). Migration abroad is even
worse in Latvia.
Latvia, a disappearing nation16
Since 1990 Latvia’s population has decreased by 789,218. That is a decrease of almost 30
percent17 (see also Dzenovska 2020).
In 2000, Latvia’s population stood at 2.38 million. At the start of this year [2018], it was
1.95 million. No other country has had a more precipitous fall in population — 18.2 percent
according to U.N. statistics. Only Latvia’s similarly fast-shriveling neighbor, Lithuania,
with a 17.5 percent decrease, and Georgia, with a 17.2 percent drop, come close.18
Atis Sjanits, a Latvian diplomat said:
At this rate, in 50 years or so, Latvia may cease to be a nation.19

Politico, “Latvia, a disappearing dation,” by Gordon F. Sander, January 5, 2018,
(https://www.politico.eu/article/latvia-a-disappearing-nation-migration-population-decline/).
16

Worldometer, “Latvia Population 1950-2020,” (https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/latviapopulation/).
17

Politico, “Latvia, a disappearing dation,” by Gordon F. Sander, January 5, 2018,
(https://www.politico.eu/article/latvia-a-disappearing-nation-migration-population-decline/).
18
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In spite of reality, the false narrative of Lithuania and Latvia’s transition improving
conditions for the poor and working class continues to serve as important neoliberal utopian
ideology to rationalize and justify capitalist dominance.

A New Neoliberalism?
Though the neoliberalism that emerged in this study was not monolithic, all of the promarket subjects in this section shared essential neoliberal values: support for free market, an
orientation toward property owners, and the domination of labor by capital. And most of these
subjects adamantly supported mass privatization of the state-owned industrial sector. However,
they also all supported welfare state programs that neoliberal ideology typically radically opposes.
These subjects accept the moral foundations of the welfare state or at least key programs
that many welfare states provide (medicine, healthcare, education, public pensions,
unemployment, paid maternity leave, welfare). They are not, however, Keynesian, as they do not
want the state to interfere in the economy. They support a laissez-faire economy and believe that
the market must be free. Their welfare state is more limited than Keynes’ and is far less regulatory
(Reinarman 1987). Unlike Keynes they do not support full employment. (However, some do
support unemployment benefits.)
Their outlook does have a conception of the ‘public good’—which is not in line with pure

Hayaek-Friedman neoliberalism—however, that conception of the public good is limited mainly
to what have been historically considered public services in Soviet Belarus: healthcare, medicine,
education, public pensions, etc. These social obligations are a part of their moral economy and are
not subject to the market and are not commodified. The rest of the economy, however, is subject
to the market—and that market is completely free. Within this market sphere of society, there are
no moral considerations. They profoundly reject Marx’s conception of “social” and do not see
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‘production’ as social but as private. Within this market sphere the most critical commodity is
‘labor power’, which is bought and sold completely freely in a basically unrestricted, unrestrained
labor market. Karl Marx saw the commodification of labor power as the key exploitive feature of
capitalism (see also Polanyi 1944).
As much as they hated and rejected the Soviet Union, their moral economies have been
shaped by it. Though they rejected Soviet socialism and the Soviet attempt to ‘socialize’

production, they accepted the Soviet Union’s commitment to public welfare I think their version
of the welfare state is ‘natural’ to them. They truly believe that society is obligated to take care of
the basic needs of citizens universally. Though for them the marketplace should be completely
commodified. However, certain parts of society are not to be commodified and should never be
commodified. In this way they deeply reject Hayek and Friedman’s pure neoliberalism. Hayek
and Friedman believed that society does not owe anyone anything. And although Reagan and

Thatcher are known for saying unapologetically, that “there is no such thing as society” (Giroux
2011:589), my neoliberal subjects did not go that far. They believe that society does owe a lot to
people, but for them the public sphere is limited to key public services and should never intervene
into the market.
The neoliberalism that emerged in this study is a new kind of neoliberalism without many
precedents in the literature. Possibly, Yeltsin in the 1990’s is the closest (Kumala et al. 2014:540541). Yeltsin sought to privatize industry and deregulate wages and prices, however, “‘he
embraced many elements of the Communists’ social welfare program.’”
The government raised pensions and wages and reduced wage arrears. Therefore, one could
perhaps argue that Yeltsin bought his victory with generous welfare spending, something
that his government had set out to minimize just a few years before (Kumala et al.
2014:540-541).
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It seems however, that Yeltsin’s embrace of welfare spending was merely a political
compromise in order to mitigate public anger against shock therapy (mass privatization). The
neoliberal subjects in my study had a strong commitment to welfare state programs as opposed to
Yeltsin’s more opportunistic welfare spending. Furthermore, though Yeltsin relied politically on
welfare spending to assuage public anger, under Yeltsin Russia did not emerge with the robust
welfare state programs that my subjects envision. And even after Yeltsin, under the more populist
presidencies of Putin and Medvedev, though there were many improvements, the “Russian welfare
model [remained] highly incoherent” (Kumala et al. 2014:526), and mixing elements of
neoliberalism and statism (p.528) and creating “major welfare policies [that] have only benefited
selected groups of people” (p.533), for example for mothers, families, foster care and orphans in
order to increase Russia’s birthrate (p. 535-6) while in general “largely withdrawing from [social
welfare] responsibilities (p.546).

Atas’ (2018) concept of a “neoliberal welfare state” (2018) might be a good description for
the neoliberalism that emerged in my study. Atlas described the Lithuanian as a “neoliberal
welfare state”. Economically, the Lithuanian model is what my subjects envision. A privatized
laissez-faire economy. However, welfare spending in Lithuania is very low and much of the
welfare state has been eliminated (Atas 2018).

My subjects, however, support more of a

commitment to public welfare than what exists in Lithuania. Possibly, if Lithuanian leaders would

have maintained a higher level of welfare spending if more money had been available, however it
is doubtful (Atlas 2018).
My subjects’ neoliberalism is not as “aggressive” and “straightforward neoliberalism”
since they support key welfare provisions (Atlas 2018:741). Is their neoliberalism “‘embedded
neoliberalism’ (a softer social liberal model of development)”? (Atlas 2018:741). I do not think
their conception of the market is ‘embedded’ enough to fit into this model neatly. For example, in
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the United States, the market is far more embedded than my subjects’ ideal vision (Karger 2014).
Even today, after the Reagan Revolution, the U.S. government still plays a somewhat active
Keynesian role stimulating and regulating the economy (Karger 2014).
My neoliberal subjects, however, also support welfare provisions that far exceed the U.S.
model. They support free healthcare, medicine, education, public pensions even paid maternity
leave. In the past there was free higher education in the U.S. In fact, New York’s free higher

education was one of the first victims of neoliberalism during the mid-seventies’ financial crisis.
In the past the U.S Social Security program was a decent public pension but it no longer is enough.
If the program were revitalized and more people could live off it, then it would be closer to my
subjects’ ideal.
It is hard to fit the neoliberalism that emerged in my study neatly into anything in the
literature. The middle-class and capitalist subjects who supported neoliberalism tended to support
an aggressive straightforward neoliberalism when it came to the ‘economy’, however, they also
supported fairly robust welfare state programs: neoliberalism combined with the key aspects of
the Soviet welfare state. They accept the social guarantees of the Soviet Union, but utterly reject
its socialism or public ownership of the means of production. They reject Karl Marx’s notion that
production is a “social” activity and see production purely as a “private” activity. In the sphere of
production their thinking is in line with the standard neoliberal ideology (Harvey 2005), however,
their conception of non-commodified non-market based social guarantees and obligations
contradicts the standard neoliberal ideology (Karger 2014; Giroux 2011; Harvey 2005).
These neoliberal subjects truly seem to believe in their vision: a laissez faire economy
coupled with robust welfare state programs. However, it does not seem to have come to fruition
in any of the other former-socialist countries in the regions that have embraced a neoliberal

207

transformation such as Lithuania (Atas 2018) Latvia (Ozolina 2019; 2016) Poland (Rek-Wozniak
et al. 2017), the Ukraine (Klimina 2015) and Russian (Kulmala et al 2014).

Chapter 6.2. The Role of the State
Ultimately, this study explored two different visions of what role the state should play in
society, especially in relation to the economy. Unlike most other countries where the fault line of
the debate is over the size and role of the welfare state, in my study there was mostly agreement
over welfare state programs. Here the debate was over what role the state would play directly in
the economy, in the sphere of production. The workers, in spite of the literature saying otherwise,
wanted the state to play and active role in the economy, as the major owner, investor, employer,
and industrial producer, while the neoliberal subjects (capitalist and some of the middle class) with
few exceptions did not want the state to play any role in production.
While there was largely agreement among both sides about welfare state programs, there
was one revealing difference—unemployment insurance benefits.

This concept was

spontaneously brought up numerous times by middle-class and capitalist subjects. However, it
was not brought up once by any of the workers in this study. The difference in opinion about
unemployment insurance benefits will provide an illustrative example of the two visions of what
role the state should play in the economy.
Interestingly Belarus, overall, has no significant unemployment benefits though the
government is considering changing this.20 Numerous middle-class and capitalist subjects brought
up this up and thought the government should significantly increase unemployment benefits so

Belta, “Higher unemployment benefits under consideration,” January 4, 2019,
(https://eng.belta.by/society/view/higher-unemployment-benefits-under-consideration-in-belarus-117767-2019). /
20
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that workers could actually live on them while unemployed.

In fact, they saw increased

unemployment benefits as a key step that would enable privatization of the state-owned industrial
sector. (Some such as Vlad and Boris did not even rely on improved unemployment benefits to
deal with their envisioned transition, but instead relied on mass migration abroad.) Most, however,
thought improved unemployment insurance would be necessary to cope with the mass lay-offs that
would accompany privatization. For example, Nina, a 48-year-old statistician, thought that
significantly raising unemployment insurance benefits might “allow investors more freedom”
since laid-off workers would have enough money to live until they found new jobs. However,
until then she defended the job guarantees of the socially-oriented privatization program:
Q: Why should an employer be forbidden from laying-off workers if that is more
profitable?
I would support it if unemployment benefits were much higher but until then, I am against
it.
The workers in this study did not agree with this, except Sasha. With only one exception,
workers wanted jobs not unemployment benefits. And it is interesting how closely this compares
to the 1984-85 British Miner’s Strike in which miners were offered redundancy payments though
their jobs would be lost and their mining pits closed. The miners bitterly rejected this and fought
to save their jobs and mining pits, striking for an entire year. One of the subjects in the study, Yan
54, who was a successful manager, even compared Belarus to Thatcher’s war on the British miners
and industrial working class. And Rek-Wozniak et al. (2017) thought Thatcher’s neoliberal
privatization was the best analogy for the harsh neoliberal shock therapy that de-industrialized
Poland, creating mass social dislocation and unemployment for the Polish working class.
The British miner’s strike is relevant to my study in other important ways. Although the
strike was instigated by Thatcher and the British ruling class in order to smash union power
(Harvey 2005; Industrial Relations Journal [IRJ] 1985), the British government publicly justified
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its harsh response to the strike on “economic” grounds: The National Coal Board [NCB] merely
wanted to close “uneconomic” coal pits, whose large tax-payer subsidies were not justified (IRJ
1985). This same economic rational was present among the capitalists and many middle-class
subjects in my study. Whether it is true or not there is a pervasive trope that Belarus’ major stateowned factories, such as Minsk Tractor Works and Minsk Autoworks are unprofitable and only
survive based on continued government subsidy. (Minsk Tractor Works, however, appears to be
profitable21).
The neoliberal subjects in my study tended to view unprofitable firms solely in economic
terms. Unprofitable firms were not to be subsidized. Most saw privatization as the solution. Pavel
thought these “worthless firms should be simply liquidated.” The workers, however, thought the
government, rather than “subsidize” firms, should “invest” in them. For example, Masha said, “In
my opinion subsidies do not hurt the companies. It helps them modernize and become more

efficient.” Lena talked about a “clothing factory that was on the verge of bankruptcy,
[B]ut the government helped the company and now it is doing very well…If a company
has a chance, if it has hope then it is worth supporting it. If the company has no hope, then
it might make sense to close it. But if it can be improved and kept running that would be
much better.
Along with investment, workers talked about bringing in experts and specialists to help
improve money-losing firms. Even Anna, a middle-class private factory manager, thought there
was great talent among the specialists at Belarus’ state firms that could help innovate and improve
them.

Belta, “MTZ increases share of innovative products” February 10, 2021,
(https://eng.belta.by/economics/view/mtz-increases-share-of-innovative-products-137324-2021/).
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The radical neoliberal subjects harshly rejected subsidies and further “investment” in these
money-losing firms. For them privatization was the solution. They saw privatization as a silver
bullet—although there is little empirical support for such optimism about privatization (Harvey
2005).
Just like in the miner’s strike, the neoliberal subjects relied on a very narrow economic
assessment of a firm. They merely viewed its ‘bottom line’—operating subsidies were not

justified. Just like in the miners’ strike, a strong purely economic argument (ignoring social factors
like the destruction of communities, etc.) could be made justifying the operating subsidy (Towers
1985). The National Union of Mineworkers [NUM] made compelling economic arguments that
the subsidies saved the tax payers millions compared to the costs of closing mines, paying
redundancy cost, and loss of taxes etc. (Towers 1985). A similar argument could be made in
Belarus.
Assume Minsk Tractor Works were losing money; this does not seem to be the case, but
let’s assume it anyway. Now assume Tractor Workers requires an operating subsidy of 5 million
dollars a year. On purely economic terms does that subsidy cost more than the cost of closing the
plant? This would include calculating the cost, not only of all of the unemployed workers but also
the loss of tax revenues, the loss of revenues to its suppliers such as Minsk Motor Works and
Gomel Glass as well as the firm’s 9 subsidiaries, 8 of which are located throughout Belarus in
smaller towns making key components.22 (Both of Svetlana’s parents worked in one of the major
subsidiaries of Minsk Autoworks in Baranovichy their whole life and even Svetlana worked there
for many years—it is a major employer in the city.). We would also have to calculate the cost of
buying expensive foreign-made tractors in agriculture and what effect that would have on the

Belarus MTW-Holding (Minsk Tractor Works), “About ‘MTW-Holding,’” (http://belarustractor.com/en/company/).
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production of food and the cost of food. Also, tractors are used for everything in Belarus, not only
in agriculture. Tractors are fitted with different equipment such as drills, digging shovels, brushes,
etc., and are used in construction, snow-removal, street cleaning, street repair, maintaining the
sewer and gas lines etc. While I don’t have the actual figures for this assessment it seems likely
that even a significant operating subsidy would likely be far cheaper than closing the plant. And
this is only looking at purely economic factors not social ones. The neoliberal subjects in this
study were not interested in looking at the economic costs broadly but narrowly focuses on the
firm’s bottom line.
The same argument could be made in support of Minsk Autoworks, truck and bus maker.
(It is not clear whether Minsk Autoworks is actually profitable or not23.) If the firm were
unprofitable, however, should the government simply give up on it? Is the operating subsidy
significantly higher than the cost—the full economic cost—of shutting down the enterprise?

Again, we are not even considering the social and other costs of shutting the enterprise. Like
tractors, Minsk Autoworks trucks and buses are ubiquitous throughout Belarus—buses are seen in
every city, including small cities and towns. Public transportation in Belarussian small cities and
towns is much better than it is in the United Sates. In fact, public transportation does not exist in
many small American cities and towns. What would be the real financial cost of the loss of
Belarus’ reliable public transportation system with the loss of its bus manufacturing in purely

economic terms? Taken together with all of the other costs (not even considering the social costs)
would it be economically wise to close Minsk Autoworks? My sense is that it would not be.

Some sources say Minsk Autoworks is breaking even (Belta, “Belarusian MAZ aims to increase output by 10% in
2020,” April 14, 2020, (https://eng.belta.by/economics/view/belarusian-maz-aims-to-increase-output-by-10-in-2020129794-2020/)), and others say it is losing a lot of money (GlobalSecurity.Org, “Minsk Automobile Plant [MAZ]Recent Developments,” (https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/belarus/maz-3.htm)).
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Pavel cynically stated that the Minsk Autoworks should spin off its highly-profitable busmaking division and put it on the market for privatization but liquidate its money-losing truckmaking division. Pavel here actually is contradicting himself and is unwittingly recognizing the
potential effectiveness of state-owned enterprises. Minsk Autoworks only began producing buses
in 1995, since then Minsk Automobile Work’s “passenger vehicles have received numerous
international awards24” and by 2004 Minsk Autoworks made 70 percent of the CIS’s buses (Ioffe
2004:91). Today Minsk Autoworks’ “buses can be seen all over Belarus and abroad (Moscow,
Saint Petersburg, Sochi 2014 Olympics, Kyiv25)” and can be seen in other countries such as
Poland, Romania, and Serbia26, as well as Cuba27 and many other countries throughout the world
including Venezuela.28
The wholly state-owned Minsk Autoworks’ innovative bus division, which now makes
electric buses,29 was launched in 1995 as an initiative of President Lukashenka’s administration.
In spite of the pervasive arguments against the state-owned industrial sector, and its complete lack
of innovation and competitiveness by the neoliberal subjects in this study, even Pavel recognizes
the technologically advanced and lucrative bus-making division of Minsk Autoworks.

Belarusian Brands, “Minsk Automobile Plant,” (https://www.belarus.by/en/business/brands-of-belarus), (No longer
available).
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Ibid.

26

Wikipedia, “MAZ-203,” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAZ-203).

Narovlya Reginal Executive Committee,”Belarus, Cuba Ink Agreement On Delivery of 100 MAZ Buses,” February
27, 2008, (http://narovlya.gov.by/special/en/republic-en/view/belarus-cuba-ink-agreement-on-delivery-of-100-mazbuses-3459/).
27

28

Belarus-Export, “MAZ to supply 200 trucks to Venazuela,” (https://www.belarus-export.com/news/2193/).

Sustainable-Bus, “MAZ in Belarus launches its first electric bus 303E10,” May 8, 2020, (https://www.sustainablebus.com/news/maz-electric-bus-launch-3030e10-minsk-automobile-plant/).
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Social Costs
Comparing the British miners’ strike to Belarus, I have been focusing on the narrow
neoliberal economic evaluation of the bottom line that simply viewed whether pits were
economically viable (profitable) and unfairly being subsidized by British taxpayers. The NUM
argued, evaluating the mining industry more broadly, it was still far more economically efficient
and cost-effective to pay the very small operating subsides than to close pits and have to pay much
higher costs.
A similar analogy could be made in Belarus, in which the subsidy of an unprofitable
enterprise, if evaluated based on the total economic (and solely economic) cost of closing the plant
would likely be well justified on purely economic grounds. Overall, the neoliberal subjects in this
study were not interested in a broad economic view of any enterprise. Their outlook only
considered the bottom line and they were even less interested in social costs. Here their outlook

was diametrically opposed to the workers, who deeply considered the social costs of privatization.
Even the majority of the middle-class subjects were concerned about the social costs of
privatization and unemployment.
As discussed in previous sections the workers were absolutely opposed to unemployment
and, although they all supported economic efficiency, when push came to shove, with only one
exception, they thought the government must prevent unemployment at all costs, including
subsiding a money-losing firm. And aside from Sasha, even the other workers who supported
privatization were completely opposed to unemployment. Their answers were all very similar to
Misha’s:
Q: Should unprofitable firms be allowed to fail?
No, there are too many people and they will lose their jobs!
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Even Tanya and Svetlana, who both voted for Tikhanovskaya, adamantly opposed
unemployment and thought the state should prevent it at all costs. Tanya answered:
Q: Is it worth subsiding unprofitable firms to prevent unemployment?
Of course, we do not need unemployment—it is horrible! It is better to subsidize these
companies to prevent unemployment.

However, it would be better to change the

specializations of these factories.
Svetlana’s answer was also insightful:
Q: Should unprofitable firms be allowed to fail?
No! No! No! Jobs!
And not only this. These companies have a big influence on our economy too.
Svetlana, though she voted for Tikhanovskaya and attended several opposition rallies, said
it was the government’s duty as “to provide people with stability” and jobs. And as mentioned
above, Svetlana said without a hint of irony or sarcasm said:
The government is the people in this country.

Discussion
One of the main findings of this study is that there are mainly two worldviews about what
role the state should play in society. The workers mainly believe that the state should be active in
the economy as the main owner, producer and employer. They also believe that the state should
provide jobs and ensure economic stability and prevent instability at all costs.

The other

worldview, which was found mainly among the capitalists and some of the middle-class subjects
in this study is primarily neoliberal. When to comes to the economy, they believe in an extremely
laissez-faire state. They envision a new kind of state in Belarus that does not play an active role
in the economy. They envision privatization of the state enterprises and subjecting Belarussian
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workers to market discipline. In a word they envision the individual will be responsible for himself
and there will be no paternalistic socialist state to provide for him.
In many ways Belarus is like Great Britain before Thatcher’s neoliberal revolution. Like
Belarus, in Britain then, most of the major industries were nationalized and the workers had a
moral economy based on hard work, solidarity, fair wages, and the right to decent living standards.
Another similarity is that in Britain there was another group of people who adamantly rejected the

workers’ moral economy. They had a neoliberal vision for Britain and they wanted to remake
society in that image (Harvey 2005). They wanted to privatize Britain’s nationalized industries
and smash the power of the working class and subjugate the entire society to market forces (Harvey
2005). Belarus also has owners with a neoliberal world view who seek to privatize Belarus stateowned industries and curb the power of the working class, subjecting it to harsh market discipline.
The biggest difference, however, was that those with the neoliberal vision were the ruling
class of Great Britain (Harvey 2005). They held state power; controlled the police and courts, as
well as the media. They also had a large middle-class base that shared their outlook. They relied
on their state power and control of the media to defeat the British working class in their defeat of
the National Union of Miners in the 1984-1985 British miners’ strike (Harvey 2005). With
workers’ power smashed, they were able to transform Britain into their neoliberal vision,
privatizing the major industries, lowering wages, implementing austerity, subjecting the whole
society to market forces (Harvey 2005).
Belarus is very different from Britain before Thatcher’s neoliberal revolution. In Belarus,
those with a neoliberal vision are not the ruling class; they do not control the police and courts;
they do not control the mainstream media—however, they do dominate the internet. Politically
they are usually in shambles and their opposition is more of a grant-funding extraction operation
(Ioffe 2014) than the well-organized centrally commanded British state apparatus in the 1980s.
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However, things can change fast as we saw during the summer of 2020. Though the opposition
movement failed there was a short time when it seemed like it might actually succeed. And like
the British ruling class, those with a neoliberal vision in Belarus also enjoy the support of a middleclass base. And although much of that middle-class base is actually adamantly opposed to
neoliberalism, they share the neoliberals’ hatred of President Lukashenka, mainly based on
President Lukashenka’s peasant background and rural folkways (Ioffe 2014: 138, 166, 170).
While Lukashenka’s rustic manner of speech and style appealed to ordinary Belarussians, it made
him utterly despicable among the educated urban middle class (Ioffe 2014: 138, 166, 170; see also
Furman 1999). President Lukashenka is constantly cast as “an illiterate bumkin” (Ioffe 2014:170)
This was clear throughout my study as well. The Russian word kolkhoznik (literally collective
farmer), “is the most persistent moniker Belarusian intellectual affix to Lukahenka. It reeks of
contempt and is more or less identical in its contextual meaning to such English words as a hick,
a bumkin, a rube, a hillbilly.”

And although Ioffe is a native speaker of Russian, my sense is the

term is even stronger and more derisive in Russian. I would translate it as stupid and illiterate
peasant (see Ioffe 2014:170). I recall the first time hearing the term kolkhoznik, while observing
the “clapping protests” against the Belarussian ruble devaluations, in the summer of 2011. A man
in his mid-to-late twenties or so was yelling kolkhoznik derisively, very slowly, drawing out the
word: Kol-khoz-nik. A woman on her way from work heard him and was offended. She started
arguing with the man, who just continued slowing yelling kolkhoznik the same way. When I heard
the man yelling, I understood it as “stupid illiterate peasant —go back to your filthy farm where
you belong—and let the social elite run the country.” It is important for Westerners and nonRussian speakers to understand how powerful this derisive ‘peasant,’ ‘farmer,’ or ‘kolkhoznik’
trope is in Belarus. It came up throughout my study among middle-class and upper-class subjects.
For example, Olga, a 50- year-old public hospital administrator, who even opposed Lukashenka
in 1994, when he first ran for president:
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I was sure that he was not the man who should be the president [and] he just speaks a lot
of nonsense.
…
He [Lukashenka] speaks like a peasant and not like a president. I don’t know a president
who would speak that way about directors. Sometimes he uses trasyanka [village dialect].
That works with his supporters
It is hard to convey to Westerners how powerfully this anti-peasant anti-kolkhoznik
ideology mobilizes the middle class against President Lukashenka. It is a central feature to antiLukashenka politics among the middle class in Belarus (Ioffe 2014: 138, 166, 170; Furman 1999).
In general, sociology has long-recognized that social elites stigmatize and de-legitimate people
based on working class and regional accents and dialects—this is part of “linguistic ideology”
(Woolard 2020).
Unlike the British miners’ strike, however, class conflict is completely obfuscated by the

way the opposition frames the political conflict in Belarus. And the Western media does the same
thing. This is the one advantage the Belarussian neoliberal opposition has when compared to
Thatcher and the British ruling class. The miner’s strike was clearly a class conflict, though the
full extent of the conflict might not have been grasped, everyone knew it was a class conflict. The
class nature of the neoliberal opposition’s battle is completely hidden. One has to read between
the lines and decipher the class issues at stake. The neoliberal opposition casts itself as the

democratic opposition gallantly fighting “Europe’s last dictator” who only stays in power by
rigging elections.30 (And the “Lukashenka-is-a-dictator” moniker is even more pervasive than
“kolkhoznik.”) Even President Lukashenka rarely evokes class politics in the battle against the
neoliberal opposition. For example, President Lukashenka, rather than a principled stance against

New York Times, “For Belarus Leader, a Fading Aura of Invincibility,” August 12, 2020, by Andrew Higgins,
(https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/12/world/europe/belarus-Aleksandr-Lukashenko-election.html).
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the neoliberal opposition and its calls for strikes last summer, mainly relied on economic
arguments to discourage workers from striking, namely that Belarussian state firms will fall behind
in their orders or will lose their share of the market:
Everyone is fighting for these markets. If we stop, we will never be able to promote our
manufacturing industry. Never! We will be pushed into this mire. People should come to
understand it: if you want to go on strike – do it, if you want to work – go ahead. 31
Although it is not always clear, politics in Belarus is clash between two opposing
worldviews about the legitimate role of the state. One has a more socialist or “socially-oriented”
worldview, while the other is, with some exceptions, neoliberal. For the past 27 years President
Lukashenka has been the leader of Belarus’ resistance to neoliberalism and defender of a more
socially-oriented society. Belarussian resistance to neoliberalism, however is far bigger and
broader than President Lukashenka. And not everyone who opposes neoliberalism supports him.
Belarus’ neoliberal opposition, which is based in the upper classes, draws on the middle-class for
support (Furman 1999). And while much of their neoliberal ideology is accepted, even middleclass Belarussians who reject neoliberalism are mobilized against President Lukashenka as he is
utterly despised as a crude uneducated peasant “kolkhoznik” and as a dictator— “Europe’s last
dictator.”
In the next chapter, I will carefully explore the August 9, 2020 Election Protest Movement,

the largest and most successful one organized by Belarus’ neoliberal opposition. I will examine
the events of the protest as well as the broader social forces behind them, relying on the insights
from my study of the moral economy of Belarussians.

Belta, “Lukasehnka comments on calls to go on strike” August 14, 2020,
(https://eng.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-comments-on-calls-to-go-on-strike-132570-2020/).
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Chapter 7. The August 9, 2020 Election Results
Do these people in the streets really believe that Tikhanovskaya won the election? If
Tikhanovskaya really won, the election then she should tell all of her supporters to come
to the main square at a set time on a set day. If several million people come out to the
square it would be obvious that she won and she would return triumphantly from Lithuania
to become the president. If she really won, why doesn’t she do that? What exactly is she
waiting for? –Male Lukashenka supporter

Chapter 7.1. A Critical Review of the 2020 Election Literature
Although the election results are the justification for the protest movement, there is
surprisingly little serious scholarship on the results. For example, Moshe and Nizhnikau provide
no evidence of any election fraud at all in their comprehensive study of the August 9 movement.
Even though Moshe and Nizhnikau (2021) called it a “fraudulent election” (p.160) and that there
were “blatant falsifications of electoral results” (p.173), they provide no evidence of election
tampering. Bedford (2021) relies on the Golos platform.
Glod (2020) does rely on two surveys; however, I will demonstrate that their findings are
not valid. First, the two studies wildly vary. The first study, Zahorski (2020) concludes that 7580 percent of Belarussians voted for Tikhanovskaya, while the other Astapenia (2020), of the antiBelarussian think tank Chatham House, concludes Tikhanovskaya only got 52.2 of the votes. Most
likely Zahorski’s (2020) results are wildly exaggerated as even harsh Lukashenka critic Astapenia
argues Tikhanovskaya’s results are much lower.
Zahorski (2020:3), who mainly relied on an “online poll using the Viber messenger
smartphone/PC application where Viber users responded to a questionnaire.” In total, there were
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45,000 Viber questionnaires, which made up most of his sample of 46,150 (Zahorski 2020:1).
Zahorski readily admits that his sample “might not be representative:”
Of course, a poll conducted via Viber will only reach people owning a smartphone/PC
using this particular messaging app, and we are well aware that such people might not be
representative of the population as a whole. This is a potential source of bias that we try to
adjust for in the statistical analyses (Zahorski 2020:3).
Zahorski is correct that Viber is the most popular messenger application in Belarus,
however, Viber users are not a nationally representative sample.

To demonstrate Viber’s

popularity, Zahorski (2020:3) relied on Aliaksandrau and Bastunets (2020), that turn relied on
research by the Baltic Internet Policy Initiative [BIPI] (2019). The BIPI (2019) study found that
70 percent of “Belarusian Internet users” aged 14-74 used Viber. However, that 70 percent is
among “Belarusian Internet users” and not among Belarussian population in general as only t only
85.1 percent of Belarussians use the Internet in 2022 and that percentage was 3 percent lower in
2021 at roughly 82.1 percent.1 And note, the 2020 percentage of Internet users was likely even
lower, however, even if we rely, on the 2021 numbers, 57.47 percent of Belarussians used Viber
in 2021 (70 percent of 82.1 percent of Internet users). Therefore, Zahorski’s study ignored almost
half of Belarussian voters. And needless to say, there would be significant support for President
Lukashenka among the voters Zahorski excluded from his sample. This is the major flaw in the
Zahorski’s study. His survey relied on a sample that not only ignored almost half of the
Belarussian population, but ignored those most likely to support President Lukashenka. Even if
administered perfectly, Zahorski’s findings would not be valid and were deeply distorted from
relying on a very unepresentative sample.

[In Russian] Economic Gazette, “How does virtual Belarus live,” February 2, 2020, EG Issue no. 15 (2512),
(https://neg.by/novosti/otkrytj/digital-2022-ispolzovanie-interneta-i-socsetej-v-belarusi/)
1
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Zahorski (2020:4) knows this so he “attempts to atone for the fact that [the] survey
respondents are not representative of the population as a whole.” Zahorski (2020:17) tries to
“debias the sample obtained via the Viber bot and the street poll” by using “multilevel regression
with poststratification (MRP)” (2020:4). However, notwithstanding the strength of MRP and its
valid applications, MRP cannot salvage such a heavily biased and unrepresentative sample such
as this one. Even MRP cannot turn lead into gold.
Zahorski further biases the sample by “advertis[ing] the] survey on social networks,” even
making “a 1-minute video about [the] project that was put on YouTube…Furthermore, an
Instagram page…was created” (Zahorski 2020:22-23). This will further bias the study toward
oppositional and anti-Lukashenka subjects, even if “[b]oth YouTube and Instagram were
artificially targeted to the audience outside the Minsk region (Zahorski 2020:22-23) as only 41
percent of Belarussians used social media in 2020 2 and a much higher percentage of Lukashenkasupporter do not use social media—or even the internet. For example, none of the Lukashenka
supporters in my study used social media or even the internet—even the ones that had smartphones
and even among those who used Viber.
Zahorski’s results are contradicted by several other researchers—even by research from
some of Lukashenka’s harshest critics. Zahorski, himself cited research findings that drastically
contradict his findings. For example, Gongalsky, whom Zahorski (2020:18) cited, concluded that

Tikhanovskaya only won 45 percent, not 75-80 percent (and that Lukashenka won 45 percent not
13-18 percent). Even harsh Lukashenka critics such as Astapenia (2020) thought Tikhanovskaya
won 52.2 percent, and Manaev (2020), who thought Lukashenka won about 50 percent not 13-18
percent. Even the very oppositional Golos [Voice] platform, which Zahorski (2020:17) cites in

DATAREPORTAL, “Digital 2020: Belarus,” February 17, 2020, by Simon Kemp,
(https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-belarus).
2

222

his study, did not claim Tikhanovskaya won 75-80 percent.

Golos did not even claim

Tikhanovskaya had won the election in its final report on the 2020 election. Golos’ (2020) final
report concluded on page 2 that: “Votes for Svetlana Tikhanovskaya were reduced significantly,”
not that Tikhanovskaya had won the election—and certainly not that she had won 80 percent.
Honest People, an activist group that worked closely with Golos, reported the same thing:
Alexander Khomich, a spokesman for the activist group Honest People, which monitored
the election, said Tsikhanouskaya received significantly more votes and Lukashenko got
significantly fewer votes.3
Pavel Lieber, the creator of the Golos platform, explicitly said that he could not determine
that Tikhanovskaya had won the election. Vedmosti reported on September 17, 2020:
Lieber also does not dare to call Tikhanovskaya the winner of the elections: ‘The Golos
platform did not set itself the goal of determining and announcing the percentage of votes
of each candidate,” [Lieber] says. "The goal was to prove the existence of falsifications

and demand that the elections be not recognized as legal’ (Sokolov 2020).
In fact, Pavel Lieber, the Golos’ (2020) final report, and Alexander Khomich of Honest
People all seem to have tacitly acknowledged that Lukashenka had actually won the election.4
Vedmosti’s actually analyzed Golos data and concluded that Lukashenka won about 50 percent
and Tikhanovskaya at most could have won 38 percent (Sokolov 2020).
In a way Zahorski’s study actually demonstrates the depth of support for President
Lukashenka. Other than the oppositional websites’ online line polls (Zahorski 2020:3-4), it would

Los Angeles Times, “Belarus poll workers tell stories of fraud in presidential election,” September 1, 2020, by
Associated Press, (https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-09-01/belarus-poll-workers-describe-fraudpresidential-election).
3

4

Although the original Golos report did not state that Tikhanovskaya won the election and tacitly acknowledged
Lukashenka won, on July 14, 2021, almost a year after the election and original Golas analysis, Golos reported that
Tikhanovskaya actually had won the election with 56 percent (World Today News, “An alternative calculation of the
results of the presidential elections in Belarus published,” July, 14, 2021, (https://www.world-today-news.com/analternative-calculation-of-the-results-of-the-presidential-elections-in-belarus-published/).
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be hard to design a survey as biased against President Lukashenka as Zahorski’s. His study was
biased against Lukashenka supporters on every level yet still up to 18 percent supported President
Lukashenka—that is almost 1 out of every 5 voters.
Glod (2020) also relied on a survey by the anti-Lukashenka think tank, Chatham House
done by its Academic Associate, Ryhor Astapenia (one of the harshest critics of Lukashenka),
Belarus Initiative Director, Russia and Eurasia Programme.5 According to Astapenia’s (2020)

study, 52.2 percent voted for opposition candidate, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya and only voted 20.6
percent for President Lukashenka. However, Astapenia’s study has several flaws and I will argue
that its results are not valid. First, the study does not rely on a nationally representative sample.
As Astapenia’s “poll was conducted using the Computer Assisted Web Interview (CAWI) method,
which in practice means that it was limited to internet users. Although various sources claim that
only 75–82 percent of the population of Belarus use the web” (Astapenia 2020:2). Not only is

Astapenia’s sample not representative, as it excludes 18-25 percent of the population, who are
more likely Lukashenka supporters, it also only focuses on “urban” areas. Astapenia, seems to
reluctantly admit this fact:
Although various sources claim that only 75–82 percent of the population of Belarus use
the web, internet users do remain more economically and socially active. Therefore, despite
the fact that our sample has been weighted to accurately reflect the make-up of Belarusian
society, it is possible that support for Lukashenka and his policies may be slightly higher
this poll indicates, as Lukashenka’s supporters tend to be less socially and economically
active than his detractors.
Zahorski (2020:22) criticizes the bias of online surveys in Belarus much more forcefully:
[O]nline surveys in Belarus typically attract the young and progressive audience

Chatham House, “Our People: Ryhor Astapenia,” (https://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/our-people/ryhorastapenia).
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Zahorski (2020:22) is aware that in general, online surveys will significantly
underrepresent Lukashenka supporters and that the distribution of the online survey should attempt
to attract Lukashenka supporters to try to represent them better in the study. There is no
information in Astapenia’s study whether any efforts were made to distribute the questionnaire in
a way that would make the study more representative. Furthermore, there is no information at all
about the way the questionnaire was distributed. Whether the questionnaire was advertised?
Whether it was advertised on social media? Or whether the distribution was connected with any
social media? These are important questions for us to evaluate carefully since social media users
will much more likely be oppositional. And that only 41 percent of Belarussians used social media
in 2020.6
Moreover, while Astapenia’s study does tell us that 13.7 of the respondents refused to
answer which candidate they had voted for, it does not include, what percentage refused to do the

survey in general. I think Lukashenka supporters who do use the internet will be less likely to
agree to do the survey. Therefore, knowing the response rate is critical. Additionally, the refusal
rate coupled with the 13.7 who refused to answer how they voted might change the results of this
survey significantly—if there are is a higher percentage of Lukashenka supporters among those
groups.
Furthermore, according to Manaev (2020), about “40 percent of the population lives in the
“small Belarus” of villages and small towns (less than 50,000 inhabitants). In total, according to
the Central Election Commission, there are about 7 million voters in the country, of which at least
2.8 million are in the “small Belarus.” Did Astapenia include these small towns in his study? Are
these towns considered urban? While the study has no information about this, I would assume he

DATAREPORTAL, “Digital 2020: Belarus,” February 17, 2020, by Simon Kemp,
(https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-belarus).
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did count the small towns with fewer than 50,000. If my assumption is right, then Astapenia survey
ignored 40 percent of the electorate—and of which there is more likelihood for support of President
Lukashenka. Manaev, however, believes Lukashenka won about 50 percent of the vote as opposed
to Astapenia, who says Lukashenka only won 20.6 percent not even half as much.
Therefore, for all of these reasons, I would not consider Astapenia’s results valid or at least
there is not enough information to evaluate its validity.

According to the harsh Lukashenka critic, Manaev (2020), Lukashenka clearly won the
election with about 50 percent of the vote, though it not clear that he won the required 50 percent
+ one vote to avoid a run-off election.7 Furthermore, Manaev is quite certain Lukashenka would
have certainly won a runoff election had there been won. Moreover, Manaev is quite clear that
Svetlana Tikhanovskaya could not have won the August 9, 2020 election and is highly critical of
the Golos platform that implied Tikhanovskaya had won.8 Although Golos only analyzed one

third of the votes, Manaev sees Golos’ main flaw “in the fact that these data do not fully represent
the structure of the Belarusian electorate:”9
Manaev points out that according to CEC data, 16.6 per cent of votes were recorded in
Minsk, 15.8 per cent in the Gomel region and 11.9 per cent in the Mogilev region…Yet
among the 1,875,998 voters in the data analysed by Golos, 34 per cent were from Minsk,
8.7 per cent from Gomel and 7 per cent from Mogilev.10

7
Reporting Democracy, “Belarus Dissident Says Russian Intervention Will Just Perpetuate Unrest by Other
Means,” September 1, 2020, Peter Birn,
(https://balkaninsight.com/2020/09/01/belarus-dissident-says-russian-intervention-will-just-perpetuate-unrest-byother-means).
8

Ibid.

9

Ibid.
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Ibid.
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According to Manaev, there was “an obvious bias in favour of the capital…. at the expense
of ‘deep Belarus’ [small towns and rural Belarus], especially in the eastern regions, where protests
were much more modest and a significant part of the electorate traditionally votes for
Lukashenko.”11

According to Manaev, an ardent opponent of Lukashenka, Tikhanovskaya clearly lost the
election and Lukashenka clearly won (though with a much lower margin).12 This position flies in
the face of the dominant narrative, not only of Western politicians and media,13 but even of social
researchers (See Glod 2020; Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021).
Recall, Moshe and Nizhnikau (2021) called it a “fraudulent election” (p.160) and that there
were “blatant falsifications of electoral results” (p.173). And although Moshes and Nizhnikau
never explicit state Tikhanovskaya won and Lukashenka lost, this position is implicit throughout
and made clear when they chastise European Union member states for not recognizing Svetlana
Tikhanovskaya as the legitimate duly elected president of Belarus as Lithuania did.
In September [2020], Lithuania recognized Tikhanovskaya as the ‘elected leader of the
people of Belarus,’ but not all EU member states followed suit. The European Parliament
called the Coordination Council the ‘interim representative of the people’ of Belarus. Yet
EU ambassadors stayed in Minsk up until the Polish and Lithuanian ambassadors were
asked to leave the country in October; at that point, some other ambassadors were recalled
for consultation out of solidarity, but they returned within weeks. The story is hard to
interpret as anything other than EU de-facto recognition of Lukashenko as the leader of the
country, rhetoric notwithstanding. Only in late November did the EU announce that it was

11

Ibid.

12

Ibid.

13

Ibid.
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no longer going to provide money to the Belarusian regime (Moshes and Nizhnikau
2021:179) (Recall Moshes and Nizhnikau never provided any evidence of vote tampering.).
Glod (2020) was more forthright than the EU, and explicitly stated “Tsikhanouskaya, [is]
the likely winner of the August 9 election” and that “Lukashenka lost legitimacy… from his defeat
at the ballot box” and referred to is as a “stolen election.” How could Moshes and Nizhnikau
(2021) and Glod (2020) have been so wrong? Oleg Manaev “accuses Western politicians and
media of insufficiently and incorrectly covering the results of the August 9 presidential election,
which is the root cause of the mass protests,”14 which is true, however, Moshes, Nizhnikau and
Glod are scholars. Yarashevich (2014) and Ioffe (2004), however, have warned about bias among
the scholars who cover Belarus. Yarashevich (2014) explicitly warned about the neoliberal bias
among many scholars of Belarus. Ioffe has warned about the political bias and anti-Lukashenka
bias of many Belarus researchers.

Chapter 7.2. Are the Official Results of Lukashenka winning 80% Plausible? A Broad
Critical Review of All of Belarus ’Elections
For those unfamiliar with Belarus, especially Westerners, an election results of 80% is
unheard of. However, it is a fact President Lukashenka won “81.1 %” in his first election in 1994
in a “freely contested presidential election” (Eke and Kuzio 2000:16-17; see also Maneav
2014:208; Silitski 2005:3; Furman 1999:13).
Furthermore, three years before the 1994 election, in a 1991 referendum, 82.7 percent of
Belarussian voted to preserve the Soviet Union (Furman 1999:7). While these elections were a
long time ago, even back then the same narrative (Lukashenka is a dictator and that he rigs

14

Ibid.
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elections) was used accusing Lukashenka of rigging the results his second election in 2001(Ioffe
2004:97) in which he officially won with won 75.65 percent (Ioffe 2004:95).

After reviewing the literature, however, it is not clear why anyone would seriously expect
Lukashenka’s popularity to have decreased significantly in 2001. Most scholars acknowledge that
social and economic conditions vastly improved for the majority of ordinary Belarussians since
Lukashenka’s first election in 1994 and that he “satisfied public expectations” (Manaev 2014:208;
See also Kulakevich 2014:890; Yarashevich 2014; Potocki 2011:2-3; Ioffe 2004:90; Eke and
Kuzio 2000:17). And while it is true President Lukashenka had consolidated enormous executive
power during his first term, even harsh Lukashenka critics, such a Kulakevich (2014:890)
recognize democratic values are not important to most Belarussians:

For most Belarussians, values such as freedom of speech, freedom of association,
independence of the media, political freedom and participation in political life were not a
priority. At the top of the list were economic prosperity, social security, and political
stability (Kulakevich 2014:890).
In all fairness Kulakevich was referring specifically to Lukashenka’s first election in 1994,
but does any scholar make a serious argument that values of ordinary Belarussian changed that
drastically in a few years? Ioffe (2014:155) argues that ordinary Belarussians as far as 2014 still
reject Western liberal democracy and that it is “alien to most Belarussians” (See also Yarashevich
2014). Ioffe (2014), quotes Valery Karbalevich, a harsh Lukashenka critic:
[Lukashenka’s] rejection of democratic reforms was conditioned by

nothing

other

than the attitudes of much of the electorate (Ioffe 2014:155).
Scholarship closer to the 2001 election does not mention anything indicating that
Lukashenka had lost popular support and certainly does not mention a ‘democratic awakening’
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among ordinary Belarussians.

For example, Furman (1999) stresses, the fundamental

undemocratic nature of ordinary Belarussians. Writing in 1999, in the wake of Lukashenka’s
massive consolidation of executive power and right before the 2001 election, Furman said:
In Belorussia the people defeated the elite, and Lukashenko’s policy was based on real
majority support. But this is precisely a popular triumph and not a triumph of democracy,
a victory of people aspiring not for freedom but away from freedom and for the suppression
of dissidence and the dictatorship of a parental figure (Furman 1999:12).
There is also nothing in Eke and Kuzio’s (2000) study on the eve of the 2001 election to
suggest that ordinary Belarussians were forsaking President Lukashenka for either economic
reasons or political reasons.

Eke and Kuzio certainly did not see President Lukashenka’s

popularity suffering from his authoritarianism:

Respectively, one of the most serious tactical errors of the opposition in Belarus before the
referendum of 1996 was to repeatedly stress the danger of dictatorship and ‘fascism’ to an
electorate that had come to favour the ‘strong hand’. The result of the referendum, in which
Lukashenka received an overwhelmingly affirmative vote to all the questions he posed,
provides clear evidence that the majority of the population either did not take this threat
seriously or did not see anything necessarily bad in authoritarian dictatorship (Eke and
Kuzio 2000:13-14).
Ioffe’s (2004) study after the 2001 election provided absolutely no evidence that ordinary
Belarussians had rejected Lukashenka for economic or political reasons. In fact, the study argues
just the opposite, that Lukashenka had truly turned things around economically, significantly
improving living standards for ordinary Belarussians. On the question of ‘democracy’ Ioffe argued
that Lukashenka’s authoritarianism was natural to ordinary Belarussians whose outlook had been
shaped by their peasant background and authoritarian peasant ethos. Furthermore, Ioffe argued
that the Belarussian opposition itself believed that the main reason for its 2001 loss was that, “the
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opposition failed to come up with an attractive and positive program of its own even though they
had years, not months at their disposal” (Ioffe 2004:99). The opposition also criticized itself that
“its candidate should have been left of centre” (Ioffe 2004:99). (Bohdan and Kassabov made the
same critique of the 2020 election). And Ioffe (2004), argues that even though the opposition
initially claimed that ballot boxes were stuffed in the 2001 election (as it did in 2020 as well), later
on, however, upon careful analysis for the reasons for its 2001 defeat: “Not a word is mentioned
about tampering with ballot boxes” (Ioffe 2004:98).
Matsuzato (2004), a very harsh critic of Lukashenka, also does not mention declining living
standards or political dissatisfaction among ordinary Belarusians in his 2004 study completed after
the 2001 election. To the contrary, Matsuzato (2004) focused on the success of the Belarussian
economy under Lukashenka as ordinary Belarussians enjoyed relatively good living standards and
stability “in comparison with Lithuania’s painful Europeanization and Russian’s and Ukraine’s
‘wild capitalism’” (Matsuzato 2004:240). In fact, Matsuzato argued in 2004:

My impression is that the low living standards in Lithuania, soon to be a member of the
EU, is providing Lukashenka with a legitimizing cause for his anti-Western policy
(Matsuzato 2004:238-9).
Matsuzato said nothing about Lukashenka’s declining popularity in 2004 but, like Furman
(1999) focused on Lukashenka’s genuine commitment to populism as compared to politicians in
the Ukraine and Russia. Lukashenka actually “began to renationalize once privatized enterprises”
in 1996-97 (Matsuzato 2004:244-5):
It is true that in Russia also, in the same year, 1996, communist candidates…often promised
voters that they would re-examine the privatisation process during the previous years and
cancel cases of illegal privatisation. But this was no more than an empty electoral slogan
(Matsuzato 2004:244-5).
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Matsuzato (2004:250), also did not think Lukashenka’s authoritarianism led to any decline
in popularity, again to the contrary, he saw the emergence Lukashenka’s authoritarian populist
regime, “which does not recognize the meaning of mediating political institutions (such as
parliaments, courts or parties)” as a major product of the “specific Belarusian mentality,

which had been shaped historically and proved to be incompatible with the post-communist
injustice and poverty. The discontent was strengthened by the population’s memory of the
late socialist period, the social and economic situation of which was relatively favourable
compared with other union republics. Thus, the population’s yearning for a strong and
‘honest’ leader hypertrophied (Matsuzato 2004:250).
Remember, Matsuzato is writing in 2004, shortly after President Lukashenka’s contested
2001 election. Although he specifically discussed the 2001 election, he did not say a word about
vote rigging or ballot tampering (Matsuzato 2004:246). This is in the context of a study in which
Matsuzato accuses Lukashenka of disappearing opposition leaders (p. 246) unlawfully persecuting
rivals—including his own officials—and organizing show trials (p. 246-249) even arresting their
family members and taking “hostages for the coming (September 2001) presidential election”
(Matsuzato 2004:249). In this context, Matsuzato did not say word about any vote-rigging or
ballot stuffing in the 2001 election (p. 246). Possibly it was just an oversight in the 26-page
seminal article about President Lukashenka shortly after the 2001 election—possibly it was not.

Matsuzato (2004:246) not only did not allege ballot-stuffing—he did not allege any
election irregularity as the reason for Lukashenka’s 2001 election victory. Matsuzato (2004:246)
also focused on the weakness on Vladimir Goncharik’s program and its lack of appeal, and argued
that Goncharik did not have chance to win the 2001 election (See also Silitski 2005:8; Ioffe
2004:98-99).
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Silitski’s (2005:7-8) analysis was similar to Matsuzato. Although very critical of the
several aspects of the 2001 election,15 he never outright accuses Lukashenka of ballot-stuffing.
Like Matsuzato, Silitski primarily blamed the opposition’s 2001 defeat on the opposition
candidate, who was a “highly uncharismatic and somewhat indecisive” centrist, Vladimir
Goncharik, who “proved insufficient to attract popular support…beyond the opposition base”
(Silitski 2005:8). Moreover, Silitski says that Goncharik only “roused no more than lukewarm
enthusiasm” among ordinary opposition members (Silitski 2005:8). In fact, Silitski (2005), a harsh
critic of Lukashenka, admitted, however, that coming into the 2001 election Lukashenka
“remained popular among the core of his 1994 electorate” and that “Polls showed that threequarters of the electorate were confident that Lukashenka would win reelection” (Silitski 2005:7).
And that is exactly the margin he won by—three quarters (75%).
The strongest evidence that President Lukashenka exaggerated his 2001 election victory
come from Oleg Manaev’s research organization, the Institute of Socio-Economic and Political
Studies [IISEPS] (Ioffe 2004:98). The IISEPS acknowledge Lukashenka clearly won the election,
however, concluded that Lukashenka won with “57-58%” of the votes not 75 percent (Ioffe
2004:98). Manaev explains this discrepancy by arguing the vote was “doctored” by a small amount
“out of a desire to avoid a second round of voting” (Ioffe 2004:98).
Although “IISEPS is often considered the leading centre for independent sociological
research on Belarus” (Yarashevich 2014:1731) I believe, that the IISEPS’ surveys, although in

15

Silitski (2005:7-8) provides the strongest criticism of the 2011 election, though does not allege ballot stuffing. He
does allege that “the authorities banned exist polls”; more “than two thousand election observers were denied
accreditation only days before the election”; “[t]he election commission included no members of the opposition, so
the vote count was in effect entirely in the hands of the regime”; “vote counters would be seated with their backs
turned to the observers, who in turn were required to keep a distance of several meters from the table where the vote
was tallied”; “[m]onitors were limited to simply recoding violations, as the election law contained no adequate
provisions for fair balloting”; and in a “final move to hamper the efforts of observers and opposition groups, the regime
disabled the mobile-phone network and cut access to opposition Web sites during the critical hours from when the
polls closed until Lukashenka declared victory” (Silitski 2005:7-8).
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principle designed well, might be significantly underrepresented Lukashenka supporters. Under
ideal conditions, social research in Belarus is very hard—especially quantitative survey research
since ordinary Belarussians tend to be very reserved and closed, especially Lukashenka supporters.
Though counter intuitive, the tendency for survey research is to underrepresent Lukashenka’s
supporters and overrepresent the opposition. Manaev (2020), the founder and director of the
IISEPS, would certainly agree with this.16 Recall Manaev’s criticism of the Golos platform’s
heavily biased approach toward Minsk and Lukashenka supporters.17 Also, look at the two surveys
I analyzed earlier in this section by Zahorski (2020) and Astapenia (2020), and how wildly
disparate their findings were. In fact, both studies admitted they underrepresented Lukashenka
supporters (Zahorski 2020; Astapenia 2020). Unlike these studies, the IISEPS were fairly welldesigned and attempted to create a random representative sample. The devil is in the details,
however. While in theory the IISEPS may have been well designed putting it into practice is
another story.
The IISEPS admits that up to 15 percent of respondents refuse to be interviewed (“On
average the number of respondents refusing to answer the questions does not exceed 15%”).18 This
refusal rate in itself might explain the discrepancy between the 2001 official results 75 percent for
Lukashenka and the IISEPS results of 57-58 percent. If the refusal rate has significantly more
Lukashenka supporters which I believe it might, that may explain the 17-18 percentage point
difference. I base this conclusion on the literature (Ioffe 2004) and my own experience conducting

Reporting Democracy, “Belarus Dissident Says Russian Intervention Will Just Perpetuate Unrest by Other Means,”
September 1, 2020, Peter Birn,
(https://balkaninsight.com/2020/09/01/belarus-dissident-says-russian-intervention-will-just-perpetuate-unrest-byother-means).
16
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Ibid.

Independent Institute of Socio-Economic
(http://www.iiseps.org/?page_id=2056&lang=en)

and
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Political

Studies

[IISEPS],

“National

Surveys,”

research in Belarus for over ten years and three years of completing formal interviews. Securing
interviews with Lukashenka supporters was much harder and presented a serious challenge to my
study. Furthermore, other aspects of the IISEPS design seem problematic and will tend to lead to
an underrepresentation of Lukashenka supporters since the national surveys involve researchers
knocking randomly on subjects’ doors unannounced and uninvited for a face-to-face interviews,
that take an hour.19 Again, this approach will likely discourage many more Lukashenka supporters
from participating in the study as they might be frightened, uncomfortable, fearful, and distrustful
of strangers randomly coming to their doors to conduct interviews. In my own study, several
Lukashenka supporters that I have known and have had friendly relations with for several years
refused to be interviewed. Numerous Lukashenka supporters who were close relatives of my
contacts refused to be interviewed even though my contacts, who were interviewed themselves,
would vouch for me. The IISEPS acknowledges my concerns admitting that interviewers “are
trained for overcoming ‘barriers of primary distrust.’…[and] they often have to face negative
reaction or fear.”20 My concern is that since Lukashenka supporters are less open and tend to be
more distrustful and fearful. Therefore, will be underrepresented in the IISEPS research.
Furthermore, based on my experience, I find the 15-percent refusal rate rather low and
would assume that it would be significantly higher—although a 15-percent refusal rate, if it were
accurate, might still invalidate the IISEPS findings. Although the IISEPS states that the 15 percent
refusal rate applies to all of its studies, it is very unlikely that the IISEPS consistently had a refusal
rate of no more than 15 percent in the hundreds of surveys it has done. There is likely wide
variation between surveys. This can easily be shown by looking at two different IISEPS surveys
concerning the 2010 election results. In one IISEPS survey, done in 2010 in December, 51.1

19

Ibid.

20

Ibid.
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percent of subjects said that they had voted for President Lukashenka,21 however, in the following
IISEPS survey in 2011 in March, 57.8 percent said Lukashenka had won the election22 (See also
Potocki 2011:4). There is a 6.7 percentage point difference between these two IISEPS surveys,
both measuring the results of the of the 2010 election with getting 57.8 percent and another getting
51.1 percent. The shows that there is a lot of variation between IISEPS surveys and it is likely that
there might be even more than a 15-percent refusal rate for many IISEPS surveys.
The strongest criticism of the validity of IISEPS can be seen when comparing it to other
independent polls. For example, other independent polls have shown much higher levels of
support for Lukashenka, such as the March 2011 survey by the “U.S.-based International
Republican Institute” (an anti-Lukashenka think tank) that found that “69 percent of respondents
were satisfied with the results of the [2010] election” (Potocki 2011:4). However, IISEPS’
December 2010 post-election surveys only found that only 51.1 percent23 of Belarussians voted
for Lukashenka in 2010 (See also Potocki 2011:4). There is an alarming 17.9 percentage point
difference between to two studies. This tends to show that IISEPS24 likely significantly underrepresents Lukashenka supporters.

And if IISEPS clearly underrepresented Lukashenka

supporters by up to 17.9 percent in 2010, it is very likely that IISEPS underrepresented Lukashenka

IISEPS, “Results of the National Opinion Poll Conducted on December 21-31, 2010,” Media publications in 2011,
(http://www.iiseps.org/?p=2746&lang=en).
21

IISEPS, “Results of the National Opinion Poll Conducted on March 2-12, 2011,”
(http://www.iiseps.org/?p=2728&lang=en).
22

IISEPS, “Results of the National Opinion Poll Conducted on December 21-31, 2010,” Media publications in 2011,
(http://www.iiseps.org/?p=2746&lang=en).
23
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Not only was there a 17.9 percentage point difference between the IISEPS survey of the 2010 election and another
independent survey (“U.S.-based International Republican Institute”) of the 2010 election (Potocki 2011:55-56), the
IISEPS admits that up to 15 percent of respondents refuse to be interviewed (“On average the number of respondents
refusing to answer the questions does not exceed 15%” (IISEPS, “National Surveys,”
(http://www.iiseps.org/?page_id=2056&lang=en). The fact of this 15- percent refusal rate might explain the vast
underrepresentation of Lukashenka-supporters in the IISEPS study compared to the U.S.-based International
Republican Institute study since Lukashenka supporters will be far more likely to refuse to be interviewed than
respondents who do not support Lukashenka. In such cases, according to the instruction, an interviewer chooses other
respondents. It takes on average about an hour to conduct an interview (Ibid.).
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supports by up to 17.9 percent in 2001. This would make IISEPS’s 2001 results 75.9 percent,
which matches the official results of 75.65 percent. Therefore, in conclusion, the official results
of the 2001 election with 75.65 percent of the vote going to President Lukashenka (Ioffe 2004:95)
might very well have been accurate.
Furthermore, the IRI survey is not the only independent study whose findings drastically
differ with the IISEPS. Stephen White, an academic scholar, commissioned national surveys in
2010-11 in Belarus, Russian and the Ukraine and in the spring of 2011(Ioffe 2014:77) learned,
similar to the IRI survey, that 68 percent of Belarussians had voted for President Lukashenka in
the December 2020 (Ioffe 2014:80). Similar to the IRI survey, the White survey differs by 16.9
percentage points from the IISEPS December 2010 survey. These large discrepancies between the
IISEPS and other independent polls serious undermine the reliability and validity of the IISEPS.
It seems that the IISEPS significantly underrepresents Lukashenka supporters.
The same arguments I have made defending the likelihood of the accuracy of the 2001
official results would also apply to Belarus’ third presidential election. Potocki (2011), a harsh
critic of Lukashenka, describe the vast economic growth and the living-standard improvements of
ordinary Belarussians in the years leading up to the 2006 election:
Belarus had experienced a decade of uninterrupted growth and surpassed its pretransition
GDP level by nearly by 30%. It was a leader in terms of ex-Soviet states in terms of growth,
with GDP rates outpacing even its western neighbors (It also had the ex-Soviet world’s
most generous pensions) …In the year prior to the 2006 election, real wages grew by 21
percent…the disparity between rich and poor was among the lowest in the word. In 2006,
Belarus spent 13 percent of its GDP—more than Russia did or Lithuania—on social
programs; these benefits reached almost two-thirds of the country’s households. Spending
on healthcare and education hit record levels. Between 2002 and 2006, the official poverty
rate fell from 31% to 11percent. From 2003 to 2005 unemployment was halved to 1.5
percent. In 2006, inflation fell to single digits for the first time. By election day in March
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of that year Belarussians were more prosperous than they had been at any time in their
history (Potocki 2011:52; italics added).
Potocki (2011:53), admits that “there can be no question [President Lukashenka] won” the
2006 election, and that Lukashenka’s popularity was undented “by either the postelection protests
or the harsh measures that he ordered against them. Lukashenka stood that month at what would
be remembered as the peak of his regime’s stability and prosperity” (p.53).
Though Potocki admits that “there can be no question [President Lukashenka] won” the
2006 election, he argues that Lukashenka inflated his victory margin by “about twenty percentage
points” based upon “independent polling” (p.53). (Potocki seems to be relying on the March/April
IISEPS survey that concluded 58.2 percent voted for Lukashenka25). However, if my criticisms
of the IISEPS are valid it is likely that the IISEPS significantly underrepresented Lukashenka
supporters again. The actual results in 2006 might have been even higher 58.2 percentage and
possibly the official result of 80 percent is accurate.
The 2010 election does differ from the previous elections in 2001 and 2006 as Belarus
faced serious economic problems in the years before the election and coming into the 2010 election
Belarus did not enjoy continued economic growth (Potocki 2011). Aside from the 2008 Financial
Crisis, Belarus’ biggest economic problem was that in 2007 Russia significantly increased prices
for oil and gas (Potocki 20011:54). According to Potocki, “Lukashenka claimed that Belarus’s
loses from the ‘energy wars’ amounted to $5 billion, or 10 percent of GDP” (p.54) Furthermore,
this led to inflation, foreign debt, and a trade deficit (p.54).

IISEPS, “Results of the National Opinion Poll Conducted on March-April of 2006,”
(http://www.iiseps.org/?p=2776&lang=en).
25
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However, there is no indication that Belarus’ economic problems seriously affected
President Lukashenka’s popularity in the 2010 election. For example, one of the “reliable”
independent polls that Potocki (p.55) cited showed 57 percent voted for Lukashenka (I believe
Potocki is referring to the March 2011 IISEPS survey26). This is the same percentage that the
IISEPS reported for the 2001 and 2006 elections during periods of great economic growth.
Furthermore, Potocki also cited a March 2011 poll of the “U.S.-based International Republican
Institute [that] found that 69 percent of respondents were satisfied with the results of the election.
(p.55-56). Not only does this poll support the position that Belarus’ economic problems did not
affect Lukashenka’s popularity, but, as discussed previously, this poll showing 69 percent support
for Lukashenka seriously questions the validity of the IISEPS surveys in general, which have never
shown such a high level of support for President Lukashenka. Stephen White also found 68 percent
voted for Lukashenka (Ioffe 2014:80).
The International Republican Institute [IRI] is deeply anti-Lukashenka27 and has ties to the
U.S government, USAID, and National Endowment for Democracy.28 Furthermore, the IRI was
openly trying to overthrow President Lukashenka and funded the Belarussian opposition with
millions of dollars.29 The IRI, supporting the opposition and trying to overthrow Lukashenka,
would not do anything to help President Lukashenka or defend his legitimacy. Therefore, even
though I do not have access to the IRI’s 2011 original study, I would assume that if the IRI found
that 69 percent of Belarussians voted for Lukashenka, it is safe to say that at least 69 percent of

IISEPS, “Results of the National Opinion Poll Conducted on March 2-12, 2011,”
(http://www.iiseps.org/?p=2728&lang=en).
26

International Republican Institute [IRI], “Associated Press cites IRI’s Work in Belarus,” January 5, 2011, by
Desmond Butler, (https://www.iri.org/resource/associated-press-cites-iris-work-belarus).
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IRI, “Who We Are,” (https://www.iri.org/who-we-are/our-partners).

IRI, “Associated Press cites IRI’s Work in Belarus,” January 5, 2011, by Desmond Butler,
(https://www.iri.org/resource/associated-press-cites-iris-work-belarus).
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Belarussians voted for Lukashenka in 2010 election. Stephen White had similar findings (Ioffe
2014:80).
The 2015 election came and went without much fanfare or protest (Crabtree et al. 2016),
although officially President Lukashenka won with 83.49% of the vote—"Both Lukashenko’s total
level of support and margin of victory (79.07%) were larger than in any previous election.
(Crabtree et al. 2016:5).
As in 2010, Belarus faced serious economic problems coming into the 2015 elections,
possibly worse than 2010 since for “perhaps the first time since Lukashenko won election in 1994,
unemployment has been a serious voter concern” (Crabtree et al. 2016:4). Furthermore, the main
candidate against Lukashenka Tatiana Korotkevich, of the People's Referendum Coalition,
concentrated her campaign on the “dilapidated state of the [contracting] Belarusian economy,”
economic hardship, lack of growth, and serious inflation as “Belarusian ruble had lost more than
30% of its value since the beginning of 2015” (Crabtree et al. 2016:5). However, according to
academic scholars, Crabtree et al. (2016) Belarus’ economic problems did not affect President
Lukashenka’s popularity.
While domestic circumstances might have seemed favorable to a change in leadership,
public support for Lukashenko was much higher than it was before the 2006 and 2011
elections (Crabtree et al. 2016:5).
Furthermore, based on Crabtree et al. (2016), there is little reason to believe Lukashenka’s
popularity had significantly fallen or had waned by the 2015 election—and this is in spite of
Belarus’ economic problems. In fact, Lukashenka might have been even more popular than in the
two previous elections (Crabtree et al. 2016:5) likely due to the crisis in the Ukraine as Belarusians
wanted to continue enjoying peace and stability (Crabtree et al. 2016:4).
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Although there are numerous allegations of voter fraud (Crabtree et al. 2016:5-6), the
strongest allegation that Lukashenka inflated his victory margin—no serious analysists believe he
lost (Crabtree et al. 2016:6)—once again comes from IISEPS surveys.

Though officially

Lukashenka won 83.47 percent (Crabtree et al. 2016:11), according to the IISEPS Lukashenka
only won about 51 percent of the vote (50.8%).30

Furthermore, the IISEPS claimed that

Lukashenka’s “current level of support is the lowest since the beginning of IISEPS’ monitoring.31”
However, this statement is misleading as the IISEPS recorded the same percentage of support for
Lukashenka in its December 2010 poll immediately after the 2010 election32 (See also Potocki
2011:4). Although the IISEPS found that only 51.1 percent voted for Lukashenka in December
2010 in its next poll in March 2011 the percent who voted for Lukashenka was significantly higher
at 57.8 percent33 (See also Potocki 2011:55) and the International Republican Institute March 2011
poll found 69 percent had voted for Lukashenka (Potocki 2011:55-56) and Stephen White found
that 68 percent voted for Lukashenka (Ioffe 2014:80). It seems the IISEPS finding of only 51
percent in 2015 election could be explained by the IISEPS unreliability more so than any real
change in public support for President Lukashenka.
Furthermore, Crabtree et al. (2016), who do not doubt Lukashenka clearly won the election,
only believe that the “election results were manipulated to some extent” (emphasis added).
However, if the IISEPS is right, then the election would have been manipulated by 32.67
percentage points. This seems to be far more than “some extent.” If the IISEPS findings are correct

IISEPS, “The Most Important Results of the Public Opinion Poll in December of 2015,” December 29, 2015
(http://www.iiseps.org/?p=3865&lang=en).
30
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IISEPS, “Results of the National Opinion Poll Conducted on December 21-31, 2010,” Media publications in
2011, (http://www.iiseps.org/?p=2746&lang=en).
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IISEPS, “Results of the National Opinion Poll Conducted on March 2-12, 2011,”
(http://www.iiseps.org/?p=2728&lang=en).
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than Lukashenka would have to have added almost 2 million fraudulent votes! (Crabtree et al
2015:11). That would be more than 64 percent of his actual votes! From roughly 3 million to 5
million (p. 11). If IISEPS is correct than the election would have required massive manipulation
on a massive scale and not merely manipulation to “some extent”. Again, it seems IISEPS finding
greatly underrepresented Lukashenka voters.
In summary, in 1991, 83 percent of the Belarussian electorate voted to preserve the Soviet
Union. Three years later the same 83 percent of the electorate voted for President Lukashenka in
free and fair 1994 election. I have argued, based on the literature, there is no reason to assume that
support for Lukashenka declined for the 2001 and 2006 elections. The main evidence that
Lukashenka exaggerated his victory margins is supplied by the IISEPS, however, I have argued
that the IISEPS surveys are unreliable and might significantly underrepresent Lukashenka
supporters. Therefore, the IISEPS likely significantly lower than the true results and that the
official results from 2001 (75%) and 2006 (80%) might very well be accurate. Furthermore, based
on the literature and IISEPS, it appears that the economic hardship Belarus faced had little effect
on the 2010 and 2015 elections. So, like 2001 and 2006, we could assume the real results were
significantly higher than the IISEPS and that the official results (80%) might very well have been
accurate.
Furthermore, an independent poll done by the anti-Lukashenka International Republican
Institute found 69 percent support voted for President Lukashenka in the 2010 as well as the
Stephen White survey that found 68 percent (Ioffe 2014:80). This not only demonstrates that the
IISEP surveys significantly underrepresent Lukashenka-supporters but that his actual support is at
least 69 percent, possibly even higher: the official results of around 80 percent might be accurate.
Therefore, if my criticisms of the IISEPS are correct, and if I am right that the economic hardships
Belarus has been facing will not significantly change the election results, then it is likely that the
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2020 official election results might be accurate.

Simply put, according Manaev (2020)

Lukashenka won about 50 percent the same as 2015. However, if my critique of the IISEPS is
correct than the actual number will be significantly higher. The real results might be 20-30
percentage points higher (70%-80%) and the official 2020 results, 80 percent for Lukashenka,
might very well be accurate.

Chapter 7.3. In Spite of the 2020 Protests, Belarussian Society Has Not Changed
Drastically Since 2015—Important Differences Between the 2015 Election and the 2020 Election
The dominant narrative of the 2020 presidential elections is one of a democratic revolution
and popular uprising that has been a long time coming (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021; Glod 2020)
and that the large protests demonstrate not only were the official results falsified but that
Lukashenka no longer enjoys popular support—in fact heckling and protesting workers prove
Lukashenka has even lost his most solid base (Nizhnikau and Moshes 2021; Glod 2020). However,
if we compare the 2020 and 2015 elections, it is clear that social conditions have not changed
significantly in Belarus, in spite of the large protest movement, and this, more than anything, best
explains the movement’s failure.
What were some key differences between the 2015 and 2020 elections? Obviously, Covid

was a major difference and played a key role shaping 2020 protest movement. Here I agree wholly
with Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021) and Glod (2020) however, based on my interviews I think this
was primarily a middle-class phenomenon. Most of the workers I spoke to were satisfied with
Lukashenka’s handling of COVID; they did not feel abandoned or at risk. Furthermore, his
comments did not bother them, and certainly did not enrage them the way the middle-class was
utterly enraged. Moreover, even the anti-Lukashenka workers in the Open Democracy study did
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not say anything about Covid (Shuntov 2021), nor did Sergey Dylevsky,34 strike leader of Minsk
Tractor Works, or the other strike leaders.35
I also strongly agree with Glod and Moshes and Nizhnikau about the crucial role social
media play in the August 9 movement not just helping to organize decentralized protests, but
creating the social environment that led up to the protests. Belarus in 2020 was far more saturated
with social media than it was in 2010 (the year of the largest anti-Lukashenka protests before

2020). Referring to the role social media played in the protests, Alena Golden, owner of an IT
firm,
Telegram has made such a huge difference,” says Golden, referring to the messaging site
that became the key source of information for people as access to the internet was cut off.
“I remember two elections ago in 2010 there was a similar situation but the protests were
not so extensive. The media was not so strong then and we didn’t have so much social
media. Now that we have all these information sources you can’t suppress the people

easily.36 (According to Golden the social conditions have not changed in Belarus drastically
and were similar in 2010. However, with social media protesters were able to protest more
effectively.)
Social media also played a critical creating the social conditions for the protest’s
movement. In the months leading up to the August 9, 2020 election anti-Lukashenka memes
spread like wildfire on social media. One meme, in particular “Sasha-3%” was so viral and

New York Times, “Laying Down His Tools, Belarus Worker Takes Up Mantle of Protest Leader,” August 21, 2020,
by
Ivan
Nechepurenko,
(https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/21/world/europe/belarus-protest-electionLukashenko.html); The Sunday Times, “I Felt Rage, Grabbed the Microphone and Spoke To the Strikers, Says
Accidental ‘Lech Walesa’ of Belarus,” August 25, 2020, by Simon Ostrovsky, (https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/i-feltrage-grabbed-microphone-and-spoke-strikers-says-accidental-lech-walesa-belarus); Wikipedia, “Sergey Delevsky,”
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Dylevsky).
34

[In Russian] Onliner.by, “Strike at MAZ and MTZ. The fate of the participants, how the authorities pressed and
what they say in the administrations now,” September 23, 2020, by Anastasia Danilovich,
(https://realt.onliner.by/2020/09/23/byvshie-zavodchane).
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Sifted, “Belarus’ tech sector puses for radical change,” August 14, 2020, by Maija Palmer,
(https://sifted.eu/articles/belarus-tech-protests).
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widespread, not only on social media, but spray-painted on walls all over Minsk37. (Sasha is the
nickname for Alexander, 3% is the amount of people who supposedly support Lukashenka. The
“Sasha-3%” meme became so ubiquitous that even President Lukashenka felt the need to address
it during a speech on June 22, 2020 over a month before the election August 9, 2020 election.38
Some might dismiss the opposition’s “Sasha 3%” meme as humorous and silly not to be
taken seriously. However, I do not. In my 13 years of coming to Belarus and 8 years of living

here year-round, I have heard that “no one” supports President Lukashenka by middle-class and
upper-class Belarussians numerous times. This is practically the opposition’s mantra; however, it
is far from reality. In fact, during my interviews both capitalists, Stas and Vlad, bluntly and angerly
said, “No one supports Lukashenka.” Zahorski (2020), a harsh Lukashenka critic, also takes the
Sasha-3% meme seriously as well as others such as Dzianis Melyantsou, of the Belarussian think
tank Minsk Dialogue:
Due to the lack of open public data on Lukashenka’s real approval rating it was a lot easier
for alternative candidates to make voters believe in the Internet meme of Lukashenka’s 3%
rating (Melyantsou 2020:3; Zahorski 2020:3)
Furthermore, the “Sasha 3%” slogan actually came from an online website survey
organized by one of the largest and most popular Belarussian web portals called Onliner.by.
(Zahorski 2020:3; see also Sokolov 2020). Other online surveys in the months before the election

also reported extremely low support for President Lukashenka including the following:

Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, “Sasha 3%? Belarusians Poke Fun At President's Slipping Support,” June 25,
2020, by Tony Wesolowsky, (https://www.rferl.org/a/belarusians-poke-fun-at-president-slippingsupport/30690555.html).
37
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Table 1. Percentage Support for President Lukashenka from Online Surveys (Sokolov 2020)

Telegram

Support for
President
Lukashenka
3%

Tut.by

6%

Nasha Niva

3%

Telegraf.by

4%

Radio Svaboda

1.7%

The People’s Will

17%

Onliner

3%

Websites/Online
Surveys

Although these online oppositional website polls are clearly not representative, Belarussian
sociologist Andrei Vardomatsky, however, argues that these polls are still very significant:
…it is with such data that the opposition basically operates. (Sokolov 2020)
And the related slogan, “We-97%” (in Russian “мы-97%”), could be seen at protests as
well (Sokolov 2020) and “The phrase “97%” had " had become a rallying symbol of the
opposition.” 39
In the 1990’s (Furman 1999:2) described Minsk as a “‘local subculture’” or “special
environment” in which the capitalist elite shapes the “values, ideology and lifestyle” of the middle
class and youth. This made Minsk into an “almost completely hostile environment” for President
Lukashenka (Furman 1999:9). In 2020, with the saturation of the internet and social media among
the youth and middle-class Furman’s (1999) “special environment” of the 1990’s had become
more like a deafening echo chamber. It came as no surprise that large protests followed the

39

Wikipedia, "Charter 97" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charter_97#cite_note-6).
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announcement of President Lukashenka’s election victory (Glod 2020; Moshes and Nizhnikau
2021).
Why were there no significant protests in 2015?
Though there are important differences between 2020 and 2015, I am arguing that there
has not been a significant social transformation from 2015 to 2020. It is my position that Belarus
is roughly the same as it was in 2015. Besides Covid and social media there are concrete reasons
why 2015 saw no protests (Crabtree et al. 2016) and 2020 saw massive protests. There are other
important differences between 2015 and 2020 that tend to show that social conditions have not
changed significantly since 2015.
First, the 2015 election occurred during a period of greatly improved relations between
Belarus and the West (Crabtree 2015). In fact, the West had previously been actively trying to
overthrow the President Lukashenka funding millions of dollars to the opposition. However, with
the improved relations with Lukashenka “EU and U.S. have…largely ceased their funding for
opposition groups, which ran to $120 million as recently as 2011” (Seddon 2015).
The political climate changed drastically after 2015, the West returned to its previous
policy of attempting to overthrow President Lukashenka by funding millions of dollars into “civil
society” organizations, though clearly civil society seems to be a euphemism for anti-Lukashenka
oppositional organizations, which some groups barely attempt to veil such as the German-based,
“Fund for Belarus Democracy” that
[M]akes support available to citizen initiatives, independent media, and human rights
groups, enabling them to resist the pressures of a dictatorial regime and work towards its
democratization…. the Fund for Belarus Democracy one of the largest support programs
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available to civil society in Belarus. Support under this program will be provided for as
long as required for the democratization and European integration of Belarus.40
As well as the EU funded “Assembly of Pro-Democratic NGOs” which:
[I]s the largest association of pro-democratic non-governmental organizations and civil
initiatives in Belarus. The Assembly was founded in 1997 as an umbrella union and now
unites more than 300 organizations. The Assembly advocates for democracy and the
independence of Belarus, defends civil activists’ rights and the common interests of NGOs,
and contributes to the development of member organizations and the formation of civil
society in Belarus” (Smolianko et al. 2019: ii).
The EU admits, that since 2016, “the [EU] financial allocation for Belarus has amounted
to around €30 million annual grant assistance, with a current portfolio standing at close to €135
million of commitments.”41 The U.S appears to have significantly funded many oppositional civil
society groups in Belarus as well before the August 9, 2020 election (Ioffe 2021).
On May 21, 2021 RT reported the “the extent of Washington’s clandestine involvement in
the unrest that erupted across the country throughout 2020,” through the National Endowment for
Democracy’s [NED] (the “US regime-change arm”) involvement in the August 9, 2020 protest
movement:42
Nina Ognianova, who oversees the NED’s work with local groups in the country,
suggested “a

lot

of

the

people” who

were “trained” and “educated” via

the

The German Marshall Fund of the United States, “Fund for Belarus Democracy,”
(https://www.gmfus.org/program/fund-belarus-democracy).
40

The European Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotioations: EU-Belarus
Cooperation,” (https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/european-neighbourhood-policy/countriesregion/belarus_en).
41

RT, “US regime-change agency NED admits its role in the strife in Belarus, but leaked documents also implicate
the UK Foreign Office,” May 21, 2021, by Kit Klarenberg, (https://www.rt.com/russia/524296-western-meddlingbelarus-power-change/).
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organization’s various endeavors there were pivotal to “the events, or the build-up to the
events, of last summer”.43 (Emphasis in original)
…
Long-time NED chief Carl Gershman – who in September 2013, less than six months prior
to the coup that shifted Kiev’s political orientation, dubbed Ukraine “the biggest prize” for
Washington – added that his organization was working with controversial opposition figure
Svetlana Tikhanovskaya and her team “very, very closely.” In all, the agency bankrolled at
least 159 civil society initiatives in Belarus, costing $7,690,689, from 2016 to 2020 alone.44
…
The team’s unguarded comments represent a rare public admission of the insidious,
destabilizing role played by the NED – in 1991, its then-president acknowledged, “a lot of
what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA. 45
The RT article also reported massive British involvement in Belarus though the UK’s
Foreign, Commonwealth Development Office [FCDO]:
In 2017, then-Prime Minister Theresa May unveiled a £100 million kitty, ostensibly for

battling Kremlin disinformation. In practice, internal FCDO files leaked by hacktivist
collective Anonymous made clear the effort was primarily concerned with “weakening the
Russian state’s influence,” particularly in its “near abroad.” As a close neighbor and
arguably most important ally of Moscow, Belarus was unsurprisingly very much in the
FCDO’s crosshairs.
…
In January of that year [2017], Whitehall commissioned an extensive analysis of

Belarusian citizens’ perceptions, motivations, and habits, in order to “identify
opportunities” to “appropriately communicate” with them. In particular, London was
interested in “existing or potential grievances against their national government” that could

43
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RT, “US regime-change agency NED admits its role in the strife in Belarus, but leaked documents also implicate
the UK Foreign Office,” May 21, 2021, by Kit Klarenberg, (https://www.rt.com/russia/524296-western-meddlingbelarus-power-change/).
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be

exploited,

and “channels

and

messages” by

which

the

UK

government

could “appropriately engage with different sub-groups. 46
It appears foreign intelligence was able to help shape the perception of the protests in
Belarus both domestically and abroad:
Footage produced by Euroradio of violent crackdowns on protesters in Minsk was
regularly aired by the Western media, including the BBC, during the strife. The outlet even
specifically amplified calls from the British state broadcaster for activists to submit

pictures and videos for use in news coverage. Franak Viacorka – an Atlantic Council senior
fellow,

and

now

senior

advisor

to

Svetlana

Tikhanovskaya

–

prominently hailed its “‘fearless’ reporting of the upheaval.47
The British government through its Open Information Partnership [OIP] “which is
the ‘flagship’ strand within Whitehall’s multi-pronged propaganda assault on Russia. Bankrolled
by the FCDO to the tune of £10 million,”

The organization maintains a network of 44 partners across Central and Eastern Europe,
including “journalists, charities, think tanks, academics, NGOs, activists, and
factcheckers.” One of the collective’s primary, covert objectives is influencing “elections
taking place in countries of particular interest” to the FCDO.48
The OIP helps “organizations and individuals produce slick propaganda masquerading as
independent citizen journalism, which is then amplified globally via its network.”49 The OIP was
heavily involved in the Ukraine and worked with a 12-strong group of online ‘influencers’ “to
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counter Kremlin-backed messaging” … allowing them to “reach wider audiences with compelling
content that received over four million views.”50 (Emphasis in original)
The OIP has also been very active in Russia and Central Asia where the OIP established a
covert network of YouTubers, helping them create videos “promoting media integrity and
democratic values.” Participants were also taught how to “make and receive international
payments without being registered as external sources of funding” and “develop editorial
strategies to deliver key messages,” while the consortium minimized their “risk of
prosecution” and managed “project communications” to ensure the existence of the network, and
indeed the OIP’s role, were kept “confidential”51 (Emphasis in original).
It would be entirely unsurprising if similar efforts were being undertaken in Belarus. After
all, the country – along with Moldova and Ukraine – is referred to in the leaked documents as “the
most vital space in the entire network,” and a “high-impact priority” for London, suggesting its
2020 election was very much “of interest” to Whitehall. If so, it would likewise be entirely
unsurprising if many of the alleged so-called citizen journalists and media outlets covering the
unrest in Minsk received funding and training from the OIP.”52 And even though the protests have
stopped the British government continues to fund and maintain opposition media in Belarus:
In March 2021, the FCDO published an update on the progress of its global ‘Media
Freedom Campaign’, which revealed that, over the past year, Whitehall had allocated
£950,000 in financing to Belarusian news outlets, enabling them to “remain open and
maintain a functional level of equipment.53
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On June 2, 2020 Real Clear World Media specifically reported the important funding and
organizing in Belarus done by “NDI, NED, IRI, USAID, [and] Amnesty International” before the
election and that civil society groups were not only combating Covid but organizing protests
against President Alexander Lukashenka.54 It appears that not only was the middle class outraged
by Lukashenka’s handling of Covid, but that Covid itself provided a way for the West to funnel
millions directly to the opposition protest movement. The June 2, 2020 Real Clear World article
basically admits this:
All those years of outside investment into Belarusian civil society seems to be finally
paying off. Civil society groups in Belarus now have a chance to demonstrate how they
have prepared themselves for this opportunity to show the world what they are really
capable of, albeit in a form their funders likely never would have imagined. On one day
last week, for example, 1,000 demonstrators got together in the Belarusian capital Minsk
to oppose another term for President Alyaksandr Lukashenko in one of the biggest protests
in the country’s history.55
The Real Clear World article insisted that “Grants Matter to Civil Society” and that the
West should continue funding civil society organizations.56 The deeply anti-Lukashenka Atlantic
Council on January 27, 2021 called for Congress “to double” the already existing budget of the
anti-Lukashenka of “Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL’s) Belarus Service, which is
overseen by the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM)” and although it is not exactly clear how
much the U.S was already spending, the Atlantic Council demands that the US State Department
“spend no less than $200 million annually on civil society and media support for Belarus.”57

Real Clear World, “Grants Matter to Civil Society in Belarus,” June 2, 2020,
(https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2020/06/02/grants_matter_to_civil_society_in_belarus_495071.html).
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Unlike 2015, not only was the West actively trying to overthrow Lukashenka in 2020, it
was funding millions of dollars into the opposition before the August 9, 2020 election. While there
was no guarantee the West would be successful, or that there would be large protests, the fact that
the 2015 election had no protests as compared to 2020 is rather telling. Especially, considering
the large protest that followed the 2010 election.
Another major difference between 2015 and 2020 was the opposition’s complete lack of
unity behind President Lukashenka’s strongest opponent, Tatiana Korotkevich (Crabtree et al.
2016:5), also a woman and the first woman presidential candidate in Belarussian history (p. 3).
In fact, not only did the opposition “never rall[y] behind Korotkevich,” but “argued that
instead of supporting her, Belarusians should boycott the elections” (Crabtree et al. 2016:5). The
opposition’s lack of unity and in-fighting even alienated its key base of “young, educated, proEuropean Belarussians,” Max Seddon (2015) reported on October 10, 2015 in the oppositionalfriendly Buzz-Feed-News:
Support for the opposition has nonetheless dipped even among its ostensible base of young,
educated, pro-European Belarusians. ‘People don’t trust the opposition. They couldn’t
even agree on a presidential candidate over the last five years. People think the younger
generation needs to take over,’ said Igor Losik, who runs @belamova, a popular antiLukashenko Twitter page.
The opposition’s utter lack of unity in 2015 is in stark contrast to the 2020 election in which
the campaigns of the three strongest oppositional candidates, Viktor Babarika, Sergei
Tikhanovskaya, and Valery Tsepkala all united behind one candidate, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya.
The opposition appeared to be the most united that it has been since 2001.

(https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/biden-and-belarus-a-strategy-for-the-newadministration/).
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Another important difference was that the 2015 election took place immediately after
Maidan in which Belarussians watched in horror as the Ukraine plunged into absolute chaos
(Crabtree et al. 2016:4). Seddon (2015) explained:
Neighboring Ukraine’s descent from revolution to war and economic collapse has scared
Belarusians off taking to the streets, with opposition rallies now attracting just a few
hundred. Dissidents who led those [2010] rallies then have emerged from jail to find the
public has lost its appetite for their program, and younger leaders have switched from

revolution to evolution. …. Fewer still have the appetite for mass protest after watching
Russian and Belarusian TV reports on the Ukraine crisis. ‘If you stand on the street with a
red-and-white flag,’ the symbol of the opposition movement, “protest and collect
signatures, people will go up and say, ‘You want it to be like Ukraine here?’” said Artem
Shraibman, a writer for tut.by, Belarus’s most popular website.
More than repression and riot police, the post-Maidan climate chilled enthusiasm for mass
protests even among young people. However, the climate was very different in 2020. By then
Maidan was already 6 years in the past. And while 6 years is a long time in politics, it is especially
a long for young people, the bulk of whom made up the most of the confrontational protest in the
nights immediately following the election. It was during these protests that the perception of police
brutality inspired large non-violent protests of women throughout Minsk as well as several worker
protests at major state enterprises that will be discussed next chapter. And everything culminated
in the massive peaceful protest on Sunday evening, August 16, 2020.

254

Chapter 7.4. Was the Massive August 16, 2020 Protest a De Facto Presidential Election
of Support of Svetlana Tikhanovskaya? Was the Golos Election Verification Platform a Parallel
Election in Support of Tikhanovskaya?
While the size of the August 16, 2020 protest was certainly unprecedented, there is nothing
about the protest that disproves the Lukashenka won the election or even that the official election
results were in accurate. According to the New York Times “Tens of thousands of protesters”
attended the August 16, 2020 protest. 58 And if we assume that tens of thousands is about 50,000
people (and all 50,000 voted for Tikhanovskaya), though while certainly a large protest, relative
to the population of Minsk that has over 2 million that would be only 2.5 percent, well within the
bounds of the official election results in which she won 10.1 percent (Sokolov 2020). And even if
we accepted higher estimates for the August 9, 2020 protest—which the New York Times did not—
they would all still fall within the bounds of the official results.59
No doubt counting the number of protesters on August 16, 2020 does not prove that
Tikhanovskaya lost the election since voters might have voted for her yet chose to stay home.
However, the small number of protesters on August 16, 2020 relative to the large population of
Minsk do not provide any evidence that President Lukashenka lost the election or even that the
official results were falsified.
Furthermore, in the same way, the Golos platform’s collection of ballot photographs,
actually tended to prove the official results—and certainly did not provide evidence that President
Lukashenka lost or that Tikhanovskaya even came close to winning the election. Golos (2020)

New York Times, “Belarus Protests Eclipse Rally in Defense of Defiant Leader,” August 16, 2020, by Ivan
Nechepurenko and Andrew Higgins, (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/16/world/europe/belarus-protestslukashenko.html).
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collected 565,743 photographs of ballots. If we assume these were actual ballots, as we can only
do with caution as Golos is oppositional and not neutral (Sokolov 2020), then Golos’ number of
verified Tikhanovskaya ballots is well within the official number of Tikhanovskaya ballots
588.622. This fact in itself proves there is no evidence that President Lukashenka lost and that
Tikhanovskaya won. For example, if there were significantly more verified Tikhanovskaya ballots
than official Tikhanovskaya ballots it would be clear that the election was falsified. Since the
number of verified Tikhanovskaya ballots is less than the number official Tikhanovskaya ballots
there is no evidence of falsification.
Again, just like my previous argument, no doubt many voters might have voted for
Tikhanovskaya but did photograph and send their ballots to Golos. Therefore, based on this fact
we cannot assume that Lukashenka won and that Tikhanovskaya lost. Though, based on the Golos’
number of verified ballots there is no evidence that Lukashenka falsified the election.
While theoretically, Golos’ verified ballots do not prove there was no election falsification,
a careful examination of the number of Golos verified ballots in the context of the previous
elections seems to indicate that the election results were not falsified. If we assume Tikhanovskaya
won the election or at least President Lukashenka significantly falsified his victory margin, it
would require mathematical conclusions that are highly improbable.
For example, if the election results were significantly falsified, the Central Election
Committee [CEC] would have to have chosen a false number of ‘official’ ballots for
Tikhanovskaya much lower than what she actually received. Let’s assume the CEC falsely chose
588,622 (the official number). If this is true, how did the CEC choose a false number of ballots
for Tikhanovskaya that so closely aligned with Golos’ verified ballots? This seems beyond
mathematical probability. The CEC cannot risk choosing a number that is lower Golos’ number of
verified Tikhanovskaya ballots. If so, it would be clearly obvious that the election was falsified.
The CEC must choose a number either slightly higher or much higher. The CEC’s number was in
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fact slightly higher. Therefore, it seems there are only two possible choices. Either the official
results are indeed correct, or the CEC breached Golos’ security and seeing Golos’ number of
verified ballots the CEC chose a number slightly higher. It is unlikely, however, that the CEC had
foreknowledge of Golos’ number of verified Tikhanovskaya ballots for two reasons. First, it is
unlikely that the Golos’ platform security could be easily breached since Golos was made by some
of Belarus’ top hackers and IT security specialists (Sokolov 2020).60 Golos’ developers even
“assure[d] the preservation of anonymity and inaccessibility of the received data to outsiders.”61
The second reason that it is unlikely that the CEC had foreknowledge of Golos’ numbers
is that it is unlikely that Golos had even finished collecting the ballots by the time the CEC had
announced the election results. Golos might not have even finished on August 9, 2020 as the
Golos’ (2020) final report says on page 18 that by August 18, 2020 Golos had collect 565,743
ballot photographs.
The CEC’s official Tikhanovskaya result of 588,622 could not simply have been chosen
out of a hat and either represents the true number or was chosen based on foreknowledge of Golos’
number of verified Tikhanovskaya votes. Since it is unlikely the CEC had foreknowledge the CEC
official results are likely valid.
Another argument in support of the official 2020 election results can be made based on
Golos’ verified Tikhanovskaya ballots. The number of Golos’ verified ballots fit perfectly into
every previous Belarussian election. While the opposition and West accuse President Lukashenka
of fraudulently repeating the patterns of previous elections, why would Golos’ numbers fit into the

See also, Trickfast.com, “Hackathon of the Coordination Council, webinar and meeting of architects.” February 3,
2021, (https://tricksfast.com/belarusnews/hackathon-of-the-coordination-council-webinar-and-meeting-ofarchitects/).
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pattern of previous elections. For example, Golos’ 565,743 verified ballots fits into the 2015
election almost perfectly: Golos’ 565,743 verified ballots matches the combined results of 575,502
of the three oppositional candidates almost exactly;62even the percentages match: Golos 9.7% and
9.4% from 2015 (Crabtree 2016:11).
And while we could make a hypothetical argument, though unlikely, that in 2020 the CEC
got foreknowledge of Golos’ verified ballots and carefully chose a false ‘official’ number for
Tikhanovskaya just slightly higher than Golos’ verified ballots so the election results would not
look suspicious, however, the CEC in 2015 had no idea about Golos 565, 743 verified ballots and
yet the 2015 numbers still match Golos’ verified ballots perfectly. Golos’ verified Tikhanovskaya
ballots not only seems to validate the official 2020 results, but proves with certainty that not only
did President Lukashenka decisively win, but the official results are accurate.
It seems fairly certain that President Lukashenka won the 2020 election and that Svetlana
Tikhanovskaya clearly lost the election. Also, based on a complete understanding of Belarusian
elections it also seems very plausible that the official 2020 results are accurate or close to accurate.
Furthermore, there is no clear evidence that the official results are not accurate. This is based on
the small number protestors on August 16, 2020 relative to the large population of Minsk as well
as to the fact that the fact that Tikhanovskaya verified ballots collected by Golos do not exceed the
number of official Tikhanovskaya votes. Moreover, a careful examination of the number of
verified Tikhanovskaya ballots shows that the 2020 official results were likely accurate. And that
the number of official Tikhanovskaya ballots fits perfectly into the established patterns of every
previous Belarusian election. It is highly mathematically improbable that this occurred randomly.
Therefore, although the Golos platform was set up to invalidate the 2020 official election results,
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(Tatiana Korotkevich 271,426 +Sergei Gaidukevich 201,945 +Nikolai Ulakhovich 102,131)
(Crabtree et al. 2016:11).
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it actually tended verify them—and without any doubt, Golos proved that not only President
Lukashenka decisively won all of the previous elections, but that the official results were accurate.
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Chapter 8. The August 9, 2020 Election Protest Movement
I still don’t understand what these people are protesting about in the streets. I see them
carrying posters with the word “Freedom” written on them. What exactly do they mean?
What exactly is it that they are not free to do in Belarus today?
--Female Lukashenka supporter
Chapter 8.1. Critical Review of the Literature
In this chapter I will critically review the most current research on the August 9 movement,
and relate my findings to them whenever possible. Although the August 9 protest movement is
framed as a democratic “revolution against a corrupt neo-patrimonial dictator,” even by some
researchers (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:60), it is better explained as part of an ongoing bitter
class conflict between President Lukashenka, representing the moral economy of ordinary
Belarussians, and the neoliberal opposition, representing the class interests of upper/middle-class

Belarusians (Furman 1999; See also Yarashevich 2014). At the root of this bitter class conflict are
the two diametrically opposed moral economies described in this study and their opposing ideas
about the role of the state. On one hand we have the moral economy that supports the state-owned
industrial sector, adamantly opposes privatization and defends workers’ rights.

President

Lukashenka represents this moral economy, although not every worker supports Lukashenka. On
the other hand, there is the neoliberal outlook that adamantly opposes the state-owned industrial

sector, supports privatization, market fundamentalism and market discipline, disciplining labor,
opposes workers’ rights and protections, and wants to subject workers to a free labor market.
The position that President Lukashenka represents is the moral economy based on
continued support for the state-owned industrial sector and opposing neoliberalism is not
controversial. For example, Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021:165) in their comprehensive study of
the August 9 movement argue President Lukashenka represented “a Soviet-style ‘social contract’
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with Belarusian society.” Glod (2020), in her comprehensive study of the August 9 protest
movement uses similar language. Glod (2021) argues that President Lukashenka represents a
“paternalistic model” based on the state-owned industrial sector.
The position that the Belarussian opposition represent a neoliberal vision of society is also
not controversial. It is also not controversial that this neoliberal vison was a key unpinning of the
August 9 protest movement. Glod (2020) explains that “Belarusian society is undergoing a wide

social transformation” (p.4) and that a key aspect of this “profound transformation” (p.5) is the
“public’s views on the role of the state” (p.5). Glod argues that Belarussians are rejecting the stateowned industrial sector and instead support privatization, and “the principles of a market
economy” (p.5). According to Glod, Belarussians are tired of “Lukashenka’s authoritarian,
reform-blocking rule” (p.4), and his “old-fashioned Soviet-era ideas on how to run an economy”
(p.5)
These same arguments are made by Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021) even more starkly.
According to Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021:166) “Belarusians became pro-market in their
economic views”: almost the majority of Belarussians (45%) now oppose the “state-controlled
economy” and “were in favor of a market economy,” while only “25% advocated for a statecontrolled economy.”
Like Glod (2020), Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021) argue that the Belarussian people
demanded that the state-owned industrial sector be privatized, however President Lukashenka
stubbornly clung to his anti-neoliberal anti-privatization outlook.
In Lukashenko’s view, reforms ought not to change the existing socio-economic model
even if the model stopped working. He repeatedly ruled out privatization and cutting red
tape within the system: ‘If we want to plunge our country and ten million people into this
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whirlpool and then go to gasp and groan, realizing that they have entered the wrong place,
this is already without me and, I am sure, without you’ (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:171).
According to Glod (2020) and Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021), President Lukashenka’s
failure to privatize the state-owned industrial sector was one of the key factors that led to the
August 9 protest movement.

My Findings Contradict the Literature
It is uncontroversial that President Lukashenka represents an anti-neoliberal vision. It is
also uncontroversial that the opposition and the August 9 protest movement represented a
neoliberal vision. However, based on my study, I disagree with some of Glod’s (2020) and Moshes
and Nizhniakau’s (2021) key points.

Did Lukashenka Impose his Moral Economy on Belarussians?
Although Glod (2020) and Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021) never use the term ‘moral
economy,’ it is implicit in both studies. In both studies, they argue that President Lukashenka
imposed his Soviet-style paternalistic socio-economic models on the Belarussian people.
Belarusian society is undergoing a wide social transformation. It is outgrowing the
paternalistic relationship that Lukashenka has imposed on it for years, whereby the
government provided acceptable living standards and in exchange people stayed away from
politics (Glod 2020).
Similarly, Moshe and Nizhnikau (2021) argued that,
The state’s tight control over the economy and rent distribution…. allowed the regime to
enter into a Soviet-style ‘social contract’ with Belarusian society, providing a certain level
of socio-economic stability in exchange for citizens’ non-involvement in politics.
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Both studies are implying that President Lukashenka created the moral economy of
ordinary Belarussians, however, this position contradicts much of the literature about Belarus.
These other researchers argue that President Lukashenka and his policies are a reflection of the
moral economy of ordinary Belarussian (Ioffe 2014, 2004; Yarashevich 2014) and this is even
recognized by the harshest critics of President Lukashenka such as Kulakevich (2014:890-1),
Miazhevich (2007:1332), Matsuzato (2004:250-6), Karbalevich (2002:5), Eke and Kuzio (2000:4)
and Furman (1999:12).
The future president [Lukashenka] was a fitting reflection of the predominant sentiments
of the masses (Karbalevich 2002:5).
…
Lukashenka’s rule is a logical outcome of population’s entrenched Soviet mentality and
widespread nostalgia for the relative prosperity of the Soviet system (Eke and Kuzio
2000:4).
…
In Belorussia the people defeated the elite, and Lukashenko’s policy was based on real
majority support (Furman 1999:12).
My own findings strongly supported this position that President Lukashenka and his
policies are a reflection of the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians. For example, support for
the state-owned industrial sector and opposition to privatization among most workers was more
principled and consistent than President Lukashenka’s official policies. Several workers even

wanted the state’s industrial sector expanded, which does seem to be President Lukashenka’s
official policy.

Almost universally, the workers in this study wanted more wage and job

protections for private sector workers, although officially there are none.
Glod and Moshes and Nizhnikau only know a Stalinist caricature of Alexander
Lukashenka. They might not know that he began his political career as a pro-Gorbachev reformer
and even heading a group “Communists of Belarus for Democracy” and denounced the August
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1991 coup, even demanding the “resignation of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus”
who supported the coup (Ioffe 2014:125). At this point Lukashenka’s political orientation was not
in line with ordinary Belarussians—although Lukashenka strongly supported the Soviet Union and
opposed its dissolution, he did not support the August 1991 coup. In fact, not only did the chairman
of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus support the coup, according to Lyavon Barshchevsky, a member
of the Supreme Soviet, the majority of Belarussians supported the August 1991 coup as well (Ioffe
2004:108).
Glod and Moshes and Nizhnikau also might not know that Lukashenka at first embraced
market reforms and that as the director of a state-farm introduced market-based economic reforms,
“assigning a certain amount of land” to farm workers “establishing a direct link between pay and
output—something that had not existed on collective and state farms prior to Perestroika (Ioffe
2014:123-4). And that in 1987 Lukashenka was part of a delegation in Moscow for agricultural

innovations and that his speeches attracted the attention of Gorbachev who asked him several
questions (Ioffe 2014:124).
In 1992 Lukashenka’s political orientation transformed when he “rejected the idea of
forming opinions on any issue whatsoever without considering what the people think about the
issue” (Ioffe 2014:126). While some might criticize this approach as opportunistic, even the harsh
Lukashenka critic, Karbalevich, does not fault Lukashenka “for following the mass consciousness”
since in a democracy “the public function of a politician is to reflect the attitudes of the electorate”
(Ioffe 2014:126).

It was at this time in 1992, a time of economic and social chaos, that

Lukashenka’s political orientation drastically changed:
Identifying with the public’s viewpoints, Lukashenka decided to distance himself from
market reforms, including privatization, and to grant his support to the government of
Viacheslav Kebich, which was bent on slowing down market reforms, restoring economic
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and political ties with Russia, and even reviving, if possible, the extinct Soviet Union (Ioffe
2014:126).
It seems, after carefully reviewing the literature, President Lukashenka did not “impose”
his paternalistic socio-economic model on ordinary Belarussians.

It is also clear that the

Lukashenka’s policies were a reflection of the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians. In truth,
ordinary Belarussians ‘imposed’ their moral economy on Lukashenka. Knowing these facts about
Lukashenka’s political development, my findings make sense in this context; namely that the
workers in this study were overall more committed to the state-owned industrial sector than
Lukashenka and more adamantly opposed privatization. In addition, they almost universally
supported wage and job protections for private sector workers far beyond anything President
Lukashenka officially endorses.

Has the moral economy of Belarussian workers changed?
Regardless of whether Lukashenka is a reflection of the moral economy of ordinary
Belarussians, Glod (2020), and Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021), argue in both articles that the moral
economy of ordinary Belarussians has indeed changed. However, most of the arguments they
make have little to do with ordinary Belarussians—if we mean the working class. However, most
of the arguments in both articles explicitly pertain to the middle class. For example, Moshes and
Nizhnikau (2021:165) discuss how the growing private sector is creating “new education and
employment opportunities, and access to new technologies” that are “providing new sources of
self-realization” (p.166) and creating “clusters of middle-class residents in major cities” (p.165;
emphasis added). Glod (2020) makes similar arguments that pertain to the middle class, stressing
the desire for much more “personal development,” an ‘exciting vision of the future” and the
“development of their business,” that the state had not been allowing.
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In both articles, there are mainly two arguments that actually pertain to whether the
working class’ morale has changed. First, survey research that shows that almost the majority of
Belarussians, “45% were in favor of a market economy and just 25% advocated for a statecontrolled economy (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:166; see also Glod 2020), and second, “the
decline of the ‘social contract’” (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:169; see also Glod 2020). I will
address the survey research first.

While both articles relied on survey research to show that Belarussian society had changed,
neither specifically demonstrated that this survey research shows that the working class had
changed. Be that as it may, with such a large amount, almost the majority, embracing a market
economy and such a small amount, only 25% defending the state-owned industrial sector, it seems
implicit that a very significant portion of the working class must have forsaken the state-owned
industrial sector and now embraces privatization. Therefore, let’s review these surveys.
Upon careful examination of this survey research, I must conclude that the validity of the
survey results cannot be evaluated. Both Glod (2020), and Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021) relied
on studies organized by the Research Center of the Institute for Privatization and Management (a
pro-privatization think tank) and financed by the European Union [EU].1 (Needless to say, the EU
is pro-privatization and deeply hostile to President Lukashenka.) Glod provides a link to the
website of the Kastrychnitsky Economic Forum or KEF, which “was created by IPM research

1

Glod (2020) relied on survey research organized by the Research Center of the Institute of Privatization and
Management and financed by the EU—the actual study was done by the marketing research firm MIA Research
[Marketing Information Art] ([In Russian] Kastrychnitsky Economic Forum, “Interview. Study the values of
Belarusian society,” June 30, 2018, (http://kef.research.by/publications/research/1802/). Moshes and Nizhnikau
(2021) also relied on survey research organized by the Research Center of the Institute of Privatization and
Management and financed by the EU, however, this research study was done directly by the Research Center of the
Institute of Privatization and Management ([In Russain] Daria Urban, “Values of the Population of Belarus,” 2019,
Research Center of the IPM, (http://kef.by/upload/iblock/5fd/SR_19_01.pdf)).
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center in concert with BEROC and CASE research network in 2013.”2 (Both BEROC and CASE
are also pro-privatization think tanks.3) However, the site does not provide the actual study but
only provides an Excel spread sheet with a distribution of the questionnaire answers. No
information about the study’s research design or methodology is available. The study Moshes and
Nizhnikau (2021) rely on, however, is available (in Russian). This study, Urban (2019), although
69 pages, is missing crucial information in order to evaluate the validity of its results. For example,
little information is provided in the study’s methodology section on how the sample was generated,
whether the sample was randomly generated, what methods were employed to ensure the sample
was randomly generated, whether the sample is a representative sample, what percentage of people
refused to be interviewed, etc.:
To achieve the goal of the study as a tool for collecting information was chosen handout
survey of the population of Belarus. The sample was formed taking into account the
following criteria: gender, age, region of residence, type of residence (city / village)
according to the structure of the general population. The achieved sample size was 1016
units. The structure of the sample includes 45.1% of men and 54.9% of women…(p.6;
translated from Russian)
When compiling the sample, the requirement to observe representativeness in the regions
of Belarus was taken into account. The survey was carried out by hand-out method at the
place of residence respondents (p.7; translated from Russian).
Again, without this crucial information, the validity of Urban’s study results cannot be
carefully evaluated, namely that “45% [of Belarussians] were in favor of a market economy and
just 25% advocated for a state-controlled economy” (Moshe and Nizhnikau 2021:166).

Kastrychnitsky Economic Forum, “About KEF,” (http://eng.kef.research.by/about/).
“The mission of BEROC is to promote market economy in Belarus by bringing economic expertise, knowledge, and
education into the public dialogue on economic development” (BEROC, “Missions and Goals,”
(https://beroc.org/en/info/mission/)); “CASE Belarus’ mission is to boost market reforms in Belarus by providing
constructive policy solutions and performing objective economic analysis in order to improve socio-economic wellbeing of the Belarusian society”(CASE-BELARUS, “About,” (https://case-belarus.eu/about-us/)).
2
3
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Furthermore, besides numerous unanswered questions about methodology and research design,
Urban’s sample does not seem nationally representative as it is much more educated than the
national average. For example, 34 percent of Urban’s sample had completed university degrees
(p.8), while nationally only 17.86 percent had completed university degrees in 2019.4 When it
comes to completed university degrees Urban’s sample is basically twice as educated as the
national average! She also significantly overrepresents those with specialized technical training
(a full 11-years high-school degree, plus completion of a technical institute) with 34 percent in
Urban’s sample (p.8), though only 25.56 percent of the national average have that level of
education.5 She also underrepresents those with only a full 11-year high school education with
only 15.8 percent (p.8), though the national average is 22.3 percent.6
Besides underrepresenting subjects with full 11-year high school degrees, Urban’s sample
does not seem to include any of the 9.21 percent of Belarussians with only a basic 9-year high

school degree, the 11.13 percent of Belarussians with only primary school (4 years) or the 10.48
percent with a basic 9-year degree plus completion of a technical institute.7 Urban’s sample is
almost twice as educated as the national average with 78.2 percent either having a university degree
or specialized education while the national average is only 43.42.8
Urban’s overrepresentation of highly-educated subjects and her underrepresentation of
low-educated subjects is the likely reason for her results that 45 percent support a market economy
and only 25 percent support the state-owned industrial sector, since more educated Belarussians

[In Russian] Economic Gazzette, “The first results of the 2019 census: where they live, how they earn money and
what language Belarusians speak”, September 22, 2020, by Dmitry Narivonchik,
(https://neg.by/novosti/otkrytj/pervye-itogi-perepisi-2019-goda).]
4

5

Ibid.

6

Ibid.

7

Ibid.

8

Ibid.
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will tend to support a market economy and less educated Belarussian will tend to support the stateowned industrial sector (Ioffe 2014; Yarashevich 2014; Furman 1999). Based on the unanswered
methodological/research design questions and the fact that Urban’s sample is not nationally
representative based on education levels, I would conclude that her results are not valid. And that
we cannot assume that it is accurate that 45 percent of Belarussians support a market economy and
only 25 percent support the state -owned industrial sector.

Declining Social Contract?
Both articles also rely on the argument that “the decline of the ‘social contract’” has
significantly contributed to a change in the workers’ moral economy; namely the Soviet-style
social contract no longer provides for the workers’ needs (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:169,171;
see also Glod 2020).
First, we must be aware that other scholars have warned about the tendency to
overexaggerate Belarus economic problems and that Belarus is facing immanent collapse. As far
back as 2004, 17 years ago, Grigory Ioffe (2004:90) warned that that the picture of “doom and
gloom” used to describe “Belarus’ economic situation” is “overstated.” Ioffe went further and
warned researchers to asses Belarus carefully without exaggeration:

Quite a few Western and liberal Russian writers who cast Belarus as inherently backward,
wretched and dependent [on Russia] are on a mission to rebuke Lukashenka ‘the last
dictator of Europe’. Besides being on a mission, some of them have not done their
homework on Belarus (Ioffe 2004:90).
While critics harshly lambasted the failure of Belarus socio-economic model, Ioffe in 2004
carefully appraised it, demonstrating many of Belarus’ great economic achievements, especially
of its state-owned industrial sector. These are just some examples from 2004:
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Belarus’ share in the overall CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] production of
buses is 70%; it also produces 30% of trucks, 60% of tractors, 50% of TV sets and 25% of
shoes for the entire CIS (Ioffe 2004:91).
Ioffe (2004:91) tried to portray Belarus economy accurately and showed as far back as
2004, “Belarus’ economic standing appears to be favourable, which is in stark contrast with the
picture routinely painted by Western and many Russian media alike.”
Although Potocki (2011:2) acknowledge Belarus’ incredible growth from 1995-2005, he
used the same phrase as Glod (2020) and Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021) ten years ago to belittle
Belarus:
[Belarus’] economic model is broken, its social contract is failing (Potocki 2011:61).
Glod (2020) and Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021) pinpoint Belarus’s decline over roughly
the last ten years, however, according to Potocki, the economic model was already broken ten

years ago and its “social contract” already failing. And notwithstanding the gloom-and-doom
forecast of Potocki in 2011, in 2014 Yarashevich carefully analyzed Belarus political economy
painting a very different picture. Yarashevich (2014) acknowledged that Belarus’ socio-economic
model, based on the state-owned industrial sector, has produced decent living standards for
ordinary Belarussian and has enabled Belarus to withstand economic shocks maintaining stability.
Yarashevich (2014), overall believes that the Belarussian model does provide decent living

standards for ordinary Belarussians. Yarashevich, like Ioffe (2004) warns scholars to evaluate
Belarus fairly and specifically warns about “neo-liberal bias” among researchers, especially in the
English-language literature (2014:1726).
In general, Yarashevich warns about a neoliberal bias in assessing Belarus’ socio-economic
model:
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It seems that Belarus’s political economy model has neither been acknowledged or
appreciated in the West precisely because it defied the core principles of the postcommunist transformation—the priority of private property and pluralist politics
(Yarashevich 2014:1731).
Like Yarashevich (2014), Veselova (2016) would not agree with Potocki (2011:7) that
Belarus’ “economic model is broken, its social contract is failing” and would not agree with Glod
(2020) and Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021). Veselova’s analysis is much fairer and nuanced:
Over the past twenty years, Belarus has been building “market socialism” in the country
under the continuous leadership of Alexander Lukashenko. By some socioeconomic
indicators, Belarus appears better than its Eastern neighbors: the economy is growing more
rapidly than Ukraine’s, its structure is more balanced than Russia’s. It has a high level of
employment, relatively little social stratification, and modernized businesses in traditional
industry. This does not mean that it is problem free: the country has survived two crises in
just the past five or six years. Nevertheless, it continues to chart its own course through the
dark without looking to foreign advice (Veselova 2016:546).
I have discussed the literature to put into context Glod’s (2020), and Moshes’ and
Nizhniakau’s (2021) position that Belarus’ social contract is broken. The claim has been made for
many years though untrue (Ioffe 2004:90). Researchers unfairly critical of Lukashenka and
Belarus’ socio-economic model have been making this claim for years (See Ioffe 2004:90) and are
prevented from carefully assessing Belarus’ system by their own neoliberal biases (Yarashevich
2014:1726).
In my own study, I did not see much support for Glod and Moshe and Nizhniakau’s position
that the social contract is broken. I am not sure that even the workers who support privatization
would go that far. Albeit they support gradual privatization and believe that that would create
more prosperity, but it is not clear that they think the current social contract is broken and cannot
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provide for them. And among the workers who opposed privatization they unquestionably do not
believe that the social contract is broken.
There have been some declines in Belarussian living standards, however, according to my
study these do not seem to affect Belarussians’ support for the system. I discussed this in my
chapter, “Patience, Optimism and Faith in the System.” Briefly, Belarussians have much patience
or perseverance; this helps them cope with hardships. However, they are also very optimistic and

have faith in the system—even those who do not support the president still support the system.
These factors seem to make ordinary Belarussian more immune to economic hardships. Here are
a few examples from my findings section. Oleg is retired and yet continues to work full time.
When asked about his low salary ($180) and low pension (also $180), he replied:
Of course, I would like to make more money and get a bigger pension, but what can you
do?” he said “This is the way it is. We don’t have oil or gas or Gold or other minerals
besides salt.
Q: “The opposition wants to raise pensions though”
Ha. You believe that! When they are through, we won’t have any pensions
When I asked about the rising retirement ages, he repeated the same thing even though
Oleg was forced to retire a year and a half later at 55½, due to the recent pension reform. Lena’s
responses were similar to Oleg.
We are pensioners. We are very comfortable. We are all right.
Q: “Some, however, complain that the pensions in Belarus are too low?”
And how do they know how much the pensions should be? Have they counted all of the
money in the state budget?
Like Oleg, Lena also was not fazed by the recent pension reforms raising retirement: “The
government is doing what it can.”
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Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021:171) argue that “not only was the state no longer capable of
maintaining the social contract, but also—as mentioned above—its key premises were no longer
widely accepted.” My findings, however, contradict this position. Though there have been some
declines in living standards recently (for example the pension age has increased three years),
overall, the workers in my study still tended to be content. And my findings support the previous
literature (Manaev 2011:97). However, in my study, overall, the middle-class and upper-class
subjects were far less content. In fact, many of these subjects were utterly frustrated with the
Belarus socio-economic model. This finding also supports the literature (Manaev et al. 2011:97).
I would agree with Moshes Nizhnikau and Glod, that a segment of the population is frustrated with
Belarus’ socio-economic model, however, I find that frustration limited to the middle and upper
class. Overall, the Belarusians working class still believes and accepts the social contract.

Is the State Still capable of Maintaining the Social Contract?
There is no doubt that living standards have declined somewhat in Belarus recently,
however, Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021:171) exaggerate how bad the Belarussian economy is,
especially for ordinary Belarussians. Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021:171) argue that “the state is no
longer capable of maintaining the social contract.” (See also Glod 2020). In fact, Moshes and
Nizhnikau (2021:172) go so far as to say that the Belarussian state “could no longer guarantee a
decent level of welfare to its own electorate.” My findings, however, did not support this. While
things could be better, overall, the workers in my study were satisfied with the economy. Again,
dissatisfaction was found mostly among the middle-class and capitalist subjects in my study.
Furthermore, Moshes and Nizhniakau’s (2021:171) position, (the collapse of the social contract)
is even contradicted by the analysis of the August 9 movement by the deeply anti-Lukashenka
National Endowment for Democracy [NED].
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The NED even commended the great

accomplishments of the Belarussian socio-economic model which provides better living standards
than many other former-socialist states, outperforms the EU in important economic categories,
such as inequality, being on par with the Nordic states. The NED said:
Even Lukashenka’s greatest critics speak approvingly of the Belarusian standard of living
In fact, not only did the NED find that the Belarussian economy was in good shape, but
that the workers’ good living standards were a major obstacle to the success of the August 9,
movement. The NED argued that unlike Poland in the 1980’s, that was plagued by deep economic
problems, living standards for Belarussian workers are good. The NED noted that the worker
protests are not about economic issues but are solely political.
But social slogans are not heard at the Belarusian demonstrations, even among the workers.
The miners striking in Saligorsk earn a better living than people in Minsk and, as in any
Belarusian factory, they receive an impressive array of benefits, including their own
hospitals and cultural institutions.
…
A society that is not pressed against the wall economically will eventually stop protesting.
This is also the position of (Melyantsou 2020). My own examination (as well as several
others) of the worker protests also found that the protests were solely political nature and not
motivated by economic problems or bread-and butter issues. I will discuss this in great detail in
Chapter 9.
In my study I found that the moral economy of Belarussian workers has not changed. I
have also argued against recent research implying workers’ moral economy has changed based on
survey research that either cannot be validated (Glod 2020) or is clearly invalid (Moses and
Nizhnikau 2021) based on the study’s lack of representativeness. Furthermore, in contradiction of
Glod 2020 and Nizhnikau (2021:171) we can safely conclude that the Belarussian state is still
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capable of providing the social contract and that workers still accept the social contract. Moreover,
we can also safely conclude that the worker protest and strikes following the August 9, 2020
election were political in nature and were not economically motivated. This brings up an important
question as to whether the Belarussian working class still supports President Lukashenka, which I
will explore in great detail in a later section. Now, notwithstanding the worker protests and strikes,
I will explore the class character of the August 9 protest movement and demonstrate, in support of
the literature (Yarashevich 2014, Furman 1999) that the August 9, 2020 Election Protest
Movement was a middle-class movement and although large, does not represent a popular
uprising.

Chapter 8.2. Was the August 9, Movement was a Popular Uprising? The Middle-Class
Composition of the August 9 Movement

Both studies refer to the August 9 movement as a “popular uprising” (Moshes and
Nizhnikau 2021:160; Glod 2020). In fact, both call it a “revolution” (Moshes and Nizhnikau
2021:160; Glod 2020).
Belarus is undergoing a pro-democracy velvet revolution of the type that swept across
Central Europe in the late 1980s (Glod 2020).
The two articles also stress how widespread and socially broad-based this revolution is,
which “spread to all regions and among all social groups” (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:174).
However, Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021) make it very clear that this revolution did not significantly
involve rural areas or small villages, but stressed the “urban nature of this ‘spontaneous popular
revolt’” (p. 160) in which “[p]eople actively engaged in urban demonstrations,” (p. 174) in which
Moshes and Nizhnikau described as a “large-scale urban contestation” (p.155).
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Moshes and Nizhniakau’s description of the “urban nature” of the protest movement also
aligns with my own observations of the protest movement. I was in Belarus the entire time and
observed as many protests in person as I could, including even pro-Lukashenka rallies. I also
followed protests and rallies outside of Minsk online and clearly observed that outside of Minsk
the pro-Lukashenka rallies were far bigger than the opposition protests and in most small and
medium-sized Belarussian cities there were significant pro-Lukashenka rallies without any
opposition protests.
Moshes and Nizhniakau’s description of the “urban nature” of the protest movement also
aligns with the literature that says Lukashenka’s “support is higher in the countryside than in the
city, in the periphery than in Minsk (Furman 1999:8-9).

The Middle-Class Composition of the August 9 Movement.
Although both studies mention some working-class involvement in the August 9
movement (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:174; Glod 2020), there is no question the August 9
Movement was mainly middle class. Media accounts of the protest movement not only support
the position that the August 9 movement was primarily middle class, but even celebrate it. For
example, the New York Times, August 29, 2020 wrote:

Comfortable urban elites long tolerated the eccentricities of the country’s ruler, Aleksandr
G. Lukashenko. Then came the coronavirus and a blatantly falsified presidential election.9

New York Times, “Something Broke Inside Belarusians. Why an Apolitical People Rose Up”, August 29, 2020, by
Anton Troianovski, (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/29/world/europe/belarus-protest.html).
9
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The article discusses in detail how the movement was based on Belarus’ prosperous and
very comfortable “large middle class and ... worldly elite” who mostly were “[a]political” and
“stayed out of politics” but “Rose Up” in protest after the August 9, 2020 election:
Trapped inside their country by the coronavirus pandemic, many Belarusians began to
chafe at the inhumanity in Mr. Lukashenko’s rule and language that had once been easy to
ignore.
In a similar article, The Seattle Times reported on August 30, 2020:

The protests brought out much of the city’s middle class.10
Even before the election the Financial Times reported on June 23, 2020 that:
Belarus’s middle class begins to turn on Lukashenko.11
Another example, Jake Cordell of the Moscow Times12 wrote on September 2, 2020:
Young professionals have been at the forefront of protests in Belarus. Their future now
hinges on whether Lukashenko stays or goes.

The article goes on:
The middle classes — first of all private businesses — were at the forefront of the protests.
They wanted to achieve change so much, because they clearly saw that the current
government’s policy had reached a ceiling in terms of business development and that things
will not move any further unless there are reforms.
The deeply anti-Lukashenka think tank Atlantic Council also noted the middle-class
composition of the protests:

Seattle Times, “Belarus President Hunkers Down as Crowds Demand He Leave”, August 30, 2020, by Anton
Troianovski, (https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/belarus-president-hunkers-down-as-crowds-demand-heleave/).
10

Financial Times, “Belarus’s middle class begins to turn on Lukashenko”, (https://www.ft.com/content/47e9c455b640-483e-8317-a301c87dc920).
11

Moscow Times, “Everyone Who Can Leave, Will Leave’: Violence, Raids and Internet Blackouts Scare Off Belarus’
Entrepreneurs”, September 2, 2020, by Jake Cordell, (https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/09/02/belarusbusiness-protests-brain-drain-violence-raids-internet-blackouts-scare-belarus-entrepreneurs-a71294).
12
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The protesters are generally very sweet, polite, and peaceful. Many are young, middle class
Belarusians who work in the country’s booming IT industry and come to rallies dressed in
form-fitting hipster ensembles.13
The Xavier News Wire14 on August 30, 2020 talks about the special role of middle-class
woman in the protest movement:
Women, middle class protest Lukashenko in Belarus.
The protests are largely comprised of middle-class women, a group not typically involved
in Eastern European political activism.
The media also noted the special role the Belarussian IT sector played in the movement,
including IT companies, individual owners, and individual IT specialists. For example, the August
29, 2020 New York Times 15 as well as the September 30, 2020 article in the Daily Beast16:
[H]ackers-lead-revolution-against-lukashenko
Tech Army Set Up by Europe’s Last Dictator Turns on Its Creator
FRANKENSTEIN’S MONSTER
Autocrat Alexander Lukashenko’s tech revolution has backfired with Belarus’ Golden
generation of coders and software engineers leading the fight to force him from office.
As well as Sifted17, an online startup magazine, discussed the important role of IT in the
conflict on August 14, 2020:

Atlantic Council, “The Belarus revolution may be too velvet to succeed”, August 22, 2020, by Vladislav Davidzon,
(https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-belarus-revolution-may-be-too-velvet-to-succeed/).
13

Xavier Newswire, “Women, middle class protest Lukashenko in Belarus”, August 30, 2022, by Mo Juenger,
(https://xaviernewswire.com/2020/08/30/women-middle-class-protest-lukashenko-in-belarus-2/).
14

New York Times, “Something Broke Inside Belarusians. Why an Apolitical People Rose Up”, August 29, 2020, by
Anton Troianovski, (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/29/world/europe/belarus-protest.html).
15

Daily Beast, “Tech Army Set Up by Europe’s Last Dictator Turns on Its Creator”, September 30, 2020, by Luke
Pierce,
(https://www.thedailybeast.com/belarus-hi-tech-park-turns-on-its-creator-as-hackers-lead-revolutionagainst-lukashenko).
17
Sifted, “Belarus’ tech sector pushes for radical change”, August 14, 2020, by Maija Palmer,
(https://sifted.eu/articles/belarus-tech-protests).
16
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Belarus’ tech sector pushes for radical change
As the unrest following the elections continues, IT industry leaders are stepping in
various ways to support protestors.” “Belarus has seen protests following disputed
elections several times before. But this time, the combination of technology itself, and the
emergence of a well-connected and wealthier middle class, created by the successful tech
industry, may make a crucial difference
…
‘Telegram has made such a huge difference,’ says Gloden, referring to the messaging site
that became the key source of information for people as access to the internet was cut off.
‘I remember two elections ago in 2010 there was a similar situation but the protests were
not so extensive. The media was not so strong then and we didn’t have so much social
media. Now that we have all these information sources you can’t suppress the people
easily.’
…
Petr says that in addition to the technology itself, working in the technology sector has
helped open people’s eyes. IT workers in Belarus typically earn about four times the
average Belarusian salary and have more opportunities to travel and meet people from
abroad.

Chapter 8.3. The Number of Industrial Workers Participating in Protests and Strikes

Greatly Overexaggerated
Media accounts of the number of industrial workers involved in protests and strikes were
greatly exaggerated: “in reality only a small portion of all workers was involved in the protests”
(Melyantsou 2020:4; see also Artiukh 2021:55). Even numerous mainstream media accounts of
the worker protests and strikes substantiate this and stress the role of the middle class and private
business owners instead. For example, Belarusfeed reported on the many small businesses
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participating in the September 1, 2020 general strike called by the opposition, however no workers
participated:18
Private Companies Join General Strike On 1 September
…
A variety of companies – from small coffee shops to beauty salons and service stations –
announced their support of the general strike in Belarus as a sign of solidarity
and dissatisfaction with the current situation. Most of them are reportedly in Minsk but
there are some in the regions too.
…
Among the companies that announced 1 September as a non-working day are shops, online
stores, bars, cafes, beauty salons, print shops, service stations, a language school, a carsharing service, an architectural bureau, a sports club, a bicycle shop, and a flooring
salon…. bookstore, …car wash, phone repair shop, climbing wall, ROCK CLUB, [and
clothing store],

According to the Washington Post19 and ABC News20 there does not seem to have been any
significant strike action by industrial workers during the September 1, 2020 opposition-called
general strike. And according to the wash, phone Guardian21 the many small businesses closed
for the October 26, 2020 general strike however, there did not appear to be any significant strikes
by industrial workers:

18

(Unfortunately, the Belarusfeed’s website https://belarusfeed.com/private-comapnies-general-strikebelarus/BelarusFeed is not available at this time).
Washington Post, “Scores detained as students march against Belarus president”, September 1, 2020, by Yuras
Karman, (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/detentions-resume-in-belarus-as-students-take-to-thestreets/2020/09/01/6cfbe176-ec3e-11ea-bd08-1b10132b458f_story.html).
19

ABC News, “Scores detained as students march against Belarus president”, September 1, 2020, by Yuras Karmanau,
(https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/detentions-resume-belarus-students-streets-72744001).
20

Guardian, “Workers and students in Belarus launch anti-Lukashenko strike”, October 26, 2020, by Shaun Walker,
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/26/workers-and-student-in-belarus-launch-anti-alexanderlukashenko-strike).
21
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Many private businesses closed for the day [October 26, 2020], and some employees took
a day of holiday in solidarity. In Minsk, a number of restaurants and cafes closed, but others
opened as normal. ‘Of course I support all of this, but we discussed it and decided it
wouldn’t be fair to our customers to close down,” said Dmitry, a waiter at a cafe in central
Minsk.
…
[D]espite the sight of large columns of protesters in the streets again – and the sense that
the protest has regained some of the momentum it has lost in recent weeks – there was no
sign of significant numbers of workers at state-controlled plants joining the strike for any
sustained length of time” (italics added).
…
At the Minsk tractor factory, one of the big plants that are the pride of Lukashenko’s neoSoviet economy, most workers appeared to be clocking on as normal for the Monday
morning shift. The leader of an earlier strike at the factory in August was forced to flee the
country under pressure from authorities, and many workers fear reprisals for striking. At
most, some workers briefly expressed support for the protest before or after their shifts, but
did not actually refuse to work.
The Warsaw Institute Review22 admitted that the October 26, 2020 “general strike turned
out to be such in name only.” Glod (2020) also admits that “Tsikhanouskaya’s call for a national
strike on October 26,” went largely unanswered by industrial workers, though some workers from
“several large state-owned companies organized protests at their workplace” (p.11).
On September 4, 2020 it was reported that the RBC23 (Russian Business Consulting Media

Group) concluded, in general, “that much of the strikes are actually protests” (see also Artiukh
2021:52; Ishchenko 2020). Even at the very height of the conflict during the two weeks after the

Warsaw Institute Review, “Belarus Alert – Day 77 & 78: Tsikhanouskaya’s General Strike”, October 27, 2020,
(https://warsawinstitute.review/belarus-alert/belarus-alert-day-77-78-tsikhanouskayas-general-strike/).
22

Bne Intellinews, “A general strike in Belarus could bring the Lukashenko regime down, but so far it has failed to
reach a critical mass,” September 4, 2020, by Ben Aris, (https://www.intellinews.com/a-general-strike-in-belaruscould-bring-the-lukashenko-regime-down-but-so-far-it-has-failed-to-reach-critical-mass-191229/).
23
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August 9, 2020 election actual strikes were very rare. Sociologist Ishchenko (2020:3-4) reported
on August 22, 2020 the following:
Frankly speaking, most of these activities do not even qualify as strikes in the strict sense.
They have been mostly petitions, meetings with management, and rallies in the yards
outside workplaces and at their entrances. Sometimes, large groups of workers did join the
opposition rallies in an organized way. There are only contradictory reports that production
has actually stopped, even if partially, and, if so, only at a few plants (Ishchenko 2020:34).
Overall, with few exceptions, the Belarussian working class did not heed the opposition’s
call for a general strike on Monday, August 17, 2020 (see also Ishchenko 2020:3-4). Even the
deeply anti-Lukashenka Atlantic Council agrees, writing on Saturday, August 22, 2020, that the
opposition’s attempt “to initiate a nationwide general strike” on Monday August 17, 2020 had
largely “falter[ed].” 24 Although there were numerous worker protests on Monday, August 17,

2020 and President Lukashenka was famously heckled, “Resign” at a meeting with workers at the
MZKT (military vehicle) plant. 25 The Guardian reported that the “Embattled Belarus president
looked shaken as people yelled ‘liar’ in fresh blow to regime.”26
(Note, that I am no implying that fear or threats of dismissal or other reprisals did not
discourage workers from participating in strikes and protests. Numerous workers were fired
during the 2020 upheaval. For example, according to Alexey Karlyuk, a strike leader at Belarus

“Opposition leaders …. attempted to initiate a nationwide general strike, but these efforts now appear to be
faltering…. Sporadic strike action continues, but the current situation is far short of the general strike required to
regain the momentum from a government that remains largely in control of the country despite a catastrophic loss of
legitimacy.” (Atlantic Council, “The Belarus revolution may be too velvet to succeed”, August 22, 2020, by
Vladislav Davidzon, (https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-belarus-revolution-may-be-too-velvetto-succeed/)).
24

Guardian, “'Resign!': Alexander Lukashenko heckled by factory workers in Minsk”, August 17, 2020, by Shaun
Walker and Andrew Roth, (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/17/belarus-opposition-calls-for-generalstrike-after-biggest-protests-yet).
25

26

Ibid.
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Potash, who was fired himself, 120-130 workers were fired for political reasons at Belarus
Potash.27 Beyond being fired, there are reports that some would-be strikers were arrested. For
example, the Guradian reported:
In those places where workers did try to strike, authorities stepped in brutally. At Grodno
Azot, one of the country’s leading chemical factories, more than 100 would-be strikers
were arrested, the human rights organisation Vyasna reported.28
There is even a report that the chairman of the Independent (oppositional) Union at Belarus
Potash “was beaten half to death during his arrest” (Artiukh 2020:17). There is no doubt that fear
of dismissal, arrest, or even being beaten, would discourage sympathetic workers from joining
worker protests and strikes. However, just because striking workers were fired, arrested, or even
beaten, we cannot assume that the majority of workers who did not participate in protests in strikes
are against President Lukashenka. I will discuss this question in more detail in the next chapter,
Chapter 9.)
During the height of the conflict there appear to have been only two Bonafede strikes: one
at Minsk Tractor Works on Monday August 17, 2020 involving 700 workers, although the plant
employs 16,000,29 and the other at Belarus Potash from Monday, August 17, 2020 till Tuesday,
August 18, 2020 involving up to 671 workers,30 although Belarus Potash employs 16,000.31 With
the exception of Minsk Tractor Works and Belarus Potash, there does not seem to have been any
Open Democracy, “Strike, exile, arrest: what happened to Belarusian workers?”, June 23, 2021, by Alexey Shuntov,
(https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/strike-exile-arrest-what-happened-belarusian-workers/).
27

Guardian, “Workers and students in Belarus launch anti-Lukashenko strike”, October 26, 2020, by Shaun Walker,
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/26/workers-and-student-in-belarus-launch-anti-alexanderlukashenko-strike).
28

[In Russian] Onliner, “Strike at MAZ and MTZ. The fate of the participants, how the authorities pressed and what
they say in the administrations now”, September 23, 2020, by Anastasia Danilovich,
(https://realt.onliner.by/2020/09/23/byvshie-zavodchane).
29

Open Democracy, “Strike, exile, arrest: what happened to Belarusian workers?”, June 23, 2021, by Alexey Shuntov,
(https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/strike-exile-arrest-what-happened-belarusian-workers/).
30

31

Wikipedia, “Belaruskali,” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belaruskali).
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significant strike at any major Belarussian state-owned industrial enterprise including Minsk
Autoworks (Bohdan 2020), Grodna Nitrogen (or Grodno Azot).32
MZKT(military vehicles) (Bohdan 2020), Belarussian Autoworks (mining vehicles),33
Naftan (oil refinery),34 Belarussian Metal Works,35 and Belshina (tires).36
Largest Worker Protests Immediately Following the August 9, 2020 Election are Relatively
Small.
Although the opposition’s calls for a general strike on Monday, August 17, 2020, was
generally unheeded by industrial workers, there were numerous worker protests of various sizes

32

According to Yuri Rovovoy, a leader of the protesting workers at Grodna Nitrogen and worker himself, there was
no strike at Grodna Nitrogen, “The decision to strike at the enterprise [Grodna Nitrogen] was never made” (Open
Democracy, “Strike, exile, arrest: what happened to Belarusian workers?”, June 23, 2021, by Alexey Shuntov,
(https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/strike-exile-arrest-what-happened-belarusian-workers/)).
On Thursday, August 13, 2020, Ruptly reported that that “[d]ozens of employees” protested on the grounds of
Belarussian Autoworks. Drone footage shows up to 200 workers at the protest (no longer available on YouTube,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HlaUvwo6fpo)). This was widely reported as a strike, however, it is not clear
whether the 200 protesting workers were actually on strike. On Monday, August 17, 2020 Belaz workers did not
strike on Monday August 17, 2020 but instead there was a protest on the territory of the plant with about 200. ([In
Russian] Onliner Belarus, “BelAZ employee about the situation at the plant”, 2020, posted on YouTube,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WWlgAZdG1is)).
33

34

There was no strike at Naftan, in fact, protest Leader at Naftan, Olga Britikova, explicitly stated that. She said, at a
rally of a few hundred workers, that the workers would go on strike in 10 days if President Lukashenka did not resign
by then ([In Russian] Reform.by, “At Naftan they demand Lukashenka's resignation within 10 days. Otherwise strike”,
August 17, 2020, (https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=ru&u=https://reform.by/156884-na-naftanetrebujut-otstavki-lukashenko-v-10-dnevnyj-srok-inache-zabastovka&prev=search&pto=aue).
35

According to portal Onliner.by, there was no strike at Belarussian Metal Works [BMW]. Several hundred workers
protested at BMW and threatened to strike in three days if President Lukashenka did not resign. However, Onliner
also reported that: “Nevertheless, some workers have already blocked the movement of specialized vehicles that bring
scrap metal to the furnaces. Now they are idling, in heating mode. ([In Russian] Onliner, “MTZ and other enterprises
went on strike. Online”, August 17, 2020, by Oksana Krasovskaya, Anastasia Danilovich, Dmitry Melekhovets,
(https://realt.onliner.by/2020/08/17/na-belorusskix-predpriyatiyax-prodolzhayutsya-akcii-protesta-onlajn
)).
According to Pavel Magidov, a worker at the plant, “he and 200-300 others blocked the plant road from noon to 5pm.”
Magidov and two other were eventually prosecuted for this (Open Democracy, “Strike, exile, arrest: what happened
to Belarusian workers?”, June 23, 2021, by Alexey Shuntov, (https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/strike-exilearrest-what-happened-belarusian-workers/)).
Although Belshina is one of the largest tire makers in Europe, Onliner.by’s comprehensive study of the protest and
strike action on Monday, August 17, 2020 (Ibid.) has no information about Belshina. I believe there was not any
significant strike action there.
36
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in the first two weeks or so after the August 9, 2020 election. The following were the largest and
most notable worker protests that took place in the week or so after the August 9, 2020:
Minsk Tractor Works: (aka MTZ) On, Friday evening, August 14, 2020, there was a
protest/meeting on the grounds of the plant of around 1000 workers,37 though over 16,000 work at
the plant,38 which means 6.3 percent of the workers took part in the protest/meeting.
(Around 800 workers left the meeting and walked out of the plant, in protest of the plant’s
management not allowing the media to attend the meeting.39 There was a march downtown,
however, it is not clear that all 800 worker participated in the march,40 in fact, it seemed like
significantly fewer workers actually marched downtown.41 Furthermore, based on photographs
and videos most of the strikers appear very young.42 The position that only a small cadre of around
200 young workers participated in the march is not only supported by the photographs and videos

My liberal estimate of 1000 is based photographs of the meeting (see for example, ([In Russian] Onliner, “Strike at
MAZ and MTZ. The fate of the participants, how the authorities pressed and what they say in the administrations
now”, September 23, 2020, by Anastasia Danilovich, (https://realt.onliner.by/2020/09/23/byvshie-zavodchane);
Onliner, “A Chronicle of the protest at MTZ, where thousands came out and production declined,” August 14, 2020,
by Oksana Krasovskaya, Anastasia Danilovich, Dmitry Melekhovets, (https://realt.onliner.by/2020/08/14/xronikamitinga-na-mtz-gde-vyshli-tysyachi-a-proizvodstvo-chastichno-stalo); Onliner, “Belarusian enterprises protest,”
August 14, 2020, Andrey Rud, Anastasia Danilovich, Dmitry Melekhovets, and Oksana Krasovskaya,
https://realt.onliner.by/2020/08/14/novyj-den-posle-vyborov-na-zavode-kozlova-rabochie-nachali-akciyu)), as well
pro-opposition eyewitness accounts of the size of the meeting. (This is in contrast to Vadim Payvin, 25, Tractor Works
strike committee member who estimated the meeting size at 3000.) Furthermore, my estimate is supported by the fact
that most of the participants left the meeting and walked out of the plant in protest to Tractor Works management
refusing to allow the media to attend the meeting. According to Tractor Works official entrance records 800 workers
left the plant at that time ([In Russian] Onliner, “Strike at MAZ and MTZ. The fate of the participants, how the
authorities pressed and what they say in the administrations now”, September 23, 2020, by Anastasia Danilovich,
(https://realt.onliner.by/2020/09/23/byvshie-zavodchane)).
37

38

Minsk Tractor Works, “About Holding “MTW-HOLDING””, (http://belarus-tractor.com/en/company/).

([In Russian] Onliner, “Strike at MAZ and MTZ. The fate of the participants, how the authorities pressed and what
they say in the administrations now”, September 23, 2020, by Anastasia Danilovich,
(https://realt.onliner.by/2020/09/23/byvshie-zavodchane).
39

40

Ibid.

[In Russian] Onliner, “Protest of MTZ workers”, August 14, 2020, posted on YouTube,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WapH2G39K6Q); AFP News Agency, “Crowds of workers walk out at Belarus
factories in support of opposition | AFP”, August 14, 2020, posted on YouTube,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jhZBeqnEJAUQ), the video at :38 shows mostly young MTZ workers
marching.
41

42

Ibid.
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avaible of the march but by the fact that according to Vadim Payvin, 25 y/o strike committee
member, only 300 workers applied for unpaid authorized personal leave in order to go on strike
without facing disciplinary action and according to Minsk Tractor Works’ official records, the
number was only 170.43)
Belarussian Autoworks (mining truck maker aka Belaz): On Thursday, August 13, 2020,
Ruptly reported that that “[d]ozens of employees” protested on the grounds of Belarussian
Autoworks.44 Drone footage shows up to 200 workers at the protest.45 (The plant, however, has
about 9,000 workers,46 which means 2.2 percent participated in protest action.)

It is not clear

whether these workers left the plant. Later, the mayor of Zhodina met (mostly young) protestors
at or near the plant.47 It is not clear whether these protestors are workers at the plant.
Minsk Autoworks: (aka MAZ). On Friday, August 14, 2020, according to Bohdan (2020)
over 1,000 workers had a protest/rally on the grounds of the plant and met with the plant’s director.
However, even if over 1000 protested, there are 15,500 workers at the plant (Bohdan 2020), which
means about 6.5 percent participated in the protest.
MZKT (military vehicles) According to Bohdan (2020), on Friday, August 14, 2020 the
workers had a similar protest-meeting with the plant director although Bohdan does not state the

43

Ibid.

44

Posted on YouTube, video is not available at this time, (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iZIFY4mQJ-4).

45

Drone footage shows about 200 workers protesting. Posted on YouTube, video is not available at this time,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HlaUvwo6fpo).
According to Belarussian Autoworks there are around 10,000 workers (Wikipedia, “BelAz”
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BelAZ#cite_note-emit-3), I was informed by a worker that 9,000 work at the plant in
Zhodina and another 1,000 work at another subsidiary.
46

[In Russian] Euroradio-Live, “Strike at BelAZ STREAM”, 2020, Posted on YouTube,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jI2yPXlOEb0); [In Russian] Bne Intellinews, “bneVideo Belarus protests local
mayor tries to placate workers at the Belarus truck plant who voted”, August 13, 2020, posted on YouTube,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nv29sC8bF_0).
47
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number of protesters. A video of a protest at MZKT around 200 workers protesting,48 although
MZKT has 5,000 workers (Bohdan 2020), which means about 4 percent participated in protest.
(This would be the plant in which President Lukashenka would be heckled on Monday, August
17, 2020)
Grodna Nitrogen (Grodno Azot): On Friday, August 14, 2020 several hundred, up to about
750 workers protested on the plant’s grounds49. Though the events at the plant were often called
a strike, it was a similar protest/meeting rally as seen at the other plants in which workers were
addressed by management, the official union, local politicians as well as by protest leaders.50 Since
Grodna Nitrogen has around 7,500 workers,51 up to 10 percent of the workers participated in the
protest.
Naftan Oil Refinery (Navapolatsk aka Novopolotsk): On Friday, August 14, 2020 a few
hundred workers, up to 300, had a similar protest/rally on the plant’s grounds.52 Naftan has around
10,000 workers,53 which means up to 3 percent of the workers participated in the protest.
Belarus Potash (Belaruskali): On Friday, August 14, 2020 it appears that during the
workday there was protest of about 100 miners who met with the plant’s director.54 An open public

[In Russian] Ilya, “March of workers at the striking MZKT”, August 19, 2020, posted on YouTube,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Vkf0OoWO2k).
48

Franak Viacorka, “Salihorsk "Belaruskali" is joing [sic] the nationwide protest. "Belaruskali" is one of the world's
largest
producers
of
potash
fertilizers,”
posted
on
Twitter,
August
14,
2020
(https://twitter.com/franakviacorka/status/1294260224828858368?lang=en).
50
[In Russian] Zerkalo, “Strike at Grodno Azot”, August 14, 2020, posted on YouTube,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yDmXhviNaQU).
49

51

Wikipedia, “Grdno Azot,” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grodno_Azot).

[In Russian] Zerkalo, “Protest action at Naftan”, August 14, 2020, posted on YouTube,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7zPGw26qvRE).
52

53

Wikipedia, “Naftan Oil Refinery,” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naftan_Oil_Refinery#cite_note-memo-2).

Jacobin, “Belarus’s Workers Are Going on Strike Against the Election Fraud”, August 14, 2020, by Maxim
Edwards (https://jacobinmag.com/2020/08/belarus-strike-election-fraud-lukashenko); Franak Viacorka, “Salihorsk
"Belaruskali" is joing [sic] the nationwide protest. "Belaruskali" is one of the world's largest producers of potash
fertilizers,” posted on Twitter, August 14, 2020
(https://twitter.com/franakviacorka/status/1294260224828858368?lang=en).
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mass meeting was scheduled at the entrance of the plant for 5:00 that evening in which the
assembly was addressed by the plant director as well as protesters and others.55 There appear to
around 1,000 at the rally, I will assume there up to 1,600 miners present. Since Belarus Potash’s
has over 16,000 workers,56 up to 10 percent participated in the protest.
The fact that these worker protests and strikes took place raise important sociological
questions, especially for my study. For example, do Belarussian workers still support President
Lukashenka and most important, do my moral economy findings still hold in light of these worker
protests and strikes? I will specifically address these issues in detail, in the next chapter (Chapter
9).
There is no doubt these worker protests and strikes are significant, however, there is no
denying that “in reality only a small portion of all workers was involved in the protests”
(Melyantsou 2020:4) The findings of my analysis of the overall size and extent of the worker
protests and strikes is not only supported by Melyantsou (2020:4) but also supported by
Volodymyr Artiukh (2021), who completed a comprehensive investigation of every instance of
labor unrest in Belarus during August and September 2020, following the August 9, 2020
presidential election.57 In fact, Artiukh (a harsh critic of President Lukashenka), is even more
conservative in his estimates of the largest worker protests limited them “to hundreds of workers”
(p.55).
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gtZLkOFylI0; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpMwtTVC0sg&t=29s
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belaruskali

“Methodologically I [Artiukh] rel[ied] on data-gathering techniques applied in empirical studies of other post-Soviet
countries.7 I have compiled a database of labor-related protest events (August 10–September 31) and performed a
content analysis of a selection of statements, interviews, and social media discussions among participants of the
protests. The structure of the database is adopted from the Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data project.8 The unit of
analysis is a protest event with the actors identified or self-identified as workers; the repertoire of collective actions is
expanded to reflect Belarusian realities (gatherings and petitions added as types of action; economic unit added as a
variable). The data have been gathered manually from online media and telegram channels” (Artiukh 2021:53).
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The Number of Protesting/Striking Workers was Always within the Bounds of
Tikhanovskaya’s 10.1 Percent Official Result
Not only were the number of protesting/striking workers relatively small, the number of
workers present at the strikes and protest are generally well within the bounds of Tikhanovskaya’s
10.1 percent official results at Belarus major plants. And even the two plants with the highest
percentage, Grodna Nitrogen and Belarus Potash, based on my very liberal estimates are still

within Tikhanovskaya’s official result of 10.1 percent.
TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE OF PROTESTING WORKERS
State
Enterprise

Protest
Participants

Total Number of
Workers at
Enterprise

Percent of
Protesting
Workers

Minsk Tractor
Works

800

16,000

5.0%

MZKT

200

5,000

4.0%

1000

15,500

6.5%

200

9,000

2.2%

300

10,000

3.0%

300

12,30058

2.4%

300

10,000

3.0%

750

7,500

10%

1,600

16,000

10

Minsk
Autoworks
Belarussian
Autoworks
Naftan Oil
Refinery
Belarussian
Metal Works
Belshina
(Tires)
Grodna
Nitrogen
Belarus Potash
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Wikipedia, “Belorussian Steel Works,” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Byelorussian_Steel_Works).
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Furthermore, If I had relied on Artiukh’s more conservative estimates limiting the largest
protests to “hundreds of workers” (p.55), the percentages at some of the enterprises would have
been even lower, for example Belarus Potash and Minsk Autoworks—possibly Grodna Nitrogen.

Western Media Greatly Exaggerated Size and Extent of Worker Protests and Strikes
Although objectively, the number of protesting and striking workers was relatively small, and
always within the bounds of Tikhanovskaya’s official results of 10.1 percent, the Western media
greatly exaggerated the extent and depth of the worker protests, promoting the image that the
Belarussian government was unraveling. For example, the New York Times reported in an article
headlined:
Workers Join Belarus Protests, as Leader’s Base Turns Against Him
The article went on:
The popular uprising against President Aleksandr G. Lukashenko of Belarus entered a
new phase on Friday as protests spread at the state-run factories at the core of his political
base.
…
In one of the most dramatic demonstrations, hundreds of workers gathered at the entrance
to the Minsk Tractor Works, a Soviet-era industrial giant whose farming machinery is one
of Belarus’s best-known brands. They presented an ultimatum to management: Unless a
new and fair election is called, they will go on strike.59
The New York Times reports of worker unrest was not limited to Minsk Tractor Works.
The New York Times also reported:

New York Times, “Workers Join Belarus Protests, as Leader’s Base Turns Against Him,”August 14, 2020, by Ivan
Nechepurenko and Anton Troianovski (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/14/world/europe/Belarus-strikeAleksandr-Lukashenko.html).
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Footage of similar protests by transit workers and autoworkers, at an oil refinery, and at
factories making synthetic fabric, fertilizer and trucks coursed through social media. The
new flash of discontent at state-owned companies — making it clear that the opposition to
Mr. Lukashenko has spread far beyond the urban middle class…60
The New York Times rather rashly determined that President Lukashenka’s “Base” had
turned against him, based merely on the fact that “hundreds of workers gathered at the entrance to
the Minsk Tractor Works,” even though the plant has over 16,000 workers. The fact that “hundreds
of workers”—not even thousands or even tens of thousands—were sufficient for the New York
Times to conclude that Lukashenka’s entire base had turned against him is alarming. It seems the
New York Times was caught up in wishful thinking rather than journalism. The New York Times
was not alone, however. Euronews, characterized the Monday, August 17, 2020 walkout of about
700 workers61 at Minsk Tractor Works as a “general strike” 62 and the Guardian reported on August
17, 2020 misleadingly that “workers at factories across the country went on strike.”63

The media coverage of October 26, 2020 as a “nationwide strike” as reported by DW64 was
even more blatant exaggeration as there was hardly any worker actions at all on October 26, 2020.65
DW’s article, however, is deceptively headlined:

60

Ibid.

[In Russian] Onliner, “Strike at MAZ and MTZ. The fate of the participants, how the authorities pressed and what
they say in the administrations now”, September 23, 2020, by Anastasia Danilovich,
(https://realt.onliner.by/2020/09/23/byvshie-zavodchane).
61

EuroNews, “Belarus on general strike in protest against election results”, August 17, 2020, by Jasmin Bauomy,
(https://www.euronews.com/2020/08/17/opposition-strike-underway-in-belarus-against-election-results).
62

Guardian, “'Resign!': Alexander Lukashenko heckled by factory workers in Minsk”, August 17, 2020, by Shaun
Walker and Andrew Roth, (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/17/belarus-opposition-calls-for-generalstrike-after-biggest-protests-yet).
63

DW, “Belarus strike action begins”, October 26, 2020, (https://www.dw.com/en/belarus-strike-action-begins/a55396530).
64

Even the New York Times admitted that on Monday October 26,2020 only “scattered groups of workers across
the country answered the call for a general strike”. New York Times, October 26,
2020, (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/26/world/europe/belarus-protests-lukashenko.html). See also the
Guardian, “Workers and students in Belarus launch anti-Lukashenko strike,” October 26, 2020, by Shaun Walker,
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Belarus strike action begins
Belarusian factory workers, students and pensioners have taken to the streets in a
nationwide strike….”
The DW article then deceptively begins:
Factory workers, students and business owners in Belarus began a general strike on
Monday to demand that President Alexander Lukashenko step down…
Euronews similarly reported on October 27, 2020 in an article headlined:
Belarus: Workers go on strike as Lukashenko ignores call to resign66
The Guardian also exaggerated the events of October 26, 2020 with an article headlined:
Workers and students in Belarus launch anti-Lukashenko strike.67
The article begins:
Workers and students across Belarus have launched strikes in a further show of defiance
at the regime of Alexander Lukashenko…
However, deeper in the body of the article the Guardian admitted:
However, despite the sight of large columns of protesters in the streets again – and the
sense that the protest has regained some of the momentum it has lost in recent weeks –
there was no sign of significant numbers of workers at state-controlled plants joining the
strike for any sustained length of time.
…

(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/26/workers-and-student-in-belarus-launch-anti-alexanderlukashenko-strike).
66
EuroNews, “Belarus: Workers go on strike as Lukashenko ignores call to resign”, October 27, 2020,
(https://www.euronews.com/2020/10/26/belarus-opposition-says-general-strike-underway-as-lukashenko-ignorescall-to-resign).
Guardian, “Workers and students in Belarus launch anti-Lukashenko strike”, October 26, 2020, by Shaun Walker,
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/26/workers-and-student-in-belarus-launch-anti-alexanderlukashenko-strike).
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At the Minsk tractor factory, one of the big plants that are the pride of Lukashenko’s neoSoviet economy, most workers appeared to be clocking on as normal for the Monday
morning shift…At most, some workers briefly expressed support for the protest before or
after their shifts, but did not actually refuse to work. 68
The BBC reported on October 26, 2020 an article headlined:
Belarus protests: National opposition strike gains momentum
…

Groups of workers and students in Belarus have heeded a nationwide strike call by exiled
opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, to press for the president's resignation.69
However, like the Guardian article, within the body of the BBC article the “momentum”
of this so-called “nationwide strike” appears rather doubtful.
By August 22, 2020, it was clear the opposition’s call for the August 17, 2020 general
strike went largely unheeded and that there would be little working-class support for the
opposition. The urban middle class, however, continued demonstrating. Every Saturday there was
a large protest of women starting at Victory Square with about 5,000 or so. And every Sunday
there continued to be massive protests in downtown Minsk along Pobeditelei Prospect (Victors’
Prospect). Impressively, these protests continued for months. However, the protest movement
started losing momentum just as Lukashenka supporters began mobilizing.
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Ibid.

BBC News, “Belarus protests: National opposition strike gains momentum”, October 26, 2020,
(https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54684753).
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Chapter 8.4. President Lukashenka’s Supporters Mobilize
Q: Why don’t you do anything to support President Lukashenka?
Female Lukashenka Supporter: What do you mean? I voted for him. We had an election
and I voted. What exactly am I required to do to support him?
After being passive for some time, Lukashenka supporters began attending rallies
throughout the country including Minsk, mainly organized by White Rus, Lukashenka’s political

organization, and the Belarussian Federation of Trade Unions. In fact, they organized massive
pro-Lukashenka rallies in every major city (besides Minsk) that I believe were far bigger than any
opposition protests held in those cities, including the five regional centers: August 18, 2020 in
Gomel70 and Magilev,71 Aug 21 in Vitebsk,72 Brest73 and Aug 22 in Grodna (Lukashenka spoke

[In Russian] TUT.by, “Rally for Lukashenka in Gomel on August 18”, August 19, 2020, posted on YouTube,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hhvdp9TccoE). [In Russian] Belarus Force, “Belarus. The Gomel rally simply
demolished the Minsk fascists. For the President For the Motherland!”, August, 2020, posted on YouTube,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=40EaRMTepAc).
70
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Onliner, video is not available at this time, posted on YouTube,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2IcuHa0CI0Q).
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Onliner, video is not available at this time, posted on YouTube,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K30AK8dsfi8).
AP Archive, “Thousands of Lukashenko supporters rally in Brest”, August 26, 2020, posted on YouTube,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R44I89aRcGw).
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there Aug 22),74 as well as other major cities, Babruisk,75 Maladechna,76 Zhlobin, Barisav,77 and
smaller cities such as Pinsk,78 Slutsk79, Slonim,80 and Nezvish.81
Immediately one notices that Lukashenka supporters are more working class and dressed
more plainly (fewer name brands). They also tended to be older and had many more elderly people
in attendance. My assessment of the pro-Lukashenka rallies is supported by Ishchenko (2020), a
very harsh critic of President Lukashenka:
It is also noteworthy that quite significant rallies are being mobilized in support of
Lukashenko around the country. The participants in pro-Lukashenko rallies look poorer
and older, on average, than participants in the opposition rallies. Even according to
opposition journalists, the pro-government rally in Minsk gathered around thirty thousand
people. It was smaller than the opposition rally the same day, and transportation to Minsk
or other cities was organized by pro-government structures. However, the participants
looked genuine and enthusiastic in their support for Lukashenko and voiced rational fears
of loss of jobs, industry, and stability, and fears about violence (Ishchenko 2020:8).

74

Onliner, video is not available at this time, posted on YouTube, (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j32yKt5XJY&t=1241s).
[In Russian] Bobruisk Courier, “Bobruisk, 19 August. Rally for Lukashenka”, August 19, 2020, posted on
YouTube, (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gJBDdCYhCLw).
75

[In Russian] Nehta Life, “Recording from Lukashenka's rally in Molodechno.”, August, 2020, posted on
YouTube, (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ap7tQ41gmBE).
76

[In Russian] ZERKALO, “A column of people goes to a rally in support of Lukashenka in Borisov”, August, 2020,
posted on YouTube, (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=63Rc4II3TN0).
77

[In Russian] TRC Varyag – Pinsk, ““We won’t let the country fall apart”: a rally in support of peace, security and
tranquility was held in Pinsk”, August 21, 2020, posted on YouTube,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BEXwe0xWfGY).
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[In Russian] Slutsk Gorod, “Rally in support of Lukashenka in Slutsk”, August, 2020, posted on YouTube,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MZ1c2v7EyBk);
[In Russian] Slutsk, newspaper "Info Courier", “Why people in Slutsk came to the rally for Lukashenka, poll”,
August 20, 2020, posted on YouTube, (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F_mL9RYpGH4).
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[In Russian] GS.BY, “A rally in support of Lukashenka was held in Slonim”, August 20, 2020, posted on
YouTube, (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToHsbeCicqU).
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[In Russian] ATN: news from Belarus and the world, “A rally in support of Lukashenka was held in Nesvizh.
Panorama”, August 20, 2020, posted on YouTube, (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YwrrCBHyWdE&t=33s).
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The New York Times also acknowledged that the pro-Lukashenka rallies “included people
who voiced genuine support for the president.”82 Andrei Sych, a Belarussian political scientist
provides important background for understanding the social context in which the proLukashenka rallies took place:
At a certain moment one could get the impression that the support of Lukashenka in the
society is minimal. But the non-politicized majority of Belarusians, who were observing
the situation from the outside, began to take part in actions in support of the state

course. This helped to radically change the picture of what is happening (cited in Sokolov
2020).
Similarly, Manaev (2020) a harsh Lukashenka critic said:
It should also be borne in mind that if the voices of “dissenting Belarus” have been heard
louder lately, especially on social media, then the spontaneous voices of “agreeable
Belarus” are almost not heard. And few people believe in organized, specially selected
speeches of “ordinary people,” officials, or siloviki. Therefore, the picture that we see and
hear in the mass and social media today is, to put it mildly, incomplete (Manaev 2020).
While the opposition initially had the tempo, as the crisis worsened Lukashenka supporters
became more active. They learned quickly, (or at least the pro-Lukashenka organizers did). They
copied the opposition’s strategies and effective symbolism. For example, the pro-Lukashenka
rallies also had 100-yard-long flags, though the red-and-green official national flag of Belarus;
people held red and green balloons (instead of red and white), and wore red-and-green ribbonwristbands (instead of white-red-white wristbands). And since the pro-Lukashenka rallies were
state-supported they could drape giant flags over buildings or hang them from military helicopters.
The opposition harshly condemned the pro-Lukashenka rallies.

They claimed the

participants were forced to go to them or that they were paid. They also claimed that the pro-

New York Times, “Belarus Protests Eclipse Rally in Defense of Defiant Leader,” August 16, 2020, by Ivan
Nechepurenko and Anrew Higgins, (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/16/world/europe/belarus-protestslukashenko.html).
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Lukashenka supporters had to be bused in from villages. Some mainstream Western media
reported this as well, even the New York Times:
The pro-government rally on Sunday [August 16, 2020] only highlighted Mr.
Lukashenko’s shrinking base of support. Many attendees had to be bused in from towns
and villages outside the capital83 (italics added).
As well as France 24 television:
He [President Lukashenka] then asked his supporters, many of them bused into the
capital, according to local journalists, if they wanted new elections. ‘No!’ the crowd
shouted’84 (italics added; see also BBC-Russian Service News85).
(It must be noted that the New York Times claimed that President Lukashenka’s base of
support” is “shrinking” since many “attendees had to be bused in from towns and villages outside
the capital,” however, President Lukashenka’s main “base of support” has always been stronger
among the “towns and villages outside the capital” (see Furman 1999, “[President Lukashenka’s]
support is higher in the countryside, than in the city, in the periphery than in Minsk, among the
uneducated and poor rather than the rich and cultures, among the elderly rather than the young
(p.8-9). )
Even if every Lukashenka supporter came by bus from the village why should that matter?
Don’t their voices—and votes—count? The truth is the urban middle-class opposition discounts
rural Belarussians and their vote, and is “haughtingly condescending to provincials” (Furman

1999:2) as well as to President Lukashenka himself for his peasant background, mannerisms, and
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Ibid.

France 24, “Lukashenko addresses supporters amid rival rallies in Belarus”, August 16, 2020,
(https://www.france24.com/en/20200816-lukashenko-says-putin-offers-help-as-belarus-protesters-plan-marchof-freedom).
84
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BBC-Russian Service relied on oppositional sources such as videos from the opposition-leaning portal Tut.by and
opposition Telegram channel Nexta (“Rallies for Lukashenka in Gomel and Mogilev”, August, 2020, post on
YouTube, (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GDZCxhRvD0U)).
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speech (Ioffe 2014: 138,166,170; see also Woolard 2020 for “linguistic ideology”). This was
apparent in my moral economy study as well.
No doubt, the fact that there were pro-Lukashenka rallies do not prove President
Lukashenka won the election, just as the fact that there were anti-Lukashenka protests do not prove
that he lost the election either—although many opposition supporters believe this to be true. For
example, Pavel Lieber, the founder and head developer of the Golos vote verification platform:
I admit that in the last elections the majority was on the side of Lukashenka. For this
election, it obviously wasn’t. This can be seen from the protest moods of people
compared to the previous [elections]
However, whatever the protest mood might be, protest moods do not determine the
accuracy of an election. In this regard, I was deeply surprised when sociologist Oleg Manaev
(2020), founder and former director of the IISEPS Belarus survey research organization, said

something very similar to Lieber, namely that the “mass protests after the vote, prove that the
80 percent of votes announced by the CEC for Lukashenko and 10 percent for his main rival
Svetlana Tikhanovskaya do not correspond to reality.”86
Again, protests—even mass protests—do not prove the accuracy of an election. Does
Manaev believe that the pro-Lukashenka rallies (including mass rallies) now prove that President
Lukashenka won?
Truth be told, while the pro-Lukashenka rallies do not prove that President Lukashenka
won the election, (although I have argued that he did), the mobilization of Lukashenka supporters
was actually were far more “unprecedented” than the 2020 post-election uprising (see Melyantsou

Manaev’s (2020) full quote is “Unprecedented queues for the right to support alternative candidates during the
election campaign, at polling stations on election day, as well as mass protests after the vote, prove that the 80 percent
of votes announced by the CEC for Lukashenko and 10 percent for his main rival Svetlana Tikhanovskaya do not
correspond to reality.”
86
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2020:3 for 2020 being “unprecedented”). There have been mass protests in Belarus before.
According to Kulakevich (2014) “ten to fifteen thousand” protested in 2006 “and in 2010, about
forty thousand people came out to protest the rigged elections” (p.887). The pro-Lukashenka
mobilization in 2020, however, was truly unprecedented.

President Lukashenka “has never

featured a grass-root mobilization beyond the electoral dimension” (Yarasehvich 2014:1719).
President Lukashenka’s remarks on Sunday, August 16, 2020, in Minsk, during his speech at the
first major pro-Lukashenka rally acknowledge this fact:
I’m not a fan of rallies but, alas, it's not my fault I had to call you to help me,’ the 65year-old said as some 10,000 supporters waved national flags and shouted ‘Thank you!’
and ‘Belarus!87
…
I did not ask you to come here to protect me. You came here, for the first time in a
quarter of a century, to protect your country (italics added).88

With the calls for the August 17 general strike unheeded and with mobilization of
Lukashenka supporters, the tide was turning. On August 22, 2020 Russia Today [RT] broadcast:
As anti-government unrest takes a breather, Pro-Lukashenko rallies gain momentum89
By August 22, 2020, in the wake of the failed general strike, the Atlantic Council (which
is deeply hostile to President Lukashenka) also recognized that the opposition, though still active,
was losing momentum, in fact, “positively sleepy.”90 By October 2020, the National Endowment
for Democracy [NED] was also warning that the opposition was losing momentum and stuck in

France24, “Lukashenko addresses supporters amid rival rallies in Belarus”, August 16, 2020,
(https://www.france24.com/en/20200816-lukashenko-says-putin-offers-help-as-belarus-protesters-plan-march-offreedom).
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Ibid. Excerpt from speech contained in the first video of the site :35-:47.
Posted on YouTube, video is not available at this time, (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-_tBa2ai_iE).

Atlantic Council, “The Belarus revolution may be too velvet to succeed”, August 22, 2020, by Vladislav Davidzon,
(https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-belarus-revolution-may-be-too-velvet-to-succeed/).
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place. The NED warned that continuing protest would be ineffective since President Lukashenka
can “wait out the protesters” since economic conditions for Belarussian workers are good unlike
in Poland in the 1980’s.91
The opposition made two more attempts to call general strikes but both went unanswered
by the working class: September 1, 202092 and October 26, 202093 (Glod 2020). The large Sunday
protests continued weekly, but began getting smaller in the fall. In one last attempt to galvanize
the opposition, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya gave President Lukashenka an ultimatum to resign by
Sunday October 25, 2020, or face mass protests and civil disobedience and a general strike on
Monday, October 26, 2020. The ultimatum did succeed in bolstering the numbers of the Sunday,
October 25, 2020 protests making it, “one of the biggest demonstrations since August.” However,
the general strike call went unheeded by workers, though many in the middle class participated.94
The weekly protests became gradually much smaller after October 25, 2020. Even the mysterious
death of a protestor on November 15, 2020 did not reignite large protests95 and by December 2020
the weekly Sunday protests had ended.
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https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/belarus-uprising-the-making-of-a-revolution/

Washington Post, “Scores detained as students march against Belarus president”, September 1, 2020, by Yuras
Karmanau, (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/detentions-resume-in-belarus-as-students-take-to-thestreets/2020/09/01/6cfbe176-ec3e-11ea-bd08-1b10132b458f_story.html).
ABC News, “Scores detained as students march against Belarus president”, September 1, 2020, by Yuras Karmanau,
(https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/detentions-resume-belarus-students-streets-72744001).
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Guardian, “Workers and students in Belarus launch anti-Lukashenko strike”, October 26, 2020, by Shaun Walker,
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/26/workers-and-student-in-belarus-launch-anti-alexanderlukashenko-strike).
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Guardian, “Belarus: thousands protest against death of teacher in police custody”, November 15, 2020, by
Andrew Roth, (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/15/belarus-thousands-protest-against-death-ofteacher-in-police-custody).
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Chapter 9. What was the Significance of the 2020 Worker Protests and Strikes? Do
my Moral Economy Findings Still Hold?
While it is undeniable the 2020 post-electoral uprising was primarily made up of middleclass Belarussians, there were numerous worker protests and even some strikes (see also Artiukh
2021). What was the significance this “labor unrest” (p.52)? For my study, this labor unrest is of
profound significance as it challenges some of the basic findings of my moral economy study. The
key finding of my study is that there is strong evidence to believe that the majority of Belarussian
workers support Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector and adamantly reject its privatization. Is
this in fact true? Do the worker protests invalidate my findings? Furthermore, do the worker
protests and strikes show that there is little support for President Lukashenka among the working
class and society in general? And although my moral economy study was not designed to measure
the percentage who support President Lukashenka, considering how President Lukashenka has
been thought to represent and reflect the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians (Yarashevich
2014:1726; Ioffe 2014:114, 189), I should at least explore this issue. Unfortunately, however,
there is simply not enough information available to answer this question very definitively.
Namely, does the working class still support President Lukashenka? Interestingly, however, there
is quite a lot of information available to answer the broader question as to whether my moral
economy findings still hold in spite of the worker protests. Namely, do the majority of Belarussian
workers still support Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector and adamantly reject its privatization?
It is my position that I can answer this question rather definitively and that in spite of the worker
protests and strikes my moral economy findings still hold.
In this chapter, I will briefly discuss whether the working class still supports President
Lukashenka in spite of the lack of information and need for further studies. Then, I will focus on
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the broader question of whether my moral economy findings still hold in spite of the worker
protests and strikes.

Does the Belarussian Working Class Still Support President Lukashenka?
Unfortunately, I will not be able to answer this question very definitively, especially as it
pertains to the industrial working class at Belarus’ largest state-owned industrial enterprises.
Further research is needed, focusing directly on Belarus’ major industrial enterprises. I would
recommend qualitative research, especially ethnographies and in-depth interviews and lifehistories.

Survey research should be avoided as it would seriously tend to underrepresent

Lukashenka supports and significantly overrepresent oppositional workers. Although this might
seem counterintuitive, Lukashenka supporters would be much more likely to refuse to participate
in surveys (or any research) while oppositional workers would be much more likely to participate,
therefore biasing the sample. Ethnography, however, especially participant observation, would
afford the researcher more freedom to get a better lay of the land and the actual politics of the
workers in the plant—even of workers who would not participate in survey.
Although more research is needed, if I had to speculate about the level of support for
President Lukashenka among industrial workers at Belarus’ major state enterprises, I would
speculate that it is still very significant. I base this speculation on several factors. First, even Sergey
Dylevsky, the charismatic young leader of the Minsk Tractor Works strike committee admits that
“there are people at the tractor factory who really do support Lukashenko.”1 Dylevsky’s admission
is very significant, especially in the social political context of the crisis in which the opposition’s
narrative was that no one supported President Lukashenka, for example “Sasha-3%” (Zahorski

Pulitizer Center, “I Felt Rage, Grabbed the Microphone and Spoke To the Strikers, Says Accidental ‘Lech Walesa’
of Belarus”, August 25, 2020, by Simon Ostrovsky, (https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/i-felt-rage-grabbed-microphoneand-spoke-strikers-says-accidental-lech-walesa-belarus).
1
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2020:3; Melyantsou 2020:3; Sokolov 2020). In fact, the Sasha-3% trope “was actively promoted
by the opposition during the campaign.” (Zahorski 2020:3). Furthermore, Dylesky’s admission is
very significant considering that Dylevsky hates President Lukashenka and that it would be hard
to overstate how much Dylevsky actually hates President Lukashenka:
‘I hate what he does with every cell of my soul,’ Mr. Dylevsky said of Mr. Lukashenko
on Tuesday as he led a group of about 1,000 workers from their factory to the city center.
‘I have overcome fear; my hatred for him defeated it... ‘Three death sentences would not
be enough for what this man did,’ he said.2
In this context, one would not expect Dylevsky to push back against an anti-Lukashenka
journalist, and actually defend President Lukashenka’s economic achievements of protecting
Belarus’ state-enterprises and workers’ jobs and countering the anti-Lukashenka journalist saying:
And there are people at the tractor factory who really do support Lukashenko.3
Here is the exact exchange in context beginning with the journalist:
For decades, factory workers in Belarus have been seen as Lukashenko’s base. He told
them that he alone managed to retain sprawling Soviet-era manufacturing plants under state
control instead of selling them off as in Russia and Ukraine, where tens of thousands lost
their jobs. ‘There’s some truth in that,’ says Dylevsky. ‘And there are people at the tractor
factory who really do support Lukashenko. I respect their opinion. Right now we are
fighting for every person to be able to express their opinion.’4
Unfortunately, Dylevsky does not give more details as to how many people at tractor works
support President Lukashenka, however, in the context of this interview we could assume there is
a significant number—significant enough for Dylevsky to have brought up the fact that there are

2

New York Times, (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/21/world/europe/belarus-protest-election-Lukashenko.html).

Pulitizer Center, “I Felt Rage, Grabbed the Microphone and Spoke To the Strikers, Says Accidental ‘Lech Walesa’
of Belarus”, August 25, 2020, by Simon Ostrovsky, (https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/i-felt-rage-grabbed-microphoneand-spoke-strikers-says-accidental-lech-walesa-belarus).
3

4

Ibid.
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workers who support President Lukashenka at Tractor Works while pushing back against the antiLukashenka journalist, in what should have been a very friendly interview. In this context, it
simply does not make sense that Dylevsky is referring to a miniscule number or percentage of
workers. The position that Dylevsky was referring to a significant number of Lukashenka
supporters at Tractor Works is even clearer when Dylesky’s statement is compared to other antiLukashenka workers such as Pavel Magidov at Belarussian Metal Works:
We asked what was going on; why there were falsifications of votes,” Magidov recalls. “I
know one person in my circle who voted for him [Alexander Lukashenko]. That’s his position, I
do not blame him. This is his position. This is one of hundreds of people whom I’m in touch with.
Out of hundreds! We even argued with him, recruited all our friends – no one voted for
Lukashenka. We sat around, calling everyone all evening, no one voted for him. Well, how does
that happen?5
One would have expected Dylevsky to have made similar statements about the President
Lukashenka’s supposed complete lack of support among the workers at Minsk Tractor Works—
especially knowing how much Dylevsky utterly despises President Lukashenka. However, that
was not the case: Dylevsky felt the need to emphasize that there are workers at his plant who
support President Lukashenka. In fact, not only do Dylevsky’s statements provide evidence
seriously pointing in the direction that support for President Lukashenka is significant at Belarus’
major industrial enterprises, they also imply that the pro-Lukashenka narrative—that President
Lukashenka saved Belarus’ factories—is also still significant at major enterprises.
The second important reason I would speculate that support for President Lukashenka is
still significant at major industrial enterprises is based on the statements made by some of the
subjects in my study as well as informal conversations I have had with workers. Both Yury and

Open Democracy, “Strike, exile, arrest: what happened to Belarusian workers?”, June 23, 2021, by Alexey Shuntov,
(https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/strike-exile-arrest-what-happened-belarusian-workers/).
5

304

Masha thought the majority of the workers at their plants supported President Lukashenka. During
informal conversations, other workers said the same thing. On a few occasions, workers told me
that their plants were roughly divided 50/50 between those who supported President Lukashenka
and those who did not. However, they also said that those who did not support President
Lukashenka did not necessarily support the opposition or vote for Svetlana Tikhanovskaya.
Therefore, based on the literature that holds that Lukashenka supporters tend to be more reliable
voters, then even a plant divided 50/50 might resemble the official result (80/10) when looking at
the actual voting record of workers at the plant. Simply put, opposition to President Lukashenka
among workers does not translate into support for the opposition candidate. Dennis was an
example of this kind of worker and voter.

Although Dennis strongly opposes President

Lukashenka, he did not vote for Svetlana Tikhanovskaya and has never voted for the opposition
candidate.
Another reason I would speculate that support for President Lukashenka is significant
among the working class is based on my observations at Oleg’s state-owned grocery store. The
overwhelming majority of the workers at the store supported President Lukashenka—and voted
for him. This was not only the case at Oleg’s branch but at other branches as well. Workers who
did not support President Lukashenka kept their political views to themselves, and the only openly
oppositional worker that I observed was ridiculed and ostracized.
Although the overwhelming majority of the workers at Oleg’s firm supported President
Lukashenka and voted for him; I am careful not to overgeneralize these findings for high-paid
high-skilled industrial workers. According to the literature, support for President Lukashenka is
highest among the “‘least qualified’ urban workers” (Yarashevich 2014:1718; Ioffe 2014:190 see
also Furman 1999), which would include unskilled low-paid retail workers such as Oleg and the
other workers at his firm. Based on this literature, more research must be done dealing specifically
with Belarus’ high-skilled high-paid industrial workers at Belarus largest state enterprises. I
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would, however, be very confident generalizing these findings for other similarly situated lowpaid and low-skilled workers.
There is no doubt more research is needed to determine definitively whether Belarus’
industrial workers still support President Lukashenka. However, if I were to speculate on this
question, based on all of the evidence available at this time, I would speculate that there is still
significant support for President Lukashenka among Belarus industrial workers in spite of the
worker protests and strikes. Now I will return to the broader question of whether the worker
protests and strikes challenge my moral economy findings.

What is the Significance of the Worker Protests and Strikes? Do my Moral Economy
Findings Still Hold?
The 2020 labor unrest significantly challenges my findings in a few ways both directly and
in directly. First, if the Belarussian socio-economic model is a reflection of the workers’ moral
economy why would they be protesting? Are my findings incorrect? Do the worker protests show
that the Belarussian workers reject Belarus’ socio-economic model? Second, if the workers were
satisfied with their living standards why would they be protesting? Does the 2020 labor unrest
prove these findings wrong? Do they show that the “the economic model is broken, [and that
Belarus’] social contract is failing” (Potocki 2011:61; see also Bedford 2021:810-811; Moshes and
Nizhnikau 2021:172; Glod 2020:4).
In spite of these challenges, however, there is compelling evidence that the majority of
protesting workers were not dissatisfied with the social contract. Furthermore, there is little reason
to believe that the majority of even the protesting workers actually rejected Belarus’ largely stateowned economic model. And while there is no doubt that the protesting workers are against
President Lukashenka, this in itself does not prove that they reject Belarus’ socio-economic model.
Workers often do things (either directly or inadvertently) that go against their socio-economic
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interests (Artiukh 2021:60; Coste 2012; Borquez 2005; Ehrman 2005; Troy 2005; Baer 2000;
Greenberg 1995; Hale 1995, 1994; Brown 1991; Reinarman 1987; Halle 1984).
Ultimately, I will show in this chapter that the worker protests were not protests against
Belarus’ socio-economic model or declining social or economic conditions, but were merely
oppositional protests. Here I agree with Ishchenko (2020), that the worker protests were protests
of “anti-Lukashenko citizens who just happen to be located at the strategic positions of economic
production (p.3; see also Kassabov 2020:6). I will focus my argument on five main ideas: First,
the worker protests did not contain any significant social or political demands. Second, there is
little evidence to believe the protesting workers rejected Belarus’ socio-economic model. Third,
the protesting workers consisted of a segment of the highest-paid workers, and through their
integration into the middle class have adopted oppositional ideology.

Fourth, President

Lukashenka’s lack of explicit socialist or class ideology might have contributed to the adoption of
oppositional ideology by those who became protesting workers. Fifth, I will discuss the only
challenges to my arguments, which were mostly contained in Artiukh (2021). Now I will lay out
how I will develop these five main ideas in more detail.
First, establishing the lack of social and economic demands made by protesting workers.
Here I will put forth my investigation of the lack of social and economic demands and then show
that numerous researchers and analysts support my position.

Second, there is little evidence that the protesting workers rejected Belarus’ socioeconomic model. The main evidence for this position will be a review of the interviews of three
leaders of the worker protest movement published in an Open Democracy article6 as well as the
discussion of two similar oppositional workers in my moral economy study. I will show that none

Open Democracy, “Strike, exile, arrest: what happened to Belarusian workers?”, June 23, 2021, by Alexey Shuntov,
(https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/strike-exile-arrest-what-happened-belarusian-workers/).
6
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of these five oppositional workers said anything remotely close to rejecting Belarus’ social
economic model and the two oppositional workers in my study, in spite of their strong opposition
to President Lukashenka, strongly defended Belarus’ socio-economic model and adamantly
opposed privatization. I will also show how contradictory their beliefs are as they mistakenly
believe that the opposition would never privatize Belarus’ state-owned industrial enterprise
(Buzgalin and Koganov 2021). Ultimately, it is my position that the three workers who led strikes
and protests in the Open Democracy article are very similar to the oppositional workers in my
study and that I can rely on the oppositional workers in my study—whom I explicitly questioned
about Belarus’ socio-economic model and privatization—to fill in the gaps of our knowledge about
the three workers in the Open Democracy article.
Third, in this section I will explore the social base of the protesting workers. I am
especially interested in why they embrace a political ideology that directly goes against their

economic interests. In other words, why do they support the anti-Lukashenka opposition, if that
will ultimately lead to the destruction of Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector? Although this
question is somewhat beyond the scope of this study and requires further research, there is,
however, enough evidence available to explore this phenomenon and reach at least preliminary
conclusions. This inquiry will rely on Weber (2009), Halle (1984) and Bourdieu (1990) and will
basically rely on the fact that the protesting workers were part of the segment of the highest-paid

and highest-skilled workers in Belarus. Namely, due to their high wages and living standards they
are integrating into the middle class (Halle 1984) in which oppositional ideology is hegemonic,
and they are actively embracing oppositional ideology, to acquire symbolic capital, as an attempt
to bolster their status as middle class (Bourdieu 1990). This inquiry will provide valuable context
for understanding the worker protest better.
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Fourth, here I will focus on how President Lukashenka’s lack of explicit socialist or class
ideology created an ideological vacuum that made it more likely for the protesting to embrace
oppositional ideology.
Fifth, in this section I will discuss the only possible challenge to my position among any
researchers or analysts who acknowledge the protesting workers’ lack of social and economic
demands. (I have already discussed those who mainly argue that the worker protests were

primarily caused by Belarussian workers’ deteriorating living standards or declining social
contract in a previous section.) In this section, I will focus mainly on the arguments of antiLukashenka socialist Artiukh (2021).

Protesting Workers Made No Significant Social or Economic Demands

Based on my own examination as well as other analysts’, there is little, if any, evidence
that the protesting/striking workers were not satisfied with social contract and that there is little
reason to believe that they rejected Belarus’, largely socialist, economic model. The strongest
evidence for this is the actual formal demands submitted by the protesting workers, which do not
contain any social or economic demands whatsoever. These demands are purely political and are
very close to opposition’s formal demands. For example, the formal demands of the protesting
workers at Naftan (oil refinery in the city of Navapolatsk, Vitebsk Region):
•

resignation of Alexander Lukashenko from the post of President of the Republic

of Belarus due to the loss of confidence;
•

resignation of the CEC headed by Lydia Yermoshina;

•

release of all political prisoners and detainees during peaceful protests;

•

cessation of violence and persecution of civilians by security forces;
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•

investigation of all cases of violence against protesters (and non-protesters) and

prosecution of those responsible; new, transparent and fair elections with the involvement of
international observers. Tyt.by 2020:08.217
The protesting workers at Minsk Tractor Works made similar demands:
The workers of MTZ [Minsk Tractor Works] have three main demands: the release of all
political prisoners, ‘the removal of the illegitimate president’ and the appointment of new
elections, as well as an end to the violence.8
The demands of protesting workers at Belaz (Belarussian Autoworks, large mining dump
truck manufacturer) were also very similar:

[Belaz] workers had put forward four demands: the resignation of Lukashenka and his
government, an immediate halt to police violence against protesters, the release of all
political prisoners and thousands of protesters detained during the last several days, and
the holding a new presidential election with all candidates who had been barred from the
recent poll.9
The Protesting workers at MAZ (Minsk Autoworks—truck and bus maker) also
“demand[ed] the resignation of President Alexander Lukashenko and new elections.”10 “MZKT
[military vehicles] recently collected signatures under a collective appeal with demands, including
the holding of new elections, an end to violence by the security forces, and the release of all those

7

An original copy of these demands was formally available on the web portal Tut.by, however, it is no longer available
since Tut.by was shut down by the government. However, other sites still contain these demands. Shiraz Socialst,
“Belarus:
strikes
against
Lukashenko continue”,
August
21,
2020,
by
Jim
Denham,
(https://shirazsocialism.wordpress.com/2020/08/21/belarus-strikes-against-lukashenko-continue/).
8

Ibid.

RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty, “Striking Workers Lead Demonstrators In Minsk March As Protests Spread”,
August 14, 2020, by RFE/RL's Belarus Service, (https://www.rferl.org/a/belarusians-join-rising-wave-of-strikesamid-postelection-protests/30783507.html).
9

10

AutoNews, website is not available at this time, (https://www.autonews.ru/news/5f354b309a79476ed9edd65b; see
also https://charter97.org/ru/news/2020/8/14/389447/).
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detained at peaceful rallies.”11 According to Alexey Karlyuk, a leader of the striking potash miners
at Belaruskali:
On 14 August, Salihorsk residents gathered outside the plant’s main building for a meeting
with the company’s general director, Ivan Golovaty. On that day, Karlyuk recalls, Anatoly
Bokun, a mechanic who later became the co-chairman of the company’s strike committee,
spoke for the first time. He read out their demands in public: to end the terror against the
protesters, to remove riot police units from the city, to bring officials and security officials
who had exceeded their powers to justice, to declare the official voting results invalid, to
release all political prisoners, and to hold new elections.12
Similar to Belaruskali, the protesting workers at BMZ (Belarussian Metal Works) had
almost the same demands—again purely political. According to Maksim Pozny the chairman of
the unofficial Belarusian Independent Trade Union:
[T]he main demands of the strikers are the resignation of Lukashenka, fair elections, an
end to violence from the security forces and an investigation into what happened,
punishment of those responsible. The workers are ready to go on strike until their demands
are met.13
The head of the Independent Trade Union, Maksim Pozny, also said that the:
Official trade unions put pressure on people who put forward political demands and are
going to go on strike.14
It would not make sense for Pozny, the head of the Belarussian Independent Trade Union
to ignore pressing social and economic issues affecting Belarussian workers, especially when

Shiraz Socialst, “Belarus: strikes against Lukashenko continue”, August 21, 2020, by Jim Denham,
(https://shirazsocialism.wordpress.com/2020/08/21/belarus-strikes-against-lukashenko-continue/).
11

Open Democracy, “Strike, exile, arrest: what happened to Belarusian workers?”, June 23, 2021, by Alexey
Shuntov, (https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/strike-exile-arrest-what-happened-belarusian-workers/).
12

Shiraz Socialst, “Belarus: strikes against Lukashenko continue”, August 21, 2020, by Jim Denham,
(https://shirazsocialism.wordpress.com/2020/08/21/belarus-strikes-against-lukashenko-continue/).
13

14

Ibid.
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social and economic issues are officially the main “AIMS” and “OBJECTIVES” of the Belarussian
Independent Trade Union.15 Furthermore, this was originally reported by Alexandra Kvitkevich
and Dmitry Bobkov of the opposition-oriented portal TUT.BY, which, according to the Voice of
America, the “Popular News Outlets Took On Lukashenko,”16 (“The Ministry of Information
stripped the outlet of its official media status in December [2020], and last month [May 2021] it
blocked access to Tut.by’s news website, claiming it was in violation of the country's mass media
law.”17) Certainly, TUT.BY, would not have ignored or omitted workers’ complaints about
abhorrent social and economic conditions in Belarus’ large state enterprises.
Moreover, on August 21, 2020, journalists Alexandra Kvitkevich and Dmitry Bobkov, of
Tut.by, “summarized and collected the main requirements that are presented [by protesting
workers] at [state]enterprises.18”
•

the resignation of Alexander Lukashenko “due to the loss of confidence (this is a

requirement, among other things, from the employees of Naftan, Grodno Azot, Belaruskali, MTZ,
BMZ, Amkodor (Molodechno), Slutsk sugar refinery);
•

the resignation of the full CEC headed by Lydia Yermoshina, Interior Minister Yuri

Karaev, Chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions Mikhail Orda;19

For example, “AIMS…to improve the working and living conditions of workers, employment, wages, working
hours, protection of health, and subsequently demand their implementation” and “OBJECTIVES… Decent pay;
Ensuring safe and healthy working conditions; Assistance in creation of pension and health insurance funds and the
introduction of additional social insurance mechanisms; Protection of workers' rights on employment, working hours,
recreation and social guarantees; Regulation of labour contract issues...”(Belarusian Independent Trade Union,
(https://belnp.org/en/#:~:text=BITU%20is%20a%20co%2Dfounder,the%20ITF%20and%20the%20IUF)).
15

Press Freedom, “Popular News Outlet Took On Lukashenko; Belarus Responded with Arrests, Raids and a
Shutdown”, June 12, 2021, Tatsiana Zamirovskaya, (https://www.voanews.com/a/press-freedom_popular-newsoutlet-took-lukashenko-belarus-responded-arrests-raids-and-shutdown/6206933.html).
16

17

Ibid.

Shiraz Socialst, “Belarus: strikes against Lukashenko continue”, August 21, 2020, by Jim Denham,
(https://shirazsocialism.wordpress.com/2020/08/21/belarus-strikes-against-lukashenko-continue/).
18

19

Demanding the resignation of Mikhail Orda, the Chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions, the official trade
union in Belarus, would appear to be a social or economic demand. However, in the context of the 2020 uprising, it
is political demand, as the official union and its chairman, Mikhail Orda, support President Lukashenka. Furthermore,
this position is supported by the fact that many of the protesting workers threatened to leave the official union on
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•

cessation of violence on the part of security officials against civilians, investigation

of all cases of violence, bringing to justice those responsible;
•

the recognition of the elections as illegitimate and the holding of new transparent

elections with the admission of independent observers, as well as international observers;
•

release of political prisoners and detainees during peaceful actions.

My own findings are strongly supported by other analysts as well, including Slawomir
Sierakowski (2020), a harsh critic of President Lukashenka, writing for the National Endowment
for Democracy, which, itself, made a “significant contribution” toward creating the 2020 uprising
(MacLeod 2021).
But social slogans are not heard at the Belarusian demonstrations, even among the workers.
The miners striking in Saligorsk earn a better living than people in Minsk and, as in any
Belarusian factory, they receive an impressive array of benefits, including their own
hospitals and cultural institutions (Sierakowski 2020:14)
Sierakowski actually complained that Belarusian workers’ good living standards would
make a successful revolution unlikely, as opposed to the poor economic conditions “that fueled
the Polish opposition in 1980.”
A society that is not pressed against the wall economically will eventually stop protesting
(p.14).
On the opposite side of the political spectrum from the National Endowment for
Democracy, also in support of my position, are “two representatives of the Belarusian left,” Ksenia
Kunitskaya and Vitality Shkurin from two small Belarussian (anti-Lukashenka) online Marxist

purely political grounds. For example, “On August 17, [protesting workers at] Naftan [oil refinery] announced that
they intend to go on strike and leave the [official] trade union if their demands are not met. “We will go on strike if
global demand number 1, and this is the resignation of Alexander Grigorovich Lukashenko due to the loss of
confidence, we will be forced, if the resignation does not occur within ten days, to exercise our right to strike.”
(https://shirazsocialism.wordpress.com/2020/08/21/belarus-strikes-against-lukashenko-continue/).
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media organizations, Poligraf.Red20 and September21 (Artiukh 2020). According to Shkurin of
September:
Unfortunately, these statements mostly do not include any social demands, only the
demands to stop the police violence, release all detainees, and hold fresh elections (Artiukh
2020:7)
…
But so far, workers have put forward only general democratic demands, in line with a broad
liberal protest (p.11-12)
Kunitskaya of Poligraf.Red has the same position:
[A]ll workers’ protests are centered around broad political demands: Lukashenko’s
resignation, the release of political prisoners, lawsuits against the security forces, fair
elections (p.10).
Volodymyr Ishchenko (2022), a Ukrainian sociologist as well as anti-Lukashenka socialist,

has the same opinion:
Another issue of concern is the lack of any socioeconomic demands in most of the strike
petitions, most of which are focused exclusively on the general political demands of the
opposition (p.4).
The conclusions of academic researcher, Volodymyr Artiukh (2021), also an antiLukashenka socialist, are very powerful, as they are the result of his comprehensive investigation
of every instance of labor unrest in Belarus during August and September 2020, following the
August 9, 2020 presidential election:22

[In Russian] Poligraf.red, (Полиграф.red), Belarus – “isle of socialism” or stable capitalism?”, July 10, 2019, by
Yuri Glushakov, (https://poligraf.red/belarus-ostrovok-sotsializma-ili-stabilnogo-kapitalizma/).
21
September media, website is not available at this time, (http://september.media/archives/3577).
20

“Methodologically I [Artiukh] rel[ied] on data-gathering techniques applied in empirical studies of other post-Soviet
countries.7 I have compiled a database of labor-related protest events (August 10–September 31) and performed a
content analysis of a selection of statements, interviews, and social media discussions among participants of the
protests. The structure of the database is adopted from the Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data project.8 The unit of
22
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Virtually all demands voiced during the labor unrest had been “political”: from mild
appeals to prosecute cases of police violence to calls for Lukashenka’s resignation (p.57).
Dzianis Melyantsou (2020), a Belarussian political analyst, also strongly supports my
position:
The workers did not voice any economic demands during the protests, their welfare
(especially at Belaruskali and in oil refining) being quite far from deplorable by Belarusian
standards (p.9; italics added).
The lack of any significant social or economic demands among the protesting workers
severely weakens the position that the labor unrest was caused by a decline in the social contract
or economic conditions. Furthermore, this lack of social and economic demands supports the
position that the protesting workers were not protesting Belarus’ socio-economic model.

Interviews of Three Leaders of Worker Strikes and Protests
Besides the lack of social and economic demands, one of the strongest pieces of evidence
in support of my position are in-depth interviews of three workers, who led strikes and protests, at
three of Belarus’ largest industrial enterprises: Alexey Karlyuk, 35, from Belaruskali; Pavel
Magidov, 39 from BMZ (Belarussian Metal Works); and Yury Rovovoy, 28, from Grodna Azot
(Grodna Nitrogen). The interviews contained nothing about poor economic conditions.23 The
interviews were published in Open Democracy, which is very oppositional and very hostile to
President Lukashenka.24 Furthermore, unlike newspaper articles or television interviews, which

analysis is a protest event with the actors identified or self-identified as workers; the repertoire of collective actions is
expanded to reflect Belarusian realities (gatherings and petitions added as types of action; economic unit added as a
variable). The data have been gathered manually from online media and telegram channels” (Artiukh 2021:53).
Open Democracy, “Strike, exile, arrest: what happened to Belarusian workers?”, June 23, 2021, by Alexey Shuntov,
(https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/strike-exile-arrest-what-happened-belarusian-workers/).
24
Open Democracy, “Latest in "Protests in Belarus"”, February, 2022, by Igor Ilyash,
(https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/tagged/protests-in-belarus/).
23
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are short and often have to omit a lot of important details, the Open Democracy article is 24 pages
long, detailed, and allowed each worker to discuss his background, motivations, and why he chose
to organize protests or strikes etc. The fact that the article only contained political motivations for
these three workers’ organizing protests and strikes, is very significant, since there no reason why
the oppositional NGO Open Democracy, would omit criticism of Belarus’ economy and socioeconomic system. The very purpose of the 24-page article was to hear from the striking workers
themselves about their “experiences under Lukashenka’s regime,” as the subtitle of the article
reads:
Workers who went on strike following the rigged elections of 2020 speak about their
experiences under Lukashenka’s regime
Furthermore, there is nothing at all in the interviews of the three leaders to make one think
that they rejected Belarus’ largely state-owned socio-economic model. Moreover, not only was

there nothing about poor economic conditions, the three workers, seemed to be doing rather well
financially. In fact, one of them, Pavel Magidov, 39, a steelworker, in Zhlobin stated this
explicitly.25 Another worker from the article, Alexey Karlyuk, 35, was a miner at Belaruskali in
the city Saligorsk south of Minsk. Recall earlier that both Sierakowski (2020), writing for National
Endowment for Democracy, Melyantsou (2020), referred directly to this enterprise and the high
salaries and benefits these miners enjoy:

The miners striking in Saligorsk earn a better living than people in Minsk and, as in any
Belarusian factory, they receive an impressive array of benefits, including their own
hospitals and cultural institutions (Sierakowski 2020:14; see also Melyantsou 2020:9).

[In Russian] Ibid. “Magidov says that if ‘he lived well under any government, it would be a sin to complain.’ For
him, ‘it all began’ with the 2020 presidential election campaign.’”
The original in Russian is “Магидов говорит, что «неплохо жил при любой власти, грех было жаловаться». Для
него «началось все» с предвыборной кампании”. (Meдиазона Бедарусь, Media Zona Belarus, May 19, 2021, by
Alexey Shuntov “"No one expected that ordinary people would not become silent." What happened to the workers
who were on strike after the 2020 elections”, (http://mediazona.by/article/2021/05/19/strikers).
25
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None of the three workers previously supported President Lukashenka, though in general,
they were not active in politics. For example, Karlyuk from Belaruskali:
Karlyuk said that he ‘did not really follow the details’ of Belarusian politics until last
year…. ‘Everything was stable until the summer of 2020.’
All three workers were outraged over President Lukashenka’s August 9, 2020 electoral
victory. Karlyuk from Belaruskali said:
It’s hard to believe the percentages [for President Lukashenka] that were reported26
Magidov from BMZ said:
We asked [during the meeting with management and the local government] what was going
on; why there were falsifications of votes,” Magidov recalls. “I know one person in my
circle who voted for him [Alexander Lukashenko]. That’s his position, I do not blame him.
This is his position. This is one of hundreds of people whom I’m in touch with. Out of
hundreds! We even argued with him, recruited all our friends – no one voted for
Lukashenka. We sat around, calling everyone all evening, no one voted for him. Well, how
does that happen?27
Rovovoy from Grodna Nitrogen was an election observer and “After the elections,
[Rovovoy] told the plant how they had falsified [the results].” Two of the workers, Karlyuk and
Magidov, explicitly discussed being angered over the arrests of Babaryka and Tikhanovsky.
Karlyuk specifically complained “how the speeches by Svetlana Georgievna [Tsikhanouskaya]
were cancelled very abruptly and for unknown reasons.” Similarly, Magidov said,
For him, ‘it all began’ with the 2020 presidential election campaign. At that time, he says
he was watching online videos by blogger and presidential candidate Siarhei Tsikhanouski,

The original Russian is closer to “It is hard to believe the percentages that were there” [Сложно поверить в те
проценты, которые там были]. Meдиазона Бедарусь, Media Zona Belarus, May 19, 2021, by Alexey Shuntov “"No
one expected that ordinary people would not become silent." What happened to the workers who were on strike after
the 2020 elections”, (http://mediazona.by/article/2021/05/19/strikers).
26

Open Democracy, “Strike, exile, arrest: what happened to Belarusian workers?”, June 23, 2021, by Alexey Shuntov,
(https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/strike-exile-arrest-what-happened-belarusian-workers/).
27

317

which often showed how the police cut short his attempts at organising public gatherings
and collecting signatures in support of his candidacy.
All three workers were outraged over the police violence and mass detentions:
The idea of going on strike at Belaruskali, says Karlyuk, was in response to ‘police roundups in the city’
Magidov’s fourteen-year-old son was arrested
Naturally, this had an effect. Today your son was detained, tomorrow your wife and
daughter? We all see on the internet what happened on the 9th and 10th of August. People
were tortured and beaten. Naturally, it affected me.
And similarly, in Grodna:
When it turned out that employees of Grodno Azot were among those detained in the first
days of the protest, the plant management organised a workplace meeting on 13 August.
The workers invited representatives of the police and local authorities to talk, and also
demanded that the detained colleagues be released within an hour. The last demand,
according to Rovovoy, was fulfilled. At the same meeting, he says, the director promised
that there would be no arrests of protesting factory workers.

The three workers political motivations matched the formal demands proposed by
protesting/striking workers at each of their respective enterprises: Belaruskali, BMZ and Grodna
Azot, as well as the protesting workers at several other enterprises including “Naftan [oil refinery]
MTZ [Minsk Tractor Works][Amkodor (Molodecna) [construction vehicles] Slutsk sugar
[works],” MZKT, 28 Belaz,29 and MAZ,30 In fact, in the article, each of the three workers discussed

Shiraz Socialst, “Belarus: strikes against Lukashenko continue”, August 21, 2020, by Jim Denham,
(https://shirazsocialism.wordpress.com/2020/08/21/belarus-strikes-against-lukashenko-continue/).
28

RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty, “Striking Workers Lead Demonstrators In Minsk March As Protests Spread”,
August 14, 2020, by RFE/RL's Belarus Service, (https://www.rferl.org/a/belarusians-join-rising-wave-of-strikesamid-postelection-protests/30783507.html).
29

[In Russian] Autonews, “Workers of Belarusian MAZ, BelAZ and MTZ went on strike”, August 13, 2020, by
Dmitry Alexandrov, (https://www.autonews.ru/news/5f354b309a79476ed9edd65b; see also
https://charter97.org/ru/news/2020/8/14/389447/)
30
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either “read[ing] out their demands” or giving their demands to both the enterprise’s general
director and local government officials during official meetings with the enterprises management31

Possible Counter Examples
Before going on to compare Karlyuk, Magidov, and Rovovoy to similar oppositional
workers in my moral economy study, I should briefly discuss two potential counter examples. The
first one being Sergey Dylevsky, the leader of the Mink Tractor Works Strike Committee.
Dylevsky could be considered a counter example, based on a passage in the New York Times, on
August 21, 2020. The New York Times reported:
Even though he represents workers, Mr. Dylevsky does not consider himself to be leftwing. He said he believes the system built by Mr. Lukashenko in Belarus, with giant
Soviet-era factories subsidized by money the country gets from reprocessing Russian oil at
its refineries, is grossly inefficient.
…
For instance, he said he was skeptical about Mr. Lukashenko taking credit for not allowing
oligarchs to own and profit from Soviet-built industrial giants, as was the case in
neighboring Russia and Ukraine.
…
The fact that we don’t have oligarchs in Belarus is far from being an achievement,’ Mr.
Dylevsky said. ‘On the contrary, it means that any sound businessman, be it a millionaire
or billionaire, does not want to invest in Belarus and its enterprises.’
While on the surface, based on this New York Times passage, it appears Dylevsky rejects
Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector and embraces free-market ideology, at least to some extent,
however, this is not clear for two reasons: First, this passage in the times is contradicted (at least

Open Democracy, “Latest in "Protests in Belarus"”, February, 2022, by Igor Ilyash,
(https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/tagged/protests-in-belarus/).
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to some extent) by Dylevsky’s interview in The Sunday Times two days later on August 23, 2020.32
The reporter begins:
For decades, factory workers in Belarus have been seen as Lukashenko’s base. He told
them that he alone managed to retain sprawling Soviet-era manufacturing plants under state
control instead of selling them off as in Russia and Ukraine, where tens of thousands lost
their jobs.
…
‘There’s some truth in that,’ says Dylevsky. “And there are people at the tractor factory
who really do support Lukashenko. I respect their opinion. Right now we are fighting for
every person to be able to express their opinion.33
The second reason the New York Times cannot be relied upon is that most of the passage
consists of the words of the New York Times reporter, Ivan Nechepurenko, who is deeply hostile
toward President Lukashenka and Belarus’ socio-economic model. In fact, Nechepurenko’s
passage only contains two actual sentences from Dylevsky:
The fact that we don’t have oligarchs in Belarus is far from being an achievement,’ Mr.
Dylevsky said. ‘On the contrary, it means that any sound businessman, be it a millionaire
or billionaire, does not want to invest in Belarus and its enterprises.
No doubt, Dylevsky has serious questions about the efficiency of Belarus’ state enterprises
(assuming he was quoted accurately). However, without further research, we cannot assume that
Dylevsky supports the privatization of Belarus’ state enterprises based on the New York Times
passage. However, even if we assumed that Dylevsky does support privatization, I do not believe
this would disprove my position that most Belarussian workers—even most of the protesting/string

Sunday Times, “I felt rage, grabbed the microphone and spoke to the strikers, says accidental ‘Lech Walesa’ of
Belarus”, August 23, 2020, by Simon Ostrovsky, (https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/i-felt-rage-grabbed-themicrophone-and-spoke-to-the-strikers-says-accidental-lech-walesa-of-belarus-dg6qwzdxt).
32

Pulitizer Center, “I Felt Rage, Grabbed the Microphone and Spoke To the Strikers, Says Accidental ‘Lech Walesa’
of Belarus”, August 25, 2020, by Simon Ostrovsky, (https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/i-felt-rage-grabbed-microphoneand-spoke-strikers-says-accidental-lech-walesa-belarus).
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workers—support Belarus’ largely state-owned economic model. First, even if Dylevsky did
embrace pro-market ideology, this played little, if any, role in the mobilization of anti-Lukashenka
workers at Minsk Tractors Works and similar pro-market views were not proposed by other
workers at Minsk Tractor Works. In fact, Vadim Payvin, 25, Minsk Tractor Works strike
Committee member explicitly opposed privatization.34 In general, the position that Dylevsky’s
pro-market views played little, if any role in the mobilization at Minsk Tractor Works, is supported
by Dylevsky’s own accounts of the mobilization and the media accounts of it,35 as well as the
formal demands of the striking workers at Minsk Tractor Works36)
Second, as far as Dylevsky’s sarcastic comment about not having oligarchs in Belarus,
Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021), relied on a similar sarcastic statement made by a worker that they
included in a footnote, Footnote 57:
[Footnote] 57 During Lukashenko’s visit to a major factory, workers totally rejected the
regime’s central rhetorical arguments, namely that without state support, they would end
up in the hands of predatory capitalism. One of workers shouted that even oligarchic
ownership would be better that the current situation (p.173).

[In Russian] EuroRadio, “Electrician with MTZ: workers will go on strike when their wallets hit”, October 10,
2020, (https://euroradio.fm/ru/elektrik-s-mtz-rabochie-zabastuyut-kogda-ih-udarit-po-koshelkam).
34

New York Times, “Laying Down His Tools, Belarus Worker Takes Up Mantle of Protest Leader,”
(https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/21/world/europe/belarus-protest-electionLukashenko.html?searchResultPosition=1);
Pulitizer Center, “I Felt Rage, Grabbed the Microphone and Spoke To the Strikers, Says Accidental ‘Lech Walesa’ of
Belarus”, August 25, 2020, by Simon Ostrovsky, (https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/i-felt-rage-grabbed-microphoneand-spoke-strikers-says-accidental-lech-walesa-belarus).
NPR, “Belarus Factory Workers Walk Out, Joining Mass Protests Calling For President To Quit”, August 17, 2020,
by Lucian Kim , (https://www.npr.org/2020/08/17/903205824/belarus-factory-workers-walk-out-joining-massprotests-calling-for-president-to-).
See also: [In Russian] Onliner, “Strike at MAZ and MTZ. The fate of the participants, how the authorities pressed
and what they say in the administrations now”, September 23, 2020, by Anastasia Danilovich,
(https://realt.onliner.by/2020/09/23/byvshie-zavodchane).
35

Shiraz Socialst, “Belarus: strikes against Lukashenko continue”, August 21, 2020, by Jim Denham,
(https://shirazsocialism.wordpress.com/2020/08/21/belarus-strikes-against-lukashenko-continue/).
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In principle, Footnote 57 appears to contradict the main findings of my moral economy
study, that workers support Belarus’ socio-economic model. In spite of Footnote 57, however, my
moral economy findings still hold. First, it should be noted that in a 23-page comprehensive study
of the 2020 uprising (including worker protests and strikes) there is only one footnote in support
of the position that Belarussian workers reject Belarus’ socio-economic model (Bedford (2021)
and Glod’s (2020) studies did not even contain anything.) Second, what is the exact source of this
observation? Was it taken from social media? If so, why didn’t Moshes and Nizhnikau provide
link to the video so their position can be verified? Was this account taken from a qualitative study?
If so, why don’t they cite the source so other researchers could verify Moshes and Nizhniakau’s
conclusion. Was this the actual observation of Moshes and Nizhnikau? And was it part of their
qualitative study, or did they just happen to be present at a large state enterprise during President
Lukashenka’s meeting with the enterprise’s workers? Maybe the event was reported to Moshes
and Nizhnikau? However, whether Moshes and Nizhnikau observed this directly or whether it
was reported why doesn’t their account have any details? For example, when and where did this
meeting take place? How many workers in total were present at the meeting? How many workers
actually “totally rejected” the regime’s rhetoric? Moshes and Nizhnikau imply that the majority
of workers at the plant “totally rejected” Belarus’ socio-economic model, is that true? What are
they basing their implication on? Furthermore, Moshes and Nizhnikau imply that these workers’
supposed total “rejection of the regime’s” rhetoric applies to the majority of all Belarussian
workers. Again, what are they basing this implication on?
No matter what the origin of this observation, Moshes and Nizhnikau should have provided
the source or more detailed information. And while protecting these workers’ anonymity is
important, there is no reason why this basic general information should have been excluded.
Furthermore, according to Moshes and Nizhnikau, these workers supposedly argued directly with
President Lukashenka—one even supposedly openly “shouted” at President Lukashenka. In this
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context, how would providing basic information about the meeting (when, where, how many
workers in total, how many workers argued), endanger any of the workers at the meeting?
While I did not come across this mindset in my moral economy study, I do not necessarily
disbelieve that some workers might prefer “oligarchic ownership” to Belarus’ current socioeconomic model, however, how much can we generalize from this anonymous comment contained
in a footnote? What can we infer about the majority of Belarussian workers based on one comment
in which we do not know any details? Now I will return to comparing Karlyuk, Magidov, and
Rovovoy to similar oppositional workers in my moral economy study.

The Anti-Lukashenka/Oppositional Workers in my Moral Economy Strongly Supported
Belarus Socio-Economic Model
In my moral economy study, I encountered workers very similar to Karlyuk, Magidov, and
Rovovoy. Like Karlyuk, Magidov, and Rovovoy, they were strongly against President
Lukashenka, supported the opposition, and went on to vote for Svetlana Tikhanovskaya. One of
them even participated in several opposition protests. However, in spite of their utter hostility
toward President Lukashenka, they strongly supported Belarus’ socio-economic model, defended
Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector, adamantly opposed privatization and were completely
opposed to neoliberalism. And although I did not have an opportunity to question Karlyuk,
Magidov, and Rovovoy explicitly about Belarus’ socio-economic model and whether they support
it, it is my position that their outlook would be very similar to the oppositional workers in my study
given the complete lack of any indication that they rejected Belarus’ socio-economic model in the
fairly in-depth Open Democracy article. I will compare Karlyuk, Magidov and Rovovoy to two
workers in my study, Svetlana and Vadim.
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Svetlana, who worked in a private automotive parts factory and was heavily featured in
this dissertation. Svetlana, like the three workers in Open Democracy article, was also against
President Lukashenka and saw him as a “brutal dictator” “who only stays in power by rigging
elections.” Like the others, she had been politically passive up until the 2020 presidential
campaign. She went on to vote for Svetlana Tikhanovskaya and participated in several opposition
protests. However, even though Svetlana hated President Lukashenka, she supported Belarus’
socio-economic model and adamantly opposed privatization of Belarus’ state-owned industrial
sector. She completely rejected neoliberalism and supported measures to protect workers and jobs
at private firms: “|Everyone should do well, not just rich people.”
Although Svetlana supported Belarus’ socio-economic model, she also supported the
opposition and did not believe it would threaten Belarus’ socio-economic model. She was utterly
dismayed when I asked her bluntly whether the opposition would privatize or close state

enterprises if it ever came to power?
Of course not, I don’t think the opposition would ever go to such extremes.
Q: But isn’t privatization an important goal of the opposition?
Svetlana: No, I don’t think they would do anything like that. Thousands of workers would
lose their jobs. Many cities—especially smaller ones—would be ruined if there were mass
privatization of Belarus state enterprises, especially my city”
And although this question was not posed to the three workers in the Open Democracy
article, I strongly believe that would have answered it similarly. Like the three workers, Svetlana’s
opposition to President Lukashenka is entirely separate from the socio-economic reality that
Belarussian workers face, especially the potential devastating neoliberal restructuring that the
opposition has in store for them (see Buzgalin and Koganov 2021:446). Like the three workers in
the article Svetlana solely focused on replacing President Lukashenka:
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Oh, I can’t stand him. He is absolutely out of his mind. We just need to get rid of
Lukashenka and then we can have a normal president. Then everything will be alright.
Vadim, another worker in my moral economy study, even more closely matched the three
workers in the Open Democracy article. Like them, Vadim is not only a man and a father, but also
works at a similar large state-owned enterprise. Although Vadim was also strongly opposed to
President Lukashenka, he adamantly defended Belarus’ socio-economic model and vehemently
opposed any privatization of any of Belarus’ state-owned industrial enterprises. Even more,
Vadim had enormous pride in his enterprise:
There is enormous talent among the workers and supervisors at our plant.

We make the

best quality vehicles; are only problem is marketing and selling them.
Although pride in one’s enterprise does not necessarily mean you are opposed to its
privatization, I sensed the same pride among the three workers in the Open Democracy article,
especially from the steel worker Magidov:
So [working at the factory] was kind of like a hobby for me. The kind of job I can’t quit
(paratheses in original).
It should be noted that not only did Vadim say that he enjoyed high wages but also
discussed the numerous other benefits including professional development, extra paid vacation
time, health and recreation spas, free schoolbags for children as well free Christmas gifts for
children37
Like Svetlana, (and the three workers in the article), Vadim’s opposition to President
Lukashenka was also entirely separate from the socio-economic reality that Belarussian workers

Vadim actually said that his plant gives free New Year’s gifts for children. In the Belarus (and the former-Soviet
Union) New Year’s Eve is similar to the West’s celebration of Christmas on December 25.
37
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face, including the potential devastating neoliberal restructuring that the opposition envisions (see
Buzgalin and Koganov 2021:446).
Q: But wouldn’t the opposition privatize or close many of Belarus’ state-owned enterprises
if it ever came to power?
Vadim: No, nothing of the sort would happen. Belarus’ state enterprises are an important
part of Belarus’ economy. Many generations of workers have worked at these enterprises
to make them what they are today. I am the third generation in my family to work at our
plant.
Q: But isn’t privatization an important goal of the opposition?
Vadim: No, the goal of the opposition is to get rid of Lukashenka! Once we get rid of him
everything will be fine. Lukashenka is the problem!
Lukashenka is our only problem!”
Q: But wouldn’t the plant be run more efficiently if it were privatized?
Vadim: No privatization! No privatization! No privatization! I have already told you our
plant works well. I am against privatization! We need to get rid of Lukashenka! If we get
rid of Lukashenka ever will be fine!
Although Svetlana and Vadim are industrial workers, their outlook is very similar to of the
capitalists in my study as it relates to President Lukashenka. And the same can be said of Karlyuk
Magidov, and Rovovoy. All five of these industrial workers have political outlooks that are in line
with the opposition. And here we are not merely looking at the formal political demands made by
protesting workers, “most of which are focused exclusively on the general political demands of
the opposition” (Ishchenko 2020:3), but at the in-depth interviews of three of the leaders of the
protesting workers, as well the in-depth interviews and life-histories of the oppositional workers38
in my moral economy study.

Why Would Belarussian Workers Go Against Their Economic Interests?
38

It should be noted that most of the middle-class subjects in my study, in spite of their utter hatred of President
Lukashenka, and support for the opposition, do not reject Belarus’ socio-economic model and oppose privatization.
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While socially these workers are no doubt industrial workers, politically, however, they
have embraced the middle-class opposition. The protesting workers’ political ideology goes
against their economic social interests. Why would workers, embrace political ideologies that go
against their social interests? This phenomenon, however, is not new and has been studied by
scholars for many decades. For example, a big part of Reinarman’s (1987) study exploring why
so many American workers supported Ronald Reagan. Along with Reinarman, numerous scholars
have explored this concept of the “Regan Democrat” (Coste 2012; Borquez 2005; Ehrman 2005;
Troy 2005; Baer 2000; Greenberg 1995; Hale 1995, 1994; Brown 1991; Halle 1984) and although
racial politics is a crucial part of the rise of the Reagan Democrat (Coste 2012; Borquez 2005) and
does not apply to the situation in Belarus, the fact “47 % of union members” voted for Reagan in
198039 (Coste 2012: 2nd para), one of the harshest anti-union anti-labor Presidents in US history
(DePhillips 2015), is very relevant to my analysis of anti-Lukashenka workers.

Reagan thus created what journalists Thomas and Mary Edsall have called a ‘cross-class
alliance’ between workers and the Republican upper classes (Edsall and Edsall 154) (Coste
2012:2nd para.).
David Halle’s (1984) ground-breaking ethnography of well-paid unionized chemical
workers is insightful to understanding the compartmentalization of the anti-Lukashenka protesting
workers’ political ideology and their socio-economic interests as industrial workers at large stateowned enterprises. Halle, building on the work of Weber (2009), argued that these workers’
consciousness existed at three, often very compartmentalized, levels: class, status (consumption),
and politics. While Halle’s workers clearly saw themselves as workers, while at work, at home,
however, they saw themselves as middle class (Reinarman saw this same compartmentalization
among the high-paid unionized UPS workers). Furthermore, politically, these workers saw

39

Only 43% of union members voted for Carter (Coste 2012: 2nd para).
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themselves and American and shifted between nationalism and populism. While some of the
specific details about Halle’s American workers are not relevant to my study, the general concept
that workers might also embrace middle-class identities as well as political identities, that do not
coincide—and even contradict—their class interests, is crucial for understanding the protesting
workers’ embrace of the middle class’ anti-Lukashenka oppositional ideology.
Rather than the worker protests being motivated by declining economic conditions (a
narrative persistently and heavily promoted by Lukashenka’s critics from both the right (see
Bedford 2021:810-811; Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:172; Glod 2020:4, Potocki 2011:61) as well
as the left (see Buzgalin and Koganov 2021; Artiukh 2021, 2020 Bohdan 2020), the real cause of
the workers’ protests was likely—just the opposite—the high wages and living standards of
industrial workers at large state-owned enterprises.

These protesting workers might see

themselves as middle class and are integrated into the middle class, including having middle-class
spouses

40

(see Buzgalin and Koganov 2021:447;41 see also Furman 1999). As these privileged

workers integrate into the middle class, they are exposed to anti-Lukashenka oppositional
ideology, which is hegemonic (Gramsci 1971) among much of the middle class.
No doubt these privileged workers are exposed to the hegemonic oppositional ideology as
they integrate into the middle class, however, they are not only passively absorbing this ideology,
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For example, Vadim, the oppositional industrial worker discussed earlier, had a wife who was a top manager at a
large Western firm. Vadim’s wife was fairly typical of the middle-class neoliberal opposition: adamantly opposed to
President Lukashenka; she also voted for Svetlana Tikhanovskaya. It is very likely that Vadim’s wife had a major
effect on his political ideology. Unfortunately, the Open Democracy article did not discuss the three workers’ wives’
political ideology or class position.
Here, Buzgalin and Koganov (2021:447) are specifically talking about “the new generation of the Lukashenko
‘nomenklatura’” or bureaucracy, who “in essence [inhabit] the same neoliberal environment and whose entire social
setting consists of people (from spouses and lovers to children and grandchildren) who live according to these
(‘Western’) standards” (p.447). However, there is no reason why this social phenomenon would not apply to highlytrained high-paid, high-skilled industrial workers. This position is supported by Rovdo who claimed the strongest
support for President Lukashenka would be found, among others, the “‘least qualified’ urban workers” (Yarashevich
2014:1718). Ioffe (2014) also discussed “ordinary” very low-paid and low-skilled workers “who form the social base
of the existing regime” (p.190; see also Furman 1999:9).
41
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but also, at some level actively embracing it as part of their aspiration to be recognized as middle
class and to bolster their status as middle class. Bourdieu’s (1990) concept of symbolic capital
and misrecognition can help us understand this phenomenon and why the protesting workers have
adopted the middle-class oppositional ideology, which goes against their own class interests.
These workers are not merely integrated among the middle class due to their high wages and living
standards (as the workers in Halle and Reinarman studies), but actively embrace oppositional
ideology as a source of symbolic capital bolstering their status as middle class, similar to the way
the much of the conventional Belarussian middle class relies on linguistic ideology and habitus
(Woolard 2020) to denigrate President Lukashenka as an “illiterate” peasant (p.170) or kolkhoznik
(literally a collective farm worker p.138, 170) in order to bolster their status as middle class (Ioffe
2014: 138, 170; see also Furman 1999; note much of the middle class will not economically benefit
from its opposition to President Lukashenka: for example, Olga in my study42.) However, due to
the fact that the protesting workers have working-class and/or peasant backgrounds themselves
(p.170; for example, Svetlana has a peasant background), that particular kind of symbolic capital
is not available to them. None of the anti-Lukashenka workers in my study ever referred to
President Lukashenka as a kolkhoznik, although the term was ubiquitous among the middle class
and capitalists in my study (see also Ioffe 2014:138) and none of the anti-Lukashenka workers in
my study denigrated or ridiculed President Lukashenka’s peasant accent “because this is how many
of them talk or this is how their parents and grandparents do or used to do” (p.170, 138). Again,
this was widespread among the middle class and capitalists in my study. Furthermore, the antiLukashenka workers in the Open Democracy article never refereed to President Lukashenka as a

Although Olga harshly denigrated President Lukashenka as an “uncultured peasant, who talks like a peasant” and
was deeply opposed to him politically, her economic interests would not be served by his replacement or overthrow
by the neoliberal opposition. Olga strongly supported Belarus’ socio-economic system and the state-owned industrial
sector and was adamantly opposed to its privatization. Supporting the neoliberal opposition goes against her own
moral economy. Personally, Olga, who works as an administrator at a state-owned hospital, has little to gain
economically by supporting the neoliberal opposition, as well.
42
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kolkhoznik or denigrated his peasant accent, background or folkways and I am unaware of any
account of anti-Lukashenka workers in the media ever doing this, including his harshest workingclass critic, Sergey Dylevsky, the leader of the Minsk Tractor Works strike committee43 as well as
among the young leaders of the anti-Lukashenka workers, such as 25-year-old44 Vadim Payvin of
Tractor Works and 19-year old Semyon Fedotov of Minsk Autoworks.45
While the symbolic capital imbued in denigrating President Lukashenka as a kolkhoznik,
is not available to the working class, the symbolic capital imbued in denigrating him as a dictator
is readily available to them, especially among the highest paid and most skilled segments of the
working class.46 As I said earlier, by embracing oppositional ideology and oppositional narratives,
this segment of the working class bolsters its own standing as members of the middle class.
However, by embracing oppositional ideology, these workers clearly undermine their own socioeconomic interests (Buzgalin and Koganov 2021:446). According to Bourdieu (1990), these
workers misrecognize their own economic interest in their desire for symbolic capital.
Symbolic capital is thus denied capital, recognized as legitimate, that is, misrecognized as
capital (Bourdieu 1990:118).
Bourdieu’s concept of misrecognition is “roughly equivalent” to Marx’s notion of false
consciousness (Gaventa 2003:9) or “might be immediately associated with the Marxian concept

New York Times, “Laying Down His Tools, Belarus Worker Takes Up Mantle of Protest Leader,” August 21, 2020,
by Ivan Nechepurenko,
(https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/21/world/europe/belarus-protest-election-Lukashenko.html).
Pulitizer Center, “I Felt Rage, Grabbed the Microphone and Spoke To the Strikers, Says Accidental ‘Lech Walesa’ of
Belarus”, August 25, 2020, by Simon Ostrovsky, (https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/i-felt-rage-grabbed-microphoneand-spoke-strikers-says-accidental-lech-walesa-belarus).
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[In Russian] BKонтакте, VKonttakkte, by Vadim Payvin, (https://vk.com/malice_guides_me).

[In Russian] Onliner, “Strike at MAZ and MTZ. The fate of the participants, how the authorities pressed and what
they say in the administrations now”, September 23, 2020, by Anastasia Danilovich,
(https://realt.onliner.by/2020/09/23/byvshie-zavodchane).
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46

This position is supported by Rovdo who claimed the strongest support for President Lukashenka would be found,
among others, the “‘least qualified’ urban workers” (Yarashevich 2014:1718). Ioffe (2014) also discussed “ordinary”
very low-paid and low-skilled workers “who form the social base of the existing regime” (p.190; see also Furman
1999:9).
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of ideology” (Navarro 2006:19). However, unlike Marx’s conception of ideology, Bourdieu’s
misrecognition exists more in the cultural realm than in the ideological realm. Misrecognition
“embodies a set of active social processes…[that] are born in the midst of culture” (Navarro
2006:19).
All forms of power require legitimacy and culture is the battleground where this conformity
is disputed and eventually materialises amongst agents, thus creating social differences and
unequal structures. Resources and activities are transformed into symbolic power (or
legitimacy) when they are separated from material interests and go unrecognised by other
social groups, and when they are presented as disinterested forms of resources and
activities. When this moment is reached, the origins of social inequalities become part of a
mystifying discourse (p.19).
A relatively small segment of high-paid high-skilled industrial workers have wholly
embraced the neoliberal opposition’s claims that it is fighting for democracy and against an unelected dictator at the expense of their own material interests. And here it should be noted that for
Bourdieu, “[m]isrecognition” often operates “in the name of democracy… (Mahar et al. 1990,
p.19)” (James 2015:100). Although it is fairly obvious, these workers are utterly oblivious to the
opposition’s real neoliberal objectives (Buzgalin and Koganov 2021:446).

For them, the

neoliberal opposition has created a “mystifying discourse” (p.19).
However, according to Bourdieu, it would be a mistake to assume these workers are merely
ideologically dominated or deceived. For Bourdieu, misrecognition operates at a more subtle level
as “the concept of misrecognition is linked to Bourdieu’s rejection of any simple distinction
between the conscious and unconscious” (James 2015:101). These workers, by embracing the
symbolic capital imbued in the opposition’s anti-Lukashenka ideology, bear some responsibility
for going against their own economic interests; although they are not fully conscious of their own
self-betrayal either (James 2015:101).
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Belarus’ Lack of Explicitly Socialist and Class Ideology
The protesting workers might not have embraced oppositional ideology so readily, if
Belarus explicitly promoted socialist ideology or working-class ideology.

According to

Leshchenko (2008), President Lukashenka does not explicitly promote socialist ideology
(p.143047) and that Belarus’ state-owned (socialist) economic model is promoted in terms of a
“national ideology” based on Belarus’ traditions, history, national traits and characteristics, such
as the “‘national’ traits of collectivism and egalitarianism” (1421). This can be seen in President
Lukashenka’s harsh rejection of neoliberalism, which is not explicitly based on class ideology or
socialist ideology, but rather on neoliberalism’s inapplicability “to [the Belarussian] people, with
our tolerance and mentality” (Yarashevich 2014:1705).
The ideology of liberalism is dominant and exceptionally aggressive nowadays. Liberalism
(or more precisely neo-liberalism) can be succinctly defined as an ideology of social
injustice, profiteering, and individualism ... if contemporary neo-liberalism is taken in pure
form, it is of course least applicable, or, to put it more precisely, not applicable at all to us,
to our people, with our tolerance and mentality (Lukashenka 2003:1705).
Several researchers, have noted Belarus lacks a ruling communist or socialist party
(Leshchenko 2008:1430; Way 2008:66; Ambrosio 2006:14) as well as any ruling party (Way
2008:66; Leshchenko 2008:1430). Furthermore, Belarus’ lack of explicit socialist ideology can
be seen in President Lukashenka’s explanation of the removal, at his suggestion, of the hammer

and sickle from Belarus’ current coat-of-arms and flag:
As you can see, we removed the hammer and sickle from the coat-of-arms and flag. Yes,
that was my suggestion. A new era began, a new era, and not only the workers and peasants
(personified by the hammer and sickle) [who] began to build our new country. New history
“Belarus lacks some key features of socialism: there is no ruling party; the elite is not collegial, but centred on one
person; the economy is not fully planned and is money-based; and the state ideology is distinctly non-communist”
(Leshchenko 2008:1430). According to Leshchenko, “the Belarusian authoritarian leader has not used socialism as a
blueprint for development, but in a more limited way as construction material for his own regime” (p.1430).
47
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has begun. There are new entrepreneurs. I'm not talking about all sorts of crooks, which
are enough today - there are honest, sincere entrepreneurs who are aimed at protecting
their country and building a new Belarus48… This was not reflected in the hammer and
sickle. Therefore, these symbols were removed.49(italics added)
Moreover, although scholars, such as Li and Cheng (2020), after careful evaluation,
consider Belarus’ socio-economic system “market socialism” (see also Veselova 2016;
Yarashevich 2014:1730), it should be noted that President Lukashenka (1998), formally changed

the name of the socio-economic model from market socialism to a socially-oriented market
economy in 1998. And though I agree with Li and Cheng’s assessment of Belarus’ socio-economic
model as “market socialism,” the fact that the model is no longer explicitly called market socialism
is important ideologically, and shows the lack of socialist and class ideology in Belarus.
President Lukashenka’s own speeches to workers during the height of the 2020 conflict
might be the strongest evidence showing the lack of socialist and class ideology in Belarus. In
these speeches, the main thrust of President Lukashenka’s argument against workers going joining
strikes was that these “strikes can have a devastating impact on [Belarus’] domestic companies in
the future.”50 For example, on August 14, 2020, at the height of the conflict, President Lukashenka
addressed workers in the construction industry.51 Although he did begin his speech praising
workers and reaffirming his support of the working class:

48

The workers in my moral economy study would not agree with President Lukashenka. Even the workers who
supported privatization would not go so far as to praise entrepreneurs to such a degree.
[In Russian] SB.By, “We are proud of our symbols and history. And this is our strength!”, May 8, 2022,
(https://www.sb.by/articles/my-gordimsya-svoimi-simvolami-i-istoriey-i-v-etom-nasha-sila.html).
49

Information Analysis Portal of the Union State, “Lukashenko comments on calls to go on strike”, August 14, 2022,
(https://soyuz.by/en/politics/lukashenko-comments-on-calls-to-go-on-strike).
50
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Ibid.
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You know and feel it very well. Of course, workers are the backbone of our country. You
have known my position on it. During the pandemic I virtually banned layoffs; I did not
allow throwing people into the street.
The thrust, however, of President Lukashenka’s argument against going on strike was
purely economic:
The head of state illustrated possible consequences of strikes using specific examples. If
Belaruskali suspends operations for several days, this will play into the hands of their major
competitors from Russia and Canada. ‘If they go on strike for two days, their competitors
– Russians and Canadians – will give thanks to God and promptly supply to the market
what they want to supply,’ Aleksandr Lukashenko said.
The same will happen with machinery producers, like MTZ and MAZ. ‘It is up to you. If
you do not make 10 tractors today and if you do not supply them to the market, tomorrow Germans
and Americans will come. Russians will also bring their machinery. They will also give thanks to
God,” the president noted.
He emphasized that the global economy has just started to recover after the pandemicrelated restrictions. ‘Everyone is fighting for these markets. If we stop, we will never be
able to promote our manufacturing industry. Never! We will be pushed into this mire.
People should come to understand it: if you want to go on strike - do it, if you want to work
– go ahead,’ the president said.
You should explain to people that this is the only chance to save their companies. If you
save your company, you will be able to provide for your family.52
While there might be an important reason why President Lukashenka chose to focus solely
on economic factors in his speech discouraging workers from joining strikes,53 the lack of

52

Ibid.

53

Here I am being very cautious since although it appears to me that President Lukashenka is avoiding the obvious
class implications of the neoliberal opposition privatization agenda, President Lukashenka might know how to relate
to Belarussian workers better than I do, especially those in the political center, who do not actively support him, yet
do not support the opposition either. I could be wrong about this. However, similar to President Lukashenka I am
aware of a worker at Belaz discouraging other workers from joining any strikes who also did not tackle the neoliberal
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emphasis on class ideology is obvious. President Lukashenka made similar economic arguments
against striking on Monday, August 17, 2020, at the very height of the conflict, MZKT (military
vehicles).54 (Note this is the meeting in which some workers heckled President Lukashenka
“Resign.”55)
With President Lukashenka’s embrace of the importance of entrepreneurs (see also
Yarashevich 2014), it is unlikely that he would ever promote explicitly socialist ideology,

however, at such a crucial point in the conflict, why didn’t President Lukashenka at least stress
the neoliberal nature of the opposition and the economic ruin it has in store for Belarussian workers
and Belarus state-owned enterprises (Buzgalin and Koganov 2021:446)?
President Lukashenka acknowledges that Belarus’ lack of strong ideology played a major
role in 2020 uprising.56 However, the harder ideological line President Lukashenka has in mind
will not focus on socialism or class, but rather geopolitics, as well as Western imperialism,
interference, and hypocrisy. The Belarussian politician and supporter of President Lukashenka,
Sergei Klishevuch,57 explains in SB, Belarus’ major state newspaper:
Having survived in 2020, our flag and coat of arms have acquired a special value.
The ideology of our state was previously quite soft and did not exist in a formalized form
for a number of reasons…

opposition directly, but focused solely on practical reasons not to join any strike. “I will not even address the issues
of this conflict, but only tell you why you should not join any strike. This plant is the most important thing in our lives
and for our families. What would happen to our plant if we listen to these young workers calling for a strike? We will
still be here depending on Belaz after these young workers are long gone.”
Belta.by, “Lukashenko comments on calls to go on strike”, September 17, 2022,
(https://eng.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-comments-on-calls-to-go-on-strike-132606-2020/).
54

Onliner, “Belarus workers chant 'resign!' at Lukashenko on factory visit”, August, 2020, posted on YouTube,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qi_Z1U34u9k).
55

Belta.by, “Lukashenko wants dramatic overhaul of ideological work”, October 1, 2021,
(https://eng.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-wants-dramatic-overhaul-of-ideological-work-143768-2021/).
56

“Sergei Klishevich, deputy of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly, member of the Communist
Party of Belarus”. [In Russian] SB.By, “Klishevich: the flag and coat of arms as symbols of the political victory of the
Belarusian state”, May 13, 2022, (https://www.sb.by/articles/simvoly-sily.html).
57
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…
During the political thaw of 2015-2020, the “soft” ideological system was used, among
other things, to establish contacts with the West, to solve investment problems and to stop
the hot phase of the war in Ukraine. At the same time, even at that moment, Western
partners unequivocally presented us with a choice: either a departure from Russia and
China, or the dismantling of the entire political system through a “color revolution”.
The task of any competent politician is to balance between centers of power in order to
achieve maximum results. However, in 2020, when the signing of road maps with the
Russian Federation began, the threat of a “color revolution” was realized and we were
rudely, without warning, hit.”58
President Lukashenka’s “hard” ideology can clearly be seen in his recent May 9, 2022
Victory Day speech,59 however, although he harshly condemns Western imperialism, intervention,
and hypocrisy, his speech contains no explicitly socialist or class ideology. Furthermore, it does
not contain explicitly anti-neoliberal ideology as well, other than a vague condemnation of
“globalism” and the West’s dream of enslaving the Slavic people:
Your dreams of driving the Slavs into a new slavery, which you call globalism, are
unrealizable60

[In Russian] SB.By, “Klishevich: the flag and coat of arms as symbols of the political victory of the Belarusian
state”, May 13, 2022, (https://www.sb.by/articles/simvoly-sily.html).
58

May 9, 2022 President Lukashenka said, “Addressing the peoples of the West today, I want to say: well, you are
not so blind that you do not understand all the monstrous consequences of the failed attempts to reorganize Libya,
Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and other countries by force. It was all in our memory. Rebuilt? Democracy under the wing
of NATO aircraft has left the peoples of these countries only pain and suffering, casualties and destruction, economic
chaos and any lack of prospects. And no puppet government that you brought to power there is capable of making a
flourishing oasis... You were used in the dark - in Yugoslavia, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and now our Ukraine…And
it was your Western elites who nurtured this monster, overthrew the legitimate [Ukrainian] government [in 2014],
armed the newly minted henchmen of Bandera and Shukhevych to the teeth, made Nazism the state ideology, and
pushed Ukrainian and Russian brothers against each other. We are peaceful people, but don't even try to talk to us
from a position of strength. Your dreams of driving the Slavs into a new slavery, which you call globalism, are
unrealizable” ([In Russian] SB, “President Aleander Lukashenko: ‘The Great Victory has become an integral part of
the Belarusian idea,’” May 9, 2022, (https://www.sb.by/articles/prezident-aleksandr-lukashenko-velikaya-pobedastala-neotemlemoy-chastyu-belorusskoy-natsionalnoy-id.html).
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The lack of a principled class-based stance against neoliberalism can also be seen at
another recent speech by President Lukashenka on May 8, 2022, in which he continues to couch
Belarus’ defense of its state-owned enterprises in terms of “remain[ing] faithful to [Belarussian]
traditions” and preserving “national wealth:”
So, it was in the 1990s, when Belarusians rejected attempts to adjust their way of life to
the Western European standard, remained faithful to traditions, saved national wealth:
domestic enterprises, land, and the right to social justice.61
Be that as it may, a “harder” anti-Western anti-color-revolution ideology might have
bolstered more support for President Lukashenka leading up to the August 9, 2020 election among
the segment of workers who joined anti-Lukashenka worker protests, even without explicit class
and socialist ideology. (Furthermore, segments of the middle class might also have not joined the
protest movement if the government’s ideology had been stronger.)

The lack of a strong

ideological stance of the Belarussian state (of any kind) during the political thaw of 2015-2020
certainly contributed to the 2020 uprising, especially considering that roughly during the same
time, oppositional ideology completely dominated the internet and social media.
While it is true that stronger ideology in general, and class-based socialist ideology in
particular, would have bolstered more support for President Lukashenka among the segment of
workers who joined anti-Lukashenka protests, there can be no doubt that in general the segment

of high-paid high-skilled workers will tend to be more susceptible to oppositional ideology, as it
further integrates into the middle class and aspires toward middle-class status. These are powerful
social forces that sociologists have recognized in other societies, in general (Bourdieu 1990) as
well as in Belarus specifically (Buzgalin and Koganov 2021; Furman 1999). Unless President

SB.By, “We are proud of our symbols and history. And this is our strength!”, May 8, 2022,
(https://www.sb.by/articles/my-gordimsya-svoimi-simvolami-i-istoriey-i-v-etom-nasha-sila.html) Here the
distinction between moral economy and Marxist ideology are apparent.
61
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Lukashenka or future presidents, can mobilize ideology in support of Belarus’ socio-economic
model to serve as a counterhegemony, more high-paid high-skilled workers would begin to
embrace oppositional ideology. Ironically, barring mobilization and a powerful ideological
counterhegemony, the Belarussian socio-economic model might eventually fall victim to its own
economic success.

Challenges to my Position
Among the researchers and analysts who argued that workers’ deteriorating living
standards (declining social contract) played a major role in the 2020 uprising, including worker
protests (see Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:172; Bedford 2021810-811; Glod 2020:4; Buzgalin and
Koganov 2021), only anti-Lukashenka socialists62 have addressed the protesting workers’ lack of
any significant social and economic demands (see Artiukh 2021:47; Shkurin, and Kunitskaya,
cited in Artiukh 2020:7, 10; Ishchenko 2020:4). However, although they acknowledge the lack of
social and economic demands, they all infer or argue that the workers do have social and economic
demands, but were unable to express them.

Among these anti-Lukashenka socialists, the

Ukrainian sociologist, Volodymyr Artiukh, whose work has been published in several scholarly
journals (2021) is most important. (Before going further, it should be noted that while I strongly
disagree with these anti-Lukashenka socialists that workers’ living workers standards were
deteriorating, and that that played a major role in the workers’ protests, it is not clear, however,
that these socialists are even arguing the workers reject the key aspects of Belarus’ socio-economic
model, namely public ownership and control of the major means of production.63)

62

Buzgalin and Koganov 2021 are also anti-Lukashenka socialists, however, they did not address the lack of social
and political demands made by protesting workers.
63

For example, Artiukh (2021) is vague about the actual moral economy of Belarussian workers or whether they
support or oppose privatization of Belarus state-owned enterprises. Although Artiukh never says that the workers
support privatization, he also never says that they oppose privatization either. Artiukh, himself, opposes privatization
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Artiukh (2021) acknowledges that “Virtually all demands voiced during the labor unrest
had been ‘political’: from mild appeals to prosecute cases of police violence to calls for
Lukashenka’s resignation” (p.57). However, he argues that the workers were unable to make
social and economic demands due to “the suppression of their voices in their workplaces,”
“bureaucratic despotism and atomization” (p.57). According to Artiukh:
The prevalence of vague populist anti-authoritarian rhetoric as opposed to substantial
“thick” ideologies in the general protest helped workers overcome the suppression of their
voice in the workplaces. …This populist ideological framing, which stems from the “nonparasites protests” of 2017 and was picked up by the opposition presidential campaign, has
encouraged workers to formulate their demands, bypassing the apathy instilled in them by
previous futile efforts to appeal to the official unions with purely economic claims.
This “thin” political articulation of workers’ demands helped bypass traditional
institutional forms of channeling labor-related grievances that have been blocked by the
state… (p.57).
However, Artiukh is not merely arguing that general anti-Lukashenka protest movement
inspired and helped mobilize the working class, but something much deeper and more
fundamental. Artiukh is arguing the worker protests were a revolt against state capitalism:

(p.60), and upon careful reading, I think Artiukh assumes the workers oppose privatization as well, however, it is hard
to separate Artiukh’s own beliefs about Belarus’ system being an exploitive state-capitalist system (p.58) from his
description of Belarussian workers’ own beliefs.
According to Artiukh the workers are economically exploited by the “state bureaucracy,” however, the exploitive role
of the bureaucrats was mystified as “[i]n popular perception economic bureaucrats do not appear as the managers of
state-owned capital that they are. They are seen instead as part of a ‘feudal’ order; their social control function is
abstracted and fetishized by the workers, and their exploitative function is left aside.” (p.58). (Interestingly, this is the
exact opposite of Burawoy’s (1992) analysis of state socialism in Hungary. Burawoy argued that the exploitive
function of the state bureaucracy was more obvious to the workers as it was not ideologically hidden in the form of
wage labor as it is under capitalism).
While Artiukh clearly supports a transition (or revolution) away from “state capitalism” and toward socialism (in
which the workers directly control production), Artiukh does not believe that the workers believe this or are even
capable of being conscious of this under the present “‘feudal’ order” (p.58). It is not entirely clear what Artiukh thinks
the workers actually do believe about Belarus’ current socio-economic model other than their suffering under the
“factory regime of bureaucratic despotism” (p.58), “atomization,” “low wages and poor working conditions” (p.57)
and a sense that the state bureaucracy consists of “corrupt bosses” (p.58). Unfortunately, Artiukh does not directly
address the question of privatization, which is so important for my study.
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The anti-authoritarian appropriation of the populist “thin ideology” created a situation of
cleavage between “us” (the “working people”) and “them” (the “corrupt bosses”). This
proved essential in overcoming the factory regime of bureaucratic despotism, since in the
state capitalist country that is Belarus, class conflict is blurred: the immediate exploiter
coincides with the state bureaucracy, and social demands cannot be disconnected from
political demands. In popular perception economic bureaucrats do not appear as the
managers of state-owned capital that they are. They are seen instead as part of a “feudal”
order; their social control function is abstracted and fetishized by the workers, and their
exploitative function is left aside. Thus, workers’ protest proved most successful not as a
struggle against exploiters but as a rebellion against both company and state bureaucracy
(p.58).
Artiukh is making some very bold claims about the nature of these worker protests.
Unfortunately, however, Artiukh does not present compelling evidence for this radical
interpretation of the worker protests. And here it is even not enough that Artiukh show that the
Belarus’ socio-economic system is state capitalism (which itself is challenging), but that the reason
for the worker protests was to protest against state capitalism. Artiukh has his work cut out for
him considering that these protesting workers did not even propose basic social or economic
demands, let alone anything close to showing that their protests represented a revolt against state
capitalism. Not only does Artiukh not present any compelling evidence in support of such a bold
claim, his position is contradicted by all of the available evidence: the actual political demands the
protesting workers submitted, the interviews of the three leaders of the worker strikes and protests
published in Open Democracy and other media, and my own moral economy study. There was
nothing in the Open Democracy article that came close to supporting Artiukh’s claim. All three
workers seemed very satisfied with their jobs—one of them, Pavel Magidov, a steelworker, even
said:
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So [working at the factory] was kind of like a hobby for me. The kind of job I can’t quit”
(parentheses in original).64
And Artiukh is not merely saying workers have complaints about management, but that the
workers face “bureaucratic despotism.” Magidov does not seem to be describing “bureaucratic
despotism” and there was nothing in the Open Democracy that supported Artiukh’s claim.
Vadim, from my study, was very similar to the oppositional workers in the Open
Democracy article. Vadim loved his job, had enormous pride in his plant, and great respect for
the managers (which even surprised me). Vadim did not describe “bureaucratic despotism.” In
fact, no workers in my study—whatever their politics—described Belarus’ state-owned plants as
bureaucratic despotism.
Furthermore, Artiukh has to show why these anti-Lukashenka worker protests are not
exactly what the protesting workers loudly proclaimed them to be. Here, I am not, however,
unaware of the complexities and nuances involved in protest movements, however, Artiukh has to
show why his interpretation is correct based on sociological evidence. He cannot assume his
position a priori.
Failing to produce any compelling evidence, and contradicted by all of the available
evidence, Artiukh’s claim that the anti-Lukashenka worker protests were actually a protest against
state capitalism appear more as examples of wishful thinking, based on Artiukh’s interpretation
Belarus’ social system as state capitalism than anything else.65 Let’s now return to the broader,
though related, discussion of Artiukh’s explanation for the lack of social and economic demands
at the worker protests.

Open Democracy, “Strike, exile, arrest: what happened to Belarusian workers?”, June 23, 2021, by Alexey Shuntov,
(https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/strike-exile-arrest-what-happened-belarusian-workers/).
64

65

The same kind of wishful thinking that Burawoy (1992) was guilty of when he mistakenly [he later admitted it]
argued that the workers in the state-owned factories in state-socialist Hungary were inadvertently becoming
transformed into supporters of worker socialism.
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Artiukh’s Explanation for the Lack of Social and Economic Demands
Artiukh’s basic argument is that the “general protest [movement] helped workers overcome
the suppression of their voice in the workplaces” through the adoption of the opposition’s “vague
populist anti-authoritarian rhetoric” (p.57). However, according to Artiukh, beneath these political
demands being made by the protesting workers, lie pressing social and economic demands such
as “low wages and poor working conditions” (p.57). If I may analogize, for Artiukh, the protesting
workers’ political demands merely represented the tip of the iceberg while the pressing social and
economic demand represented the rest of the massive iceberg under the surface of the water.
Maybe an even better analogy would be that of a volcano, in which the protesting workers’
political demands merely represented the top of the volcano, while the pressing social and
economic demands represented the molten lava inside the volcano waiting to erupt. Regardless,
of the analogy, if Artiukh were right, there should be some manifestation of this massive iceberg
(or molten lava) and most important, sociologists and other researchers should be able to detect
such powerful social forces through various forms of research, including interviews,
ethnographies, direct observations, media analysis, etc. Artiukh does not provide any evidence of
this, and all of the existing evidence contradicts his position.
Artiukh’s main argument to explains the complete lack of any significant social and
economic demands is that the protesting workers, by promoting the opposition’s political demands
were able to bypass “the apathy instilled in them by previous futile efforts to appeal to the official
unions with purely economic claims. This ‘thin’ political articulation of workers’ demands helped
bypass traditional institutional forms of channeling labor-related grievances that have been
blocked by the state” (p.57).
Even if we assume that Artiukh’s argument is correct, that the protesting workers had
previously been apathetic due to the official union’s inability to win the workers’ purely economic
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demands, his argument is simply not convincing. First, even if workers had previously made
economic demands to the official union to no avail, what is stopping them from making them now,
even when their demands are not being made through the official union? In fact, many protesting
workers either threatened to leave the official union or actually left it, joining independent unions
instead.66 Artiukh acknowledges that “Strike committees have actively worked with [independent]
trade unions, the most notable case being Belaruskali, where the Independent Miners’ Union was
at the forefront of the struggle” (p.56; italics added). Under these circumstances, why would the
previous impotency of the official union’s handling of economic demands even be relevant?
Furthermore, wouldn’t the Independent Miners’ Union, which is a major part of the Belarusian
Independent Trade Union [BITU], be capable of articulating workers’ pressing social and
economic demands, especially since these are the official “AIMS” and “OBJECTIVES” of the
Belarusian Independent Trade Union?
AIMS…to improve the working and living conditions of workers, employment, wages,
working hours, protection of health, and subsequently demand their implementation” and
“OBJECTIVES… Decent pay; Ensuring safe and healthy working conditions; Assistance
in creation of pension and health insurance funds and the introduction of additional social
insurance mechanisms; Protection of workers' rights on employment, working hours,
recreation and social guarantees; Regulation of labour contract issues... 67

For example, on August 21, 2020, TUT.by reported “plant workers declare their withdrawal from the [official] trade
unions,” and that “The workers of the Belarusian Metallurgical Plant are announcing their resignation from the official
trade union, the chairman of the trade union organization of the enterprise Alyaksandr Koleda told BelaPAN. ‘It seems
that now there will be a massive exodus of enterprise workers from the official trade unions. People are trying to join
independent trade unions. Official trade unions put pressure on people who put forward political demands and are
going to go on strike, suggested Maksim Poznyakov, chairman of the Belarusian Independent Trade Union.” (Shiraz
Socialist, “Belarus: strikes against Lukashenko continue,” August 21, 2020, by Alexandra Kvitkevich and Dmitry
Bobkov, ((https://shirazsocialism.wordpress.com/2020/08/21/belarus-strikes-against-lukashenko-continue/)). And at
Minsk Tractor Works 62 workers joined an independent union (Onliner, “Strike at MTZ and MAZ. The fate of the
participants, how the authorities pressed and what they say in the administrations now,” September 23, 2020,
(https://realt.onliner.by/2020/09/23/byvshie-zavodchane)).
66
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Belnp, The Belarussian Independent Trade Union,
(https://belnp.org/en/#:~:text=BITU%20is%20a%20co%2Dfounder,the%20ITF%20and%20the%20IUF).
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And according to BITU’s website, besides Belaruskali, the BITU is “most active” at
Grodna Azot and Naftan.68 Surely, BITU could have helped the protesting workers at Grodna
Azot and Naftan articulate their pressing social and economic demands.
Second, in general, why are the protesting workers now incapable of making economic
demands (under any circumstances) but are capable of making political demands? Third, why
didn’t the protesting workers put forth their supposedly pressing social and economic demands
along with the political demands or at least add the most important ones to the political demands?
What did they have to lose? Certainly, President Lukashenka would more likely agree to give
workers’ a raise rather than to resign. And if these social and economic demands were so pressing
why didn’t any worker protest—at any state enterprise—put forward some of them?
Furthermore, it must be noted that Artiukh appears to be contradicting himself since on
August 14, 202069 he said that “Belarusian industrial workers have… a habit of formulating clear
demands”70
Belarusian industrial workers have an experience of cooperation and coordination, some
kind of organizational structure, however bureaucratic, and a habit of formulating clear
demands71
Here Artiukh is referring to the Belarussian industrial workers habit of formulating social
and economic demands.72 What has happened since August 14, 2020? (The beginning of the

68

Ibid.

[In Russian] Commons, “Partisan or worker? Belarusian Protest Figures and Their Perspectives” August 14,
2020, by Artyukh Volodymyr, (https://commons.com.ua/uk/partizan-ili-rabochij-figury-belorusskogo-protesta-i-ihperspektivy/).
69

LeftEast, “Partisans or Workers? Figures of Belarusian Protest and Their Prospects”, by Volodymyr Artiukh
(https://lefteast.org/partisans-or-workers-belarusian-protest/).
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The position that Artiukh is referring to social and economic demands appears obvious in the passage as these are
the kinds of demands that workers make. Furthermore, this position is supported by additional text in the same
passage: “if there is a hope to resolve the impasse that the protest has entered in Belarus in a peaceful and progressive
way, it can happen only thanks to an organized group of workers who understand, formulate and defend their interests”
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worker protests.) Why does Artiukh now (2021) believe workers no longer know how to formulate
clear economic and social demands? Could the fact that the protesting workers did not put forward
social and economic demands be the reason for Artiukh changing his position—if not outright
contradicting himself?
Moreover, if such pressing social and economic demands actually existed and were so
obvious, why didn’t the protesting workings propose such demands in response to “proLukashenko authorities” who rejected strike proposals (based on Belarussian labor law), on the
grounds the strike was not “occasioned by a labor dispute with management” but by a “political
grievance” (Kassabov 2020:6; see also Melyantsou 2020). No protesting workers, at any state
enterprise proposed any such social or economic demands in response—not even opportunistically
in order to justify a legal strike.
Besides the fact that Artiukh contradicts himself, his claim, that the protesting workers
could not make social and economic demands (but could make political demands), sounds very
patronizing and defies much of what we know about labor movements in general. This point is
made very clear by other anti-Lukashenka socialists, who are affiliated with Artiukh (2020). For
example, Ksenia Kunitskaya, of the leftist Poligraf online magazine (p.2) said in an interview with
Artiukh (2020) that:
Recently, a small grassroots initiative has emerged with a purpose of bringing economic
and social demands to the workers’ protest agenda, since at the moment, all workers’
protests are centered around broad political demands: Lukashenko’s resignation, the
release of political prisoners, lawsuits against the security forces, fair elections (p.10).
Is it really so hard to convince the protesting workers how low their wages and living
standards are? In the same article, anti-Lukashenka socialist, Vitaly Shkurin from September

(LeftEast, “Partisans or Workers? Figures of Belarusian Protest and Their Prospects”, by Volodymyr Artiukh
(https://lefteast.org/partisans-or-workers-belarusian-protest/).
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leftist media platform (p.2) said something very similar to Kunitskaya during his interview with
Artiukh (2020):
Everyone tries to organize a strike movement and propose social and economic demands
to shift these protests from a purely electoral to a social agenda (p.10)
Again, is it such a challenge to convince these protesting workers how much their living
standards have deteriorated? Why is the role of Belarus’ socialist vanguard the opposite of the
struggle of other Marxists? Other Marxists have struggled to connect the obvious economic
deprivation of the working class, to the larger “political struggle” with the capitalist state (Marx
and Engels 1847:19). For Marx, the challenge was not to show that the working class faced
economic deprivation, this was obvious to the working class; it spontaneously formed trade unions
to resist the capitalists’ attack on their wages (p.19). The real challenge for Marxists was linking
these local economic struggles with individual capitalists “into one national struggle between
classes,” organizing the working class “into a political party” (p.19) for the “conquest of political
power by the proletariat” (p.22). In fact, not only was the economic deprivation of the working
class obvious, Lenin argued against “Economism,” or the overemphasis of the economic struggle
of the working class, at the expense of its political struggle (Hammond 1949:277-280). Similarly,
American Marxist Eugene Debs (1970) consistently argued against solely focusing on, the obvious,
economic deprivation the working class faces at the expense of the broader political struggle
against the capitalist class in his critique of “pure and simple unionism”73 (p.127). The narrow
focus on workers’ obvious economic demands continues today through “business unionism,”
which is dominant in the United States and in many other countries throughout the world (Haidar
Debs’ (1970) critique of pure and simple unionism is somewhat similar to Lenin’s critique of economism. In pure
and simple unionism class struggle is ignored, as well as the workers’ political struggle against the capitalist class.
The union’s role is limited to the economic interests of workers in a specific craft union (as opposed to industrial
unionism). Furthermore, this kind of union is not revolutionary but sees itself as a partner of the capitalists,
cooperating with them and sharing the same fundamental interests. For Debs, the American Federation of Labor or
AFL typified pure and simple unionism (p.117-140).
73
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2015; Ross and Savage 2012; Mollona 2009; see Moody 1988 for a comprehensive examination
of business unionism).
For Marxists (or even radical reformers), channeling workers economic frustration into an
organized political struggle has always been the hardest challenge, however, no one has ever had
to convince the workers that their wages and living standards were being threatened. The fact that
no significant social or economic demands have been made by protesting workers strongly points
to the conclusion that they in fact did not have significant social and economic demands. The only
explanation for this lack of social and economic demands, which is provided by Artiukh, is very
unconvincing and contradicts what he has earlier said. The anti-Lukashenka socialist Kunitskaya
of Poligraf did not even attempt to propose an explanation for the lack of protesting workers’
social and economic demands. And the anti-Lukashenka socialist Shkurin of September described
the lack of social and economic demands as “unfortunat[e]” (p.7) and lamented that “the workers
were indoctrinated” by the neoliberal liberal and nationalist agenda (p.12).
Furthermore, although my examination of the social position of the high-paid high-skilled
protesting workers is preliminary and requires more research, it is based on solid sociological
evidence and is far more compelling than Artiukh’s explanation. Artiukh does not even address
the high pay and high living standards of the protesting workers. In fact, Artiukh cannot address
this fact, as it would completely eviscerate his position. Instead, he argues that these workers are
suffering economically from “low wages and poor working conditions” (p.57). However, Artiukh
is not only contradicted by the lack of economic demands, other anti-Lukashenka analysts (see
Sierakowski 2020; Melyantsou 2020), my moral economy study, but by the accounts of the actual
leaders of the worker protests and strikes.
In conclusion, I agree with Volodymyr Ishchenko (2020), who ironically is also an antiLukashenka socialist, that the worker protests were protests of “anti-Lukashenko citizens who just
happen to be located at the strategic positions of economic production (p.3; see also Kassabov
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2020:6). The fact that these protests took place does not challenge the main findings of my moral
economy study. Clearly, the worker protests do not show Belarus’ social contract has significantly
declined. More important, the worker protests do not contradict the main finding of my moral
economy study. Namely, that the majority of the Belarussian working class supports Belarus’
state-owned socio-economic model and adamantly opposes privatization of the state-owned
industrial sector.

Furthermore, not only is there no evidence that the workers who did not

participate in protests of any kind, reject Belarus’ socio-economic model, in this section I presented
strong evidence that there is no reason to believe that even most of the protesting workers reject
Belarus’ socio-economic model.
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Chapter 10. Important Events Since the 2020 Protest Movement
Before going on to discuss the character and nature of August 9, 2020 protest movement
further, it would be very useful to discuss some of the important events that have taken place in
Belarus after the 2020 protest movement. I will discuss, the March 23, 2021 Ryanair incident, the
sanctions that followed the Ryanair incident as well as the sanctions that followed the Russian
invasion of the Ukraine including the IT exodus. I will also discuss the 2021 summer/fall Belarus
refuge crisis as well as Belarus’ new constitution. In general, looking at all of these events will
provide important context for understanding the 2020 protest movement as well as the sociopolitical situation in Belarus in general.

Some of these events, especially Belarus’ new

constitution, will also provide valuable insight into the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians.
Let us now turn our attention to the end of the 2020 protest movement.
Although the August 9, 2020 protest movement lasted for several months, with large
protests every Sunday, by the winter there were no longer any large protests. I assumed there
would be protests at President Lukashenka’s All Belarussian People’s Congress, scheduled for
February 2021(the All-Belarussian People’s Congress takes place every five years). However,
surprisingly, there were not any protests at the February 2021 All-Belarussian People’s Congress.
There were claims by the opposition that the protest movement would start again in the
spring of 2021, however, there were no significant protests or rallies on March 25, 2021, which is
an important day for the Belarussian opposition as it is the anniversary declaration of independence
of the Belarussian People’s Republic [BPR] in 1918. (The opposition’s white-red-white flag
comes from the 1918 BPR, a short-lived Belarussian nationalist government created under German
occupation).
After March 25, 2021 came and went without any protests it was clear the 2020 postelection protest movement was over. Furthermore, there were no significant protests at all in
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Belarus since December 2020 and throughout 2021, including on August 9, 2021 the anniversary
of the August 9, 2020 election. After over a year without any protests, there were anti-war protests
on Sunday, February 27, 2022 (the day of Belarus’ constitutional referendum), which took place
three days after the Russian invasion of the Ukraine. According to the AP:
Hundreds of Belarusians protest[ed] [the] Russian attack on Ukraine…In the capital of
Minsk, demonstrators marched in different parts of the city carrying Ukrainian flags”1 and
“More than 500 people have been detained… according to the country’s most prominent
human rights group [Viasna]2
According to Radio Free Europe:
Protests broke out at several locations across Belarus on February 27 against the invasion
of Ukraine. Crowds chanted "Glory to Ukraine!" and "No to war!" before police came and
made hundreds of arrests3
The February 27, 2022 anti-war protests did not crystalize into a larger sustained protest
movement and there have not been any significant street protests since then. Allow me now to
return to May 2021.
Although the election protest movement had stopped by late fall 2020, there have been
important events related to Belarus since then. An important event involved the emergency
landing of a Ryan Air passenger plane in Minsk on May 23, 20214. The plane was flying to Vilnius
from Athens but was diverted to Minsk after a bomb threat was reported. An important opposition

Times of Israel, “Hundreds of Belarusians protest Russian attack on Ukraine”, February 27, 2022,
(https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/hundreds-of-belarusians-protest-russian-attack-on-ukraine/).
1

Wisconsin’s Radio station, “Live updates: Belarus detains 500-plus at invasion protests”, February 27, 2022, by AP News,
(https://wtmj.com/ap-news/2022/02/27/live-updates-belarus-detains-500-plus-at-invasion-protests/).
2

RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty, “Anti-War Protests Break Out Across Belarus”, February 27, 2022, by Current
Time, (https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-ukraine-protests/31726865.html).
3

BBC NEWS, “Belarus 'diverts Ryanair flight to arrest journalist', opposition says”, May 23, 2021,
(https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-57219860).
4

350

figure, Roman Protosevich, the co-founder and former head of oppositional Nexta telegram
channel that was instrumental in organizing the August 9, 2020 protest movement. Although the
Ryanair diversion had not been investigated, the West and Belarussian opposition condemned the
plane’s diversion as “state terrorism” and accused Belarus of “hijacking a plane”5
Belarus diverts Ryanair flight to arrest journalist, opposition says
A Ryanair plane from Greece to Lithuania was diverted to Belarus for several hours
on Sunday, with activists saying it was done to arrest a dissident journalist on board.”
European nations reacted with outrage, accusing Belarus of ‘state terrorism’.
The ex-editor of the Nexta group, Roman Protasevich, was detained before the plane was
allowed to resume its flight.
Belarus media said a MiG-29 escorted the jet to Minsk because of a bomb scare but no
explosives were found……
The US ambassador to Belarus, Julie Fisher, tweeted that it was ‘abhorrent’ Mr.
Lukashenko had faked a bomb threat and sent fighter jets to arrest a journalist….
European Council chairman Charles Michel said EU leaders would discuss "this
unprecedented incident" on Monday at a Council summit and it would not "remain without
consequences".6
Although the Western/Opposition narrative seemed apparent, the Belarussian government
bitterly contested this version of events and it insisted that it acted correctly “in accordance with
all international standards,” and has cooperated fully with the International Civil Aviation
Organization [ICAO] investigation.7 Belarus insists that it did not force the Ryanair plane to land
in Minsk but only recommended that the plane divert to Minsk—the decision to land in Minsk was

5

Ibid.

6

Ibid.

Belta, “New York Times article about Ryanair aircraft landing in Minsk dismissed as fake”, December 9, 2021,
(https://eng.belta.by/society/view/new-york-times-article-about-ryanair-aircraft-landing-in-minsk-dismissed-as-fake146069-2021/).
7
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solely the pilot’s choice.8 Belarus has released all of the communications between Belarussian air
traffic controllers and the Ryanair pilot,9 which have been published by Reuters10 and the Wall
Street Journal.11 According to these transcripts it is clear that Belarus did not order or force the
Ryanair plane to land in Minsk. And although Belarus has released its communications with the
Ryanair pilot, the communications between Ryanair and Vilnius air traffic control have not been
released as well as the communications among the Ryanair crew on board.12
Furthermore, from the moment Belarussian air traffic controllers contacted the Ryanair
pilot upon entering Belarussian airspace, it took almost 15 minutes for the pilot to decide to divert
to Minsk and was “just over 25km away from the state border.”13 Artyom Sikorsky, head of
Belarussian aviation said:
It is still not clear to us what made the pilot in command turn around and fly to Minsk two
minutes before crossing the border between Belarus and Lithuania. At the same time, the
aircraft did not even descend throughout the entire route to Belarus, although usually it
always starts descending near Baranovichi in order to have time to enter the appropriate

8

Ibid.

9

Ibid.

Reuters, “They say code is red’: transcript of controller telling plane to land in Minsk”, May 25, 2021, by Gabrielle
Tetrault-Farber and Andrew Osborn, (https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/they-say-code-is-redtranscript-controller-telling-plane-land-minsk-2021-05-25/).
10

The Wall Street Journal, “Ryanair Pilots Questioned Request to Land, Transcript Released by Belarus Shows: The
back-and-forth between the cockpit and ground control suggests pilots sought clarity on diverting to Minsk”, May 25,
2021, by Benjamin Katz and Ann M. Simmons, (https://www.wsj.com/articles/ryanair-pilots-questioned-request-toland-transcript-released-by-belarus-shows-11621968263).
11

Belta, “New York Times article about Ryanair aircraft landing in Minsk dismissed as fake”, December 9, 2021,
(https://eng.belta.by/society/view/new-york-times-article-about-ryanair-aircraft-landing-in-minsk-dismissed-as-fake146069-2021/).
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Belta, “Who wanted Ryanair plane to land in Minsk? ONT TV channel tells story behind Athens-Vilnius flight”,
June 3, 2021, (https://eng.belta.by/society/view/who-wanted-ryanair-plane-to-land-in-minsk-ont-tv-channel-tellsstory-behind-athens-vilnius-flight-140513-2021/).
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landing configuration. This raises a lot of questions. The pilot should speak out and tell
what made him take this decision.14
Also, Belarus says that it did not know that Roman Protosevich was aboard the flight.15
The fact that Belarussian authorities took so long to arrest Protosevich supports their claim.
Furthermore, the opposition might have actually informed the Belarussian authorities that
Protosevich was one of the passengers when key opposition leader Franak Vecherka, advisor to
Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, posted that Protosevich was arrested at least 30 minutes before he was
actually arrested:
According to the TV channel, Roman Protasevich was one of the last to get off the plane.
After the check he calmly boarded a bus. When he was still in line at the passport control,
reports about the forced landing of the plane and the detention of Roman Protasevich
suddenly popped up on the internet. It was first published on social networks by Franak
Vecherka. Even half an hour later since his first post, Roman Protasevich was still going
through the airport control.16
What appeared as an obvious brazen attempt by President Lukashenka to force down a
civilian airplane in order to arrest opposition figure Roman Protasevich, might not have been true.
Protasevich might have been used as a pawn for the West and opposition in order to justify
sanctions. The Ryanair incident might very well have been a set up or trap for the Belarussian
authorities. What really happened does not seem to be relevant, however. The incident was used
to justify immediate sanctions, as well as reignite a new wave of aggressive sanctions. Moreover,

Belta, “New York Times article about Ryanair aircraft landing in Minsk dismissed as fake”, December 9, 2021,
(https://eng.belta.by/society/view/new-york-times-article-about-ryanair-aircraft-landing-in-minsk-dismissed-as-fake146069-2021/).
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Belta, “Who wanted Ryanair plane to land in Minsk? ONT TV channel tells story behind Athens-Vilnius flight”,
June 3, 2021, (https://eng.belta.by/society/view/who-wanted-ryanair-plane-to-land-in-minsk-ont-tv-channel-tellsstory-behind-athens-vilnius-flight-140513-2021/).
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ICAO investigation is very passive and wasting a lot of time.17 And even if the ICAO investigation
were more assertive, it does not appear that even if Belarus were vindicated by the ICAO that it
would lead to a repeal of most of the Western economic sanctions against Belarus.

Western Sanctions After the Ryanair Incident
Immediately after the May 23, 2021 Ryanair incident the EU banned “Belarusian carriers
from its airspace and airports” and called for “further targeted economic sanctions.”18
The European Union, United States, Britain and Canada joined on Monday to expand
sanctions on Belarus, in response to the forced landing of a flight and detention of an
opposition journalist by Belarus last month.19
The opposition and the West began focusing on economic sanctions, explicitly “targeting
the economy.”20 In July 2021, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, presidential candidate and opposition
leader met with several top U.S officials, “including White House national security adviser Jake
Sullivan, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, US Agency for International Development (USAID)
Administrator Samantha Power and US Agency for Global Media (USAGM) acting CEO Kelu
Chao” includig a personal meeting with U.S. President Joseph Biden21.

Belta, “New York Times article about Ryanair aircraft landing in Minsk dismissed as fake”, December 9, 2021,
(https://eng.belta.by/society/view/new-york-times-article-about-ryanair-aircraft-landing-in-minsk-dismissed-as-fake146069-2021/).
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European Council of the EU, “EU bans Belarusian carriers from its airspace and airports.”, June 4, 2021,
(https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/06/04/eu-bans-belarusian-carriers-from-its-airspaceand-airports/).
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New York Times, “Belarus Faces Expanded E.U. and U.S. Sanctions, Targeting Economy”, June 21, 2021, by Steven
Erianger, (https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/21/world/europe/eu-belarus-sanctions.html).
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CNN Politics, “Biden meets with Belarusian opposition leader at the White House”, July 28, 2021, by Maegan
Vazquez, (https://edition.cnn.com/2021/07/28/politics/joe-biden-belarus-svetlana-tikhanovskaya/index.html) .
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Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya said she gave the Biden
administration a specific list of targets she would like to see sanctioned as she pushed for
the United States and international community to ratchet up pressure on the Lukashenko
regime.
…
Tsikhanouskaya, who is in Washington for meetings with senior administration officials,
told reporters Tuesday that she delivered a list of companies…including Belaruskali potash
as well as oil, wood and steel enterprises.
…
The Belarusian opposition politician called on the administration to enact stronger
sanctions, saying that the she believed the initial sanctions were more symbolic and ‘moral
sanctions22’
Officially the goal of these economic sanctions, by targeting the Belarussian economy, is
to put “pressure on the Lukashenko regime”23 however, Belarusian officials have called the
sanctions “economic warfare.”24 On July 30, 2021, President Lukashenka, described the true aim

of sanctions, that do not target “the Belarusian authorities, but the Belarusian nation, primarily
working people”25 “to demoralize [the] workforce,[and] launch a new wave of walk-outs and
protests.”26 President Lukashenka also said:
The main goal of western sanctions is to leave Belarusians without pensions, salaries,
stipends, high-quality healthcare, …. We have not seen such a scale of restrictive measures
CNN Politics, “Belarus opposition leader says she gave sanctions list to Biden administration”, August 7, 2021,
by Jennifer Hansler, (https://edition.cnn.com/2021/07/20/politics/belarus-opposition-leader-sanctionslist/index.html).
22
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Belta, “Western sanctions against Belarus described as economic warfare”, July 12, 2021,

(https://eng.belta.by/society/view/western-sanctions-against-belarus-described-as-economic-warfare-141605-2021/).
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President of the Republic of Belarus, page is not available at this time,
(https://president.gov.by/en/events/soveshchanie-o-protivodeystvii-sankcionnym-meram-1625068734).
Belta, “Lukashenko: Western sanctions aim to leave Belarusians without pensions, salaries”, July 30, 2021,
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before…. Like, they are looking for our sore spots. First of all, they target export-oriented
industries of the Belarusian economy. These are petrochemistry, machine-building, the
potash industry, etc. But the main goal is to leave people without pensions, salaries,
stipends, education, healthcare, and to cause an outcry in the Belarusian society.27
Belta reported:
According to the president, they are trying to demoralize workforce, launch a new wave of
walk-outs and protests. ‘That is how they aim at the foundation of the Belarusian
development model – the social state.’28
Using economic sanctions to hurt ordinary Belarussian workers in order to ignite revolt
against President Lukashenka would follow the analysis of the National Endowment for
Democracy.29 It found one of the key weaknesses of the August 9 Movement was that Belarus,
unlike Poland in the 1980’s, was in good shape economically, and not wracked by the deep
economic problems that Poland faced in the 1980’s. The NED warned that without deep economic
problems, President Lukashenka could easily outlast any protest movement.
And while Tikhanovskaya did not explicitly state her goal is to attempt to foment
revolution by creating social and economic instability by targeting working-class Belarussians, she
did not deny that her sanctions would harm ordinary Belarussians when “U.S. officials responded
with concern about how such sanctions would affect the people of Belarus: She argued that the
people were already suffering30”
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Journal of democracy, “Belarus Uprising: The Making of a Revolution”, October, 2020, by Sławomir
Sierakowski, (https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/belarus-uprising-the-making-of-a-revolution/).
29

30
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Although Svetlana Tikhanovskaya was vague about the goal of the economic sanctions,
Anatol Kotau, key opposition leader and former member of President Lukashenka’s administration
was upfront about the goals of the sanctions and confirmed President Lukashenka’s position.
It's time to bleed Belarus's economy, says former Lukashenko adviser [Anatol Kotau]
A once-loyal civil servant is now working to help overthrow Belarus’s strongman
…
Lukashenko's economy cannot survive without external finance, and cutting off the sources

of income will shorten his days,’ said Kotau. ‘He will not be able to pay salaries for the
majority of Belarusians … and these people will go to the streets.
…
Kotau cites a Belarusian saying, "The refrigerator will vote," which suggests that only
when people can no longer afford basic necessities will Lukashenko's iron-fisted hold on
power be shaken.31
Though not as forthright as Kotau, the European Union also admits the sanctions would

hurt ordinary Belarussians:
We didn’t use economic sanctions in the beginning because we know they affect everyone,
because they affect the economy,” Mr. [Josep] Borrell [of the E. U.] said. But he also said
that Brussels was prepared for a fifth round of sanctions if necessary32.
…
EU promises new sanctions will hurt Belarus
These are going to hurt

CBC, “It's time to bleed Belarus's economy, says former Lukashenko adviser”, May 29, 2021, by Chris Brown,
(https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/belarus-lukashenko-economy-1.6043951).
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Erianger, (https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/21/world/europe/eu-belarus-sanctions.html).
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Borrell said the ministers will also prepare a raft of economic sanctions for EU leaders to
endorse at a summit on Thursday. ‘These are going to hurt, going to hurt the economy of
Belarus heavily,’ he said.33
The German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas practically agreed with President Lukashenka
who accused the West of “looking for [Belarus’] sore spots. First of all, they target export-oriented
industries of the Belarusian economy.” Mass said:
We will no longer just sanction individuals. We will now also impose sectoral sanctions - meaning that we will now get to work on the economic areas that are of particular
significance for Belarus and for the regime’s income34.
Alexander Klaskouski, a political analyst “told the Associated Press that the economic
sanctions ‘are much stricter and more painful than the previous measures.35’” A fellow at the
deeply anti-Lukashenka think tank, the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, Katsiaryna
Shmatsina, ironically stated:
The most proactive part of society that takes part in the protests, they stand for the
sanctions, realizing that it puts morepressure on Lukashenko,” she said. “They are ready to
suffer the short-term losses36.”
However, the “most proactive part of society that takes part in the protests” who is mainly
middle-class, will not be heavily affected by these sanctions, which will fall most heavily on the

Euronews, “'There's no going back': EU promises new sanctions will hurt Belarus”, October 4, 2021, by AP,
(https://www.euronews.com/2021/06/21/there-s-no-going-back-eu-promises-new-sanctions-will-hurt-belarus).
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Independent,ie, “EU hits Belarus with sanctions intended to hurt Lukashenko and his allies”, June 24, 2021, by
Mike Corder and Lorne Cook, (https://www.independent.ie/world-news/eu-hits-belarus-with-sanctions-intended-tohurt-lukashenko-and-his-allies-40576324.html).
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Washington Post, “The E.U. wants to toughen sanctions on Belarus. How likely is that to work?”, May 28, 2021,
by Claire Parker, (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/05/28/belarus-sanctions-explainer/).
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industrial workers at the sanctioned enterprises as well as pensioners whose pensions might be in
arrears if the sanctions lead to a significant loss of income at the sanction’s enterprises.
Although the 2021 spring/summer Western sanctions against Belarus were unprecedented,
I predicted that the sanctions would not lead to severe socio-economic instability or the overthrow
of President Lukashenka. First, Belarus had experience dealing with sanctions and withstood them
fairly well. Second, rather than turning the working class against Lukashenka, the sanctions would

likely have the opposite effect. They would likely win over more support including some of the
working-class support President Lukashenka might have lost during the summer of 2020. Third,
the sanctions, which target working-class Belarussians would further alienate the opposition.
Whatever working-class sympathy the opposition gained would be lost.
Writing now in April 2022, it appears that my predictions were correct. So far, at least, the
2021 Western sanctions have not led to any socio-economic instability. President Lukashenka
described the loses from these Western sanctions as “miniscule” “compared to the growth we have
had this year.”37 President Lukashenka attributes Belarus’ recent economic growth (in spite of the
Western sanctions) to the fact that Belarus only many other countries, did not impose a lockdown
or “stop the economy” in response to COVID.38 Belta reported:
Aleksandr Lukashenko said, explaining that Belarusian producers got a chance to tap more
into foreign markets at a time when other countries were on lockdown.39
(Ironically, President Lukashenka’s response to COVID, which enraged much of the
middle class and was a major factor in the large mobilization of the anti-government protests in

Belta, “Belarus' losses from Western sanctions described as minuscule”, December 1, 2021,
(https://eng.belta.by/president/view/belarus-losses-from-western-sanctions-described-as-minuscule-145771-2021/).
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2020, also led to favorable economic conditions that minimized the effect of the protest movement
and contributed to Belarus’ stability.)
The 2021 spring/summer Western sanctions also have not re-kindled any protest
movement. In general, in spite of the opposition’s massive protest movement in the summer of
2020, the opposition seems to have returned to its past position, very isolated from ordinary
Belarusians and insignificant (Yarashevich 2014; Ioffe 2004). And, as I predicted, the opposition

sanctions that directly targeted the working class, in general, seem to have undone any sympathy
gained among working-class Belarussians.

A New Round of Post-Ukraine-War Sanctions
In February/March 2022 the West levied a new round of broad economic sanctions against
Belarus, officially in response to Belarus’ support of the Russian military invasion of the
Ukraine.40 (Although no Belarussian soldiers were involved in the invasion, Belarus allowed the
Russian military to invade the Ukraine from within Belarussian territory). This broad wave of
Western sanctions included the European Union’s removal of three large Belarussian banks from
the international SWIFT financial system, “a prohibition on transactions with the Central Bank of
Belarus,” “limits on the financial inflows from Belarus to the EU,” and “a prohibition on the
provision of euro-denominated banknotes to Belarus.”41

U.S. Departament of the Treasury, “U.S. Treasury Targets Belarusian Support for Russian Invasion of Ukraine”,
February 24, 2022, (https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0607); European Council, “EU restrictive
measures against Belarus”, March, 2022, (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictivemeasures-against-belarus/).
40

European Council, “EU restrictive measures against Belarus”, March, 2022,
(https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-belarus/).
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Although not nearly as broad as the measures taken against Russia by individual
companies, this round of sanctions also included measures enacted by several companies
themselves in response to the invasion of the Ukraine42 including DHL, UPS, and FedEx; 43
DuPont;44 , Honeywell;45 Western Union, Deutsche Bank, Western Union, Amazon and American
Express.46
Were it not for the highly volatile and unprecedented situation in the world right now in

response to the war in the Ukraine, I would predict that the latest round of economic sanctions
against Belarus would also be unsuccessful. It appears, however, that the world is re-ordering,
possibly dividing into two separate economic camps: the West (the US and EU) and the East
(Russia, China, India, etc.). It is not entirely clear how this would affect Belarus’ economy, which
trades heavily with the West. Be that as it may, however, Belarus and its social economic model
has proven very resourceful against economic sanctions (Ioffe 2014). Belarus socio-economic

model, though it “has been declared dead on many occasions” has gone on to survive in spite of
its many detractors (Ioffe 2014:51). Though Belarus might face now face its greatest economic
challenge, Belarus is also strategically situated to cope with this challenge especially since it
produces, among other things, tractors, combine-harvesters, potash and fertilizers—things that are
absolutely vital in the context of the potential food security crisis resulting from the war in the

ABC News, “Companies that have suspended operations in Russia over invasion of Ukraine”, March 25, 2022, by
Rebecca Gelpi-Ufret, (https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/companies-suspended-operations-russia-invasionukraine/story?id=83653738).
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DuPont , “DuPont Statement on Suspending Business Operations in Russia and Belarus”, March 15, 2022,
(https://www.dupont.com/news/dupont-statement-on-suspending-business-operations-in-russia-and-belarus.html).
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Reuters, “Honeywell suspends business in Russia, Belarus”, March 9, 2022,
(https://www.reuters.com/business/honeywell-suspends-business-russia-belarus-2022-03-09/).
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ABC News, “Companies that have suspended operations in Russia over invasion of Ukraine”, March 25, 2022, by
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Ukraine. Furthermore, Belarussian food production itself, which is in good condition, might also
be strategically positioned to benefit from possible food shortages. It is likely that Belarus’ socioeconomic model will survive this challenge as well.

IT Industry Exodus in Response to the Ukraine War
In response to the 2020 election and police crackdown thousands of Belarussian IT workers
have left Belarus in what was characterized as an “exodus.”47 This supposed exodus might pale
in comparison to flight of IT workers and firms in response to the Ukraine war. Now, Belarussian
IT workers—mostly men—fear being drafted and are fleeing, mainly to Georgia.48 According to
Georgian officials 16,000 Belarussian have already fled to Georgia a tenfold increase from the
same period in 2019 and according to the Globe and Mail these numbers might are already even
higher49
It is not clear what effect this exodus of IT workers and sanctions in general will have on
Belarus’ High Tech Park. Previous reports of the imminent demise of Belarus’ IT Sector have
been exaggerated. For example, in spite many Belarussian IT workers leaving Belarus after the

France24, “Belarus IT sector hit by exodus after post-vote crackdown”, June 27, 2021, by AFP,
(https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210627-belarus-it-sector-hit-by-exodus-after-post-vote-crackdown). See
also Washington Post, “Belarus once cultivated high-tech talent. Now those people are fleeing political crackdowns”,
July 24, 2021, by David L. Stern and Robyn Dixon, (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/belarus-techflee-lukashenko/2021/07/23/862d6594-cf95-11eb-a224-bd59bd22197c_story.html).
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Georgia”, March 21, 2022, (https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-brain-drain-thousands-of-young-draftfearing-digital-nomads-flee/).
49

Ibid.

362

2020 election and police crackdown BNE-IntelliNews (a harsh critic of President Lukashenka),
reported as late as February 8, 2022 that “the IT sector is still growing in Belarus.”50
If the recent sanctions and exodus of IT workers were to diminish the Belarussian IT
significantly this would certainly affect the Belarussian economy negatively as it would lose
millions of dollars of hard currency.51 Regardless of the fate of the Belarussian IT sector, it is
certain that the recent exodus of young male IT workers will make it far less likely ever to

overthrow President Lukashenka or the Belarussian government in general (see also Marples
2006). 2006). Minsk-based IT workers played a critical role in the 2020 uprising likely making
up the bulk of the protesters on the street. With the loss of several thousand more IT workers (if
not even greater numbers) the likelihood of a successful revolution is greatly diminished (see
Marples 2006). Though the future of the Belarussian IT sector is unclear, the continued exodus of
young male IT workers will most likely lead to increased stability for President Lukashenka and

Belarus’ socially-oriented economic model.

Refugee Crisis at Belarussian Border
Another important event to take place in Belarus since the 2020 protest movement was the
refugee crisis at the Belarussian border. I introduced this topic—indirectly—in the introduction
of this dissertation. According to President Lukashenka, Belarus stopped preventing refugees from
crossing its borders into the European Union. President Lukashenka said in May 2021,

Bne Intellinews, “What will happen to the Hi-Tech Park?”, February 8, 2022, by bne
IntelliNews, (https://www.intellinews.com/what-will-happen-to-the-hi-tech-park-234175/).
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In the context of the current crisis (following the Ukraine war), however, it is not obvious that US dollars or other
“hard” Western currencies, such as the Euro, will play such a dominant role in Belarus’ future.
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We stopped drugs and migrants.

Now you will have to eat them and catch them

yourselves.52
This led to a situation in which numerous refugees, manly from the middle east, were
coming to Belarus to attempt to cross the border into Poland and Lithuania. In response, Poland
and Lithuania tightened their borders and prevented migrants from coming through. Poland was
absolutely determined to keep the migrants out; it declared a state of emergency in the border
regions and “deployed more than 15,000 soldiers, joining scores of border guards and police
officers.”53 According to the New York Times,
Poland, eager to keep the migrants’ suffering out of the public eye, has sealed off its side
of the border, barring aid workers, journalists and even doctors. On Tuesday, hundreds of
migrants tried to rush into Poland, but Polish border forces used water cannons and tear
gas to drive them back.54
Not only was there a humanitarian crisis as many migrants were camped out in the cold
waiting to get through at risk from exposure, many feared that the standoff would escalate into a
wider conflict in the region, possibly a military conflict.55
The Western narrative is very similar to the Belarussian narrative, except it claims
President Lukashenka weaponized migrants as a political maneuver and was directly assisting
migrants get to the border—forcing them to cross the border,56 even beating them.57

BBC New, “Belarus-Poland border row escalates - BBC News”, November 11, 2021, posted on YouTube,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JJksoloubBg).
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The dictator of Belarus, across the border, is accused of organizing
This [migrant] crossing for thousands to here, Lithuania, in the EU, for
Retaliation of sanctions
…
This is all about a dictator getting revenge58
The crisis was eventually resolved diplomatically when German Chancellor, Angela
Merkel, called President Lukashenka on the telephone and spoke to him twice.59 And although it

is reported that Chancellor Merkel referred to President Lukashenka as “(‘Mr.’) Lukashenko, not
calling him president,”60 it appears her two telephone calls might have served as unofficial
recognition of President Lukashenka.61 Obviously, opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya was
very upset by Chancellor Merkel’s calling President Lukashenka twice. Though Tikhanovskaya
insisted, after talking to Merkel herself, that they together, “concluded that this [phone call] had
been done out of humanitarian motives and that any recognition [of Lukashenka] is out of the

question.”62 It seems, however, that the telephone calls did represent an unofficial recognition of
President Lukashenka. Tikhanovskaya said,
This [phone call] was something incomprehensible because for more than a year now the
EU has been pursuing the policy of the nonrecognition of Lukashenka as legitimate and

CNN, “Hear stories from the border of Europe's last dictatorship”, August 21, 2021, by CNN Editor Nick Paton
Walsh, (https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/21/opinions/linas-kojala-belarus-migration-op-ed/index.html).
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France Presse, (https://www.barrons.com/news/belarus-opposition-leader-says-merkel-lukashenko-calls-strange01637586607).
60
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France Presse, (https://www.barrons.com/news/belarus-opposition-leader-says-merkel-lukashenko-calls-strange01637586607); see also ERR News, “Mihkelson: Who gave Merkel a mandate to speak to Lukashenko?”, November
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they have not stepped back from their strategy. Well, such a phone call was very
unexpected and strange.63
According to the French Press Agency,
[Tikhanovskaya] appealed to EU ministers ‘to refrain from any contacts’ with Belarus ruler
Alexander Lukashenko, describing German Chancellor Angela Merkel's calls with him as ‘very
strange’.64
The understanding that Chancellor Merkel’s telephone calls to President Lukashenka
served as an unofficial recognition was clear on Estonian Television:
On Wednesday, Merkel held a second phone call with Lukashenko in three days. This is
the first time a western leader has communicated with him since the presidential election
in 2020, which is widely regarded as rigged.65
Marko Mihkelson, Estonian politician and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee
“criticized German Chancellor Angela Merkel's talks with Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko.”
He criticized her first telephone call as “‘disappointing’66
Is it necessary to have talks at the level of the German chancellor with a person who
committed a coup last year and who is not recognized as head of state by leaders of the
European Union?’ he [Mihkelson] asked.67
The Polish government’s reaction also supports the position that Merkel’s telephone calls
represented an unofficial recognition of President Lukashenka.
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Earlier on Wednesday, Polish government spokesperson Piotr Mueller described Merkel's first call
with Lukashenko as ‘not a good step.’
In remarks to public broadcaster TVP, he [Mueller] said the conversation was ‘in a way, acceptance
of his election.’”68
The talks have riled top officials in the governments of countries that border Lukashenko.
Poland’s president, Andrzej Duda, said he would not recognise any deals cut ‘over our
heads’.
…
No serious leader has spoken with Lukashenko so far,’ he said, promising Poland
would enforce its sovereignty ‘ruthlessly’.69
Chancellor Merkel’s telephone calls to President Lukashenka has caused criticism within
Germany as well:
Merkel and Lukashenko’s first telephone conversation on Monday, which lasted about 50
minutes, had already provoked criticism from inside and outside Germany.70
…
Within Germany, the foreign policy spokesperson for the Green Party, Omid Nouripour, described
the talks as ‘devastating.’
Merkel's spokesperson was forced to defend the call on Wednesday.”71

Daily Sabah, “Lukashenko agrees with Germany to hold talks over migrants”, November 17, 2021,
(https://www.dailysabah.com/world/europe/lukashenko-agrees-with-germany-to-hold-talks-over-migrants). See also
France 24, “Merkel and Lukashenko discuss need for talks, aid in migrant border crisis”, November 17, 2021,
(https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20211117-merkel-and-lukashenko-agree-to-talks-about-belarusian-bordercrisis).
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The fact that “Putin had called on EU leaders to talk directly to Lukashenko” and that the
Kremlin “welcomed contact between Belarus and the EU, calling it ‘very important,’”72 also
supports the position that Chancellor Merkel’s telephone calls represented an unofficial or de facto
recognition of President Lukashenka.

Belarus’ February 27, 2022 Constitutional Referendum
One of the most important events that have taken place in Belarus since the 2020 protest
movement was the February 27, 2022 Constitutional Referendum, which was approved by 65
percent of the vote officially.73 The referendum was, however, greatly overshadowed by the recent
February 24, 2022 Russian invasion of the Ukraine. Western coverage of the referendum focused
on the Belarus’ shedding of its “neutral and nonnuclear status, paving the way for closer military
ties with Russia.”74 And although the new constitution includes term limits “the restriction will
only take effect once a ‘newly elected president’ assumes office, which gives Lukashenko an
opportunity to run for two more [5-year] terms after his current one expires in 2025.”75 In principle
President Lukashenka could remain president until 2035.
The Belarussian opposition “charged” that the referendum “was a rigged election.”76 And
opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya harshly condemned the new constitution:

The Guardian, “Lukashenko has got the ear of the EU at last – but it won’t help him”, November 18, 2021, by
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It is a betrayal of the country, betrayal of the nation…. In order to hold on to power,
Lukashenko held a fake referendum and offered our lands for the Russian troops to invade
[Ukraine].77
…
Tikhanovskaya added that "Lukashenko is trying to prescribe himself immunity from
criminal prosecution, powers to strip Belarusians of their citizenship.78
Rather than boycott the referendum, the Belarussian opposition called on supporters to
submit “spoiled ballots” as a way of symbolically protesting the referendum.79 The deeply antiLukashenka and pro-opposition think tank, Atlantic Council, also condemned the referendum as a
“sham,” that will only “concentrate more power in [President Lukashenka’s] hands,” and that “the
referendum will not end the deep political crisis in Belarus or secure the legitimacy that
Lukashenka craves”80
The opposition has also criticized referendum’s formal incorporation of the All-Belarus

People’s Assembly into the new constitution “as a new body to operate in parallel with the
parliament”81 and “as the ‘highest representative body of the people's power of the Republic of
Belarus.’”82
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Tsikhanouskaya added that ‘Lukashenko is trying to …appoint a new Politburo embodied
in the All-Belarus People's Assembly that no one has elected’83
According to the International Institute of Democracy and electoral Assistance [IDEA]:
Initiated in 1996, the ABPA’s originally stated purpose is as a public consultative body,
meeting every five years to deliberate on economic and social issues. In reality, however,
the ABPA has been stacked with loyalists connected to the government or state-owned
businesses and has functioned as a mouthpiece of Lukashenka’s regime. This would not
change in the new iteration of the ABPA, as its membership will be determined by the
current pro-Lukashenka legislature (Art. 144).84
The Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance warns that giving the All-Belarussian
People’s Assembly “wide-ranging competences and significant powers85” could seriously weaken
the legislative branch and conceivably prevent a future elected pro-opposition president from
taking office.86 Specifically, the Institute warns that President Lukashenka:
As potential president of the All-Belarusian People's Assembly, Lukashenka could
further consolidate power and weaken the standing of the elected houses of
parliament…87 (bold in original)
…
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If the reforms pass and Lukashenka leaves the presidency but still heads the ABPA, he will
have succeeded in “replicating Lukashenka’s system without Lukashenka” and could
instrumentalize the ABPA to remove future presidents and dispute election results. 88
Furthermore,
The proposed changes would effectively exclude almost all current opposition from
running for president… (bold in original)
Another indication of Lukashenka’s intention to maintain control and stifle opposition, the
proposed changes would effectively exclude almost all current opposition from running for
president. Eligibility is limited to those who have been permanently resident in the Republic of
Belarus for at least 20 years immediately prior to the election [previously it was 10 years89], and
who have not previously held a foreign citizenship or residence permit, or other document of a
foreign state (Art. 80). This amendment would appear to put into practice Lukashenka’s previous
pronouncement in relation to presidential replacement: “Even if I would not be here … over my
dead body, they [the opposition] would not succeed.”90
However, in general, replicating the Lukashenka system without Lukashenka is the very
goal of the new constitution from President Lukashenka’s perspective. I have been discussing
Belarus’ new constitution from the perspective of the opposition and opposition-minded analysts
who have mainly focused President Lukashenka’s personal desire to hold on to power as the main
goal of the new constitution. However, from President Lukashenka’s perspective one of the main
goals of the new constitution was to “to preserve the main social guarantees” of Belarus’ socio-
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economic model, specifically “healthcare, support for the elderly, jobs, education, and so on” (as
well as to “ensure security”).91 President Lukashenka stressed:
There is no doubt the Constitution has to specify such basic needs as a priority and it will
definitely do so. If we don't do it, we will undo the entire history of the last 25 years when
we worked to create the sovereign and independent state. It is our legacy, our advantage.
We cannot abandon it. And we won't.92
The new constitution kept the key social welfare aspects of the previous one, including:
Article 1 that specifically calls Belarus a “social state” and Article 21 that specifically states:
Everyone has the right to a decent standard of living, including adequate food, clothing,
housing and continuous improvement of the necessary conditions for this.93
The new constitution also kept Article 41, in support of full employment as the state’s
official goal:
The State shall create conditions necessary for full employment of the population. In the
event that a person is unemployed for reasons beyond his control, he is guaranteed training
in new specialties and advanced training, taking into account social needs, as well as
unemployment benefits in accordance with the law.94
And Article 42 guarantees a living wage:
Employees shall be guaranteed a just share of remuneration for the economic results of
their labour in accordance with the quantity, quality and social significance of such work,
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but it shall not be less than the level which shall ensure them and their families a life of
independence and dignity.95
Now that Belarus’ socially-oriented economic model is well-established President
Lukashenka wants to prevent any future president from being able to dismantle it easily (as well
as threaten Belarus’ security), since the previous 1996 constitution gave enormous power to the
president. President Lukashenka said:

Lukashenko will not last forever, and we do not know who my successor will be: maybe,
a dictator or an authoritarian leader – no one knows. This is the main reason why we have
resorted to amending the Constitution.96
This is why the new constitution has limited the president’s power for example,
“presidential decrees would no longer have the force of law (Art. 85), a return to the status quo
before the 1996 referendum.”97 In principle, Belarus’ political system would no longer be a superpresidential system (Astapenia 2022; see also Matsuzato 2004) or “hyper-presidential system with
power consolidated in the office of the president.”98 Furthermore,
Lukashenka’s purported reasoning for enshrining the powers of the ABPA [AllBelarussian People’s Assembly] in the constitution was to transfer, and thus neutralize,
excessive presidential powers.99

95

Ibid.

Belta, “Lukashenko in favor of preserving strong presidential authority”, March 30, 2021,
(https://eng.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-in-favor-of-preserving-strong-presidential-authority-138605-2021/).
See also Clingendael Spectator, “How Lukashenko internationalizes the Belarusian crisis”, June 9, 2021,
(https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/publication/how-lukashenko-internationalises-belarusian-crisis).
96

Constitution Net, “Belarus's upcoming referendum: Lukashenka stacks the deck,” February 24, 2022, a project of
the Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance, no longer available, (https://constitutionnet.org/news/belarussupcoming-referendum-lukashenka-stacks-deck).
97

98

Ibid.

99

Ibid.

373

Recent criticism of Belarus’ new constitution has mainly focused on President
Lukashenka’s personal desire to hold on to power. However, whatever President Lukashenka’s
personal inclinations for holding onto power, he has demonstrated a genuine commitment to
Belarus’ socially-oriented economic model (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021, 2019; Papko and
Kozarzewskiu 2020; Rudy 2020; Veselova 2016; Yarashevich 2014; Ioffe 2014, 2004; Potocki
2011; Leshchenko 2008; Ambrosio 2006; Matsuzato 2004; Furman 1999). Even some of President
Lukashenka’s harshest critics have admitted this (for example Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:171,
2019; Leshchenko 2008; Ambrosio 2006:15; Matsuzato 2004:244-245; Furman 1999:8 see also
Bedford 2021 and Glod 2020 and Potocki 2011100). Therefore, it is clear that a major goal of the
new constitution is to help preserve Belarus’ socially-oriented economic model after President
Lukashenka is long gone. And Enshrining the All-Belarussian People’s Assembly with great
constitutional powers would serve that purpose safeguarding the Lukashenka system without
Lukashenka in the future. President Lukashenka said this explicitly at the last meeting of the AllBelarussian People’s Assembly in February 2021:
That is why I proposed to make the All-Belarusian People's Assembly a constitutional
body, to make it with the powers that if this social contract that we conclude is violated,
the All-People's Assembly, you, will have all the power. Even without me.101
The All-Belarussian People’s Assemble has defended Belarus’ “socially-oriented policy as
a priority” in the past,102 for example in 2016 the assembly declared:

Though Bedford (2021), Glod (2020) and Potocki (2011) do not explicitly discuss the genuineness President’s
commitment to Belarus’ socially-oriented economic model, it is absolutely clear from their articles, that they believe
he is committed to the model and will not change it.
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Preserving the socially-oriented policy as a priority is the most important thing.103
And the All-Belarussian People’s Assemble has continued to pledge support for the
socially-oriented economic model at its latest assembly in January 2021104 declaring: “The social
state will remain the unchanged…”105
President Lukashenka “has always attached great importance to the VNS [All-Belarussian
People’s Assembly].”106 In 2016 he said that the:
All-Belarusian People’s Assembly is rightfully one of the most important forms of direct
democracy and a self-justifying public institution.107
And according to representatives of the Belarussian government, membership in the AllBelarussian People’s Assembly will be open to everyone through a fair democratic process.108 In
fact, according to the Belarussian government, membership in the All-Belarussian People’s
Assembly has always, in principle, been open to everyone through a fair democratic process.109
On the one hand President Lukashenka considers the All-Belarussian People’s Assembly
“one of the most important forms of direct democracy” while on the other, the opposition considers
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it an unelected Politburo110 or a “reincarnation of the CPSU.”111 Who then is right? Unfortunately,
I will not be able to answer this question definitively as a comprehensive examination of AllBelarusian People’s Assembly is beyond the scope of this study. Be that as it may, I will make a
few important points concerning this topic.
First, there is no doubt that the All-Belarussian People’s Assembly mainly consists of
President Lukashenka’s supporters. During President Lukashenka’s February 11, 2021 address to
the All-Belarussian People’s Assembly, he unabashedly and directly referred to them as his
supporters (literally “the supporters of the current President”).112 And although in principle
membership in the assembly is open to everyone including the opposition, it is also clear that
President Lukashenka does not anticipate that the All-Belarussian People’s Assembly sociopolitical orientation or composition will change drastically in the future.113 This is the obvious
reason that President Lukashenka has entrusted the All-Belarussian People’s Assembly with great
powers to defend Belarus’ socio-economic model and security without him (“even without me”).
Be that as it may, though the composition of the All-Belarussian People’s Assembly is
mainly Lukashenka supporters (and supporters of Belarus’ socio-economic model), we cannot,
however, assume that members with alternative or oppositional viewpoints are unfairly excluded.
First, if support for President Lukashenka is much higher than the opposition believes (a position
I have argued throughout this study), then it seems likely that the support for President Lukashenka
within the All-Belarussian People’s Assembly would be very high. Second, and even more
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Euronews, (https://www.euronews.com/2021/12/28/belarus-unveils-constitutional-changes-to-extend-lukashenko-srule).
110

Meduza, “The Lukashenko circus Why the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly matters and what it means for the
opposition”, February 12, 2021, (https://meduza.io/en/feature/2021/02/12/the-lukashenko-circus).
111

[In Russian] President of the Republic of Belarus, “Report of the President of Belarus at the VI All-Belarusian
National”, February 11, 2021, (https://president.gov.by/ru/events/shestoe-vsebelorusskoe-narodnoe-sobranie). .
112

113

Ibid.

376

important, the lack of oppositional members in the All-Belarussian People’s Assembly could be
explained by the opposition’s radicalism or even extremist viewpoint. By radical or extremist, I
mean the opposition’s insistence upon overthrowing President Lukashenka and implementing a
radical program, rather than working toward reforms within the existing framework. This radical
aspect of the opposition is well-noted in the literature (Ioffe 2014, 2004; Yarashevich 2014;
Manaev 2014:229; Kulakevich 2014). Even pro-opposition researchers such as Kulakevich
(2014:898) and Manaev (2014:229) admit this. For example, Kulakevich, a staunch supporter of
the opposition and harsh critic of President Lukashenka said:
The majority of the opposition forces in Belarus support complete removal of the current
regime and a radical change of the entire political system to a democratic one (p.898)
Similarly, Manaev warned:
Those who are eager for democracy should move from the philosophy of the barricades to
a philosophy of coexistence with their opponents—politics, economy, culture, and in the
mass media (p.229)
Knowing this fact about the Belarussian opposition and its very radical orientation, it does
not seem surprising that opposition supporters would not be very eager to become members of the
All-Belarussian People’s Assembly even if membership were open to them.

Belarus’ State-Owned Industrial Sector and the New Constitution
One of the main goals of Belarus’ new constitution is to protect Belarus’ socially-oriented
economic model thereby preserving it for future generations regardless of whoever is president.
Surprisingly, however, there is nothing in the new constitution that explicitly protects Belarus’
state-owned industrial sector from privatization, although the state-owned industrial sector has
been instrumental in preserving Belarus’ socially-oriented policy and economic development (Li
and Cheng 2020; Yarashevich 2014). Leaving out explicit protections for Belarus’ historic and
377

critical state-owned industries cannot simply be an oversight, especially when many workers,
during meetings about the new constitution specifically requested that the new constitution
explicitly forbid the privatization of Belarus’ major state-owned factories—especially large
factories that are the main industry of a city.114
They [the workers] also ask[ed] about items related to the preservation of health. By the
way, people have asked to prescribe in the Constitution a ban on the privatization of large
city-forming enterprises. For many, it is important that the factories remain owned by the

country115
(Note these workers’ concerns were not published in an oppositional source, but were
published in the largest state-owned newspaper SB ––formally known as Soviet Belorussia—which
promotes the president’s policies.)
Furthermore, on July 22, 2021, President Lukashenka “signed a decree, under which part
of the presidential functions regarding the privatization of state property, are transferred to the
government and local authorities.”116 This new law shows how critical the issue of privatization
is and the new law serves as an effort to safeguard Belarus’ state-enterprises in the future. In this
context, it seems a constitutional provision forbidding privatizing of state-owned enterprises would
be appropriate.
What then is the significance of the new constitution’s silence on the forbidding the
privatization of Belarus state industries? Does this imply the government plans on privatizing

[In Russian] SB Tendency, “Constructive Ideas? Propose (them)” “Конструктивная идея? – Предлaгай!” No. 7,
(26400) Thursday, January 13, 2020, Page 2, online version is available at
(https://www.sb.by/articles/konstruktivnaya-ideya-predlagay.html).
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Belarus’ state-owned factories? This is a complicated question: one that researchers, in general,
have been exploring for many years (for example, Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021, 2019; Bedford
2021, Li and Cheng 2021; Glod 2020; Papko and Kozarzewski 2020; Rudy 2020; Veselova 2016;
Yarashevich 2014; Ioffe 2014, 2004; Potocki 2011; Leshchenko 2008).
Notwithstanding the new constitution’s silence on privatization, it does not seem likely that
the Belarussian government will privatize its state-owned industrial sector anytime in the near
future (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021, 2019; Bedford 2021, Li and Cheng 2020; Glod 2020; Papko
and Kozarzewski 2020; Rudy 2020; Veselova 2016; Yarashevich 2014; Ioffe 2014, 2004; Potocki
2011; Leshchenko 2008). President Lukashenka railed against mass privatization during his
February 2021 address to the All-Belarussian People’s Assembly. He condemned the neoliberal
policies of shock therapy and mass privatization that overcame Russia in the 1990’s and
condemned Belarussian opposition’s support for “wholesale privatization:”

First. Economy. Carrying out wholesale privatization of enterprises. Private property is
everything, it will save the country and it has the prospect of development. I won't
comment. Think for yourself.
Second. Immediate liquidation of weak enterprises. There are no losses to speak of.
Liquidation - period. All those who are released at these enterprises, and millions of people
will be thrown out into the street, I quote, ‘will find their place in the IT sphere.’117
(Note, in support of my major findings about moral economy, President Lukashenka said
during this speech that if the opposition had come to power and tried to implement its program of
wholesale privatization “the [Belarussian] people would trample you”118(emphasis added))
On March 24, 2021, President Lukashenka forbade the privatization of a tannery:
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The privatization of the Minsk Leather Production Association is out of the question.
Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenko made the relevant statement as he visited this
enterprise in Gatovo, Minsk District on 23 March, BelTA has learned.
Aleksandr Lukashenko stressed: “Any privatization of this enterprise is out of the question.
The processing of raw hides is a strategic branch of the national economy.” He remarked that
proper attention should be paid to this economic branch.
We cannot give all the raw materials to one person however good they may be. You
understand what may happen if we do,” the president added. Moreover, in his words, the
terms of the possible privatization were not the best for the enterprise and the state. 119
And as recently as January 28, 2022, President Lukashenka was condemning, among other
things, the opposition’s mass-privatization program:
Their program provided for restructuring, partial and full privatization of large and
medium-sized enterprises, in fact, a manageable sale of farmland and industry flagships
under the guise of massive privatization and development of the land market (like in
Ukraine). It was decided who would get what and under what conditions. The assets would
go to those who finance the opposition today.120

President Lukashenka, However, is not Categorically against Privatization
Although Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector has been the backbone of Belarus’
socially-oriented economic development—and what has distinguished its developmental model
from other similar countries (Li and Cheng 2020; Yarashevich 2014), President Lukashenka,
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however is not categorically against “the sale of state-run assets.”121 Speaking as recently as
December 2, 2021 president Lukashenka clarified his position on privatization as reported in Belta:
Aleksandr Lukashenko said: “If I see that they [the former-state firms] will disappear, I
will be categorically against such a privatization.
The president explained his stance using Belarusian MAZ and Russian KamAZ as an
example. “I didn't oppose the merger of these enterprises. But I was dead set against our MAZ,
which makes quality vehicles, becoming an auxiliary branch of KamAZ. It is what I opposed,” he
said.122 On June 7, 2018, President Lukashenka explained his views on privatization carefully
during his meeting with the EBRD (European Bank of Reconstruction and Development) Vice
President as reported by Radio Belarus. (At the end of the passage President Lukashenka briefly
explains, what I have been calling Belarus’ Socially-Oriented Privatization Program)
During the talks Alexander Lukashenko stated that Belarus was not opposed to
privatization, but spoke against mass or ‘shock’ privatization:
We are absolutely not opposed to privatization. It is quite a natural process. We are
against mass or ‘shock’ privatization. This is the essence of our approach. After all, the
public property was created by the whole nation, and it is especially true for earlier times.
We do have some valuable assets on our hands. Selling it for a penny would mean giving
rise to injustice and stirring discontent among people. We saw it happen in the neighboring
countries of the former Soviet Union. We would not want privatization to become a zone
of tension in the society. Also, transfer of public property to private investors must bring
benefits to the country. It should envisage good salaries for workers of the privatized
companies, new jobs and regular revenues to the state budget.123
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President Lukashenka (1998) supports privatization when it is beneficial to everyone,
leading to good wages, stable jobs and modernization. This concept, which I referred to as the
Socially-Oriented Privatization Program, was a major part of this study. In principle, President
Lukashenka is open to privatizing (on favorable terms) most of Belarus’ state-owned firms (Ioffe
2014:261). On March 30, 2012 President Lukashenka said:
Any enterprise can be privatized without exceptions. Why do we have to conceal things?"
the President stressed and added: "We have to make it clear once and for all: no ubiquitous
privatization, privatization is pinpoint, if the state needs it, and all Belarusian enterprises
can be privatized for the right price124
President Lukashenka has repeated this position or similar ones on numerous occasions,
including May 29, 2020. Belta reported:
The president stressed that …he is not against the sale of state-run assets. “First, tell me
how much you will pay. And I will think whether we should sell this enterprise [Minsk
Tractor Works] or not,” Aleksandr Lukashenko said.
…the head of state added. In this regard, he stressed that he cannot sell state-owned assets
for a song, because those production facilities were set up people, by previous
generations.125
Whether President Lukashenka is truly open to privatizing any state-owned firm is
questionable, however; most researchers believe President Lukashenka is very reluctant to
privatize major state enterprises (for example, Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021, 2019; Bedford 2021,
Li and Cheng 2021; Papko and Kozarzewski 2020; Rudy 2020; Glod 2020; Leshchenko 2008).
Even nuanced researchers such as Veselova (2016) and Yarashevich (2014) argue that President

President of the Republic of Belarus, “Aleksandr Lukashenko holds government session on privatization”, March
20, 2021, (https://president.gov.by/en/events/alexander-lukashenko-holds-government-session-on-privatization-73).
124

Belta, “Belarus president shares his opinion on privatization”, May 29, 2020,
(https://eng.belta.by/president/view/belarus-president-shares-his-opinion-on-privatization-130722-2020/).
125

382

Lukashenka will likely not privatize a significant portion of Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector.
Yarashevich even said:
Belarus’s authorities have ostensibly aspired to Soviet-type socialism, which implies
predominance of public property in economy (p. 1730).
Similarly, Veselova argued, that in spite of Belarus’ supposed openness to privatization,
few companies were privatized and that Belarus “has not ceased attempting to find ways to expand
foreign and domestic investments without selling state-owned property” (p.552). Furthermore, it
also seems clear that President Lukashenka will never sell Belarus’ major oil refineries126 or its
giant mining-vehicle maker Belarussian Autoworks (Belaz).127 On October 20, 2020, President
Lukashenka said:
[W]e [do not] want to consider the privatization of our giant companies that we've managed
to preserve and to upgrade as you can see,128
And on September 21, 2020 President Lukashenka’s argument against the privatization of
Belarus’ major industries was very much in line with the moral economy of most of the workers
in this study. As reported by Belta:
Aleksandr Lukashenko noted that the government will always support BelAZ because it is
a Belarusian brand and part of the national legacy just like many other
factories…Aleksandr Lukashenko stressed that one cannot take away from citizens what
millions of people have created and give it to one investor.129
Belta, “Privatization of Belarusian oil refineries ‘out of the question'”, October 20, 2020,
(https://eng.belta.by/president/view/privatization-of-belarusian-oil-refineries-out-of-the-question-134365-2020/).
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It would seem, however, that enshrining these principles explicitly in the new constitution
(forbidding privatization or at least regulating privatization) would be a priority—especially in the
context of ensuring the future of these giant state-owned enterprises such as Belarussian
Autoworks and others.130
Though there is no doubt that President Lukashenka has fiercely resisted mass
privatization, he is not, however, categorically against privatization. Belta reported:
Aleksandr Lukashenko stressed: ‘Great Deng Xiaoping would say: whatever [color] the
cat may be, as long as it can catch mice, it is a good cat. Therefore, it does not matter what
form of ownership is used. It is important that an enterprise can manufacture good products,
pay good salaries to workers without forgetting to pay taxes.131
This position, however, would be bitterly rejected by most of the workers in my study—
they categorically rejected privatization. Even many of the workers who were harsh critics of
President Lukashenka categorically rejected privatization as well as most of the middle-class
subjects
The reason the new constitution does not forbid the privatization of major state-owned firm
industries could be that President does not want to hamstring future Belarussian governments,
preventing them from privatizing state-owned firms if that privatization would be advantageous.
President Lukashenka’s March 30, 2012 speech on the topic of privatization is insightful. The
context is very similar. President Lukashenka was discussing the Belarussian government’s
willingness to privatize any state-owned enterprise “without exceptions”—even “strategic
enterprise[s].”132 And that laws forbidding the privatization of certain state-owned firms only
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interfere with the government’s ability to implement the privatization of firms in the public
interest.133 President Lukashenka said:
Why do we have to confuse things so that later we would have to pass a law to remove an
enterprise from the list of enterprises, which privatization is forbidden and so on?134
And although in the March 30, 2012 speech President Lukashenka referred specifically to
the privatization of Beltransgas, which was the center of a long-standing conflict with Russia,135
in general, however, President Lukashenka’s rejection of laws forbidding privatization seems clear
and helps explain why no such articles forbidding the privatization state enterprises exist in the
new constitution.
Notwithstanding the fact that the new constitution contains no provisions protecting
Belarus’ state-owned enterprises, it seems very unlikely that either President Lukashenka or the
All-Belarussian People’s Assembly would support significant privatization of state enterprises—
certainly not in the relatively near future. Be that as it may, the lack of constitutional provisions
forbidding privatization of state-enterprises raises important questions for this study. First, does
this fact, mean Belarus is preparing to shift from a kind of socialism to a welfare state? It seems
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for Belarus to just $100 per 1,000 cubic metres from the previous $46 instead of the initially planned $200” (CNBC,
“Gazprom, Belarus Postpone Pipeline Deal”, May 18, 2007, by Reuters, https://www.cnbc.com/2007/05/18/gazprombelarus-postpone-pipeline-deal.html)). In 2011, Belarus agreed to sell the remaining 50 percent of Beltransgas for 2.5
million: “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said Friday that Gazprom will now charge Belarus $164 per 1,000 cubic
meters of gas in the first quarter of next year, down from the $280 per 1,000 cubic meters it was paying in the

third quarter of this year. The gas price for Gazprom customers in Europe hovers around $400 per 1,000
cubic meters” (France24, “Russia secures ownership of Belarus gas pipelines”, November 11, 2011,
(https://www.france24.com/en/20111125-russias-gas-deal-power-putin-belarus-pipeline-ukraine-lukashenkomoscow)).
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that it does. According to Belarus TV Channel 1 on September 26, 2021, President Lukashenka
said:
A social welfare state is the real brand of Belarus that we have maintained for many years.
Support to multi-child families, construction of housing and development of the pension
system are now our number one tasks.136
This commitment to a social welfare state is clearly enshrined in the new constitution, as
opposed to a commitment to socialism, which is not.
Although Belarus’ socio-economic model under President Lukashenka has always
officially been a welfare state, the real foundation of that social model was socialism or a kind of
socialism, based on state-ownership of the commanding heights of the economy (Papko and
Kozarzewski 2020; Li and Cheng 2020; Shraibman 2019; Yarashevich 2014; Veselova 2014; see
also Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021, 2019; Bedford 2021, Glod 2020; Potocki 2011; Leshchenko
2008). What I have been calling the state-owned industrial sector throughout this study, is at the
very heart of Belarus’ socially-oriented economic model—whether it be official or unofficial
(Papko and Kozarzewski 2020; Shraibman 2019; Yarashevich 2014; Veselova 2014; see also
Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021, 2019; Bedford 2021, Glod 2020; Potocki 2011; Leshchenko 2008)
The overwhelming majority of workers in my study adamantly supported Belarus’ state-owned
industrial sector and deeply opposed to any privatization. They would not agree with President
Lukashenka’s “cat” analogy or do not agree that “it does not matter what form of ownership is
used”
Aleksandr Lukashenko stressed: ‘Great Deng Xiaoping would say: whatever [color] the
cat may be, as long as it can catch mice, it is a good cat. Therefore, it does not matter what

RTV.by, “А. Lukashenko: Social welfare state is a real brand of Belarus”, September 26, 2021,
(https://www.tvr.by/eng/news/obshchestvo/sotsialnoe_gosudarstvo_nastoyashchiy_brend_belarusi/).
136
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form of ownership is used. It is important that an enterprise can manufacture good products,
pay good salaries to workers without forgetting to pay taxes.137
The workers in this study, categorically opposed privatization of any state-owned
enterprise. And although they strongly supported the Belarus’ welfare-state goals, their outlook
was clearly socialist and not social-democratic (see also Yarashevich 2014). The moral economy
of ordinary Belarussians is far more radical than the official policy and outlook of President
Lukashenka and the Belarussian government.

(I will discuss this in greater detail in the

conclusion).
Notwithstanding the very large number of researchers who do not think President
Lukashenka will ever significantly privatize Belarus’ largely state-owned economy, some, such as
Leonid Zayiko talk about the “creeping privatization… that is taking place in Belarus in tacit
anticipation of the privatization of large state-owned firms” (Ioffe 2014:44-45).
Scores of private businesses are emerging as go-betweens in procuring the input and selling
the output of those large firms. These auxiliary businesses do not boast of a large profit
margin, but gradually they will accumulate the financial means necessary to buy up
Belarus’s major industrial plants when privatization is given the green light. Waiting on
the sidelines are local political elites eager to complete their transformation into Belarus’s
economic elites (Ioffe 2014:45-46).
Ioffe (2014:46) seems to agree with Zayiko’s position and the likelihood of the inevitable
privatization of Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector due to the “sustainability of the Belarusian
economy in the long run”:
It is likely that what the neoliberal paradigm has long insisted on doing is going to be
accomplished anyway, only gradually (p.46)

President of the Republic of Belarus, “Aleksandr Lukashenko holds government session on privatization”, March
20, 2021, (https://president.gov.by/en/events/alexander-lukashenko-holds-government-session-on-privatization-73).
137
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If Zayiko and Ioffe are correct, that the privatization of Belarus’ state-owned economy is
inevitable, this could explain why no provisions were included in the new constitution forbidding
the privatization of state enterprises. Bohdan (2020, 2012), goes much farther than Zayiko and
Ioffe. Criticizing President Lukashenka from the left, Bohdan argues that President Lukashenka
has already forsaken Belarus state-owned industrial sector and his President Lukashenka’s socioeconomic model cannot be considered socialist:
Lukashenka pledged to continue his current policies, and they include the silent and
consistent reduction of social guarantees and dismantling of whole enterprises. Belarusian
cities and towns are already full of former industrial buildings which are either abandoned
or transformed into shopping centres.
…
“Lukashenka’s competitors in this [2020] election offered no alternative for workers,
either. Everyday social problems, the deficit of decent employment and deindustrialisation, which affect a large part of the Belarusian population, have remained
completely out of focus in the ongoing Belarusian political confrontation.
Though Bohdan (2012) does acknowledge that there are “some real signs which make the
Belarusian regime look socialist” such as the “health, education and welfare systems,” which are
“probably the most positive aspects of the Belarusian state.” He argues, however, “they exist as
remnants of Soviet times and are gradually being dismantled as the government gradually cuts
costs.”
Bohdan completely rejects the notion that President Lukashenka’s socio-economic model
represents any kind of socialism with an article titled:
The European Myth of Belarusian Socialism.
The Belarusian regime is a self-interested opportunistic authoritarianism which has no
stable ideological preferences. Lukashenka has much more in common with Ferdinand
Marcos of the Philippines and Asian despots than with Fidel Castro or leftist Latin
American rulers
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…
For that reason, it is pointless to talk about any kind of Socialism or even a left-wing
ideology of the Belarusian regime.
If Bohdan’s analysis were correct, it would obviously explain why no provisions were
added to the new constitution forbidding the privatization of state enterprises. However, in spite
of Bohdan’s very gloomy description of privatization and de-industrialization in Belarus
(“dismantling of whole enterprises”), Bohdan admitted in 2012 that privatization of state
enterprises in Belarus is “still improbable” in spite of the government’s often “declared…plans to
privatise state-owned enterprises.” However, there still has not been any significant privatization
of Belarus’ large state-owned industrial enterprises since 2012138 (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021,
2019; Bedford 2021; Papko and Kozarzewski 2020; Rudy 2020; Li and Cheng 2020; Glod 2020).
This fact calls into question the accuracy and the extent of Bohdan’s gloomy description of the
privatization, deindustrialization, and “dismantling of whole enterprises” he described in 2020.139
Before going on to finish my discussion of the new constitution and its lack of provision’s
forbidding, I should say that a consistent and principled leftist critique of President Lukashenka is
very rare in the academic literature (see for an example Artiukh 2021), as well as among Belarus
policy analysts in general (although I am not convinced that Bohdan’s leftist critique is in fact

For a careful and nuanced analysis of how Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector has been changing see Papko and
Kozarzewski (2020). According to Papko and Kozarzewski, the share of the economy of state-owned enterprises
[SOEs], “since the beginning of the 1990s... has slowly but constantly declined,” however, “SOEs still dominate in
the Belarusian economy” (p.22) and “[a]ccording to the EBRD [the European Bank of Reconstruction and
Development] (2015), it remains one of the largest among all post-communist countries: about 70% of Belarusian
GDP (p.19). In fact, Papko and Kozarzewski argue that “The real role of the state in the enterprise sector may be even
bigger than the EBRD estimations” (p.19) and “according to another study (Akulova, 2015), the state sector may
produce 74-75% of the total production volume and employ up to 69-82% of the workforce” (p.21).
138

139

There is no doubt that many Soviet-era factories closed and were abandoned or have been converted into shopping
centers or commercial space. For example, two of the workers in this study worked at a major Soviet-era factory that
produced reinforced concrete that closed in the early 1990’s and was never re-opened. However, although not every
Soviet-era factory was preserved, a significant number were, and a significant part of the economy remained stateowned—this fact is even starker when compared with other former-socialist states or Soviet republics (Papko and
Kozarzewski 2020:19; Li and Cheng 2020Yarashevich 2014). Bohdan’s criticisms might apply better to the
privatization of Belarus’ small and medium-sized factories as opposed to its large state-owned enterprises. (Recall
Masha’s small electronics factory (300 workers) that was closed).
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principled based upon his oppositional and free-market oriented background140).

However,

various socialist and Marxist organizations have a similar analysis as Bohdan, such as The New
Left Review,141 (the British) Socialist Workers Party,

142

Socialist Alternative,143 and, The Party

for Socialism and Liberation,144 The Freedom Socialist Party,145The Internationalist Communist
Tendency,146 The Communist Party of Greece147 and The Democratic Socialists of America
[DSA],148 as well as the leftist Belarussian opposition party Just World149 and two very small
Belarussian (anti-Lukashenka) Marxist online media organizations, Poligraf.Red150 and

140

For example, Bohdan is an associate analyst at the Ostrogorski Centre, (Belarus Digest,
(https://belarusdigest.com/story/author/siarhei-bohdan/) a Western-oriented think tank (Belarus Digest,
(https://belarusdigest.com/about/)), that assists Belarus’ “transition to a market economy.” (Ostrogorski Center,
http://ostrogorski.org/en/about). Before joining the Ostrogorski Centre, Bohdan worked for the Belarusian Institute of
Strategic Studies, another free-market oriented pro-privatization think tank.
Sidecar, “The Opposition Business”, July 29, 2021, by Alexei Sakhnin,
(https://newleftreview.org/sidecar/posts/the-opposition-business).
141

Socialist Revolution, “Statement on Belarus Movement: Why Do the Masses No Longer Believe in Lukashenko’s
Regime?”, August 12, 2020, (https://socialistrevolution.org/statement-on-belarus-movement-why-do-the-masses-nolonger-believe-in-lukashenkos-regime/). See also Socialist Worker, “IST statement on Belarus and the struggle against
Lukashenko”, August 26, 2020, (https://socialistworker.co.uk/press-releases/belarus-and-the-struggle-againstlukashenko/#).
142

Socialist Alternative, “Analyzing the Belarusian Revolution and the Tasks of Socialists”, January 31, 2021, by
BySupratsiwlenine
Pratsownykh,
(https://www.socialistalternative.org/2021/01/31/analyzing-the-belarusianrevolution-and-the-tasks-of-socialists/).
143

Liberation, “What’s behind the crisis in Belarus?”, October 12, 2020, (https://www.liberationnews.org/whatsbehind-the-crisis-in-belarus/). (The PSL’s analysis is very nuanced.)
144

Freedom Social Party, “In Belarus, women lead revolt against tyranny and reaction”, December, 2020,
(https://socialism.com/fs-article/in-belarus-women-lead-revolt-against-tyranny-and-reaction/).
(The
Freedom
Socialist Party’s analysis is not much different from the standard oppositional narrative).
145

Internationalist, “Winds of Change in Belarus: Neither Dictatorship Nor Democracy Offer Anything for the
Working Class”, August 11, 2020, by Nikopetr, (http://www.leftcom.org/en/articles/2020-08-11/winds-of-change-inbelarus-neither-dictatorship-nor-democracy-offer-anything-for).
146

Sputnik, “Greek Communists Condemn 'Foreign Interference' in Belarus, Oppose Minsk's 'Bourgeois Regime'”,
August 18, 2020, by Jason Dunn, (https://sputniknews.com/20200818/greek-communists-condemn-foreigninterference-in-belarus-oppose-minsks-bourgeois-regime-1080206512.html).
147

Jacobin, “In Belarus, Labor Is Struggling to Find Its Voice”, August 30, 2020, by Ognian Kassabov,
(https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/08/belarus-election-lukashenko).
148

Jacobin, “In Belarus, Labor Is Struggling to Find Its Voice”, August 30, 2020, by Ognian Kassabov,
(https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/08/belarus-election-lukashenko).
149

[In Russian] Полиграф.red, “Belarus - "isle of socialism" or stable capitalism?”, July 10, 2019,
(https://poligraf.red/belarus-ostrovok-sotsializma-ili-stabilnogo-kapitalizma/).
150
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September151 which have little influence in the Belarus. Members of all three Belarussian groups
have been featured in Jacobin, the journal of the Democratic Socialists of America, as part of the
DSA’s analysis of the 2020 election protest movement and Belarus’ socio-economic system in
general.152 In general, the outlook of all anti-Lukashenka Marxist organizations was summed up
in Jacobin, August 30, 2020:
For Sergei Vozniak, a central committee member of the left-wing party Just World, the
Lukashenko regime is a “bourgeois dictatorship.” Such a choice of words may seem odd
to the outside observer, given Belarus’s “Soviet” trappings. But it is in many ways borne
out by Lukashenko’s real actions.153
(I will discuss the Marxist/leftist critique of President Lukashenka in greater detail later in
this study)
By no means, however, do all socialist and Marxist organizations share this point of view,
for example, The Communist Party of the United States,154 Workers’ World,155 The Communist

151

September Media, web-page is not available at this time, (http://september.media/archives/3577).

Jacobin, “In Belarus, the Left Is Fighting to Put Social Demands at the Heart of the Protests”, August 17, 2020,
(https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/08/belarus-protests-lukashenko-minsk); Jacobin, “In Belarus, Labor Is
Struggling to Find Its Voice”, August 30, 2020, by Ognian Kassabov, (https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/08/belaruselection-lukashenko).
152

Jacobin, “In Belarus, Labor Is Struggling to Find Its Voice”, August 30, 2020, by Ognian Kassabov,
(https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/08/belarus-election-lukashenko).
153

People’s world, “Belarusian Communists say EU is backing a ‘coup’ in their country”, August 31, 2020, by
Morning star, (https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/belarusian-communists-say-eu-is-backing-a-coup-in-theircountry/).
154

Worker world, “Workers and communists in Belarus unite behind Lukashenko”, August 29, 2020, By Otis
Grotewohl, (https://www.workers.org/2020/08/50925/).
155
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Party of Poland, 156 The Communist Party of the Russian Federation,157 as well as the Communist
Party of Belarus, which “[s]ince its foundation in 1996, …has supported Lukashenko”158
Returning to my discussion of Belarus’ new constitution, it could be, however, that
Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector will continue to remain under state-ownership in spite of the
new constitution’s lack of provisions forbidding its privatization. After all, it has remained under
state ownership even though there were no provisions protecting it in the previous constitution.
Furthermore, it has continued to stay under state ownership even after the “moratorium on
privatization [from the late 1990’s] was withdrawn in 2011” (Ioffe and Yarashevich 2011:756),
allowing for the privatization of hundreds159 of state-owned firms (Veselova 2016:552; Ioffe
2014:261; Ioffe and Yarashevich 2011:756).
It might be, as I have been discussing, that President Lukashenka merely wants Belarus’
future government to have control over any potential privatization although the new government
might continue the current policy that avoids privatization. Be that as it may, however, this position
still shows a disconnect between the Belarussian government and the majority of Belarussians who
adamantly oppose privatization. This was one an important finding in this study. Namely,
Belarus’ social policy is a reflection of the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians—and not the
other way around. Furthermore, the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians is far broader and

Worker world, “Workers and communists in Belarus unite behind Lukashenko”, August 29, 2020, By Otis
Grotewohl, (https://www.workers.org/2020/08/50925/).
156

Belta, “Russia's Communist Party: Recent events in Belarus is a coup attempt”, August 13, 2020,
(https://eng.belta.by/society/view/russias-communist-party-recent-events-in-belarus-is-a-coup-attempt-1325322020/).
157

Worker world, “Workers and communists in Belarus unite behind Lukashenko”, August 29, 2020, By Otis
Grotewohl, (https://www.workers.org/2020/08/50925/).
158

According to Veselova (2016:552) “140 companies [were] slated for privatization” in response to Belarus’ 2011
financial crisis, yet “only 20 found new owners by the end of 2012, and the plan to privatize the remaining 128 [sic]
was officially cancelled.” According to Ioffe and Yarashevich (2011:756), however, the number of state firms set to
be privatized in 2011was even higher: according to them “178 state-run enterprises [were] on the list to be
transferred to private ownership within two years.” And finally, in 2011 President Lukashenka said, “we have 300
enterprises that could be privatized” (Ioffe 2014:261).
159
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much more hostile to free-market ideology than President Lukashenka’s outlook or Belarus’
official policy. Based on the literature this position should come as no surprise (Lukashenka 1998;
Ioffe 2014:123-126). However, this view is not well-known since the Belarussian opposition have
effectively promoted a caricature of President Lukashenka, as a ruthless dictator who unilaterally
imposes his will upon the hapless Belarussian people (Ioffe 2014, 2004). Unfortunately, this view
is strongly supported by many pro-opposition researchers (for example Moshes and Nizhnikau
2021, 2019; Bedford 2021; Glod 2020; Potocki 2011; Leshchenko 2008). These researchers tend
to ignore ordinary Belarussians and likely could not imagine that Belarus’ social policy, especially
Belarus’ largely state-owned economy, is a direct reflection of the moral economy of ordinary
Belarussians. And when the opposition and many pro-opposition researchers do focus on ordinary
Belarussians, they tend to be highly dismissive of them (Ioffe 2014, 2004; Yarashevich 2014) and
their “wrong views” (Manaev 2014:229), “entrenched Soviet mentality” (Eke and Kuzio 2000:4),
“Sovietized” (Silitski 2006:48), “aspiring… away from freedom” (Furman 1999:12) and who are
incapable of “forming and advancing their own interests” (Leshchenko 2008:1424). (I will discuss
this in greater detail in the Conclusion.) Now, in the context of some of the important events that
have happened since the 2020 election protest movement, I will discuss the character and nature
of the 2020 election protest movement.
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Chapter 11. What Was the Nature and Character of the August 9, 2020 Election
Protest Movement? Was it an Attempted Color Revolution?
It is my position in this study that the 2020 election protest movement was not a
“democratic uprising” or democratic revolution (see Way 2020:17 see also Moshes and Nizhnikau
2021:160; Glod 2020:3). However, how then can we understand the nature and character of the
2020 protest movement? Based on the literature there are roughly five overlapping and interrelated
theoretical interpretations of the 2020 electoral uprising.

First, it was “yet another ‘color

revolution’ for ‘regime change,’” (Succor 2020; see also Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021; and
MacLeod 2021 Episkopos 2020). Second, it was a Kremlin-sponsored political maneuver (Socor
2020; Marple 2021). Third, it was Russian-oligarch sponsored political maneuver independent of
the Kremlin. Fourth, it was a Western-imposed attempted neoliberal capitalist counterrevolution.
And, fifth, it was a domestic neoliberal capitalist counterrevolution (Furman 1999).
Although it might make sense to discuss these five interpretations in one single chapter, I
will, however, break it up into a few chapters to keep the discussion more manageable.
Furthermore, I will include an important chapter demonstrating that the previous post-electoral
uprisings in Belarus (2001, 2006. 2010), though usually classified as color revolutions, were
foreign-imposed (Western-imposed) attempted capitalist revolutions.
An Attempted Color Revolution?
Many see the events of 2020 “as yet another ‘color revolution’ for ‘regime change,’”
(Succor 2020). By “color revolution,” I am generally referring to the Western sponsored regime
change — especially by the United States—in former-socialist states (Way 2008:56). Specifically,
“in Belarus all major attempts at ‘colour revolutions’ used elections as a trigger event” and have
taken the form of “‘postelectoral’ popular uprisings” (Silitski 2009:86; see also Korosteleva
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2012:37-38), relying on key aspects of color revolutions including: “various forms of election
monitoring and parallel vote counts,” (Way 2008:56); “[e]mphasizing … that the election results
were falsified” (Marples 2006:363); and “popular protest against vote fraud.” (Way 2008:56).
In general, color revolutions have relied on “considerable U.S. support for opposition
movements in Central Europe (a point often overlooked by analysts who focus on the European
Union’s role),” especially “assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) and other organizations” (Way 2008:56; see also Korosteleva 2012:40). Specifically, in
the context of Belarus, both the US and EU have provided support:

The US is by far the biggest donor in terms of democracy assistance and civil society. Prior
to the 2001 presidential election, an estimated $37.78 million in assistance was given to
Belarus, including $12.1 million in Freedom Support Act assistance largely addressing the
elections themselves. (Jarabik 2006:86)
After successful “Color Revolutions in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and the Ukraine, it became
evident that none of those revolutions would [have] ever succeeded if there were no US
organizations like NED [the National Endowment for Democracy], NDI, [the National Democratic
Institute] IRI [the International Republican Institute, Freedom House and Soros Foundation behind
the scene” (Nechyparenka 2011:19; see also Jabarik 2006). And in spite of obstacles created by
the Belarussian government “the United States continued its donor support programs to the
Belarusian NGOs through NED, NDI, IRI and USAID programs” (p.19; see also Jarabik 2014).
US assistance to Belarus is almost exclusively targeted at the country’s non-governmental
sector and independent media working to promote the development of civil society and the free
flow of information. Most of this assistance is channeled through US non-governmental structures,
which have proved to be active and flexible actors in civil society development (Jarabik 2014:88).
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Promoting a color revolution or regime change in Belarus is not merely US foreign policy
but actually US law:
President Bush’s second administration… made democracy promotion a key pillar of US
foreign policy. The Belarus Democracy Act, passed unanimously by the House of
Representatives on October 4, 2004, stressed democratic development, human rights and
the rule of law in Belarus, and a supplementary assistance bill added democracy assistance
worth $5 million in 2005. The act authorized necessary assistance for supporting
Belarusian political parties and nongovernmental organizations, independent media,
including radio and television broadcasting into Belarus, and international exchanges.
Finally, the House of Representatives earmarked a further $24 million for the period of
2006 to 2007 and authorized the US government to spend the assistance on building
democracy in Belarus including the promotion of free elections, the development of
political parties and independent media, protection of human rights and ensuring the rule
of law (Jarabik 2006:89).
Although “The US is by far the biggest donor in terms of democracy assistance and civil
society” (Jabarik 2006:86) the European Union also contributes (Jabarik 2006; EU 2012) as well
as other European state, quasi-state, and private organizations (Raik 2006:176). Unlike the US,
the EU tends to focus on funding and promoting Belarussian civil society more than merely
funding the Belarussian opposition (Jabarik 2006; see also EU 2012:6).

Targeting massive support on the anti-Lukashenka opposition and human rights activists
did not bring about the desired changes so far. The EU should thus energise the institutionbuilding component of its democracy-promotion policy and step-up efforts towards civil
society at large. More flexible funding opportunities should be redirected to NGOs and
even public institutions able to form the backbone of an autonomous civil society. (EU
2012:6)
…
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Targets should not only be the traditional 'pro-EU' segments of the population – the
democratic opposition, politicised CSOs and reform-minded youth – but all public
institutions forming the socioeconomic backbone of the country (p.41).
Although the color revolution literature often stresses “nonviolent popular protest” and
training and assistance from “experts in nonviolent protest such as Gene Sharp,” (Way 2008:56),
in practice, however, some color revolutions have relied heavily on violence, such as the so-called
“Bulldozer Revolution” in Yugoslavia (Serbia) in 2000 (Way 2008:58)

Bands of young people armed with Molotov cocktails set fire to the federal parliament
building. In addition, scores of police and military veterans organized into armed
paramilitaries with the aim of taking over key government buildings (Way 2008:58)
In Yugoslavia “violence was not simply incidental but rather considered a core element of
opposition strategy” (Way 2008:58). Similarly, the 2009 color revolution in Moldova1 was
wrought with tremendous violence:
[D]emonstrators burn[ed] the parliament building and president's office.2
…
One woman died and about 100 people were hurt after protesters, who alleged that a
weekend parliamentary election won by the communists was rigged, ransacked [President]
Voronin’s offices and looted parliament.
…

Chattam House, “How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine,”
January, 2013, by Orysia Lutsevych,
(https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0113bp_lutsevych.pd
f).
1

The Guardian, “Moldova claims Romania plotted attempted coup,” April 9, 2009, by Luke Harding,
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/09/moldova-parliament-communist-demonstrators).
2
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[R]iot police re-took the smoking and wrecked buildings early on Wednesday and rounded
up 193 opposition protesters.”3
The attempted 2010 color revolution in Belarus (Lysenko and Desousa 2015:629)
employed violence as well. Depending on the account, 5,000 to 40,000 (Ioffe 2014:147) protestors
“turned violent Sunday after protesters tried to storm a government building housing the country's
Central Election Commission.”4 According to the BBC:

Protesters try to storm government HQ in Belarus
Thousands of opposition protesters in Belarus have tried to storm the government
headquarters, following the country's presidential election.
The demonstrators smashed windows and doors at the building in Minsk, but were later
pushed back by riot police.5
The more recent successful 2014 Maidan color revolution in the Ukraine also relied on
“massive violence” (Ishchenko 2020:202):
[O]n January 19 [2014], the spectacular massive clashes between the protesters and the riot
police with use of cobblestones, sticks, and Molotov cocktails erupted in reaction to a set
of repressive laws directed against Maidan. On February 18, the street fights escalated into
an armed uprising with use of firearms in response to an attempt of the final crackdown of
Maidan camp in Kiev (Ishchenko 2020:201)
Some see the violence of Maidan as an “aberration” next to many of the peaceful “color”
revolutions in recent decades (Ishchenko 2020:202), however, upon careful examination of the
color revolution literature there does not seem to be any fundamental commitment to nonviolence

Reuters, “Moldova blames Romania after anti-govt riots,” April 8, 2009, by Sabina Zawadzki, Dmitry Chubashenko,
(https://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-38952920090408).
3

Voice of America, “Belarus Opposition Attacks Government Building After Election,” December 18, 2010, by
James Brooke, (https://www.voanews.com/a/belarus-police-beat-opposition-leader-polls-show-lukashenko-win112156569/132496.html).
4

BBC News, “Protesters try to storm government HQ in Belarus,” December 20, 2010,
(https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-12029814).
5
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(see Way 2008). For example, Lucan Way (2008), color revolution proponent, strategist and
theorist, writing for the National Endowment of Democracy [NED], not only did not condemn the
violence during the 2000 “Bulldozer Revolution” in Serbia, but appears to advocate violence in
order to overthrow President Lukashenka (p.66) as Belarus has proven very resilient to attempted
color revolutions, even though the opposition had “adopted the ‘right’ strategies from abroad,”
with “input from Serb, Slovak, Ukrainian, and other activists in the run-up to the 2006 presidential
elections (p.58):
Lukashenka’s opponents seemed to do everything they were supposed to and arguably
followed the “model” much more faithfully than did Kyrgyzstan’s successful opposition in
2005. Just as in Serbia in 2000 and Ukraine in 2004, the major opposition leaders in Belarus
put aside their personal political ambitions to support a single candidate, Alyaksandr
Milinkevich. The opposition also had its own youth movement, Zubr, which received
extensive support from its Serbian counterparts and others. Regime opponents focused
their efforts on elections, remained consistently nonviolent, used humor, had their own
color, and set up tents following fraudulent elections, just as in Ukraine. Yet no large-scale
support materialized, and Lukashenka never came close to being unseated(Way 2008:5859; see also Korosteleva 2012)
In response to President Lukashenka’s and Belarus’ resilience to color revolutions Lucan
Way seems to be advocating violence in order overthrow President Lukashenka (p.66). Way
believes that Belarus lacks,

[T]he combined authoritarian state and party strength found in China, Cuba, or Malaysia—
rooted in armed struggle or a long history of ruling-party electoral success—that has
allowed autocratic governments in these countries to withstand severe crises
…
Regimes in Belarus and Armenia are particularly vulnerable. In both cases, autocrats are
especially susceptible to defection by allies due to the weakness of the ruling parties. In
Belarus, Lukashenka has so far used economic control and an extensive security apparatus
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to preempt any serious opposition challenges. Yet the regime lacks a ruling party as well
as the kind of ideology or common experience with large-scale violent struggle that could
facilitate the suppression of mass unrest or dissuade allies from turning on Lukashenka in
the event of crisis. The relatively weak cohesion within the security apparatus was
demonstrated in the fall of 2004 when, following fraudulent parliamentary elections,
Leanid Yerin, the head of the KGB, met with protestors in an apparent show of sympathy.
Although Yerin was later dismissed, this could be a sign of broader disloyalty within the
security forces that may haunt Lukashenka in the future (Way 2008:66).
Way believes that the Belarussian security forces, lacking experience in “large-scale
violent struggle” are not “battle-tested” (p.66) and lack “the experience, the stomach, and the
cohesion to put down” (p. 63) “mass unrest” (p.66). Taken in the context of the article, in which
Way (2008) already insisted that the Belarussian opposition “remained consistently nonviolent” to
no avail (p.59), it appears Way is advocating violence. In the context of Belarus, what does he
mean by “mass unrest” (p.66)? It seems that the “mass unrest” Way is advocating is far beyond
the “humorous” “consistently nonviolent,” mobilization of the failed 2006 color revolution in
Belarus (p.59). It seems that Way is forsaking “Gene Sharp’s techniques of nonviolence,” (p.58)
in the case of Belarus in favor of violence.
Lucan Way might very well have inspired the Belarussian opposition’s recognizable shift
in strategy, forsaking the nonviolent approach used in the 2006 attempted color revolution, in favor
of a violent approach in 2010. Furthermore, Way’s 2008 analysis might have even provided the
strategy of the violent protests during the 2014 Maidan Color Revolution.

Moreover,

notwithstanding any incidents of unauthorized police use of force or violence, Way’s analysis
might have provided the violent strategy of the The Belarus 2020 electoral uprising, especially the
nights initially following the August 9, 2020 election in which the Belarussian security forces were
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almost overwhelmed by the level of protester violence and publicly admit they were not prepared
for it.6

All Three of Belarus Previous Electoral Uprisings Were Color Revolutions
Although all three of Belarus’ previous post-election protest movements (2001, 2006, and
2010) were attempted color revolutions (Lysenko and Desousa 2015:629; see also Radnitz 2012;
Korosteleva 2012; Nechyparenka 2011; Silitski 2010; Way 2008; Marples 2006), the Belarussian
opposition insists that the 2020 post-election protest was not a color revolution (Way 2020:17). In
fact, not only were all three previous post-election protest movements considered color revolutions
by most researchers, there is a fairly developed academic literature on Belarus’ resilience to color
revolutions, mostly by anti-Lukashenka pro-opposition researchers, with academic articles titled:

The Political Success of Russia-Belarus Relations: Insulating Minsk from a Color
Revolution (Ambrosio 2006)
Color revolutions: the Belarus case (Marples 2006)
This paper examines some reasons why to date there has been no color revolution in
Belarus” (p.352; see also Lysenko and Desousa 2015; Korosteleva 2012; Finkel and
Brudny 2012; Landry 2011; Nechyparenka 2011; Potocki 2011; Radnitz 2010; Silitski
2010, 2006, 2005; Silitski 2010; Way 2008; Marples 2006).
Be that as it may, the opposition and opposition-oriented researchers argue that the 2020
uprising was not color revolution:

ATN, [In English], “About the protests in Belarus, the failed revolution, the security forces and the radicals.
Confrontation” A documentary film by Belarussian State TV Broadcaster ATN (All-National Television]
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mw-jkVsuzlg).
Russian version “О протестах в Беларуси, неудавшейся революции, силовиках и радикалах. Противостояние.
Фильм АТН” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfqQZ9PR7C).
6
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[P]rotest leaders have explicitly distinguished their new movement from the “color
revolutions” that have taken place in other postcommunist countries. Rather than calling
for major changes in geopolitical orientation, as in Ukraine’s 2013–14 EuroMaidan, they
have focused their demands on free and democratic elections together with a return to the
constitutional status quo that existed before Lukashenka (Way 2020:17).
…
The movement has repeatedly emphasized its continued commitment to a pro-Russian
orientation for Belarus. Tsikhanouskaya has framed herself as an interim leader who would
usher democracy into Belarus (p.24).
…
Svetlana Tikhanovskaya…has gone to great lengths to stress that these protests are neither
pro-Russia nor pro–European Union. ‘Our revolution is not geopolitical,’ Tikhanovskaya
said in a recent op-ed in The New York Times. ‘It is a democratic revolution.’7
Some researchers and analysts have also argued this point, such as Katia Glod (2020), of
the Center for European Policy Analysis [CEPA]:
Belarus’ uprising is not a color revolution, like in Georgia (2003) or Ukraine (2004- 5 and
2014), as it is not characterized by strong pro-Western or anti-Kremlin sentiments (p.3).
However, for almost twenty years, Western color revolution organizers, such as Roger
Potocki, of the National Endowment for Democracy, (Ioffe 2014:7, 109)

have been trying to

cultivate a Russian-friendly opposition. They understood that the Belarussian opposition had no
chance of succeeding, unless it “overcame its Russophobia,” (p.153) and chose candidates
“acceptable to a Kremlin tired of Lukashenka’s antics” (p.148) and understanding that the
opposition would have to cooperate with Russia “realizing that ‘the eastern brother’ will remain a
cardinal factor in Belarusian politics” (p.153). Therefore, the fact that the 2020 uprising was “not

The Atlantic “Supporting Protesters Without Undermining Them,” September 27, 2020, by Yasmeen Serhan,
(https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/09/challenging-western-meddling-narrativebelarus/616462/).
7
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characterized by strong pro-Western or anti-Kremlin sentiments” does not mean it was not a
Western-sponsored color revolution.
Although Svetlana Tikhanovskaya denied the 2020 uprising was a color revolution in
general, I am unaware, however, whether Tikhanovskaya ever explicitly denied that there was any
Western funding, training, organizing, and advising leading up to the postelection uprising as
would be typical of a color revolution. For example, the National Endowment for Democracy
admits it played a “significant” role in creating the postelection protest movement (MacLeod 2021)
Nina Ognianova, who oversees the NED’s work with local groups in the country,
suggested ‘a lot of the people’ who were ‘trained’ and ‘educated’ via the organization’s
various endeavors there were pivotal to “the events, or the build-up to the events, of last
summer.8
…
Nina Ognianova, boasted that the groups leading the nationwide demonstrations against
Lukashenko last year–actions that made worldwide headlines–were trained by her
organization. ‘We don’t think that this movement that is so impressive and so inspiring
came out of nowhere–that it just happened overnight,’ she said , noting that the NED had
made a ‘modest but significant contribution’ to the protests(MacLeod 2021).
…
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is spending millions of dollars yearly on
Belarus and has 40 active projects inside the state, all with the same goal of overthrowing
Alexander Lukashenko and replacing him with a more U.S.-friendly president. Although
not a single individual or organization is named, it is clear from the scant public information
it reveals that Washington is focusing on three areas: training activists and civil-society
organizations in non-violent regime-change tactics; funding anti-government media; and
bankrolling election-monitoring groups (MacLeod 2021).

RT, “US regime-change agency NED admits its role in the strife in Belarus, but leaked documents also implicate the
UK Foreign Office,” May 21, 2021, by Kit Klarenberg, (https://www.rt.com/russia/524296-western-meddlingbelarus-power-change/).
8
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The NED “bankrolled at least 159 civil society initiatives in Belarus, costing $7,690,689,
from 2016 to 2020 alone.” 9
The NED was set up by the Reagan administration as a front group for the CIA, to continue
the agency’s work in destabilizing other countries. ‘It would be terrible for democratic
groups around the world to be seen as subsidized by the CIA,’ Gershman [NED
president] said, explaining its creation. Another NED founder, Allen Weinstein, was
perhaps even more blunt: ‘A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by
the CIA,’ he told The Washington Post (MacLeod 2021; see also Sussman 2006).
According to Belarussian authorities, Western states and organizations were heavily
involved in the 2020 uprising. The Belarussian KGB has released a detailed description of the
organizers of what it believes was an attempted color revolution or coup in 2020.
The KGB chief said: “According to our evaluations, the United States of America played
the most important role in organizing protests in Belarus. The USA is trying to secure its
geopolitical interests like that. If we talk about our neighbors, the regimes of Vilnius and
Warsaw pursue the most aggressive policy against Belarus.
…
[E]xisting or retired intelligence operatives are behind civil society structures in Belarus.
Bloggers, reporters, and activists, who only act as public faces of the coup, are only
puppets. Belarusian intelligence agencies know the people, who control them. Those
include a civil society expert with the European Foundation for Democracy, researcher
with the German Marshall Fund, former Slovak minister of foreign affairs Pavol Demes,

the former aide to the U.S. secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor, former
head of the Freedom House organization David Kramer, an employee of the Warsaw
Center for Eastern Studies Kamil Klysinski, Freedom House project director Vytis
Jurkonis, Executive Director of the European Foundation for Democracy Jerzy
Pomianowski, and the Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

9

Ibid.
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But Michael Carpenter, Senior Director of the Joe Biden Center for Global Engagement,
is the key author of the Belarusian mutiny. He previously worked as a deputy assistant of
the U.S. secretary of defense with responsibility for Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia and as a
foreign policy advisor for the then Vice President Joe Biden.10
British intelligence seems to have played a significant role in the events leading up to the
postelection protests as well.11 Furthermore, in general, the 2020 events had many of the key traits
of a color revolution. Namely, it announced its “color” early—the “Slipper Revolution”12; it
created a “united and organized opposition” (Marple’s 2006:363; see also Way 2008:56)
represented by Svetlana Tikhanovskaya (Way 2020:23); it employed “various forms of election
monitoring and parallel vote counts,” (Way 2008:56) namely election observers Zubr and Honest
People and the Golos platform, a parallel vote count13, which, through “significant independent
media” (Marples 2006:363) were all used effectively “[e]mphasizing … that the election results
were falsified (Marples 2006:363); inspiring “popular protest against vote fraud” (Way 2008:56).
(The name Slipper Revolution comes from former candidate Sergey Tikhanovsky (husband
of Svetlana Tikhanovskaya).

The slipper (often more of a flip-flop) was the symbol of

Tikhanovsky’s movement. Tikhanovsky “denounced Lukashenka as a ‘cockroach’ and drove
around with a large slipper (to kill the cockroach) tied to the top of his car” (Way 2020:22))
Moreover, although Svetlana Tikhanovskaya consistently claimed: “Lukashenka was the
one provoking violence, not her;” and that the opposition was peaceful; and that she “was not the
10

Ibid.

11

Ibid

Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, “Belarus’s ‘Slipper Revolution’ Seeks to Stamp Out Lukashenka. Is He At
Risk?” June 6, 2020, by Tony Wesolowsky (https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-s-slipper-revolution-seeks-to-stamp-outlukashenka-is-he-at-risk-/30656256.html).
12

Voice of Belarus, “Golos platform presents the final report on the presidential election,” August 20, 2020,
(https://www.voiceofbelarus.com/golos-final-election-report/); see also Final Report on the 2020 presidential
Elections in Belarus: Based on the data collected by the Voice platform, Zubr platform, and Honest People initiative.
(https://drive.google.com/file/d/1WnyAfVKDhZOQxxDd2tdi5xcH3eiOng0V/view?fbclid=IwAR19kKvivO5CtSj1e
2QkBCDIf9Ip2BVKSHbyn6OhJUN-nnbTBkWKqeHTsvM0).
13
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one seeking to create a ‘Maidan’” (Way 2020:23-24); in truth, however, she took over the
campaign of her husband Sergey Tikhanovsky, which was anything but non-violent.

The

Tikhanovsky campaign seemed deliberately fashioned after the violent color revolutions of
Yugoslavia, Moldova, and especially Maidan.14 Nikolay Statkevich, who was a key leader and
directly involved in the 2010 attempt to storm the Parliament, was a key part of Sergey
Tikhanovsky’s team.15 Statkevich stressed that a relatively small number, only 3.5 percent of the
population, could completely overwhelm Belarus’ security forces.16 Video footage is available of
Tikhanovsky advocating violence against the police and even explaining that their large slippers
(the movement’s symbol) could be made out of steel to be used as shields during battles with the
police.17
MacLeod (2021), writing for the socialist journal Monthly Review Online, has described
the 2020 events in Belarus as “familiar regime-change script” and compared Tikhanovskaya to

Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaido.

MacLeod harshly condemned Svetlana

Tikhanovskaya’s close ties to the United States:
Another reason …[for] Tsikhanouskaya’s seeming total willingness to be a representative
of the U.S. government in Belarus. Her senior advisor, Franak Viacorka, for example, is a
consultant for the U.S. Agency for Global Media; the creative director of Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, an organization described by The New York Times as a
Belteleradiocompany [In English] “The overwhelming minority: Tikhanovsky's true plans.” A Documentary film
of the Belarussian State Belteleradiocompany ANT TV (All-National Television),
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TwnsWeB8NzQ); see also in English, “Country for Brutality”: TV News
Agency`s film on Tikhanovsky’s gang and plotting a terror in Belarus
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UUhtU8PJ6gY&t=471s);
ANT, [In English], “About the protests in Belarus, the failed revolution, the security forces and the radicals.
Confrontation” A documentary film by Belarussian State TV Broadcaster ATN (All-National Television]
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mw-jkVsuzlg).
14

Belteleradiocompany, [In English] “The overwhelming minority: Tikhanovsky's true plans.” A Documentary film
of the Belarussian State Belteleradiocompany ANT (All-National Television),
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TwnsWeB8NzQ).
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“worldwide propaganda network built by the CIA.” He is also a Non-Resident Fellow at
the Atlantic Council, a NATO-linked organization that boasts no fewer than seven former
CIA directors on its board. At an Atlantic Council event in July, Tsikhanouskaya called on
the West to do more to overthrow her opponent, saying “I think it’s high time for
democratic countries to unite and show their teeth.” According to the NED’s Gershman,
the U.S. continues to work “very, very closely” with her.
Macleod also criticized Tikhanovskaya’s public meeting with US Undersecretary of
State, Victoria Nuland during Tikhanovskaya’s visit to the United States.

According to

Macleod, “Nuland was the brains behind the U.S.-backed Maidan Insurrection in Ukraine
that overthrew the government of Viktor Yanukovych, bringing in a far-right, pro-Western
administration.” And although Svetlana Tikhanovskaya “has framed herself as an interim leader
who would merely usher democracy into Belarus” (Way 2020:24), MacLeod strongly rejected this
claim:
Tsikhanouskaya fashions herself merely as a ‘transition president’ who would not run for
re-election after Lukashenko falls. This is eerily similar to how Jeanine Añez, the U.S.
backed Bolivian leader who came to power after a coup against Evo Morales in 2019,
described herself. Like Tsikhanouskaya, Añez was also an obscure political figure held up
by the United States as the savior of democracy. Despite describing herself as the “interim
president,” she immediately began radically transforming the country’s economy and
foreign relations, privatizing state assets and moving Bolivia closer to the U.S. She
also suspended elections three times before being forced to concede after a
nationwide general strike paralyzed the country (MacLeod 2021).
Mark Episkopos (2020), a reporter for the National Interest also believes the events in
2020 were a “failed color revolution.” While both MacLeod and Episkopos characterize the
2020 events in Belarus as a color revolution, they condemn it for different reasons: MacLeod
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from a socialist viewpoint, and Episkopos, from the perspective of political “realism,” in which
“American interests” are the priority of US foreign policy:18
Policymakers and analysts sometimes ask why a particular color revolution failed, and
what Western institutions can do to help the next one succeed. But the record is abundantly
clear: color revolution is itself a failed policy, driven by a misguided focus on enforcing
liberal-democratic values rather than pursuing concrete strategic ends.
Episkopos, in his article, “Why America’s Belarus Strategy Backfired” heavily
criticized the Washington’s “failed ‘color revolution’ in Belarus,” which only “isolated Belarus
even further from European institutions and delivered a reluctant Lukashenko straight into
Moscow’s geopolitical embrace”
Lukashenko, predictably, was forced to abandon his long-standing “multi-vector policy”
of fostering relations with the West as a counterweight to what would otherwise be his
one-sided dependence on Moscow.

The National Interest “About The National Interest (Published by The Center for the National Interest),”
(https://nationalinterest.org/about-the-national-interest).
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Chapter 12. Was the 2020 Uprising a Kremlin-Sponsored Political Maneuver?
(Also: Was 2020 a Political Maneuver of the Russian Oligarchs Independent of the
Kremlin?)
Succor (2020), argues that the 2020 uprising in Belarus was not a Western-sponsored color
revolution but rather Kremlin-sponsored political maneuver to weaken President Lukashenka (yet
still maintaining him as president), that spun out of control, however, and was coopted by the West.
One of Socor’s key arguments is that all of the initial opposition candidates were pro-Russian with
ties to Russia:
[N]amely, the presidential candidacies of Viktar Babarika (head of Gazprombank’s
Belarusian branch), Valery Tsepkalo (former official with long-standing Moscow
connections), and Siarhei Tsikhanousky (“Russian World”–sympathizing blogger).
Moscow had counted on these political projects to destabilize Lukashenka in the postelection period, before presenting the disobedient (presumably still reelected) president
with the next ‘integration ultimatum’…. Moscow also sent a group of 33 Wagner Group
mercenaries to trouble the post-election waters in Belarus(Socor 2020b).
Similarly, Marples (2021) sees the candidacies of Babaryka and Tsapkala as a potential
political maneuver by the Kremlin:
And in Viktar Babaryka and Valeryi Tsapkala, he [President Lukashenka] faced the
possibility of campaigning against two figures who had good standing in and close
associations with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. In fact, he may have perceived their coming
forward to run against him as a signal that Russia wanted to be rid of him, a plausible theory
given the tensions between Lukashenka and Putin, both personally and on a variety of
contemporary questions such as oil and gas prices, Putin’s demand for a Russian air base
on Belarusian territory, and Russian pressure for closer integration using the already
existing base of the Russia–Belarus Union (p.286).
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Socor believes “Moscow abandoned the political projects associated with Babarika,
Tsepkalo and Siarhei Tsikhanousky as soon as their Coordinating Committee became tainted with
a ‘color revolution’
—that is, within days of the August 9 election. The spontaneous mass movement overtook
and overwhelmed the Coordinating Committee, rendering its members unusable by Moscow
because: a) the Kremlin abhors the potentially contagious effect of regime-change movements
from below, its own modus operandi being controlled destabilization; b) the Coordinating
Committee failed to bring the spontaneous mass protests under its control; c) the Committee
adopted members not controlled or approved by Moscow and not Russia-oriented; and d) the
Committee was soon decimated by arrests or the forced emigration of its members. Instead,
Moscow shifted gears tactically to shore up Lukashenka on a temporary basis, and conditional on
an orderly regime change under Russian arbitration. Moscow’s abandonment of the Coordinating
Committee made possible a Western interception of what had started as a Russian project (Socor
2020b)
One fact that strongly supports the assertion that at least Babaryka was working with
Russia, is that Babaryka announced the formation of his new party “Together” (“Vmeste”)
(Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:175), on the exact same day that Putin officially recognized the
legitimacy of the election of President Lukashenka.1 On that same day, Babaryka also accepted
President Lukashenka’s election and acknowledged, much to the chagrin of Svetlana

Tikhanovskaya and the Coordinating Council, that the opposition’s “electoral victory had not been
achieved” (p.175). The fact that Babaryka announced his new party with a pre-recorded video
message, “which appears to have been recorded before Babariko was arrested and jailed at the end

Bne IntelliNews, “Opposition leaders Viktor Babariko and Maria Kolesnikova found political party “Together”,”
September 1, 2020, (https://www.intellinews.com/opposition-leaders-viktor-babariko-and-maria-kolesnikova-foundpolitical-party-together-190863/).
1
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of July,” 2 is further proof that he was working with Russia, as he could have released that video
anytime, yet only released it the same day Putin officially recognized President Lukashenka’s
election.
Socor’s analysis is quite serious. The position that Babaryka was working with the Kremlin
is very strong. However, I think Socor is wrong to believe that the 2020 uprising was primarily a
Kremlin-sponsored political maneuver and not a Western-sponsored color revolution.

The

evidence shows that both were taking place simultaneously. Furthermore, in general, I have
several questions about Socor’s argument.
First, Socor overestimates the importance of pro-Russian candidates and their stated lack
of desire to change Belarus’ geo-political orientation relating to Russia. This is the same argument
Svetlana Tikhanovskaya made. In the previous section on color revolutions, I have already
explained that an effective “Western-sponsored” color revolution in Belarus would require an
alternative presidential candidate that is not hostile to Russia (Potocki 2002). Related to this
position, Socor (2020b) believes that “Western organizations only knew the Belarusian ‘old
political opposition’ and had basically de-funded it in recent years.” However, this is clearly not
true. By the “old political opposition,” I believe Socor means the more openly pro-Western (antiRussian) Belarussian nationalist opposition—however, the West had been trying to restructure the
old nationalistic opposition for almost twenty years before the August 9, 2020 election—making
acceptable to Russia and abandoning Belarussian nationalism (Potocki 2002:153).
Second, according to Socor (2020b) “Belarus seems to be the only case in which a “color
revolution” broke out without any kind of Western-assisted preparations.” This is not the case,
however. And I although I have already discussed US and foreign involvement in the 2020
uprising in the previous section on color revolutions, I will briefly say that I think Socor

Bne IntelliNews, “Opposition leaders Viktor Babariko and Maria Kolesnikova found political party “Together”,”
September 1, 2020, (https://www.intellinews.com/opposition-leaders-viktor-babariko-and-maria-kolesnikova-foundpolitical-party-together-190863/).
2
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underestimates Western intelligence services and its massive regime change apparatus, including
USAID, NED, NDI, IRI, and Freedom House (Jarabik 2006:87; see also Nechyparenka 2011).
Furthermore, according to MacLeod (2021) National Endowment for Democracy admitted that it
played a “significant” role in creating the postelection protest movement (MacLeod 2021) 3 and
had funded the opposition “$7,690,689, from 2016 to 2020 alone” and British intelligence also
likely played a significant role.4 Moreover, the Belarussian authorities listed David Kramer of
Freedom House, among others, as one of the people who contributed to the 2020 protest
movement. And while I am not in a position to verify this information, according to Ioffe
(2014:104, 110), David Kramer of Freedom House, is an aggressive professional fulltime
opposition organizer and funder of the Belarussian opposition, whom Ioffe characterized as
“another US crusader for Belarusian democracy” (p.110). Knowing this, it would be surprising if
David Kramer and his US-funded Freedom House had not been involved.
Furthermore, Sergey Tikhanovsky was working closely with Nikolay Statkevich, a longtime opposition leader and central figure in the 2010 attempted color revolution, especially the
2010 storming of the Parliament building. Most likely, Statkevich had strong ties to Westernfinanced color-revolution regime-change apparatus in the past. Though it is not clear whether
Statkevich still has ties to the West, the fact that he was an important part of Tikhanovsky’s
organization lends support to the position that Tikhanovsky’s movement—notwithstanding its proRussian orientation—might still have been a Western-sponsored color revolution.
Third, if Socor’s analysis is right it would have been a very risky maneuver for the Kremlin
to have tried, especially while facing ongoing bitter protests in Khabarovsk in Russia’s far east
(Marples 2021:291). And if Socor is right, then that would mean Russian intelligence completely

RT, “US regime-change agency NED admits its role in the strife in Belarus, but leaked documents also implicate
the UK Foreign Office,” May 21, 2021, by Kit Klarenberg, (https://www.rt.com/russia/524296-western-meddlingbelarus-power-change/).
3

4
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failed to understand the political situation in Belarus that was fairly obvious—unless however, the
Kremlin was aware of the potential risk but thought it would work anyway or that it could help
President Lukashenka if things would have gotten out of control.
Russian intelligence should have been aware of the potential instability that was brewing
in Belarus. For example, Russian intelligence should have seen the large pre-election rallies such
as the very large July 30, 2020 rally that attracted thousands and appeared to be the largest
opposition rally in recent history.5 On May 28, 2020, long before the large July 30, 2020, Wilson
(2020a) discussed how the political situation in 2020 was very different from previous elections—
“the least predictable Belarusian election in decades.” Wilson focused on the “tensions” and
“public discontent” created by President Lukashenka’s perceived mishandling of COVID—which
could potentially worsen, as well as economic woes. He also saw that the “Belarusian presidential
election campaign features at least three candidates the government cannot control or ignore—all
of whom have the potential to reach a broad audience.” Furthermore, Wilson discussed powerful
social forces coming to the fore this election. Namely, he discussed the Belarussian capitalist
class’ growing power, independence and influence. Wilson was predicting a potential social
revolution as far back as May 28, 2020, over two months before the election. Russian intelligence
should have been aware of this.
Moreover, there were other early signs that the postelection protests would be big. For
example, the ubiquitous “Sasha3%” meme, which not only pervaded the web, but was printed on
tee-shirts and written as graffiti throughout the streets of Minsk. 6 This opposition trope, (Sasha
3%) was so widespread that President Lukashenka publicly addressed it on June 22, 20207 well

BBC News, “Belarus opposition rally attracts thousands despite crackdown,” July 30, 2020,
(https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53603460).
5

Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, “Sasha 3%? Belarusians Poke Fun At President's Slipping Support,” June 25,
2020, by Tony Wesolowsky, (https://www.rferl.org/a/belarusians-poke-fun-at-president-slippingsupport/30690561.html).
6
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over a month before the August 9, 2020 election. Similar, to Andrew Wilson, Tony Wesolowsky,
writing for Radio Free Europe, predicted on June 25, 2020 “Lukashenka is facing a challenge he
has never seen before.”8 And though it would be expected that oppositional media would
overexaggerate the opposition’s prospects—usually President Lukashenka ignored the opposition
and did not feel the need to address them. Like Wilson, Wesolowsky also addressed President
Lukashenka’s perceived mishandling of COVID:
In power since 1994, Lukashenka is facing growing public unrest and skepticism largely
due to his government's handling of the coronavirus pandemic. The country has one of
Europe's highest per capita infection rates, and Lukashenka has ignored calls to institute
social-distancing measures and other restrictions, instead saying that vodka, a ride on a
tractor, or a visit to the sauna would fend off the coronavirus, earning him ridicule abroad
and disbelief at home.9
While it is my position that President Lukashenka’s COVID policy mainly affected the
middle class and did not alienate his supporters, I do agree that it absolutely enraged the middle
class and upper class.
Belarus’s middle class begins to turn on Lukashenko
(The Financial Times June 22, 202010)
The words of former candidate, Viktor Babaryka published in the June 22, 2020 in the
Financial Times capture the rage of the middle-and-upper-class’:
Nobody’d ever been so careless with our lives in 26 years. No people can forgive and put
up with that kind of treatment,” Mr. Babariko said in an interview with Russian radio
station Ekho Moskvy shortly before his arrest.11

8

Ibid.

9

Ibid.

Financial Times, “Belarus’s middle class begins to turn on Lukashenko,” (https://www.ft.com/content/47e9c455b640-483e-8317-a301c87dc920).
10

11

Ibid.
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In June 2020, after Babaryka’s arrest12 “thousands of Belarusians took to the streets.
Hundreds were detained. Despite this, opposition activists feel that, for the first time in decades,
the president is vulnerable.”13 Well before the August 9, 2020 election the protest mood was strong
and palpable:
The fact more and more everyday Belarusians are willing to take to the streets despite such
repression is unprecedented, Belarusian analyst Valery Karbalevich told Current
Time television.14
As reported in the Financial Times on June 22, 2020, pro-opposition “Aleksandr Feduta, a
former adviser to the president,” predicted that the protests would continue to worsen and lead to
another Maidan:
Yet even if Mr. Lukashenko succeeds in [winning another term], it is not clear that this will
be the end of the protests, according to Mr. Feduta.
‘It’s one thing for him to win, and another for what happens afterwards. If people go to the
squares [to protest], then it will be [another] Maidan,’ he said, referring to the protests that
ousted Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich in 2014.15
It was clear that the well before the August 9, 2020 election that the political situation in
Belarus was volatile and that there would likely be large post-election protests. The New York
Times sensed the instability before the election
Europe’s ‘Last Dictator,’ Facing Re-Election, Is Increasingly in Peril

12

Officially Babaryka was arrested for money laundering and other financial crimes related to his tenure as head of
Belgazprom Bank. According to the opposition, these were “false charges” (see for example, Bedford 2021:809).
Informants who know people who know Babaryka have told me that the charges are likely true. Be that as it may, the
timing of the arrest appears politically motivated, regardless of whether the charges are true or not. This is supported
by the fact that President Lukashenka has vowed in the past to keep businessmen and capitalists out of Belarussian
politics (Yarashevich 2014:1710).
13

Ibid.

Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, “Sasha 3%? Belarusians Poke Fun At President's Slipping Support,” June 25,
2020, by Tony Wesolowsky, (https://www.rferl.org/a/belarusians-poke-fun-at-president-slippingsupport/30690561.html).
14

Financial Times, “Belarus’s middle class begins to turn on Lukashenko,” (https://www.ft.com/content/47e9c455b640-483e-8317-a301c87dc920).
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For 26 years, Aleksandr G. Lukashenko has ruled Belarus as if it were his personal fief. In
his sixth presidential election, the result is not in doubt, but he is being challenged like
never before.
…
The man often described as “Europe’s last dictator” has never looked so shaky…he faces
his most difficult challenge yet ahead of a presidential election on Sunday, …he struggles
to explain an upsurge of popular discontent.16
The New York Times’ article also discussed President Lukashenka’s perceived mishandling
of COVID. It appeared to everyone—except Russian intelligence? — that a perfect storm was
coming together that would culminate in the August 9, 2020 election. Even President Lukashenka
acknowledged this publicly before the election:
I am a realist — I understand that the pandemic and everything else have come together,”
he said. “I don’t have any jitters about the election,” he added. “I just won’t be comfortable
if there will be brawls on the streets that will need to be dispersed. 17
It seems unlikely that Russian intelligence would have misread something so badly that
was so obvious to everyone else. However, in support of Socor’s position, the Kremlin might have
been aware of the risk of great instability, but thought that President Lukashenka would still be
able to prevail—albeit weakened—and if need be, the Kremlin would directly assist President
Lukashenka, ensuring his survival, again in a weakened state. The two telephone conversations
between President Putin and President Lukashenka on Saturday, August 15, 2020 and Sunday,
August 16, 2020 might be proof of Socor’s position.18 Namely, that as the Kremlin saw that the
situation in Belarus was beginning to spiral out of control after the election, it quickly abandoned
its plot to destabilize President Lukashenka. President Putin’s telephone calls, ensuring Russia’s

New York Times, “Europe’s ‘Last Dictator,’ Facing Re-Election, Is Increasingly in Peril,” August 7, 2020, by Ivan
Nechepurenko, (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/07/world/europe/belarus-election-aleksandr-lukashenko.html).
16

17

Ibid.

The Guardian, “'We will perish': embattled Lukashenko sends SOS to Putin,” August 16, 2020, by Andrew Roth,
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/16/we-will-perish-embattled-lukashenko-sends-sos-to-putin).
18
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support to President Lukashenka, might be proof of Socor’s position. Ultimately, the situation in
Belarus certainly worked out in the Kremlin’s favor. However, it is not clear whether the Kremlin
had solely instigated the crisis from the beginning.
Socor (2020b) argues that the West fully coopted the opposition when Svetlana
Tikhanovskaya went to Lithuania.
Once the protest movement broke out and state repressions forced some Coordinating
Committee members to move abroad, the West embraced them along with the antiLukashenka regime-change agenda. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya in Lithuania is the most
conspicuous case of a successful interception of a political project (Socor 2020b).
Socor’s assessment might be correct, it appears that the West did gain full control over
Tikhanovskaya once she went to Lithuania. However, we know that the West was already involved
in organizing the movement long before Tikhanovskaya left for Lithuania. Though to what extent
is not clear. If we assume, however, that Socor is correct, that the West only co-opted the
movement when Tikhanovskaya went to Lithuania on Tuesday August 11, 2020, it would not seem
to have made much of a difference as the height (and highlight) of the opposition movement only
took place a few days later, on Sunday, August 16, 2020, consisting of a large protest of about
50,000,19 which was mainly organized by Nexta Telegram channels, that are run from Poland
under the protection of the Polish authorities .20 (It would seem rather far-fetched that a Kremlindirected political maneuver is run from Poland under protection from the Polish authorities)

It

is not clear that Tikhanovskaya being in Lithuania (under the control of the West) had any effect
on the large, Sunday August 16, 2020. Furthermore, it seems that the Western-funded opposition
already had everything in place for the August 16, 2020 protest, including costly 100-meter-long

New York Times, “Belarus Protests Eclipse Rally in Defense of Defiant Leader,”
(https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/16/world/europe/belarus-protests-lukashenko.html).
19

Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, “The Blogger Based In Poland Who's Become A Driving Force In The Belarusian
Protests,” September 7, 2020, by Daria Yurieva, (https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus--nexta-blogger-putsila-polishbased/30825462.html).
20
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white-red-white flags21 that certainly did not appear spontaneously and likely had been
manufactured well in advanced.22
Last, Socor argued that the Belarus uprising did not represent a color revolution since the
opposition intended to “cultivate better relations with Russia than Lukashenka has” and “more
favorable to Russia” (Socor 2020a). However, this assessment also supports the position that the
2020 uprising was a political maneuver of the Russian capitalist class (the oligarchs) itself,
independent of the Kremlin. This would explain why they risked creating enormous instability in
Belarus, which would likely not be in the Kremlin’s interest.

Was the 2020 Uprising in Belarus an Attempted Takeover by Russian Oligarchs?
Some believe that Presidential candidate, Viktor Babaryka, multimillionaire,23 formerdirector of Russian-owned Gazprom Bank Belarus (Belgazprom Bank), might have represented a
direct attempt of Russian oligarchs to seize power in Belarus themselves (Wilson 2020;
Kazakevich 2020).
President Lukashenka has not only been resisting Russia’s political absorption of Belarus
(Ioffe 2014:66) but even more so, he has been resisting Russian neoliberalism and take-over by
Russian oligarchs (Marples 2021:286; Ioffe 2014:67,104,151-152, 262)
Russian oligarchs have intruded into the Belarusian economy, buying over recent decades
the gas transit line and several large machine-building enterprises. Lukashenka has rigidly
protected his main money-making factories, such as Belaruskali, one of the world’s major
The Guardian, “'We will win': vast Belarus rally adamant Lukashenko must go,” August 16, 2020, by Shaun Walker,
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/16/we-will-win-vast-belarus-rally-adamant-lukashenko-must-go).
21

22

Not only would the 100-meter long flags be very expensive (a 30 x 60 foot flag—about half the size costs about
$2000 in the US) (see for example Collin’s Flags,
(https://www.collinsflags.com/usflagdetail.cfm?NPart=Z010117004&ref=1)), more important, arranging for their
production would be rather challenging in Belarus as the few companies that could produce such a large flag might
refuse to make them not wanting the ire of the authorities. Therefore, the large flags might have had to have been
made abroad or if made domestically very discreetly. In either case they would have had to have been made well in
advance of the August 16, 2020 demonstration.
Wikispro, “Viktar Babaryka Wiki, Biography, Age, Wife, Net Worth, Family, Instagram, Twitter & More Facts,”
(https://wikispro.com/viktar-babaryka-wiki-networth-age/).
23
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producers of potash, and Hrodna Azot, which produces fertilizers and nitrogen compounds
(Marples 2021:286).
Belarus’ socially-oriented economic model actually faces a far greater threat from Russian
neoliberalism than it does from the Western neoliberalism (Ioffe 2014:67,104,151-152,262) or
from its own domestic capitalist class (p.44-45). President Lukashenka is always “staving off
brazen attacks of Russian oligarchs eyeing Belarus’s lucrative assets” (Ioffe 2014:152). However,
how much independence does the Russian capitalist class have? Could they have interfered into
Belarus to such a degree without Putin’s approval—at least tacit approval?
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Chapter 13. The Previous Post-Electoral Uprisings in Belarus Were All Foreign
Western-Imposed Attempted Neoliberal Capitalist Counterrevolutions.
Furman (1999) and Yarashevich (2014), in general, have explained the conflict between
President Lukashenka and the opposition as a class conflict in which President Lukashenka
represented the interests of ordinary Belarussians (workers, pensioners, rural dwellers, etc.), while
the neoliberal opposition represented the interests of capitalists, the urban middle class, university
students etc. This is an attractive theory, however, if the conflict between President Lukashenka
and the opposition has really represented an attempted revolution or counterrevolution of the
Belarussian capitalist class, why then has it been so dependent on foreign aid and organization?
(Ioffe 2014:110).

[N]o success of the opposition is possible without Western aid (p.110)
The extent of past foreign involvement and financial assistance in Belarus is staggering
(p.108-110; Yarashevich 2014: 1731-32),

The vital role of Western financial support for the opposition was acknowledged by
Matsuzato (2004, p. 255), and even in the opposition media, as it was admitted that despite
formal restrictions on direct funding from abroad, most political parties existed on indirect
funds provided to numerous shell-NGOs operating in the country (Raskolnikov 2005)
(Yarashevich 2014:1732).
(Furthermore, in the previous section on color revolutions I cited pro-opposition
researchers (see Jarabik 2014; Nechyparenka 2011) who openly discussed the extent of Western
financial assistance to the Belarussian opposition, especially through USAID, NED, IDI, IRI,
Freedom House etc.)
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The extent of Western financial aid in Belarus was so great that it created the “impression
that [Belarussian opposition activists] are committed more to the fight for grants (perhaps much
more) than to the fight for regime change” (p.108). Yarashevich (2014), has even acknowledged
that:
On their part, Belarus’s opposition seems to have assumed a provocative role of
undermining the credibility of Lukashenka’s presidency on the international arena, unable
to enter formal institutions due to an unpopular policy agenda, internal weakness, and
dependence on foreign financing (p.1731-32).
Even more so, the lack of any significant protests after the 2015 election (Crabtree et al.
2016:3) shows that anti-Lukashenka protest movements have been practically completely
dependent upon foreign aid and organization. Although I have discussed the 2015 election in great
detail in a previous section, it is worth briefly repeating that the 2015 election took place at a time
when the West was pursuing good relations with Belarus and was not trying to overthrow President
Lukashenka (Seddon 2015). During this time the West was not funding opposition groups in an
effort to foment President Lukashenka’s overthrow (Seddon 2015). While there are other factors
that contributed to the lack of protests after the 2015 election, such as the recent Maidan Revolution
in the Ukraine that led to chaos and instability (Crabtree 2016:2; Seddon 2015), the fact that the
one presidential without any protest movement was also the only one in which West was pursing
friendly relations with President Lukashenka and not funding the opposition, is telling. And the
fact that, in 2015, “Opposition leaders [said that] they felt betrayed by the West” (Seddon 2015)
shows how utterly dependent the opposition was on Western aid and how it was incapable of
launching an uprising on its own independently.

Finally, not only were the previous attempted revolutions in Belarus (2001, 2006, & 2010)
lead, financed, and organized from abroad we know that they were not lead, financed, or organized
by the Belarussian capitalist class (Radnitz 2010). The Belarussian capitalist class, due to the lack
of privatization in Belarus, was simply to small and weak to have played a significant role in the
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previous attempted revolutions in Belarus (Radnitz 2010; see also Leshchenko 2008). Without the
leadership of the Belarussian capitalist class, it seems mistaken to categorize the previous
attempted revolutions as capitalist. These attempted revolutions, that were primarily foreign lead,
financed, and organized seem to fit the description of color revolutions rather than capitalist
revolutions. However, in the context of Belarus the three previous attempted color revolutions
(2001, 2006, & 2010) could also be characterized as foreign-imposed neoliberal capitalist
revolutions or counterrevolutions.

First, the key foreign institutions and their representatives, who are behind these attempted
revolutions are fighting to imposes neoliberal reforms on Belarus, especially mass privatization.
For example, “Roger Potocki of the National Endowment for Democracy, the man who for many
years oversaw channeling funds to the members of the Belarussian opposition and who by some
accounts single-handedly appointed and dismissed the leaders of some Belarusian political parties”
(Ioffe 2014:7). Potocki (2011) is a staunch supporter of neoliberal reforms— “wrenching reform,”
(p.61) and mass privatization (p.56, 61) (likely shock therapy privatization).

Real economic liberalization [in Belarus] does not appear to have been in the cards. By
borrowing, the regime was able to generate economic security (or its appearance) without
significantly changing Belarus’s ‘socially oriented’ and overwhelmingly state-run
economy (p.56)…the economic model is broken, its social contract failing, its homo
sovieticus base has thinned…As the crisis drags on, public confidence in the regime’s
attempts to shore up ‘market socialism’ by command is fading…Tinkering will not fix the
economy’s structural problems or resurrect the credit-enabled ‘economic miracle.’ It is
wrenching reform or ‘the cliff’ (p.61).
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David Kramer, former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, 1 and head of Freedom
House, is also a staunch supporter of “large-scale privatization of Belarusian enterprises.”2
Kramer, and his organization, Freedom House also even appear to support shock therapy
privatization:
With more than 70 percent of the economy still under state control, Belarus’ transition
would represent the largest privatization program since the collapse of the Soviet Union
(Freedom House 2011:24)
…
In laying the groundwork for an eventual transition in Belarus, the overriding priority for
Western officials should be to ensure that the country’s political and economic reforms are
complete and irreversible (Freedom House 2011:24)
This passage came from the report of a joint project of the Center for European Policy
Analysis and Freedom House in which David Kramer was co-chair (p.2). The goal of the project
was to create a “Framework for Action” (p.1) and besides the CEPA and Freedom House, the
report had additional contributors including Roger Potocki of the National Endowment of
Democracy, several members of the Atlantic Council and the German Marshall Fund, two former
US State Department member, Anders Aslund (renowned neoliberal proponent (Yarashevich
2014) of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Stephen Nix, of the International
Republican Institute, as well as a member from the International Republican Institute, Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, the Foreign Policy Institute (p4).

Committee on Security and Cooperation, “Belarus: Freedom Denied?” February 24, 2006, at
(https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/press-and-media/press-releases/belarus-freedomdenied?sort_by=field_date_value&page=17 ).
1

Unity Democracy Freedom, “David Kramer: IMF must not give credit to Lukashenko,” July 20, 2011, at
(https://udf.name/english/main-story/44546-david-kramer-imf-must-not-give-credit-to-lukashenko.html).
2
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Stephen B. Nix, Regional Director for Eurasia Programs for the International Republican
Institute (currently as well3) not only contributed to the CEPA/Freedom House Joint Report but
testified to the “U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
Europe and Eurasia [on] July 26, 2011.” Although Nix’s language was more subdued than the
CEPA/Freedom House joint report, it is clear that he and the IRI want to implement neoliberal
reforms in Belarus including privatization:
Belarus must make fundamental, systemic economic reforms if it is to recover from its
current situation. The regime now faces a dilemma: To recover economically, the
government has to dramatically change its current economic model, which is the
foundation of its political control over the country. Economic reform would mean giving
up political control... Lukashenka has no interest in transparency, establishing markets or
creating a society based on the rule of law. …without serious implementation of market
reforms it will serve to only temporarily stabilize the economy without addressing the
underlying problems4
…
More importantly, the U.S. and the European Union must think strategically about Belarus
post-Lukashenka, when the people of Belarus are finally able to establish a democratic
society based on principles of free-market economy. U.S. assistance should be directed
toward increasing the effectiveness and capacity of democratic political parties and
activists inside the country first and foremost. They are the ones who constitute the
alternative to Lukashenka and are capable of bringing about needed economic and social
reforms.5 (Italics added)

International Republican Institute, “Stephen B. Nix, Esq.” n.d. at (https://www.iri.org/who-we-are/iriexperts/stephen-b-nix/).
3

Stephen B. Nix, “Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia July 26, 2011 (Page 3) (https://www.iri.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/201120July202620IRI20Eurasia20Driector20Testifies20on20the20State20of20Democracy
20in20Europe20and20Eurasia20-20complete20testimony.pdf). Stephen Nix of the IRI did not merely call for
market reforms and privatization in Belarus but (among other things) condemned the market reforms and
privatization that had already taken place that benefited Russian firms over Western ones: “The economic crisis may
force the Belarus government to sell many state-owned enterprises, most likely to Russian interests, as Lukashenka
has shown no willingness to work with the West productively. Lukashenka has no interest in transparency,
establishing markets or creating a society based on the rule of law. This helps to explain why much of the so-called
privatization will most likely occur with Russia.”
4

5

Nix, Ibid, page 5.
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The US State Department itself is committed to the “transition” of former communist
countries into “market-oriented countries:”
Over the past 30 years, since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia, the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator of U.S.
Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (ACE) has led the coordination of the U.S.
government’s (USG) effort to support the former communist countries in Europe, Eurasia,
and Central Asia in their transition to free, democratic, prosperous, and market-oriented
countries6
In general, the US State Department works closely with the federal agency, USAID, and
specifically as it relates to Belarus.7 President George W. Bush, as far back as 2001 has been very
clear that his “vision” for Belarus is for Belarus “to return to the path of democracy and a free
market economy” (italics added).8
Although I have been focusing in this section on Belarus’ previous attempted revolutions
(2001, 2006, & 2010)—even today, key opposition leader, Franak Viacorka, is a radical proponent
shock therapy privatization (Viacorka 2014).

Viacorka is the Senior Advisor to Svetlana

Tikhanovskaya and “is a consultant for the U.S. Agency for Global Media; the creative director of
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, an organization described by The New York Times as a
“worldwide propaganda network built by the CIA.” He is also a Non-Resident Fellow at the
Atlantic Council, a NATO-linked organization that boasts no fewer than seven former CIA
directors on its board.” (MacLeod 2021). Franak’s views on shock therapy privatization are
similar to CEPA and Freedom House’s—only even more forthright:

Jonathan Benton, Nicole Hollinshead, and Miki Templeton, “Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe,
Eurasia, and Central AsiaLeading the U.S. government’s assistance to a critical region,” at
6

(https://statemag.state.gov/2021/08/0821office/)
Ibid.

7

Philip T. Reeker, “Belarus: Election Declared Undemocratic” Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, September
10, 2001, at (https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2001/4855.htm).
8
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Privatization should be fast and irreversible. As previously noted, all attempts of
privatization in Belarus were belated and slow. They alternated with long pauses and pushbacks strengthening the role of the state. After a reverse in 1996-1998, the business-climate
in Belarus was very unfavorable. As a result of these controversial practices the positive
effects of privatization were degraded. Sequential privatization does not save the
population from negative effects and, therefore, strengthens negative public opinion on
reforms. In order to reduce the side-effects both for markets and reforms, the population,
privatization should be as fast as possible, preferably concluding in only a few years
(Franak 2014:8; bold in original).
Though the US has been more aggressive in its attempt to impose neoliberal capitalism on
Belarus, in Western Europe, the European Union [EU] plays the most important role (along with
various state, quasi-state and private institutions). The European Union, a neoliberal capitalist
institution (Lopez and Garcia 2019; Duroy 2014) —even the Wall Street Journal admits this9—is
trying to impose neoliberal reforms, especially mass privatization in Belarus (EU 2012:21). The
EU’s neoliberal agenda for Belarus is not a secret, although, like the US (Sussman 2006), the EU
prefers to frame its intervention into Belarus as “democracy assistance,” (Raik 2006),
“[d]emocracy promotion” (EU 2012:6), “democratization,” (p.1), “Europeanisation,” (p.1)
“modernising” (p.1), and developing “civil society” (p. 6). In spite of the use of these euphemisms,
the EU’s neoliberal agenda for Belarus is usually fairly clear.
The EU has a multi-faceted policy on Belarus with one clear aim: to foster the development
of democracy, the rule of law and the market economy (Tapiola 2006:70; italics added)
Let’s examine the following Policy Department Study of the EU’s (2012) European
Parliament: “Sociological Study on the Composition of The Belarussian Society.” The study was
written by Dr Anais Marin, a Researcher of the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood and Russia research
programme of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki (p.2). Again, in spite of the

Simon Nixon, “The European Union’s Neoliberal Dilemma,” The Wall Street Journal, October 4, 2017, at
(https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-european-unions-neoliberal-dilemma-1507147154).
9
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use of many euphemisms, a careful examination of the EU policy reports reveals the neoliberal
agenda the EU “wishes to impose” on Belarus, which is not a “panacea in the eyes of most
Belarusians” (p.8). Phrases like “market reforms” (p.20), “to trigger a transition from a managed
economy to a free market” (p.40), “undermin[ing] Lukashenka’s economic model at the worker
level” (p.40) and “de-Sovietisation” (p.6). Reveal the EU’s real neoliberal agenda. And unlike the
US, the EU at times is far more honest about the situation in Belarus, admitting:
At the root of the problem is an enduring misunderstanding of Belarusians’ mentality
and worldviews (p. 8; bold in original) …the EU still needs to admit that Belarusians are
not ready to swap their neo-Soviet governance model for a Western one just yet. (p.5) …the
EU needs to understand the population’s apprehensions and adopt a more inclusive
approach of the challenges awaiting the country on the road to de-Sovietisation. (p.6) …
that the itinerary Brussels wishes to impose is not a panacea in the eyes of most Belarusians
(P.8) (bold in original).
Candidly, and forthright, the EU admits:
This dominant segment of the population is hostile to systemic changes and privatisation
as they could directly harm their interest (p.21).
While the concept of a color revolution can be important, it seems however, that in the
context of Belarus, the supposed attempted color revolutions of 2001, 2006 and 2010 could be
better understood as attempted externally-imposed capitalist revolutions or counterrevolutions or
even neoliberal counterrevolutions.

Before going on to discuss whether the 2020 uprising

represented a capitalist revolution (domestic or foreign imposed) I would like show that the West’s
neoliberal agenda for Belarus is an intrinsic goal in itself, separate from the West’s geopolitical
rivalry with Russia.
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Chapter 14. The West’s Neoliberal Agenda for Belarus is an Intrinsic Goal in Itself,
Separate from Anti-Russian Geopolitics
Obviously, Belarus is of great strategic importance to the West as part of the West’s
geopolitical strategy against Russia (Ioffe 2014,2013, Ioffe and Yarashevich 2011; EU 2012). This
fact is even more obvious now in the context of Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine, with Belarus
being Russia’s only ally in the region and vital for Russia’s military campaign against the Ukraine.
However, notwithstanding the geopolitical significance of Belarus as part of the West’s strategy
against Russia, it is my position, that the West’s neoliberal agenda for Belarus is an intrinsic goal
in itself, independent of the West’s geopolitical strategy against Russia. Putting forth this
argument is the main goal of this section.
Some might say that this question is beyond the scope of this study, and to a certain degree
they might be true. However, I have chosen to focus on this question for two reasons. First,
understanding the West’s devout commitment to imposing neoliberal transition on Belarus puts
the 2020 uprising in the proper context getting beyond the popular euphemisms, tropes, and memes
that dominate the Western media and even academic research. Second, and likely more important,
the West’s neoliberal ideology, which is very similar to the neoliberal ideology of the capitalists
in my qualitative study, is directly antagonistic to the moral economy of the workers in this study.
Like the capitalists in my study, exploring the neoliberal orientation of the West itself, will provide
a wider context for understanding Belarus better. This will allow us to see the moral economy of
the Belarussian workers in a broader context than merely within Belarus nationally, but Belarus,
and its unique socially-oriented economic model, in the context of a region that is dominated by
neoliberal capitalist ideology and institutions, namely the US and EU.
As I have previously said, notwithstanding the geopolitical significance of Belarus as part
of the West’s strategy against Russia, it is my position, that the West’s neoliberal agenda for
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Belarus is an intrinsic goal in itself, independent of the West’s geopolitical strategy against Russia.
First, although Belarus is geopolitically strategic for the West, the West’s neoliberal agenda for
Belarus is also very important and is not an afterthought; this was shown in the previous Chapter.
According to Ioffe (2013), the two goals are inseparable. I will go even further than Ioffe: namely
that the West’s neoliberal agenda for Belarus is in fact the priority. This would explain why the
US made such “predictable” mistakes in 2020, “deliver[ing] a reluctant Lukashenko straight into
Moscow’s geopolitical embrace” (Episkopos 2020). Episkopos explains the United States’
massive geopolitical blunder as “driven by a misguided focus on enforcing liberal-democratic
values.” What if, however, those liberal-democratic [read neoliberal capitalism] are the main
priority, even more so than “engag[ing] Minsk in the context of a broader Eurasian grand
strategy.”
In the previous section I discussed the deep commitment to neoliberal reform, especially
mass privatization, in Belarus of four important US-government-funded organizations that are
trying to impose neoliberal reforms on Belarus: namely, Freedom House, the National
Endowment for Democracy [NED], the International Republican Institute [IRI] and US Agency
for Global Media [USAGM], (as well President Bush and the US State Department itself). In
this section, I will argue, focusing on Freedom House, the National Endowment for Democracy,
and the International Republican Institute, that although these three organizations are deeply
committed to the United States’ long-term geopolitical strategy against Russia, in general, 1
specifically, in the case of Belarus, their priority is neoliberal reform, especially mass
privatization. (In fact, they prioritize neoliberal reform in Belarus seemingly at the expense of

Freedom House, “Contending with Putin’s Russia,” February 2020, at
(https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/SR_Contending_with_Putins_Russia_PDF.pdf);
Tyler Roylance, “Why Putin is not ok.” Freedom House, July 11, 2018, at (https://freedomhouse.org/article/whyputin-not-okay);
1
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long-term US geopolitical interests against Russia (see Episkopos 2020).). In the same way, I
will also discuss the European Union. Let’s start with David Kramer’s Freedom House.
Freedom House’s (2011) report focused heavily on implementing neoliberal reforms,
especially mass privatization (p.24). In fact, neoliberal transition was a far greater priority in
the report than geopolitics. According to the report Belarus’ neoliberal transition was the
“overriding priority for Western officials.”
The overriding priority for Western officials should be to ensure that the country’s political
and economic reforms are complete and irreversible (p.24).
Furthermore, when the report did discuss geopolitics or “long-term strategic interests”
(p.28), it did so presupposing Belarus’ socio-economic transformation into a free-market
economy (see Ioffe 2013).
A pro-Western, democratic, free market Belarus would place considerably less strain on
the stability and security outlook of key NATO allies in the region (p.28).
Not only is neoliberal transition inseparable from Western geopolitical interests (Ioffe
2013), for Freedom House; it is a prerequisite.
Similarly, the National Endowment for Democracy [NED] also prioritized neoliberal
reform in Belarus over geopolitics. This can be seen in the articles of
Roger Potocki (2011, 2002), former NED Senior Director for Europe, who oversaw the
NED’s Belarus portfolio (2011:61). As I discussed in the previous section Potocki (2011) was
deeply committed to “[r]eal economic liberalization” “privatization” and “significantly
changing Belarus’s ‘socially oriented’ and overwhelmingly state-run economy” (p.56). Potocki
declared that Belarus’ “economic model is broken” and that “attempts to shore up ‘market
socialism’ by command is fading” and that it is time for “wrenching reform” (p.61). However,
Potocki was far less committed to geopolitics. For example, in 2002 not only did Potocki not
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support turning Belarus against Russia, he actively discouraged it (p.148, 153). Furthermore,
Potocki maintained his nuanced position concerning Russia in his 2011 article. No doubt one
could argue that Potocki’s nuanced position concerning Russia was merely opportunism—
nothing but realpolitik. However, then, why is Potocki not nuanced when it comes to insisting
upon neoliberal reforms? Why not be more tolerant of Belarus’ socially-oriented state-run
economy and focus on changing Belarus’ geopolitical orientation?

This is exactly what

Episkopos (2020) and other political realists would have liked to have seen. The West had been
doing this to a great degree before the attempted 2020 revolution and Episkopos thought this
was working.2 Why then was Potocki and the NED able to be so nuanced about Russia but not
on the question of neoliberal reform?
The words of Carl Gersham, president of the National Endowment for Democracy,
further supports my position. On September 1, 2020, not long after what turned out to be the
height of the 2020 uprising (and instability), and at time when the opposition and West seriously
feared Russian intervention with security forces to quell the uprising, 3 Gersham wrote a piece
of a larger article for the NATO-affiliated Atlantic Council: “Belarus uprising faces Kremlinbacked crackdown,” 4 in which Gersham talked about “build[ing] a new market economy” in
Belarus, and of all people relied on Anders Aslund, one of the “most prominent and influential
neoliberals” who advocated shock therapy in the early 1990s for the former-socialist states (King
2003:5; see also Yarashevich 2014) and who along with Jeffrey Sachs, “advised the Russian

2

It could be argued that fact that the US worked with President Lukashenka for a time trying to draw him away from
Moscow proves that the US is not fundematlly and inherently committed to neoliberal reform in Belarus. Sakhnin
(2021), however, rejects this argument. According to Sakhnin, in spite of the political thaw, President Lukashenka
“could not endear himself to Western powers, who would accept nothing full-scale privatization” (p.4).
Peter Dickenson, “Belarus uprising faces Kremlin-backed crackdown” Atlantic Council, September 1, 2020, at
(https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/belarusalert/belarus-uprising-faces-kremlin-backed-crackdown/).
3

4

Ibid.
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government and guided its shock therapy reform process in 1992–1993” (Marangos 2007:88).
Gersham wrote:
But as Anders Aslund has noted, if Belarus can break free of Lukashenka’s iron grip and
start a process of democratic transition, it has an excellent opportunity, with its educated
population, to build a new market economy that could gradually become more integrated
into European and global economies5 (Italics added).
In spite of serous fears of Russian intervention with security forces into Belarus,
Gersham is seriously talking about building a market economy. This fact alone seems to prove
that neoliberal reform is by far the priority for the West over geopolitics concerning Russia.
Moreover, not only did Gersham rely on Aslund, but provided a direct link to Aslund’s article
right in the text. The article, 6 published Saturday, August 15, 2020 during the height of the
2020 uprising, promoted orthodox neoliberal shock therapy as well as orthodox shock therapy
privatization for Belarus, including the previously disastrous voucher privatization scheme to
privatize the economy very rapidly (see King 2003). Not surprisingly, Aslund believes that the
“Belarusian economy cries out for liberalization and privatization.”
Under Lukashenko, Belarus has maintained a Soviet-style, state-dominated economy that
has been stagnating since 2012… The public sector comprises three-quarters of the
economy, which is highly dependent on heavy industry and dominated by just a few big
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The five most important enterprises – the potash company
Belaruskali, the two largest oil refineries, the Minsk Tractor Works (MTZ), and the Minsk
Automobile Plant (MAZ) – tend to be subsidized and inefficient, and the economy overall
is heavily regulated.
…

5

Ibid.

6

Anders Aslund, “The Economic Factor in Belarus,” Project Syndicate, August 15, 2020, at (https://www.project-

syndicate.org/commentary/belarus-economy-after-lukashenko-by-anders-aslund-2020-07
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The Belarusian economy cries out for liberalization and privatization, and it has the basic
ingredients for launching such a process. The country has many assets, and it has
maintained the best of the Soviet education system, offering excellent training in
mathematics and natural sciences. Despite being under authoritarian rule, Belarus has
become the home of a substantial software industry. And many in the large diaspora are
ready to return when the time is right.
…
Subsidies to SOEs will need to be curbed as well. Here, too, Belarus benefits from the fact
that, unlike other post-Soviet countries, there are no oligarchs and little sign of state capture
by big businessmen.
…
But these starting conditions could make privatization more difficult, simply because there
are no big private companies to serve as a model. If the bulk of inefficient SOEs are sold
on the market, Belarusians fear that risk-loving Russian businessmen will swoop in to
snatch them all up at fire-sale prices.
…
After all, the Russian potash company Uralkali has long tried to take over Belaruskali, and
the Russian petrochemical giants Rosneft and Lukoil have their eyes on Belarus’s two big
oil refineries. Given these risks, the best option is probably to give away most enterprises
in the form of individual shares to their current employees7 [voucher privatization, (see
King 2003)].
Let’s now discuss the International Republican Institute [IRI] and its President, Stephen
Nix.

Like Freedom House and the NED, the IRI, also prioritizes Belarus’ neoliberal

transformation over geopolitics. For example, although IRI President Stephen Nix warned that
the, then current, limited non-transparent privatization in Belarus, would benefit Russian firms
and not Western ones, he did not talk about Belarus’ geopolitical strategic significance against
Russia in his discussion of Belarus during his July 26, 2011 address to the US House of
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia Congress

7

Ibid.
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Committee.8 In fact, Nix, at the end of his discussion of Belarus stated the most important
priority for the US and EU concerning Belarus:
More importantly, the U.S. and the European Union must think strategically about Belarus
post-Lukashenka, when the people of Belarus are finally able to establish a democratic
society based on principles of free-market economy 9(italics added).
And though there is no doubt that Stephen Nix and the IRI do focus on promoting US
geopolitical interests in the region (against Russia), in general, I do believe Nix’s failure to
discuss geopolitical interests in regard Belarus is significant, especially when he discussed them
fairly explicitly while discussing the Ukraine during his address. 10 Again, as I discussed earlier,
neoliberal transition is the prerequisite for further geopolitical integration. This can be clearly
seen in Nix’s statement: “to establish a democratic society based on principles of free-market
economy” (italics added). For Nix, the IRI and other neoliberal institutions, democracy itself is
based on neoliberal capitalism (see Ioffe 2013:1255). They fundamentally reject the notion that a
democratic society could choose to have a socialist economy if it thought that was in its best
interests. And even more so, they reject the notion that a socialist society could be democratic.
For Nix, the IRI and other neoliberal institutions, neoliberal capitalism itself is synonymous with
democracy, and anything that is not neoliberal capitalism is fundamentally un-democratic and

Stephen B. Nix, “Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia July 26, 2011 (Page 3) (https://www.iri.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/201120July202620IRI20Eurasia20Driector20Testifies20on20the20State20of20Democracy
20in20Europe20and20Eurasia20-20complete20testimony.pdf).
8

9

Ibid (Page 5). I am not implying that the Stephen Nix or the IRI does in general not pursue US geopolitical interests
in the region. During the address Nix discussed the work the IRI was doing in the Ukraine [this was 3 years before
Maidan]
“The current Ukrainian government has stated deeper and closer ties to Europe, with aspirations of eventual EU
membership as a foreign policy priority. At present, the Ukrainian government is in the process of negotiating a deep
and comprehensive free trade agreement with the European Union.
The United States has consistently supported Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations.” (Ibid. P.10; italics added)
10
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authoritarian (see Harvey 2005). This neoliberal ideological conception of democracy explains
why, in the case of Belarus neoliberal transition is prioritized over geopolitical concerns.
The EU also has a very strong commitment to neoliberal reform in Belarus that appears to
be more of a priority than its geopolitical interests in Belarus strategically against Russia. Recall,
Pirkka Tapiola (2006), “Senior Advisor for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in the Policy Unit of
the European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier
Solana” (p.65). Tapiola did not even include geopolitics in his summary of the EU’s goals with
regard to Belarus:
The EU has a multi-faceted policy on Belarus with one clear aim: to foster the development
of democracy, the rule of law and the market economy (p.70).
The EU’s (2012) policy report certainly discussed geopolitics for example, the EU’s failure
“to withdraw Belarus from Moscow’s sphere of influence and turn it into a stable, democratic and
pro-EU partner” (p.8). However, the report concludes that in spite of Belarus’ geopolitical
significance, Belarus’ democratic transition must remain the priority on ideological grounds:
Still, the EU cannot remain true to its very purpose if it fails to eradicate an
authoritarian regime that is prospering right at its doorstep, even if it happens to also be
in Russia’s backyard. Acknowledging the many dimensions of the problem, including
those stemming from their own mistakes, the EU and its member states should devise an
ambitious strategy for returning to 'Realpolitik' in relation to the regime, rationalising
support to civil society (the 'second track' diplomacy), while investing in the 'third track' of
a real partnership aimed at Belarus as a country (P.8; bold in original).
And although the passage talked about eradicating an “authoritarian regime” and did not
include anything about Belarus’ neoliberal transition, it is very clear from the report that Belarus’
state-owned economy is a crucial, if not the main aspect of Belarus’ authoritarianism.
Furthermore, the passage raises the question of the “very purpose” of the EU. Many scholars argue
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that promoting neoliberal capitalism is, in fact, the very purpose of the EU (for example LopezCastellano and Garcia-Quero 2019; Sakellaropoulos 2017; Isleyen 2015; Duroy 2014; Hermann
2005). And long before being a neoliberal capitalist institution, the EU’s predecessor was a
capitalist institution (Sakellaropoulos 2017):
It was not the product of spontaneous tendencies towards collaboration within European
states but in fact was clearly a political initiative of the United States aimed at checking
Soviet influence in Western Europe.
…
To be specific. The European economy emerged from the Second War in ruins; moreover,
a number of European countries (Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, Albania,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR) came under Soviet influence. All of this obliged the
USA, as the hegemonic power in the capitalist world, to adopt a policy of forging capitalist
productive relations (Sakellaropoulos 2017:20-21).
Furthermore, the EU (and its predecessors) were eager to expand into the former-socialist
states of eastern Europe:
[T]the decision to expand the EU into the formerly socialist countries. The basic factor was
the prospect of entering new markets and exploiting new investment opportunities (low
labor costs, high levels of specialization, the existence of infrastructures) (p.228).
The EU’s potential expansion into Belarus would offer the same opportunities—if not
more.11 No doubt this also contributes to the EU’s frustration over Belarus. Viewing the EU’s
feud with Belarus in the context of the EU’s fundamental neoliberal capitalist orientation provides
the most clarity. Unfortunately, not enough scholarly attention has been paid to this important
question (see for example Yarashevich 2014).

As I cited Aslund (2020) earlier, “The Belarusian economy cries out for liberalization and privatization, and it has
the basic ingredients for launching such a process. The country has many assets, and it has maintained the best of the
Soviet education system, offering excellent training in mathematics and natural sciences…. [Belarus has a] welleducated, highly disciplined workforce…potash… two big oil refineries,” one of which, “NAFTAN, based in
Novopolotsk, Vitebsk region…is the largest refinery in Europe” as well as many other large industrial state-owned
enterprises (Ioffe 2014:21)
11
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The main purpose of this section is to show that the West’s hostility toward Belarus is
primarily driven by Belarus’ state-owned economy due to the West’s (both the US and EU)
fundamental neoliberal capitalist orientation. No doubt geopolitics also plays an important role;
however, the West ideologically cannot accept Belarus’ largely socialist model and will sacrifice
geopolitical goals against Russia in order to transform Belarus’ state-owned economy. It is not
entirely clear whether this is merely a mistake due to the West’s ideological hang ups (see
Espikopos 2020), or whether this is part of a larger long-term two-stage strategy in which formersocialist countries must withstand neoliberal transition before being incorporated into the West
and its geopolitical strategy against Russia (see Freedom House 2011:28).12
Related to the understanding of the fundamental neoliberal capitalist orientation of the
West and its policies toward Belarus, one can see Belarus’ unique largely socialist economic model
as a potential “good example” and threat to the dominant neoliberal capitalist model (Chomsky

12

Franak Viacorka, Senior Advisor to Svetlana Tikhanovsky, USAGM funded-consultant, and non-resident fellow
of the NATO-affiliated Atlantic Council (MacLeod 2021), whose radical support for shock therapy privatization
was discussed in the previous Chapter (Viacorka 2014), has an interesting analysis of the geopolitical situation
involving Belarus and Russia. Viacorka argues that if the socialist or Soviet socio-economic system is overthrown
in Belarus it would inevitably lead to collapse of the Russian government. This position is explained in an August
26, 2020 Atlantic Council article with the insightful title: “Belarus is a reminder that the USSR is still collapsing,”
(https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/belarusalert/belarus-is-a-reminder-that-the-ussr-is-still-collapsing/). Viacorka
states:
With the emergence of an independent Belarusian national identity, we are entering a new stage in the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Thirty years after the empire officially expired, the sun may finally be setting
on the last remaining outpost of Soviet authoritarianism in Central Europe. Events in Belarus remain finely
poised, but it is already clear that the country will never be the same again. The ramifications of this shift
will be felt throughout the region, and could eventually hasten the final act of the Soviet collapse inside
Russia itself
Viacorka’s assessment is interesting and supports my position that neoliberal reform is the West’s priority. Viacorka
does not see focusing on overthrowing Belarus’ government and socio-economic system as a misguided diversion
from anti-Russia geopolitics but as critical step toward overthrowing the Russian government. Viacorka might very
well be right that overthrowing President Lukashenka would lead to the political collapse of Russia (see also Marples
2021; Socor 2020), however, if he is characterizing Russia’s socio-economic system as Soviet then that would be very
problematic (Chandler 2020; Kumala et al. 2014; Rutland 2013). Furthermore, if Viacorka, is equating Russia’s
current political authoritarianism with being Soviet, then that would also be very problematic, as Russia’s current
authoritarian super-presidential political system was created by Boris Yeltsin in 1993, growing out of Yeltsin’s bloody
1993 Black October coup, in which he violently overthrew Russia’s democratically elected Parliament attacking the
Parliament building with tanks (The Atlantic, “20 years ago Russia had its biggest political crisis since the Bolshevik
Revolution,”
October
4,
2013,
by
Mikhail
Sokolov and Anastasia
Kirilenko,
(https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/10/20-years-ago-russia-had-its-biggest-political-crisissince-the-bolshevik-revolution/280237/); see also Furman 1999).
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1992). The idea that Belarus’ socio-economic model is an unaccepted good example can be seen
in the reactions against it. For example, David Kramer (2006), the president of Freedom House as
well as by the EU (2012):
There is no place in Europe for a regime of this kind (p.151).
…
[T]he EU cannot remain true to its very purpose if it fails to eradicate an authoritarian
regime that is prospering right at its doorstep (p. 8; italics added)
The EU relied on the term “authoritarian” regime; however, we have already discussed that
in this context “authoritarian” the EU means socialist or more broadly a rejection of neoliberal
capitalism. Furthermore, not only was privatization and neoliberal reforms a crucial part of the
EU report, there was nothing in the report proposing democratic reforms within the context of
maintaining the largely socialist economic model. In fact, the report explicitly said just the
opposite, showing that the EU’s neoliberal conception of “democracy” fundamentally excludes
socialism, or key elements of socialism, or even social democracy:
One ‘trick’ for maintaining Belarusians undemanding of universal human rights and
fundamental freedoms is to systematically distort the very definition of democracy: for
Lukashenka, democracy is the right to have a job, earn a living and feed one’s family
(EU 2012:19; bold in original).
(These two differing conceptions of democracy are at the very heart of this dissertation. I
will discuss this more in the Conclusion)
Ultimately, for them, Belarus represents an unacceptable example or alternative. And I
conclude that the West’s hostility toward Belarus is mainly driven by its refusal to accept an
alternative model to neoliberal capitalism.
Last, the surprising popularity of the disastrous shock therapy privatization scheme (see
King 2003:5) promoted for Belarus serves as further proof that neoliberal transformation is the
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priority for the West above geopolitical interests concerning Russia. This argument is two-fold.
The first part is ideological and the second part is political.
First, the West, being ideologically and fundamentally oriented toward neoliberal
capitalisms naturally promotes orthodox neoliberal shock therapy privatization for Belarus (in
spite of the fact that it has been heavily criticized by numerous13 academic scholars) (Ioffe 2014:
45)). The second argument is political; however, it is also inherently linked to the ideological basis
of neoliberal capitalism. I will briefly explain.
Although shock therapy privatization has been heavily criticized by numerous academic
scholars, as a practical matter or politically speaking, it is most advantageous for the rapid for the
complete—and irreversible—transformation of socialist property relations14 (King 2003:5). King
(2003:5) explains the rationale of the original architects of shock therapy:
[F]or the neoliberals, rapid privatization was even more urgent for political reasons. Unless
it was done quickly, they warned, ‘the political battle over privatization will soon lead to a
stalemate in the entire process, with the devastating long-term result that little privatization
takes place at all.’ Managers and workers in inefficient SOEs [state-owned enterprises] will
have an interest in derailing privatization and maintaining state subsidies and protection.
Thus, one of the aims of rapid privatization is ‘to decrease the political power of the state
sector.’ Because of the great urgency of privatization, it ‘must take place before firms have
been restructured.’… privatization could not proceed as it has in the West, where firms are
sold one at a time to the highest bidder. There were simply far too many SOEs and not
enough capitalists. As a result, ‘If the government becomes enmeshed in case-by-case

Yarashevich alone “reviewed almost 200 Western publications critical of the neoliberal perspective on
postcommunist transition” for his 2006 doctoral dissertation (Ioffe 2014:45).
13

14

Whether shock therapy privatization actually leads to the development of capitalist property relations is heavily
debated (Melkonian 2011; Simon 2010:445; Kagaritsky 2002; Kotz 2001; Ericson 2001; Burawoy 2001, 1992)
There are no grounds whatever for maintaining that the money and property accumulated by the ‘New
Russians’ during this period became capital in the full sense. The distinguishing feature of capital is its ability
to grow, and of the capitalist enterprise, its capacity for expanded reproduction (which distinguishes it from
a feudal undertaking). Nothing of the sort was to be observed in Belovezhskaya Russia. Private property had
triumphed, but not all private property is capitalist (Kagarlitsky 2002:5; italics added)
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bargaining, there will be no end in sight.’ Thus, a significant amount of the shares of SOEs
must be given away (King 2003:5; see also Rutland 2013:339)
The shock-therapy theorists fears were not unwarranted as the industrial workers and
managers at state owned enterprises became a powerful political force against privatization in
Belarus and the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) (Savchenko 2002). This was also a
serious problem in Russia, in which “Gavriil Popov, the free-market economist who was mayor of
Moscow during the tumultuous years 1989 to 1992, argued:
If we cannot soon denationalise and privatise property, we will be attacked by waves of
workers fighting for their own interests. This will break up the forces of perestroika and
put its future in question… We must seek new mechanisms and institutions of political
power that depend less on populism (Harmon 2007; see also Melkonian 2011).
Not only did industrial workers and managers become an important political force against
privatization in Belarus in the 1990’s, they, together with other workers, rural Belarussians, and
pensioners became the social base behind President Lukashenka and the rejection of neoliberalism
and mass privatization (Yarashevich 2014; Furman 1999).

This phenomenon continues as

industrial managers and workers are still a major obstacle to privatization in Belarus (Ioffe and
Yarashevich 2011:756) and according to my more recent findings in this study, Belarussian
workers were still deeply opposed to privatization today.
While understanding the logic and foundation of shock-therapy privatization is very
important for a deep understanding of Belarus in general, in this section I am discussing shock
therapy to show the West’s profound ideological commitment to Belarus’ neoliberal transition and
the West’s profound political commitment to Belarus’ neoliberal transition. Most important, the
West’s insistence on shock therapy privatization for Belarus, shows the West’s deep political
commitment to transform property relations in Belarus completely and irreversibly, which
overshadows the West’s geopolitical interests in Belarus concerning Russia.
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Now I will go on to discuss the 2020 uprising itself exploring whether it could be characterized
as a neoliberal capitalist counter revolution.
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Chapter 15. Was the 2020 Uprising a Domestic Capitalist Revolution?
In the previous sections, I demonstrated the previous post-electoral uprising in Belarus
(2001. 2006, 2010) were externally-imposed attempted neoliberal capitalist revolutions by the
West (primarily the US, as well as the EU). The reason that these attempted revolutions had to be
externally imposed is that the Belarussian capitalist class was too small and too weak due to the
lack of privatization in Belarus (Radnitz 2012; see also Leshchenko 2008). There is no question
that the West continued its strategy in 2020, especially leading up to the 2020 presidential election.
However, what role did the domestic Belarussian capitalist class play in the 2020 uprising? Has
there been sufficient privatization and growth of the private sector for the Belarussian capitalist
class to have played an important role—if not a leading role—in the 2020 uprising? (See Radnitz
2012).
In Belarus’ previous post-electoral uprisings, the middle class made up the bulk of the
protest movement (Radnitz 2010; Marples 2006; Potocki 2002). There is no doubt that the middle
class made up the bulk of the 2020 protest movement as well (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021;
Bedford 2021; Glod 2020). However, was the movement primarily, organized, funded and led by
the Belarussian capitalist class?

Interestingly, numerous non-Marxist analysts, Socor 2020, Chaly, Wilson 2020a, and
Shraibman have portrayed the 2020 uprising in Belarus as a capitalist revolution or “bourgeoisdemocratic revolution of the well-to-do people,” (Sergey Chaly cited in Socor 2020a). These
analysists are very harsh critiques of President Lukashenka, strong proponents of privatization,
and strongly support the opposition.
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Vladimir Socor (2020), who is affiliated with NATO, the Foreign Policy Research Institute,
and “was previously an analyst with the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute
(1983-1994)”1 described the 2020 uprising as “bourgeois”

[T]he social mainspring of this protest movement is primarily members of the Minsk-based
“bourgeois.” However, this group is acting in a heavily industrialized country with a large,
state-dependent working class. These two social classes have not converged into the protest
movement: partly because their interests differ, and partly because the Minsk intelligentsia
has apparently not figured out how to bridge those interests. Belarus’s working class today
is as pivotal to the country’s social structure as was the case in neighboring Poland three
decades ago. There, members of the Polish intelligentsia coalesced with workers to form
the Solidarity movement. But there is no comparable initiative in Belarus. The Polish
prerequisites for it are missing (Socor 2020a).
…
[The two social classes mentioned above are Belarus’s distinctive features after a quartercentury of Lukashenka’s rule. Belarus is neither transitioning to a post-industrial society
nor turning into a surplus-labor exporter. It has, instead, preserved and further developed
its massive Soviet-legacy industries…and the state-owner has guaranteed the welfare of its
industrial working class. Along with this, Lukashenka’s Belarus has become a world-class
center of IT services, with tens of thousands of local high-tech personnel and their families
forming Minsk’s new, prosperous middle class. It became a prime moving force of this
“color revolution”; and (just like Minsk’s “old opposition” and artistic intelligentsia) they
find it hard to relate to the working class. Tut.by’s in-house pundit, Siarhei Chaliy, reflects
that attitude: “this is a bourgeois-democratic revolution of the well-to-do people,” whereas
“the industrial workers used to be a force in the last century or two centuries ago” (Tut.by,
October 28) (Socor 2020a)

Foreign Policy Research Institute, “Vladimir Socor” (https://www.fpri.org/contributor/vladimir-socor/);
The Jamestown Foundation, “Vladimir Socor” (https://jamestown.org/analyst/vladimir-socor/).
1

443

Andrew Wilson (2020a), Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council of Foreign
Relations,2 saw the events leading up August 9, 2020 as a capitalist political revolution. Namely,
the Belarussian capitalist class—Wilson uses the problematic term “oligarchy”—was attempting
to achieve political power.

[President Lukashenka] has always made a virtue of saying that there will be no oligarchy
in Belarus. But the candidacies of [Valery] Tsapkala [former ambassador and founder of
IT Park] and [Viktor] Babaryka [former head of Belgazprom Bank] signal that the elite is
diversifying its options. The growing power of private firms, especially those in the digital
sector, is slowly undermining the old state-managed economy. The new economy tends to
focus on services and to sell to the European Union, pushing Lukashenka further towards
rapprochement with Brussels. Emerging Belarusian oligarchs could easily make alliances
with their Russian counterparts (Wilson 2020a).
…
In his speeches, Tsapkala supports good relations with Russia and radical reforms to
build effective market economy.3
Artyom Shraibman, of the Carnegie Endowment,4 has a similar analysis as Andrew Wilson.
Furthermore, Shraibman notes that the candidacies of Tsepkalo and Babaryko represented
significant defections from the Belarussian political and business establishment against President
Lukashenka:
Even more unusually for Belarusian politics, two other presidential candidates hail not
from the opposition, but from the establishment. Valery Tsepkalo is a former ambassador
to the United States and deputy head of the Foreign Ministry who later created the Belarus
Hi-Tech Park, while Viktor Babariko is a banker and philanthropist. Their ideas are similar:
The European Council on Foreign Relations, “EXPERTS & STAFF: Andrew Wilson”
(https://ecfr.eu/profile/andrew_wilson/).
2

LRT, “Is Belarus facing a 'slipper' revolution?” June 11, 2020, by Dzmitry Mitskevich, (https://www.lrt.lt/en/newsin-english/19/1187033/is-belarus-facing-a-slipper-revolution).
3

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Does Belarus Election Mark Start of New Era?”, June 2, 2020, by
Artyom Shraibman, (https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/81958).
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sweeping modernization of the state and liberalization of the economy, a two-term limit
for presidents, and a neutral, pragmatic foreign policy.
…
The urban middle class, meanwhile, which previously saw no viable alternative to the
president, has been given new hope by the candidates from the world of business.5
Shraibman notes the growing “discontent” among Belarus’ governmental political elites
and that “the main political risk to the current Belarusian leadership is a schism within the elite”
(see Way 2008; also, Radnitz 2010)
[I]t’s fair to say that the views of the Belarusian prime minister, most of the government’s
economic bloc, and the heads of the central bank and Foreign Ministry are closer to those
of Tsepkalo and Babariko than Lukashenko’s. For the first time in many years,
discontentment among the elite appears to have spilled over into the public space, though
it would be premature to expect the system to collapse any time soon: the problems are not
yet big enough.6
Similar to Wilson, Shraibman, saw the candidacies of Tsepkala and Babaryko as
representing the beginning of a capitalist political revolution, which might attract other
“businessmen” (capitalists) and political elites in the future:
If Tsepkalo and Babariko manage to avoid prison after the election, that will be an
important precedent. Other businessmen and officials who don’t like the state of affairs in
the country might also decide that it’s worth the risk of going into politics
Socor, Chaly, Wilson, and Shraibman all either saw 2020 as a capitalist political revolution
or as the beginning of a capitalist political revolution. This feature, the direct participation of the
capitalist class, was distinctly missing in Belarus’ previous post-electoral uprisings in 2001, 2006,
and 2010 (Radnitz 2010).

5

Ibid.

6

Ibid.
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Other researchers and analysts such as Bedford (2021), Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021) Gold
(2020) also support the position that the 2020 Belarus uprising was a capitalist revolution. These
thinkers are also non-Marxists, harsh Lukashenka critics, pro-opposition and adamant proponents
of privatization.
Glod (2020) directly supports the position that the 2020 uprising represents a capitalist
revolution, directly comparing the 2020 “Belarus revolution” with “the revolts against communist
rule in 1989” (p.3)
Belarus is undergoing a pro-democracy velvet revolution of the type that swept across
Central Europe in the late 1980s (Glod 2020:3; see also Bekus 2021 who compares the
symbolism and ideology of 2020 uprising to 1989).
Glod saw the rejection of Belarus’ “state-owned” (p.5) economy, and “old-fashioned
Soviet-era ideas on how to run an economy” (p.5), as fundamental to Belarus’ 2020 uprising.
Beyond the rhetoric about “democracy,” Glod saws the foundation of Belarus’ 2020 attempted
revolution about “market reforms” (p.11), privatization of Belarus’ “state-owned enterprises”
(p.11 see also p.5) and the transformation of Belarus into a “market economy” (p.5, 11). Glod
focused heavily on the role entrepreneurs played in the 2020 uprising:
The middle classes — first of all private businesses — were at the forefront of the protests.
They wanted to achieve change so much, because they clearly saw that the current
government’s policy had reached a ceiling in terms of business development and that things
will not move any further unless there are reforms.7
…
As Oksana Shelest, a sociologist, rightly put it: “People had been ready for much more in
their personal development or the development of their business than the state had been

The Moscow Times, “‘Everyone Who Can Leave, Will Leave’: Violence, Raids and Internet Blackouts Scare Off
Belarus’ Entrepreneurs”, Sep.2, 2020, by Jake Cordell, (https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/09/02/belarusbusiness-protests-brain-drain-violence-raids-internet-blackouts-scare-belarus-entrepreneurs-a71294).
7
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allowing them. … Sooner or later people had been arriving at the conclusion that the state
in its current form was not doing anything useful, and that was prompting their desire for
change (Glod 2020:5).
…
The promise of stability, highly welcome to the traumatized Soviet-era population, is no
longer as compelling. People want a new, exciting vision of the future, in which they can
play an active role (Glod 2020:5).
Glod, also focused on the opposition’s professional and capitalist leadership:
The new opposition includes professionals with diverse backgrounds and skills, which they
have brought to politics. Viktar Babaryka, the jailed former banker, and his team are
managers, lawyers, and public relations specialists who were behind Tsikhanouskaya’s
election campaign, which rallied previously unrepresented strata of society. Valery
Tsapkala and Pavel Latushka are former government officials (Glod 2020:6).
Like Glod, Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021) also saw the foundation of the 2020 uprising as
“pro-market” revolt against Belarus’ “state-controlled economy” (p.166; see also p.161) and that
would usher in privatization (p.171) and at last transform Belarus into a “market economy” (p.166
see also p.165,171). Like Glod (2020), Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021) also saw the middle class
and capitalist class at the heart of Belarus’ revolution. For example,
Belarusian society changed rapidly over the course of the last decade. Since the mid-2000s,
Belarusian society has benefitted from a rapidly growing private sector, new education and
employment opportunities, and access to new technologies. Despite the state’s negative
attitude toward market reforms and the corresponding lack of governmental support for
such reforms, some estimates suggest that the private sector represented 60% of GDP by
the end of the 2010s.8 The private sector employs more than 50% of the workforce9 and

8

Moshes and Nizhnikau assert that 60 percent of the GDP is produced by the private sector, however, according to
the EBRD in 2015, about 30 percent of the GDP was produced by the private sector and 70 percent of the GDP was
produced by state-industrial sector (Papko and Kozarzewski (2020:19). Papko and Kozarzewski estimate that the state
contribution to the GDP is even higher than the EBRD estimate (p.19) and according to Akulova (2015), the state
contribution is as high as 74-75 percent (Papko and Kozarzewski 2020:21).
Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021) do not provide any source for their assertion that the “private sector employs more
than 50% of the workforce” (p.165). The actual estimate is lower—possibly much lower. According to Belstat—
which underestimates the level of state ownership and control due to its methodology (Papko and Kozarzewski
2020:19)—the Belarussian state “employs over 57% of the labour force, which seems to be a quite conservative
9
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has created clusters of middle-class residents in major cities. New technologies have
boomed,…. [[such as] IT service exports grew by 1.5 times in 2017-2019, to $2 billion….
providing new sources of self-realization and information of which the government had
little awareness (Moses and Nizhnikau 2020:165-166; see also Bedford 2021).
Bedford (2021), is very similar to Glod, Moshes and Nizhnikau as well. In her analysis of
the 2020 uprising, she also focused on Belarus state-owned economy. Bedford (2021) criticized
Belarus’ “Lack of Reforms” (p.810), “Soviet-style social contract” (p.810) and lack of
privatization (p.810-811). Bedford even argued, based on a previous 2019 Moshes and Nizhnikau
article about Belarus’ state-owned economy and President Lukashenka’s reluctance toward
privatization, that:
It has even been suggested that Lukashenka refused change [economic reforms] because
he personally thinks that market economy is ideologically unacceptable (Moshes and
Nizhnikau 2019). Bedford (2021:811)
Bedford (2021:813), referred to a modernizing population and modernizing society (see
also Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:165, who, refer to “Societal Modernization” in their discussion
of the key role of the middle class and capitalist class; see also Glod 2020:4-5). For example,
Bedford talked about “An Archaic President versus a Modernizing Population” (p.813):
[T]the election campaign clearly capitalized on the growing gap between an open-minded
population ready for transformation of Belarusian society and an archaic president afraid
of change and progress (Moshes and Nizhnikau Reference Moshes and Nizhnikau 2019)
(Bedford 2021:813; italics added; see also Gapova 2021; Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021;
Glod 2020).
There is no ambiguity that the “transformation” Bedford has in mind is a neoliberal
transformation, especially mass the privatization of Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector (see

estimate because according to another study (Akulova, 2015), the state sector may… employ up to 69-82% of the
work force” (Papko and Kozarzewski 2020:21)
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Moshes and Nizhnikau 2019). Like Bedford, Gapova also described the 2020 uprising as a
“transition” from the “legacy of socialism” (p.51) toward a “different social contract,” no longer
based on class in which Belarussians previously had been “‘respected’ and recognized in their
capacity as workers contributing to the common good” but toward “autonomous political subjects”
(p. 51; italics in original; see as Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021; Glod 2020).
There is no doubt that the growth of the IT sector, especially in Minsk played a crucial role
in contributing to the larger size and duration of the 2020 uprising.
At the time of the August 2020 presidential election, the Belarusian IT sector employed
more than 70,000 specialists, whose average salary was five times higher than that in other
sectors of the economy. The higher remuneration levels contributed significantly to the
development of an affluent Belarusian middle class…. Since June 2020, many Belarusian
IT specialists have been active on the country’s political scene.
In the pre-electoral period of June–August 2020, a group of IT professionals developed the
online platform Golas (Voice) as an alternative vote counting mechanism. Together with
other initiatives, such as Zubr (Bison) and Chesniya Lyudzi (Honest People), they gathered
proof of electoral fraud during the 2020 presidential election….
The IT sector also played an important role during the postelection popular uprising. IT
specialists took part in street demonstrations and formed their own solidarity groups
to criticize the Lukashenko regime.10
The IT sector and other middle-class Belarussians played a major role in the 2020 uprising,
however, what role did the Belarussian capitalist class play? While a comprehensive examination
of this question is beyond the scope of this study, I will discuss it briefly. It does appear that the
capitalist class did play an important role in the 2020 uprising itself and this important fact
distinguishes the 2020 uprising from the previous ones in 2010, 2006 and 2001, in which the

Wilson Center, “Belarusian IT Sector a Crucial Actor in the Fight against the Lukashenko Regime”, October 12,
2021, by Alla Leukavets, (https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/belarusian-it-sector-crucial-actor-fight-againstlukashenko-regime).
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capitalist class, due to its small size and weakness did not play a significant role (Radnitz 2010;
see also Marples 2006; Potocki 2002).
On September 3, 2020, the Russian-language edition of Forbes Magazine, called Belarus’
businessmen a “Revolutionary class”
Revolutionary class: businessmen who challenged Lukashenka11
According to the Forbes article, not only were “Entrepreneurs … actively participating in
the protests,” many financially supported the protest movement while “several top managers and
entrepreneurs” took an active leadership role, joining the opposition’s Coordinating Council. The
Coordinating Council was created “[a]t the initiative of the [Svetlana Tikhanovskaya], …to ensure
the transfer of power.”12 President Lukashenka, however, saw the Coordinating Council as an
attempted coup or illegal “attempt to seize power.”13
We have already discussed the important role played by Viktor Babaryka, multimillionaire,
former-director of Belgazprom Bank (as well as Valery Tsepkala, former ambassador, founder of
the High Tech Park and entrepreneur).

Wilson 2020 argued that their foray into politics

represented a political revolution of Belarus’ growing capitalist class. Babaryka was directly
represented on the Presidium [board] of Coordinating Council through his representative and
campaign manager Maria Kolosnikova.14 Maxim Znak, a prominent lawyer and businessman, also

[In Russian] Forbes, “Revolutionary class: Businessman who challenged Lukashenko,” September 3, 2020, by
Kristina
Zhukova,
(https://www.forbes.ru/tehnologii-photogallery/408087-revolyucionnyy-klass-biznesmenykotorye-brosili-vyzov-lukashenko).
11

12

Ibid.

Belta, “Opposition's coordinating council described as attempt to seize power in Belarus”, August 18, 2020
(https://eng.belta.by/president/view/oppositions-coordinating-council-described-as-attempt-to-seize-power-inbelarus-132657-2020/).
13

14

Coordination Council, “Board of the Coordination Council,” (https://rada.vision/en/prezidium).
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supported Babaryka and became a member of the Coordinating council’s15 Presidium.16 Other
businessmen also actively supported Babaryka as well, including Yury Voskresensky and
Alexander Vasilevich, “a well-known Belarusian businessman, co-owner of the advertising agency
“Vondel/Hepta,” co-founder of the newspapers Kyky and The Village Belarus, and creator of the
contemporary art gallery “Galereya Ў” and an attached wine bar. For a long time, this bar was one
of the trendiest places in Minsk; it hosted modern art exhibitions, poetry evenings, and “creative
gatherings.””17
Arkady Dobkin, the owner of Belarus’ largest IT company, EPAM, was accused of
financing the protest movement by President Lukashenka.18 Dobkin’s net worth is estimated to be
at least 674 million dollars.19
Epam Systems is an American software company headquartered in Pennsylvania with a
market capitalization of $17 billion. The company was founded by an entrepreneur of
Belarusian origin Arkady Dobkin, who emigrated to the United States in 1991. Dobkin was
one of the initiators of the creation of the Hi-Tech Park, where the Minsk office of Epam
Systems is located (Sokolov 2020).

[In Russian] Forbes, “Revolutionary class: Businessman who challenged Lukashenko,” September 3, 2020, by
Kristina Zhukova, (https://www.forbes.ru/tehnologii-photogallery/408087-revolyucionnyy-klass-biznesmenykotorye-brosili-vyzov-lukashenko).
15

16

Coordination Council, “Board of the Coordination Council,” (https://rada.vision/en/prezidium).

Meduza, “As if none of it ever happened,” December 15, 2020, Story by Alexey Shumkin, Translation by Karina
Mamadzhanyan, (https://meduza.io/en/feature/2020/12/15/as-if-none-of-it-ever-happened).
17
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Reform.by, “Lukashenka accuses Dobkin of financing protests and ties with special services,” August 9, 2021,

(https://reform.by/248206-lukashenko-obvinil-dobkina-v-finansirovanii-protestov-i-svjazjah-so-specsluzhbami).
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Maxim Bogretsov was “a vice president of software developer EPAM Systems” for 23
years. In August 2020, Bogretsov, “took an indefinite leave and joined the Coordinating Council
for the transfer of power to the new president [Svetlana Tikhanovskaya]”20
Pavel Lieber, “a top manager at Epam Systems” was “the creator of the [Golos or Voice]
platform,” parallel online vote-counting platform, though Lieber denies Dobkin had anything to
do with the creation of the Golos platform: “Although I work at EPAM, I took a vacation while
working on the project” (Sokolov 2020).
Golas played a crucial role in propelling the rise of civic activism among the previously
passive Belarusian electorate. It was the first time that evidence of electoral fraud had been
gathered with the massive participation of the voters themselves.21
Mikita Mikado, “the founder and director of the IT-company PandaDoc, offered financial
assistance to those security officers who were willing to side with the protesters.”22 As of
September 2021 PandaDoc was valued at 1 billion dollars.”23 Mikado continued to provide
financial assistance to security officers with the creation, along with other entrepreneurs, of
BYSOL (Belarussian Solidarity Fund).24 The “other entrepreneurs who initiated the creation of

[In Russian] Forbes, “Revolutionary class: Businessman who challenged Lukashenko,” September 3, 2020, by
Kristina Zhukova, (https://www.forbes.ru/tehnologii-photogallery/408087-revolyucionnyy-klass-biznesmenykotorye-brosili-vyzov-lukashenko).
20

Wilson Center, “Belarusian IT Sector a Crucial Actor in the Fight against the Lukashenko Regime”, October 12,
2021, by Alla Leukavets (https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/belarusian-it-sector-crucial-actor-fight-againstlukashenko-regime)
21

Meduza, “As if none of it ever happened,” December 15, 2020, Story by Alexey Shumkin, Translation by Karina
Mamadzhanyan, (https://meduza.io/en/feature/2020/12/15/as-if-none-of-it-ever-happened);
22

Wilson Center, “Belarusian IT Sector a Crucial Actor in the Fight against the Lukashenko Regime,” October 12,
2021, by Alla Leukavets, (https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/belarusian-it-sector-crucial-actor-fight-againstlukashenko-regime).
Techcrunch, “PandaDoc, the e-document startup, now valued at $1B as it closes a big Series C,” September 22,
2021, by Ingrid Lunden, (https://techcrunch.com/2021/09/22/pandadoc-the-e-document-startup-now-valued-at-1b-asit-closes-a-big-series-c/).
23

Wilson Center, “Belarusian IT Sector a Crucial Actor in the Fight against the Lukashenko Regime,” October 12,
2021, by Alla Leukavets, (https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/belarusian-it-sector-crucial-actor-fight-againstlukashenko-regime; The Calvert Journal, “As Lukashenko clings to power, a new initiative seeks to retrain Belarus’
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the fund are Yaroslav Likhachevsky, CEO of Deepdee” and “Dmitry Navosha, former CEO of
Sports.ru”25 BYSOL would “help citizens who lost their jobs due to participation in protests and
strikes”26 and even “retrain Belarus’ riot police as computer programmers.”27
Tatyana Marynich, who founded Imaguru as well as Belbiz business club (a site for startups
and innovation) and TechMinsk (international school of innovative entrepreneurship), also joined
the Coordinating Council.28
Entrepreneur Vitaly Volyanyuk, joined the Coordinating Council as well and is the
Co-founder of entrepreneurship portal Probusiness.io. The site has over 600,000 unique
users per month, according to Google Analytics.”29 Vadim Prokopyev, “[f]amous Belarusian
restaurateur”30 and staunch “oppositionist,”31 was a harsh critic and opponent of President
Lukashenka well before the August 9, 2020 election, even addressing President Lukashenka as

riot police as computer programmers”, November 17, 2020, by Katie Marie Davies,
(https://www.calvertjournal.com/articles/show/12319/belarus-protests-2020-solidarity-fund-bysol-retrain-police-asprogrammers).
[In Russain] Forbes, “Belarusians affected by political repressions will be helped from a new fund,” August 14,
2020, by Rinat Tairov,
25

(https://www.forbes.ru/newsroom/obshchestvo/407121-postradavshim-ot-politicheskih-repressiy-belorusampomogut-iz-novogo).
26

Ibid.

The Calvert Journal, “As Lukashenko clings to power, a new initiative seeks to retrain Belarus’ riot police as
computer programmers”, November 17, 2020, by Katie Marie Davies,
(https://www.calvertjournal.com/articles/show/12319/belarus-protests-2020-solidarity-fund-bysol-retrain-police-asprogrammers).
27

[In Russian] Forbes, “Revolutionary class: Businessman who challenged Lukashenko,” September 3, 2020, by
Kristina
Zhukova,
(https://www.forbes.ru/tehnologii-photogallery/408087-revolyucionnyy-klass-biznesmenykotorye-brosili-vyzov-lukashenko).
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Charter 97, “Vadim Prokopyev to Lukashenka: You Know Your Tiny Rating,” July 17, 2020,
(https://charter97.org/en/news/2020/7/17/386098/).
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UA verified, “Vadym Prokopyev, Belarusian oppositionist,” (https://uaverified.com/stories/vadym-prokopyevbelarusian-oppositionist).
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“Sasha 3%.”32 Prokopyev owned numerous restaurants in Minsk, a catering business, and was the
founder of the iconic33 “Grand Cafe” restaurant in Minsk34
The Belarussian authorities also accused Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky of
financing the uprising.35 Khodorkovsky launched the pro-democracy NGO Open Russia, which
promotes “European values.”36 Khodorkovsky is adamantly opposed to President Lukashenka.37
“Two Open Russia coordinators, Artyom Vazhenkov and Igor Rogov,” both Russian citizens, were
arrested at post-election protests in Minsk in August 2020.38
Discussion
Based on Radnitz (2010), there is no doubt that the development of an “independent
business community” (p.140) contributed to the larger and much more sustained mobilization in
2020 as opposed to Belarus’ previous post-election uprisings in 2001, 2006 and 2010. Unlike
these previous uprisings, in 2020, Belarus’ independent business community or capitalist class had
“the resources to recruit, communicate its message,” (p.140) readily available domestically.

Charter 97, “Vadim Prokopyev to Lukashenka: You Know Your Tiny Rating,” July 17, 2020,
(https://charter97.org/en/news/2020/7/17/386098/).
32

[In Russian] Relax.by, “Remember how it all started? Popped into the Grand Cafe after the update,” May 7, 2021,
(https://mag.relax.by/citynews/10710923-pomnite-kak-vse-nachinalosy-zaglyanuli-v-grand-cafe-posleobnovlenija/).
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[In Russian] Ex-PRESS.BY, “Who is Vadim Prokopiev,” July 18, 2020, (https://express.by/rubrics/obshhestvo/2020/07/18/kto-takoj-vadim-prokopev).
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Meduza, “As if none of it ever happened,” December 15, 2020, Story by Alexey Shumkin, Translation by Karina
Mamadzhanyan, (https://meduza.io/en/feature/2020/12/15/as-if-none-of-it-ever-happened);
Wilson Center, “Belarusian IT Sector a Crucial Actor in the Fight against the Lukashenko Regime,” October 12, 2021,
by Alla Leukavets, (https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/belarusian-it-sector-crucial-actor-fight-againstlukashenko-regime).
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Khodorkovsky, “What Is Open Russia?” (https://khodorkovsky.com/what-is-open-russia/).
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Furthermore, the Belarussian capitalist class provided financial assistance and other assistance that
Radnitz did not even anticipate, such as financially supporting workers who were fired for striking
or protesting, retraining riot police to work in IT, paying fines and legal fees, etc.
Though the 2020 mobilization was larger and more sustained than Belarus’ previous postelectoral uprisings, it ultimately failed. One of the reasons for its failure was that only a segment
of the Belarussian capitalist class actively supported the uprising. Recall from our discussion that
most of the capitalists actively involved in the uprising were in IT or other online businesses, which
are very easy to re-locate as opposed to other industries. In fact, several Belarussian capitalists in
the IT sphere already live abroad (or were abroad) such as EPAM’s Arkady Dobkin (Sokolov
2020) and PandaDoc’s Mikita Mikado.39 The lack of active participation of capitalists in other
spheres, especially industry, seriously contributed to the weakness of the 2020 uprising. For
example, there is no comparison of Belarus’ 2020 uprising to the social upheaval created during
Venezuela’s 2002 capitalist-class inspired “national strike.”40
On December 2, 2002, [Venezuela’s opposition] called a “national strike” backed by the
so-called “meritocratic” administrators of Pdvsa – together, they brought oil production to
a halt. The objective of their action: force President Chavez, Venezuela’s democraticallyelected President, to resign.
[T]he Venezuelan opposition, caused a wave of scarcity in basic goods (milk, rice, beef,
etc.) since gasoline used to transport foods became limited.
At the same time, private industry knowingly closed its doors to citizens in need, turning
scarcity into depravation. As such, the Venezuelan people were forced to live with the daily

Meduza, “As if none of it ever happened,” December 15, 2020, Story by Alexey Shumkin, Translation by Karina
Mamadzhanyan, (https://meduza.io/en/feature/2020/12/15/as-if-none-of-it-ever-happened);
Wilson Center, “Belarusian IT Sector a Crucial Actor in the Fight against the Lukashenko Regime,” October 12,
2021, by Alla Leukavets, (https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/belarusian-it-sector-crucial-actor-fight-againstlukashenko-regime).
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Venezuela Analysis, “The 2002 Oil Lockout: 10 Years Later,” December 7, 2002, by Yuleidys Hernandez Toledo
– Ciudad CCS / CdO International, (https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/7527).
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consequences of a clearly insurrectional lockout, a political maneuver aimed simply at
overthrowing the President of the Republic. 41
There is simply no comparison between the 2002 Venezuelan national strike—which
completely paralyzed an entire nation—and the 2020 Belarussian uprising, which mainly consisted
of protest demonstrations, and of which the backbone of the movement were large Sunday evening
protests. Lacking the active support of the rest of the capitalist class, especially industrial
capitalists, there was little that could be done once the initial “Maidan-style” protests failed to
make “the state security apparatus crumbl[e]” (Episkopos 2020)42, other than maintain a protest
movement (I will discuss worker protests and strikes in the next section).

While

an

in-

depth analysis of the entire Belarussian capitalist class is beyond the scope of this study, it is fair
to say that besides the IT sector, online services and restaurants, much of the Belarussian capitalist
class did not actively or openly support the uprising. First, the bulk of the nation’s heavy industry
is owned by the state, and unlike Venezuela, there were no instances of revolt by the administrators
of any of the state firms. For the portion of the economy that is privately-owned such as most of
the retail and service sector, as well as a very significant portion of industry, (Papko and
Kozarzewski 2020:20),43 there was not much open defiance. No doubt a significant portion of the

41

Ibid.

For more on the initial Maidan-style protests that followed the August 9, 2020 election see In English, “The
overwhelming minority: Tikhanovsky's true plans.” A Documentary film of the Belarussian State
Belteleradiocompany ANT TV (All-National Television), YouTube, “The overwhelming minority: Tikhanovsky's true
plans. Film of Belteleradiocompany”, August 12, 2021, (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TwnsWeB8NzQ); see
also in English, “Country for Brutality”: TV News Agency`s film on Tikhanovsky’s gang and plotting a terror in
Belarus, YouTube, Sep.1, 2021 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UUhtU8PJ6gY&t=471s);
In English, “About the protests in Belarus, the failed revolution, the security forces and the radicals. Confrontation”
A documentary film by Belarussian State TV Broadcaster ATN (All-National Television] YouTube, “Belarusian
protests, failed revolution, security forces and radicals. Confrontation. ATN movie”, October 15, 2021,
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mw-jkVsuzlg).
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Belarussian capitalist class is loyal to the president.44 However, unlike the IT sector that can easily
relocate, those who are not loyal to the president, and are openly defiant, have a lot to lose, since
retail establishments and factories cannot be easily relocated.
In the last section I discussed the West’s hostility toward Belarus’ largely socialist
economy model. I concluded that the previous post-election uprisings were actually externallyimposed attempted neoliberal capitalist revolutions as the Belarussian capitalist class was too small
and weak to foment its own internal revolution (see Radnitz 2010). Based on the available
evidence that I discussed in the last section, there is no reason to believe the West did not play a
significant role in 2020 and once again tried to impose externally another neoliberal capitalist
revolution. This time, however, due to the tremendous growth of the IT sector, the capitalists in
the IT sector played a significant role domestically.45
In spite of the significance of the independent IT-sector capitalists, the West, however,
likely played an important role beyond merely funding opposition groups. The unified opposition
in 2020 (in which the campaigns of Valery Tsepkala and Viktor Babaryka united with Svetlana
Tikhanovskaya’s) was likely organized by the West, as it had been in 2001 and 2006 (see Ioffe
2014:109; Parker 2011:206-7, 309).46 And the Coordinating Council, which maintained a unified

For example, Alexander Moshensky, owner of the Santa Bremer fish company [as well as other companies], “is
said to be a close ally of Lukashenko”, RUV, “Favours for friend of Lukashenko, and of Iceland?”, March 18, 2022
(https://www.ruv.is/frett/2022/03/18/favours-for-friend-of-lukashenko-and-of-iceland).
44

Albeit, several Belarussian capitalists in the IT sphere already live abroad (or were abroad) such as EPAM’s Arkady
Dobkin and PandaDoc’s Mikita Mikado.
45

For example, for the 2006 election, “Milinkevich had emerged as the unified opposition candidate following a
meeting with the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Lithuania in April 2005. As reported in the Washington
Post on the agenda of the meeting was (again) ‘unifying the opposition around a candidate to challenge President
Alexander Lukashenko’” (Parker 2011:206-7). Furthermore, the director of the NED’s Belarus portfolio, Roger
Potocki, has openly admitted the crucial role the West must play in creating a unified opposition and that without
Western intervention a unified opposition would not have been possible for the 2001 and 2006 elections (Ioffe
2014:109). However, in 2010, “to Potocki’s chagrin, the West adopted a ‘hands-off approach’ and allowed internal
feuds and personal ambitions of opposition leader to take center stage. As a result, the opposition did not unite behind
a single candidate…Consequently, in 2010, there appeared a motely group of nine presidential hopefuls who would
divide the protest vote and weaken the opposition” (Ioffe 2014:109).
46
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opposition after the election, was also likely organized by the West as well. This position is
supported by the fact that on Monday, August 31, 2020 former candidate Viktor Babaryka and his
campaign manager Maria Kalesnikava, announced that they were forming a new political party
“Together” (Vmeste) that would focus on constitutional changes—which “stunned” some of the
other members the opposition’s Coordinating Council “who argued that it could divert attention
from the main goal of getting Lukashenko to step down”47 (see also Moshes and Nizhnikau
2021:175).
In the previous section, we discussed Babaryka (former head of the Russian-owned,
Belgazprom Bank) and his ties to Russia. Babaryka’s ties to Russia might have been the reason
for breaking48 with the Coordinating Council (which appeared to be US-controlled (see Socor
2020)). The fact, Babaryka announced his new party with a pre-recorded video message, “which
appears to have been recorded before Babariko was arrested and jailed at the end of July,” on the
same day that Putin officially recognized the legitimacy of the election of President Lukashenka,49
strongly supports this position. Shortly after Babaryka announced his new party, key opposition
leader, former ambassador, and Coordinating Council Presidium member50 Pavel Latushko
“formed his own opposition structure, the People’s Anti-Crisis Governance” (Moshes and
Nizhnikau 2021:175).
The “short-lived” unity of the opposition (p.175), supports my position that the unified
opposition candidate and the unified Coordinating Council were likely organized by the West,

CBC News, “Leading activist, two opposition council members missing in Belarus amid crackdown on protests”,
Sep.7, 2020, (https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/opposition-activist-council-members-missing-in-belarus-1.5714790).
47

Technically, Babaryka, did not break from the CC, however, by accepting that the opposition’s “electoral victory
had not been achieved,” he contradicted and undermined the entire purpose of the CC” (Moshes and Nizhnikau
2021:175)
48

BNE Intelli News, “Opposition leaders Viktor Babariko and Maria Kolesnikova found political party “Together””,
Sep.1, 2020 (https://www.intellinews.com/opposition-leaders-viktor-babariko-and-maria-kolesnikova-foundpolitical-party-together-190863/).
49
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Coordination Council, “Board of the Coordination Council,” (https://rada.vision/en/prezidium).
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however, due to the political differences and political ambitions of its leader, quickly unrivalled
(p.175; see also Ioffe 2014:109).51 And it should be noted that even the Coordinating Council
showed early signs of disunity, as former presidential candidate, Valery Tsepkala, whose wife,
Veronica Tsepkala, represented his campaign in the unified opposition, “was not invited to the CC
[Coordinating Council]” (p.175).
Returning to the main question of this section, what was the character of the 2020 Belarus
uprising? Like the previous Belarussian post-election uprisings in 2001, 2006, and 2010, the 2020
uprising involved a significant attempt of the West imposing a capitalist revolution, yet unlike
previous uprisings, in 2020 a portion of the Belarussian capitalist class (mostly in IT and online
services) played an important role organizing, funding and even leading the uprising. The 2020
uprising differed from previous electoral uprisings in that Russia might have played a significant
role in supporting the revolution (see Socor 2020) either directly from the Kremlin, or possibly
with the support of the Russian capitalist class independent of the Kremlin. The fact that the main
candidate against President Lukashenka, Viktor Babaryka, was the director of Gazprom Bank’s
Belarussian division, and that he accepted President Lukashenka’s presidency the same day that
Putin did, is strong evidence that Babaryka was aligned with Russia and likely directly with the
Kremlin. And while geopolitics certainly matter to Russia, it must be noted that the two major
candidates with strong ties to Russia were both capitalists and both adamantly supported mass
privatization and neoliberal reforms. Therefore, Belarus faced capitalist revolution from every
direction: from the West, domestically (as well as from Belarussian capitalists abroad) and from
Russia. These three forces combined with three other factors (all of which were new), to contribute
to the large mobilization against President Lukashenka in 2020: first, the general growth of the IT
sector, which created a relatively large affluent middle class in Minsk; second, the middle class’

51

Ibid.
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outrage over President Lukashenka’s perceived mishandling of COVID; and third, outrage over
police violence during the initial protests.
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Chapter 16. Conclusions
Has the Moral Economy of Ordinary Belarussians Changed?
Has the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians changed? The simple answer is no, it
hasn’t—not drastically. Although ordinary Belarussians have abandoned the Soviet Union’s
radical conception of egalitarianism, they still strongly support Belarus’ state-owned industrial
sector and adamantly oppose its privatization.

This conclusion contradicts the position of

researchers and analysts Potocki (2011), Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021), Bedford (2021) and Glod
(2020). Ordinary Belarussians are embracing a “market economy” as these researchers and
analysts have insisted. In spite of their claims, however, I found very strong support for Belarus’
state-owned industrial sector among ordinary Belarussians. Not only did the overwhelming
majority of workers in my study adamantly support Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector, and
adamantly oppose its privatization, to my surprise, there was even great support for it among the
workers who were against President Lukashenka, as well as those who even voted for the Svetlana
Tikhanovskaya—even among one worker who participated in several opposition protests. (The
majority of the middle-class subjects even supported Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector and
opposed its privatization). For example, consider Tanya, a 50-year-old private retail worker who
voted against Lukashenka and voted for Svetlana Tikhanovskaya in the 2020 election:
Q: What are your thoughts about the state-owned industrial sector in Belarus?
I think it is alright. In principle you cannot know what would happen if they were not stateowned. We have work. There is stability. We have pensions. We have salaries.
Like the Lukashenka supporters in the study, Tanya was also against privatization:
I think that could be bad because if the government sells these companies the new owner
might fire people. Or might divide the companies into smaller parts and close some of the
factories. I think the government should protect the state-owned factories. Our economy
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depends on them a lot. The government should play a big role protecting the state-owned
factories so that the people who work there know they are safe and protected.
Overall, the workers in this study did not merely support Belarus’ state-owned industrial
sector and oppose its privatization, but saw it as part of the very fabric of Belarussian society,
belonging directly to the Belarussian people, and part of Belarus history. For example, Yury, 51year-old factory worker

Most factories are government-owned…it’s the major part of the economy for most people.
It is the biggest part of life in the Republic of Belarus…. In our country the government is
better than our neighbors since the government supports the factories…
And Oleg, a 62-year-old former-factory worker, who now works in a state-owned grocery
store:
These factories are supposed to be owned by the government. The government should
control them so that no one robs or steals from these companies. These companies are
owned by the people of Belarus. This is part of our history and culture. These factories
belong to the people of Belarus, themselves—not the president, not the government, but the
Belarusian people themselves. The government has to protect them [state-factories]. Of
course, the government has to protect them more than privately owned factories because
the government must protect the people.
These workers not only strongly supported Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector as a
crucial part of Belarussian society providing for its well-being, but also strongly believed that
Belarus’ state-owned enterprises overall were very efficient, competitive, and profitable. These
workers did not share the neoliberal critique of state-owned enterprises are inherently inefficient—
a belief that was seen as self-evident among the capitalists in this study. The overwhelming
majority of workers in this study did not view Belarus’ state-owned enterprises as inefficient or
less productive than privately-owned firms. The workers’ outlook (in support of the productivity
of state-enterprises) was natural and obvious to the them. In fact, not only did the overwhelming
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majority of the workers in this study believe that state-owned enterprises could be very efficient
and economically successful; some even used terms like innovation and technological
development when describing Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector. This understanding is very
far from neoliberal ideology that professes that innovation and technological development will be
drastically stifled (if not impossible) within a state-owned economy or a state-owned enterprise—
a belief that is likely even accepted by many Western critics of neoliberalism. Tanya, for example,
provided a good example of Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector being a source of innovation:
Q: Should the state-owned sector be expanded?
Tanya: Probably yes. There would be more jobs. That would be a good thing. It would
be useful for us and the country will have more innovation…If it expands it is better—that
means it is developing, more innovations, higher standard of living.”
Similarly, Dennis, a 47-year-old electrician at a private factory, (who opposed President
Lukashenka) was, not only a strong supporter of Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector, but saw it
as critical for the continued “technological development of Belarussian society.”
There is no Valid Survey Research Showing that the Moral Economy of Ordinary
Belarussians Has Changed.
Potocki (2011) was one of the strongest proponents of the position that the moral economy
of ordinary Belarusians had changed and that Belarussians rejected Belarus’ “‘socially oriented’
and overwhelmingly state-run” socio-economic model (p. 56, 61-62).
[Belarus’] homo sovieticus base has thinned…As the crisis drags on, public confidence in
the regime’s attempts to shore up ‘market socialism’ by command is fading. There is
increasing disillusionment with the authoritarian modernization that legitimized the
regime’s heavy hand…Support for a market economy has gone from 35 percent five years
ago to 42 percent. Tinkering will not fix the economy’s structural problems or resurrect
the credit-enabled ‘economic miracle.’ It is wrenching reform or the ‘cliff’ (p.61).
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Potocki’s 2011 article was one of the main reasons I chose to research the moral economy
of ordinary Belarussians. I wanted to explore whether the moral economy had actually changed.
And though Potocki did not cite the studies that he was relying on to show that support for a market
economy had grown to 42 percent in 2011 (p.61), 1 I was able to analyze similar studies: one that
Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021;166) cited claiming that support for a market economy was up to 45
percent by 2018, and another by Glod (2020:5), that claiming support for a market economy was
up to 40 percent in 2018. In Chapter 7, I carefully, demonstrated that these two studies had deep
methodological flaws.

Namely, the studies were not representative, had drastically

overrepresented well-educated middle-class subjects and drastically underrepresented less
educated Belarussians.
Furthermore, these two studies not only do not show that the working class is embracing a
market economy, but likely show, due to their samples’ overrepresenting the middle-class, that
even the majority of the middle class still do not support a market economy, which is in line with
my study’s findings.
Moreover, the 2018 study showing 40 percent2 support for a market economy Glod
(2020:5) relied on, has a big problem when compared to the study Potocki relied on in 2011 that
said that 42 percent supported a market economy. Accordingly, in seven years, support for a
market economy actually decreased. This completely eviscerates all of their positions since all of
these researchers insist support for a market economy is rapidly growing. The best explanation

1

Potocki was likely relying on IISEPS survey research

It makes little difference whether we use Glod’s (2020:5) 2018 study, showing 40 percent support a market economy
in 2018, or the 2018 study Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021:166) cited, showing 45% support a market economy. If we
compared Moshes and Nizhnikau 45% to the study Potocki relied on in 2011 showing 42 supported a market, it would
mean that in seven years (likely more) support grew by only 3%. Thereby, still disproving their narrative that support
for a market economy is rapidly increasing.
2
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for this is likely (due to both samples’ overrepresenting the middle-class3) that support for a market
economy—even among the middle class, is not growing rapidly, but actually stable. Therefore,
beyond, showing that the working class has not embraced a market economy, the popular narrative
among opposition-oriented researchers of “An Archaic President versus a Modernizing
Population” (Bedford 2021:813; see also Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:165, 2019; Glod 2020:4)
might itself be drastically exaggerated. Namely, the majority of the middle class—in spite of their
opposition to President Lukashenka—most likely does not reject Belarus’ largely state-owned
socio-economic model.

Practically Universal Support for Belarus’ Socially-Oriented Privatization Program’s
Wage and Job Protections
Even broader than support for Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector, the workers in this
study practically universally supported protecting workers’ wages and jobs at newly privatized
state enterprises (A program I have called Socially-Oriented Privatization). Namely, a private
owner buying a state firm would have to guarantee to continue paying the workers’ current wages
and maintain the current number of jobs. In other words, the new owner would be legally
forbidden from lowering the workers’ wage or eliminating jobs. Surprisingly, even the workers
who supported the gradual privatization of Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector strongly
supported these measures, including Sasha, a 40-year-old worker at a private shampoo factory,
who declared “I like capitalism more,” and, like the capitalists in this study, thought state

3

Potocki was relying on IISEPS survey research. In Chapter 8 I discussed the IISEPS in great detail and argued that
their surveys systematically underrepresent Lukashenka supporters and, in the context of this discussion,
underrepresent working class subjects and overrepresent middle-class subjects.
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enterprises were inherently inefficient. By far Sasha was the most supportive of capitalism and
free-market ideology of any worker in this study:
It is too risky to let private owners manage everything—especially if we are talking about
the main factory of a town. The new owner can lower the wages since the workers have
no other choice. The government must set the wages and have the workers share a
percentage of the profits. Maybe the government should set the minimum salary or the
maximum salary but it should not let the new owner control the wages!
Sasha, did, however, similar to the capitalists in this study, afford more leeway for laying
off workers at former state-firms since he believed many state-firms had too many workers and
the number of workers would have to be reduced. To my surprise, however, the other three
workers who supported gradual privatization supported the socially-oriented privatization program
without any qualifications. For example, Vova, a 50-year-old long-distance truck driver:
It doesn’t matter who bought the [state] company. The salary and number of workers
should stay the same…I am against laying-off any workers.

Near Universal Support for Wage and Job Protections for all Private-Sector Workers
The wage and job protections of the socially-oriented privatization program certainly goes
against the neoliberal conception of a free-market economy and that is exactly why I included
exploring the socially-oriented privatization program’s wage and job protections in my original
research design. However, through that exploration it became clear that the workers in this study
did not merely support protecting workers’ wages and jobs at former state-owned enterprises but
in general, especially at large firms.
Again, even the workers who supported gradual privatization, supported private sector
wage and job protections. For example, although Sasha supported necessary layoffs at formerstate enterprises, he adamantly opposed layoffs in general that merely served to increase profits at
466

the expense of the workers. In fact, in spite of Sasha’s pro-capitalist views, he did not believe
large firms should even be legally permitted to lay off workers.
Q: Why should an employer be forbidden from laying-off workers if that is more
profitable?
Sasha: “No, it is not fair! I am a worker as well and I can be in this situation and I can
easily lose my job. So, I do not think it is fair! It is not good for the workers. There
should be some institute that controls the situation. A third party should regulate it. We
have unions that should do this [protect workers from unnecessary layoffs] and make sure
the workers are protected but I am not sure these unions are working effectively today.”
Again, in spite of Sasha’s self-professed support for capitalism, Sasha is advocating here
a version of capitalism far from the neoliberal conception in which the employer alone has the
right to hire and fire (DePhillips 2015; Harvey 2005).
Q: Should private entrepreneurs be free to maximize their profits?

Sasha: “Yes, but the workers should not suffer. The workers should keep the same standard
of living and conditions. The owner should maximize his profits but without hurting the
workers.”
Vova, who also supported gradual privatization, captured this key aspect of their moral
economy very well.
Maximizing profits should not be the highest goal. People should be the core of our
society. The most important thing is the workers’ standard of living and salaries. Extra
profits should be secondary. You should not think about profits until your workers are
satisfied…Everything should be for the workers.
Whether the private sector is bigger, as it would be in the case of the small minority who
supported gradual privatization, or whether the private sector is smaller, in the case of the
overwhelming majority who opposed privatization, the workers in this study almost universally
supported wage and job protections for private sector workers. In this sense, they supported a
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version of capitalism very similar to that of the workers in Thompson’s study in which the role
of the free market was limited and constrained by notions of “fairness.” Like the workers in
Thompson’s study, they were not fundamentally against the market, however, just as
Thompson’s workers strongly believed in a “fair price” the workers in this study strongly
believed in a “fair wage” and the workers’ right to job security. Neoliberal conceptions of a free
market, especially a free-labor market, were alien to the workers in this study; they were very
hostile to them and bitterly rejected them.
This conclusion further calls into question the findings of researchers and analysts who
have argued that Belarussians increasingly support “a market economy” (Potocki 2011:61) or
“share the principles of a market economy” (Glod 2020:5;) or have “become pro-market in their
economic views” (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:166; see also Bedford 2021:811). For example,
what exactly does “pro-market” mean in the context of my study in which even the very small
minority who supported gradual privatization envision a very heavily-regulated economy in
which the market is severely limited and deeply constrained to such a degree that the owner
cannot set wages or employment levels freely? Possibly, these researchers and analysts are
aware of this, however, if they were their claims that Belarussians are “pro-market” would
require significant qualification.
Moreover, this conclusion shows the need for qualitative research, especially in-depth
interviews and life-histories, when researching vague and complex ideas such as support for
“free-market ideology.” Only through rigorous qualitative research can we learn what subjects
actually mean by these vague ideas, themselves in a very different cultural and historical context.
And beyond merely qualitative research my study strongly supports the conclusion that
Thompson’s conception of moral economy is critical for investigating these complicated social
and economy questions. For example, although my moral economy study involved researching
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subjects’ utter hostility to free-market ideology and how capitalists must be heavily constrained
by the state, when I simply asked toward the beginning of our interview “Should private owners
be free to run their business as they choose? Almost every worker in this study rather matter-offactly answered “Yes.” However, whatever those subjects meant by agreeing that private owners
should be free to run their businesses as they choose, upon further examination it was absolutely
clear that the “freedom” business owners should enjoy should not include the freedom to set
workers’ wages or set the number of employees at the firm. In addition, it is clear that the
researcher’s moral assumptions embedded in these questions are not necessarily the same as
subject’s moral assumptions. As we saw with Sasha, terms like “capitalism” can mean very
different things to different people, especially in different cultures. The same is obviously true
with many other complex terms such as “free market,” and “market economy.”

In conclusion,

these examples show the weakness of survey research, which can be utterly blind to such subtle
moral distinctions. These examples show the importance of qualitative moral economy
sociological research as developed by Reinarman since moral economy is often elusive and must
be elicited indirectly (p.7, 161), especially by directly confronting subjects with free-market
ideology. And although Reinarman did not explicitly stress the importance of eliciting his
subjects’ moral outrage other than referring to asking “probing” questions (p.18), it is very clear
in his study that that is exactly what he did to be sure he was taping into his subjects’ moral
economy, as moral economy is moral outrage in direct response to free-market ideology
(Thompson 1991:340).

The Decline of Belarus’ Social Contract is Drastically Exaggerated
Researchers and analysts critical of President Lukashenka and Belarus’ socio-economic
model tend drastically to exaggerate Belarus’ economic problems and the decline of Belarus’
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social contract (Ioffe 2014:51 2004:113 2003:1011; Ioffe and Yarashevich 2011:750; Yarashevich
2014), a tendency that has dominated Belarus research since at least since 2004 (Ioffe 2004:113)
if not even earlier (see Potocki 2002 for an example). Most recently, critics of President
Lukashenka and Belarus’ socio-economic model have continued to exaggerate Belarus’ economic
problems and the decline in living standards (see for examples Bedford 2021; Moshes and
Nizhnikau 2021; Glod 2020). Furthermore, for these researchers, this supposed “decline in the
‘social contract’” (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:169) was at the very foundation of the 2020 postelection uprising. In fact, Moshes and Nizhnikau characterize the extent of this decline to such a
degree that that they say that President Lukashenka, or in their words, the “archaic regime” “could
no longer guarantee a decent level of welfare to its own electorate” (p.172; see also Bedford 2021;
Glod 2020). My moral economy study, in spite of the economic problems Belarus faces, did not
support their position.

No doubt Belarus does face objective economic problems. For example, a recent pension
reform increased the retirement age by three years. However, in my study, the pension reform did
not elicit anger or outrage. Overall, the workers accepted the government’s justification for raising
the retirement age three years, including Oleg, who actually had to wait an additional year and a
half before he received his pension. Furthermore, those in the study receiving pensions were
generally satisfied with the amount and accepted the Belarus’ economic conditions:
Oleg: “Of course I would like to make more money and get a bigger pension, but what can
you do? This is the way it is. We don’t have oil or gas or gold or other minerals besides
salt.”
Q: “The opposition wants to raise pensions though”
Oleg: “Ha. You believe that! When they are through, we won’t have any pensions!”
Furthermore, it is not enough merely to state objective economic problems such as Belarus’
recent pension reform, but to see how ordinary Belarussians see these problems in the context of
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the wider former-Soviet Union, especially Russia and the Ukraine (Ioffe and Yarashevich 2011).
Harsh critics of President Lukashenka and proponents of the declining-social-contract narrative,
Buzgalin and Koganov (2021), even acknowledged this, at least in part, admitting that ordinary
Belarussians understand that the “level of social well-being [in Belarus is] one of the highest in
the post-Soviet world,” and that ordinary Belarussians view Belarus’ “overall stable political
situation…against the background of the situation in Ukraine” (p.445). Therefore, comparing
Belarus’ recent pension reform to the pension crisis in the Ukraine4—even before the February
2022 war began—is informative. Even before the war the Ukraine’s current pension system was
on the verge of “collapse”5 and pensions have been described as “abysmal”
Millions of Ukrainian pensioners are living below the poverty line – and with prices for
food products and utilities constantly rising, their situation may yet get worse.6
In my moral economy study as well, ordinary Belarusians often compared Belarus’

economic situation to that abysmal economic situation in the Ukraine. And while Belarus’ recent
pension reform certainly represents a decline in Belarus’ economy, the extent of the reform should
not be exaggerated, especially in comparison with the Ukraine’s pension crisis and, more
important, according to my study, ordinary Belarussians accept the need for pension reform as
legitimate and did not see it as a

betrayal of the social contract.

Emerging Europe, “Ukraine’s abysmal pensions make retirement a dream few can afford”, September 16, 2021, by
Christian Mamo (https://emerging-europe.com/news/ukraines-abysmal-pensions-make-retirement-a-dream-few-canafford/); Open Democracy, “The slow-burn crisis inside Ukraine’s pension system”, July 8 2021, by Serhiy Guz
(https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/ukraine-pension-system-crisis/).
4

Open Democracy, “The slow-burn crisis inside Ukraine’s pension system”, July 8 2021,
(https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/ukraine-pension-system-crisis/).
5

by Serhiy Guz

Emerging Europe, “Ukraine’s abysmal pensions make retirement a dream few can afford”, September 16, 2021, by
Christian Mamo (https://emerging-europe.com/news/ukraines-abysmal-pensions-make-retirement-a-dream-few-canafford/).
6
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Another objective economic reality in Belarus is the widespread use of fixed-term labor
contracts, that have replaced previous appointments based on an unlimited duration (Yarashevich
2014:1718). Although these fixed-term labor contracts were “[o]fficially justified by the need to
strengthen worker discipline in a non-privatized economy,” they have been harshly criticized as a
means to maintain political control over workers (Yarashevich 2014:1718).

Surprisingly,

however, fixed-term labor contracts did not elicit any moral outrage in my moral economy study
and were accepted rather matter-of-factly. The workers simply did not see them as a “mechanism
of political control” (p.1718). Furthermore, the fact that the government had no qualms to openly
firing hundreds of workers at state enterprises for political reasons who organized or participated
in strikes,7 supports the position that the fixed-term labor contract system is primarily motivated
by economic reasons, especially to deal with alcoholism.8
Patience, Optimism and Faith in the System
The Belarussian national character trait of “patience” is well-established in the literature
(see for example Matsuzato 2004:242; Ioffe 2003a:1022; see also Engelking 2013, 2001). (Oleg’s
statement in the previous paragraph “that the way it is” is a good example of Belarussians’
patience.) However, along with patience I also discovered a deep sense of “optimism” and “faith
in the system.” Often this optimism and faith in the system appeared naive, childlike—even
childish. What was most fascinating is that these qualities were even found among workers who

7

For example, Alexey Karlyuk, a strike organizer at Belaruskali was openly fired for political reasons along with 120130 other workers at Belaruskali (Open Democracy, “Strike, exile, arrest: what happened to Belarusian workers?”,
June 23 2021, by Alexey Shuntov (https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/strike-exile-arrest-what-happenedbelarusian-workers/)).
8

While alcoholism in Belarus is not as bad it is in Russia it is still a problem. To deal with alcoholism was an important
justification for implementing the fix-term labor-contract system. Under the contract system, alcoholics can easily be
“dismissed” by refusing to renew their contracts for vague reasons. This allows enterprises, especially large state
enterprises, to remove alcoholics without directly confronting the problem of alcoholism and potentially facing harsh
backlash from sympathetic workers or actual alcoholics themselves. Ultimately, however, the use of the contract
system to remove alcoholics is sweeping the problem of alcoholism under the rug.
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did not support President Lukashenka—even among his harshest opponents such as Svetlana, who
not only voted for Tikhanovskaya but participated in several opposition protests. Along with
patience, this sense of optimism and faith in the system helps make ordinary Belarussians immune
to neoliberal narratives and withstand economic hardships.
This contrast between the optimistic ordinary Belarussians and the deeply cynical
capitalists was obvious in my study—especially concerning Belarus’ state-owned enterprises. As

I stated earlier, ordinary Belarussians truly believed in the efficiency and potential of Belarus’ state
enterprises while the capitalists bitterly rejected state ownership. Even broader than the stateowned industrial sector, the workers in this study, in general, believed the purpose of the
government was to protect the livelihoods and well-being of the people—and, most important, in
general they believed that it did. As I said earlier, even Svetlana, a harsh opponent of President
Lukashenka, believed that the government’s duty is “to provide people with stability” and without

irony or sarcasm said that,
The government is the people in this country.
The sense of optimism and faith in the system imbued in this statement is hard to
exaggerate. As I discussed in my findings, Svetlana’s statement sounds similar to Belarus’ official
state mottos seen on billboards that have been harshly criticized by some researchers as an attempt
to mobilize “people behind the president through the endorsement of social unity….it proposes the
subordination of individual interests to the collective will and interest” (Leshchenko 2008:1424;
see also Miazhevich 2007:1334). Here are some examples of official state mottos:
Belarus: The Government for the People
We are Belarus
Belarus—Together
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For Belarus
Belarus—That is We
The fact that Svetlana was by far the most hostile to President Lukashenka and the most
oppositional worker in this study is rather telling. This shows how widespread this sense of
optimism is among ordinary Belarussians. I disagree with Leshchenko. The “social unity” and
“collective will and interest” (read moral economy) of the Belarussian people is at the very

foundation of Belarussian society and far bigger than President Lukashenka. I will discuss this in
more detail later in this chapter. For now, I want to focus on the optimism and faith in the system
that was so prevalent among ordinary Belarussians.
Although much more attention is placed on Belarussian character trait of patience in the
literature, some researchers have also noted the character traits of optimism and faith in the system
such as Manaev et al (2011:97) and Matsuzato (2004:242). For Manaev the optimism of ordinary
Belarussians is in stark contrast to the cynical and pessimistic outlook of oppositional Belarussians
who tend to be from the middle and upper class (p.96-97; see also Furman 1999). My study was
completely in line with this position. Matsuzato (2004) not only recognized Belarussians’ lack of
cynicism but argued that Belarussians’ lack of cynicism, “in contrast to Russians and Ukrainians”
made Belarussians “more accessible than Russians and Ukrainians to populist promises to restore
the ‘justice’ that once existed” (p.242; see also Manaev et al. 2011:99). Although Matsuzato does

not use the term, it is clear he is referring to the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians:
The specific Belarusian mentality, which has been shaped historically, proved to be
incompatible with post-communist injustice and poverty (p. 255; see also Manaev et al
2011:99; Yarashevich 2014:1726)
Therefore, this lack of cynicism is inseparable from the moral economy of ordinary
Belarussians and their deep belief in economic justice and fairness. Ultimately, what I have been
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calling optimism, faith in the system, and a lack of cynicism is their moral economy in that they
truly believe in these notions of economic fairness and the role of the state without exception or
qualification. What often appeared throughout this study as naiveness among the workers was
nothing other than their actual moral economy, which is rather at odds with a typical Western
outlook that “tends to assume” free-market ideology “as inevitable and ‘natural’” (Thompson
[1971]:197-98). In this way, the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians, with its harsh rejection
of free-market ideology, is closer to the moral economy of the English workers in Thompson’s
study (p.197-198). Furthermore, along with subjects’ moral outrage, disbelief, and indignation,
moral economy researchers should consider that when their subjects’ statements appear utterly
naive or childish, that they are tapping into the moral economy.

Belarussian Socialism is a Distinctively Non-Marxist Conception of Socialism
A Fair Day’s Wage for a Fair Day’s Work
The conception of socialism that emerged in this study is a distinctively non-Marxist
conception of socialism. The socialism that emerged in this study was based on the public
ownership of the means of production since the government would act in the interests of society
as opposed to private owners: “The private owner will only care about himself!” (Masha). Their
conception of socialism was not based Marx’s fundamental critique of capitalist social relations of
production as inherently exploitive based on the capitalist’s appropriation of surplus value. Almost
universally, the workers in this study rejected Marx’s fundamental critique of capitalist social
relations of production as inherently exploitive. With only one exception, the workers utterly and
derisively rejected Marx’ s critique of wage-labor and the capitalist’s appropriation of surplus
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value. In fact, even some of those workers who were most committed to public ownership and
hostile to the private sector, utterly and derisively, rejected Marx’s critique of wage-labor.
This conclusion is in line with the state-capitalist Marxist critiques of the Soviet Union,
especially by Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff (2002; see also Satya Gabriel, Stephen Resnick
and Richard Wolff 2008). Although I disagree with their conclusion, that the Soviet Union was
not socialist but capitalist,9 I find their analysis of the Soviet economy based on surplus value very

useful for understanding Belarus and the conception of socialism that emerged in my study.
Overall, their description of the Soviet socio-economic system describes the version of socialism
that emerged in my study. First, it was not based on the critique of the appropriation of surplus
value:
Concepts of class and surplus [value] had been successfully banished from the
consciousness of most Soviet citizens in part because they had been expunged totally from
officially sanctioned discourse. (Gabriel et al. 2008: 546).
Second, like the workers in my study, in their analysis of the Soviet socio-economic
system, legitimacy was based on public ownership:
The USSR was depicted as having achieved socialism because it had collectivized the
ownership of means of production (by dispossessing the former private owners), made the
state – as the workers’ representative – the owner and operator of productive enterprises,
and because the state’s central planning replaced markets. Workers’ wages were said to be

their fair share of the collective output (Gabriel et al. 2008:545).
Based on the workers’ lack of control over the surplus created, Gabriel, Resnick, Wolff
(2008), do not consider the Soviet Union socialist, but rather capitalist in which the state is the

See Thomas (2006) for a discussion of the “three traditions” of the Marxist critique of the Soviet Union first, as a
bureaucratically degenerated worker’s state”; second as state capitalism; and third, as a new form of exploitive
society namely bureaucratic collectivism (see also Laibman 1978)
9
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capitalist. However, the Soviet Union’s public orientation was not merely rhetorical. In spite of
Gabriel, Resnick, and Wolff’s criticism of the state controlling the surplus produced by the workers
through the “Council of Ministers” or “(COM)” (p.545), they acknowledged that there was
significant redistribution of this surplus that greatly benefited the working class.
A particularly important distribution of the surplus by the COM went to provide free or
subsidized housing, education, medical care, transportation, etc.: this collective consumption
program proved crucial to the workers’ sense that the Soviet system was a genuine ‘workers’
society’ or ‘socialism’” (p.546).
Similarly, Klimina (2015) described the “public” orientation of the Soviet Union:
[B]ecause the goals of society ‘were public rather than private,” and the “surplus,” in line
with the socialist state, was used to achieve “a substantial degree of equity through full
employment and state provision of social benefits for all (Laibman 1978:25) (Klimina
2015:418).
Notwithstanding Gabriel, Resnick, and Wolff’s theoretical classification of the Soviet
socio-economic system as state capitalism, their critical analysis helps describe a kind of socialism
based on state ownership of the means of production in order to protect people’s livelihoods, and
best provide for the public good. In spite of the Soviet Union’s shortcomings, in general, the
literature is clear that ordinary Belarussians strongly supported Soviet socialism and believed in it

(Ioffe 2014, 2004, Ambrosio 2006; Matsuzato 2004; Eke and Kuzio 2000; Furman 1999). My
study also strongly supports this position. And today, though there were differing degrees of
tolerance for the private sector among the workers in my study, overwhelmingly, the workers still
support a kind of socialism similar to Soviet socialism in that they strongly support Belarus’ stateowned industrial sector—and in spite of the growing private sector, they want the state to maintain
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its ownership over the state-owned industrial sector at its current size—and some would like to see
it expanded, including Tanya, who actually voted for Svetlana Tikhanovskaya.
Another interpretation of the non-Marxist socialism that emerged in my study (which is
actually linked with Gabriel, Resnick, and Wolff’s critique) is based on Ioffe’s (2004) application
of the Russian Peasant-Commune literature to Belarus (p.104-108). Briefly, according to this
extensive literature, Soviet socialism was shaped far more by Russian feudalism than by any

theories of Karl Marx. The collectivism in Soviet industry was an extension of the collectivism of
the Russian feudal manor. Marxist concepts such as a critique of “surplus value” simply had
nothing to do with it. The Russian feudal manor, although owned by a feudal lord, was worked
communally and collectively by the peasants (legal serfs until 1861). For centuries in Russia, the
feudal lords rented their lands to the entire village communally. The shift from the communal
feudal manor to the Soviet collective farm (kolkhoz) was not a big change. The Soviet Union’s

ideology was not shaped by Marxism but by the peasant’s “primitive communal instincts and
redistributive ethos” (Ioffe 2004:106).
Ann Engelking (2013), an anthropologist who studied contemporary Belarussian peasants
(collective farm-workers or kolkhozniks) for twenty years, provides empirical support for Ioffe’s
theory.
As a result of the petrifaction of the old model of the feudal estate by the Soviet kolkhoz
system, we encounter in today’s Belarusian countryside probably one of the last remnants
of premodern mentality and social identity still extant in Europe (Engelking 2013:276).
And even today the Belarussian collective farm has preserved the feudal arrangements of
the lord (the collective farm director) and the serfs (the peasants—collective farm workers).
[Kolkhozniks] perceive the contemporary socioeconomic context of their own existence as
a specific continuation of the ancient manor estate, in which…. the kolkhoz president plays
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the role of a former landowner while they, the kolkhozniks, take the positions of former
serfs or farmhands. The kolkhozniks’ collective identity is a continuation of peasant or serf
identity from the era of the feudal manor (Engelking 2013:264).
It was clear to Engelking that the mindset of modern-day Belarussian collective farm
workers was not at all “Soviet” (or Marxist) but a “living embodiment of archaic” religious
premodern mindset (Engelking 2013:276).
According to Ioffe (2004:107), under rapid Soviet urbanization, these “archaic peasant
masses gush[ed] into the cities” which led to a “Soviet type of development [that] led as much the
ruralisation of the urban places as it did to the urbanisation of rural villagers (Ioffe 2004:107).
The archaic rural culture came to dominate the entire [Soviet] urban milieu (Ioffe
2004:107).
Just as the premodern feudal relations were reproduced in the Soviet Union’s rural

collective farms, with rapid industrialization and urbanized industrialization, these premodern and
feudal relations were reproduced in Soviet factories. This theory is supported by the Marxist
bureaucratic collectivist critiques that saw the Soviet industrial system as “resemble[ling]
feudalism to a certain degree” (Thomas 2006:225) and as “feudal-type fiefdoms” (Thomas
2006:237; see also Artiukh 2021:58, who argues that even today Belarussian workers at state
enterprise themselves “as part of a ‘feudal’ order”). Soviet socialism’s most “essential features”

were attributed to “Russia’s oriental affinities, not to Marxism” (Ioffe 2004:107).
[Soviet socialism] was essentially a reincarnation of the Russian peasantry’s traditional
arrangements now extended over the entire society under a smokescreen of Marxist
symbols (Ioffe 2004:107).
And this theory applies even more to Belarus as its industrialization and urbanization “was
even more delayed than in Russia and even more precipitate” (Ioffe 2004:108) since “in 1940 only
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21% of Belarus’ population lived in cities and towns, compared with 34% in Russia and Ukraine
(Ioffe 2004:86,108). By 1970 the urban population of Belarus had more than doubled to 43% and
continued rapidly increasing (Ioffe 2004:108).
The non-Marxist socialism that emerged in my study fits very well with Ioffe’s peasant
commune. According to the theory the collective orientation of ordinary Belarussians is rooted in
their communal peasant background. Their conception of socialism based on public ownership

has nothing to do with Karl Marx’s critique of the appropriation of surplus value.
Overall, the peasant commune theory describes the foundation of Belarus’ non-Marxist
conception of socialism better. For example, Gabriel, Resnick and Wolff’s in their state-capitalist
analysis talk about the disappearance of the concept of surplus value (p.546), however, is not clear
the concept was ever widespread among the ordinary Russians, including industrial workers—and
the Marxist concept certainly would not be widespread among the massive peasant class. This
calls into question Gabriel et al.’s criticism that the concept of surplus value had to be
“expunged…from officially sanctioned discourse” and that it was “successfully banished from the
consciousness of most Soviet citizens (p.546). The concept of surplus value likely was never part
of the consciousness of most Soviet citizens and would not require banishing.
While a comprehensive examination of the foundations of Soviet socialism is beyond the
scope of this study, I am satisfied with the theoretical analysis available in the literature to help
ground the non-Marxist conception of socialism that emerged in my study: a socialism based on
public ownership and the public good, rather than on Marx’s critique of capitalism.
The socialism that emerged in this study was non-Marxist in other important ways. For
example, none of the workers in this study knew why the Soviet Union was called the Soviet Union.
Not even Lena, by far the most radical worker in the study, (who understood Marx’s critique of
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surplus value and remembered learning about it at some point in her life). Even Lena did not know
why the Soviet Union was called the Soviet Union. This is not wordplay or word games. The
Russian word soviet means council or workers’ council in this context: the workers’ council was
foundation of socialism and of workers’ democracy and control, in revolutionary Russia—and the
basis for the country’s name (Anweiler 1974). The fact that no worker in the study knew this fact
is telling. Although workers’ councils played a key role in revolutionary Russia, almost from the
inception of the successful 1917 Russian Revolution, the workers’ councils, as independent organs
of workers’ power were being subverted by Lenin and by 1921 the independent soviets were
completely repressed (Anweiler 1974; for an opposing viewpoint see Rosenberg 1978). Much
more so than the concept of surplus value, the concept of workers’ soviets as direct organs of
workers’ democracy and control had been repressed (Anweiler 1974) and played little formal
role,10 if any, in the consciousness of Soviet workers (Sirianni 1982; Anweiler 1974).

In spite of the lack of soviets or direct formal worker control over state enterprises,
however, in general, the workers in this study saw Soviet socialism as truly socialist and did not
consider it state capitalism. Instead, they truly saw the state as the representative of the people in
both Soviet times and today. For example, Lena:
We work for ourselves… the profits are reinvested into society as opposed to going to some
private owner…and who knows what he will do with the money. (Recall also Oleg who
said the state enterprises belong directly to the Belarussian people)
Another non-Marxist aspect of the conception of socialism that emerged in this study was
a lack of internationalism and solidarity. For example, when discussing Yury’s conception of
socialism, I asked him whether major industries in America should be nationalized. He replied, “I

10

Ironically, however, in spite of the lack of soviets, formal control, and the ability to make important general
management decisions about state enterprises, workers under state socialism, enjoyed a high degree of autonomy on
the shop floor (Burawoy and Lukacs 1992; Burawoy and Krotov 1992; see also Artiukh 2021)
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don’t know. Are the workers being exploited?” I was utterly astonished by his reply. From a
Marxist perspective Yury’s reply is completely absurd—however, Yury (and the others in this
study), does not have a Marxist perspective. Yury does not view capitalism as inherently
exploitive based on the capitalist’s appropriation of surplus but rather pre-revolutionary Russian
capitalism was “exploitive” due to low and unpaid wages, lack of vacations, poor working
conditions, failure to pay taxes, etc. A similar situation arose when talking to Vadim, who also
strongly supports Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector. I asked him whether John Deere should
also be nationalized. His facial expression hardened and he harshly replied, “John Deere is our
competitor—I don’t care what they do.” I was very surprised by Vadim’s response and his lack
of solidarity with other similar workers. And though this question is beyond the scope of this
study, Vadim’s response does fit directly into the literature that holds Belarus’ socialism or “statebased economy” is grounded in the “‘national character’ and ‘national traditions’” of Belarus
(Leshchenko 2008:1421). President Lukashenka, himself, continues to couch support for Belarus’
“domestic enterprise” in terms of ““remain[ing] faithful to [Belarussian] traditions”11 (see also
Yarashevich 2015:1705).
In conclusion, a distinctive non-Marxist conception of socialism emerged in this study, that
has been “shaped historically” (Matsuzato 2004:255; see also Leshchenko 2008) and is similar in
many ways to Soviet socialism of which it is the product. Therefore, this conclusion not only

sheds light on the contemporary Belarus but can help provide insight into Soviet socialism and the
moral economy of the Soviet Union.

“So, it was in the 1990s, when Belarusians rejected attempts to adjust their way of life to the Western European
standard, remained faithful to traditions, saved national wealth: domestic enterprises, land, and the right to social
justice”, [In Russian] SB.BY, “We are proud of our symbols and history. And this is our strength!” May 8, 2022, by
Yevgeny Kononovich and Polina Konoga, ( https://www.sb.by/articles/my-gordimsya-svoimi-simvolami-i-istoriey-iv-etom-nasha-sila.html).
11
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Egalitarianism
Although the workers in this study tended to dislike extreme inequality—especially as seen
in Russia—their views on egalitarianism were complicated, paradoxal, and contradictory. For
example, every worker in this study, including Lena, believed that people had the right to be rich
and that the government had no right to take anyone’s wealth. They were not committed to wealth
redistribution through taxation or even progressive income taxation. They all adamantly rejected
Soviet-style egalitarianism—although those who were old enough strongly supported Soviet
egalitarianism during the Soviet era. In this way, the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians has
changed since the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Why have views about egalitarianism changed?
This is a fascinating and complicated question—and certainly deserves more research.
Taken at face value, the explanations given in favor of income inequality were rational arguments.
For example, Lena and Masha, the two most radical workers in my study:
The income does not need to be equal, since some people work harder. If someone works
harder then he should be paid more… [For example] The president is responsible for the
entire country and his pay should be higher. It doesn’t make sense to have everyone’s

salaries the same…. I don’t think there will ever be a society where everyone is paid the
same.
Masha agreed with this, and also opposed any kind of radical egalitarianism.
Q: “Do Belarussians support the idea that everyone’s income should be equal or at least
closer to equal?
Masha: “I don’t support that…I do not support equal salaries. If one person works and the
other sits around and drinks, why should he get the same pay?”
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Although their arguments are very convincing and will resonate true for many readers, they
still do not explain why both Lena and Masha strongly supported the high degree of income
equality during the Soviet era. For example, the two richest capitalists in the study adamantly
opposed Soviet egalitarianism during the Soviet era long before the breakup of the Soviet Union.
This was not the case for either Lena or Masha as both of them strongly embraced Soviet
egalitarianism.

In spite of the rational arguments made by the workers to justify income inequality,
understanding the workers’ rejection of income equality since the breakup of the Soviet Union can
best be understood ideologically (see Burris 1988:17). Although many aspects of the Soviet moral
economy have been preserved in the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians today, the collapse
of the Soviet Union has led to the collapse in the ideological foundation of the Soviet Union’s
radical conception of egalitarianism. To understand this phenomenon, the Marxist conception of

reification (Burris 1988) (popularized by Lukacs 1923) is very useful. According to Burris, under
capitalism inequality is reified as something natural:
[I]nequality, from this perspective, appear[s] as the consequence of personal deficiencies
in the capacity to acquire technical skills, rather than the normal outgrowth of capitalist
economic institutions. This appearance lays the foundation for the meritocratic
legitimation of class inequality, both at the level of popular ideology and in the more
elaborate theoretical constructions of bourgeois social science (Burris 1988:17).
Even the language the workers in my study used supports the concept of the reification of
inequality as they consistently referred to inequality as natural or as the way it must be. Recall
Lena earlier in this section, “I don’t think there will ever be a society where everyone is paid the
same.” Tanya similarly responded:
In the Soviet Union we were all equal; we did not have millionaires…Now everything has
changed. There are poor people, middle-class, rich and very rich.
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Q: Are you against this?
No, I am not against it. Probably, it must be this way. But in my time, it was not like that…
I don’t know what to say…. Equality, as for me equality was always good. But now
everything has changed
And though Burris was describing the ideological reification of inequality in advanced
capitalist states, it is very likely that a similar phenomenon took place in the former-socialist states
and former-Soviet republics, including Belarus. Not only did the Soviet Union collapse, but
socialism itself as a deliberate ideology collapsed as well—and along with it the Soviet Union’s
radical conception of egalitarianism. Here I might seem to be contradicting myself as a major
conclusion of this study is that key aspects of Soviet socialism (for example, the largely stateowned economy) have been preserved in Belarus, however, I have argued throughout this study
that the version of socialism that has survived is not, by any means, purposeful and deliberate, but
rather couched in cultural, national, and historical terms as opposed to socialist ideology.
While Belarus is fascinating in that so many aspects of Soviet socialism have been
preserved here, it would be naive to assume, that Soviet socialism and the Soviet moral economy
could survive the collapse of the Soviet Union and over thirty years of being a market economy
completely unscathed. Soviet egalitarianism was one of the victims of this great ideological
transformation that entailed both an intense radical ideological rupture with the collapse of the
Soviet Union, and a slow, but consistent development of a market economy for over thirty years.
Oleg’s response, was typical among the workers in this study, capturing this ideological
transformation.
Q: “In the Soviet Union you supported income equality?”
Oleg: “Yes, of course. In the Soviet Union everyone was equal.”
Q: “Now you do not support income equality, though. When did you change?”
Oleg: “I don’t know. I have never thought about it.”
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Q: “Did it change after the Soviet Union broke up?”
Oleg: “It must have. I have never thought about it before. It must have been a gradual
change. I was not even aware of it happening.”

Stuck in Transition
It is clear that ordinary Belarussians have significantly moved away from the radical
egalitarianism since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Other aspects of their views of egalitarianism
can be explained by Belarus’ transitional position between Soviet socialism and a market
economy. Namely, here I argue that many of the apparently contradictory positions concerning
egalitarianism can be explained by the fact that most ordinary Belarussians still have a socialist
outlook even though Belarus is moving toward social democracy. This explains many of the
apparent inconsistencies in their attitudes towards wealth redistribution, progressive income
taxation, etc. By socialist outlook I mean an outlook in support of a social-economic model in
which the government strives toward full employment relying heavily on state ownership of the
means of production (Yarashevich 2014:1717).12 This is in contrast to a social democratic outlook
in which one supports the social policies of social democracy or the welfare state, in which the
main objective of the system is “to smooth the negative impact of fierce labor competition on those
who do not fit in the capitalist system, by providing them with subsistence assistance on the basis
of actual material need” (p.1717). The difference between these two outlooks explains why
ordinary Belarussians are not interested in key welfare state policies such as progressive taxation
and unemployment insurance. In fact, only one worker in the entire study (Sasha) brought up
unemployment insurance benefits himself, although the discussion of unemployment insurance—

12

I am not implying, however, that various capitalist welfare states have not striven toward full employment (see
Lindbeck’s (1997) “Full Employment and the Welfare State.” However, the focus of the capitalist welfare state is
different, relying on various means and policies to create full employment with a primarily capitalist system, as
opposed to the socialist model that relies mainly on the state’s role as the main employer.
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and Belarus’ lack of meaningful unemployment insurance benefits—was widespread among the
middle-class and capitalist subjects. The workers in this study wanted jobs and were not interested
in unemployment insurance benefits. Demanding jobs is likely a better long-term strategy for
ordinary Belarussians than demanding unemployment insurance benefits, however, without
progressive income taxation or other methods of wealth redistribution, it is not clear how income
inequality could be kept low, especially as the private sector continues to grow and wealth becomes
more concentrated.

On the question of full employment, the socialist outlook of ordinary

Belarussians is very practical, however, their socialist outlook is ill-equipped to deal with the
problems of inequality that will become more severe in the future.

Egalitarianism: Superficial Free-Market Ideology vs. Moral Economy
Surprising, every worker in this study defended the right to be rich, opposed the
government’s ability to limit one’s wealth, and claimed that the owner of a private business should
be free to run his business as he chooses. However, when questioned further, almost universally,
the workers in this study supported what would be considered by many to be extreme restrictions
on private property or property rights. For example, as discussed earlier in this chapter, almost
universally, the workers in this study supported wage and job protection for private sector workers.
As this was discussed earlier in this chapter, my reason for bringing this up here is to talk about
the contradiction between these responses. What could explain this level of contradiction?
No doubt workers can say things—and believe things—that are contradictory. This
concept was an important part of Reinarman’s study—and a major reason why he chose a
qualitative approach. It is not entirely clear to me why the workers in this study gave some of the
responses that they did. What I have called superficial free-market ideology appears to be
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extensions (or residues) of the powerful free-market ideology or neoliberal ideology that dominate
much of the world, however, have not taken deep roots among ordinary Belarussians—though they
are embraced superficially. It is my firm position, however, that the workers’ answers that came
in response to my confronting them with the harsh reality of free-market ideology represented their
moral economy—and truly represents their position on these issues regardless of anything else
they might have said to the contrary. The workers, after confronted with free-market ideology,
displayed high degrees of moral outrage, indignation, and disbelief. This conclusion is in line with
Thompson and Reinarman.
This conclusion is also important methodologically. Researchers can be sure they are
tapping into subjects’ moral economy when their subjects’ responses display high degrees of moral
outrage, indignation and disbelief as opposed to superficial ideologies that do not garner such
reactions. This concept is especially relevant when the emotionally laden response contradicts

other (less emotional) statements that are more in line with free-market ideology. This conclusion
can help others doing qualitative moral economy research and can help support the concept of
moral economy in sociology.

Free-market and Neoliberal Ideology
This study had a significant advantage over Reinarman’s and others (see Keskula 2017;
Ibrahim 2014) in that I had an opportunity to interview capitalists (and some middle-class subjects)
who strongly embraced neoliberal ideology. This provided me with an excellent contrast to the
workers’ moral economy and allowed me to flush out the workers’ moral economy more fully than
Reinarman and the others who could only on neoliberal narratives mainly portrayed in the media.
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This provided me with more perspective and a deeper understanding of the workers’ moral
economy. For example, although the capitalist and middle-class proponents of neoliberalism did
not consciously know anything about the theorical concept of moral economy, several of them
inadvertently summarized the entire study in a few succinct sentences. Ivan, a 51-year-old printing
business owner, gave an exceptionally insightful response:
You keep asking me whether something is ‘fair.’ It is not a question of ‘fairness’; it is just
a question of business.
This concept was widespread among the proponents of neoliberalism in this study:
It doesn’t matter what is moral; it is only an economic question (Boris).
…the law and fair are different things (Vlad).
Overall, five major categories of neoliberal ideology emerged in this study that stood in
stark contrast to the moral economy of the workers. Relying heavily on Harvey (2005), I roughly
organized them as: The Invisible Hand of the Market, Capitalist Social Relations of Production,
Privatization, Shock Therapy, The Self-Regulating Market, and Social-Darwinism. Rely heavily
on traditional Marxist thinkers such as Das (2017a) (as well as Harvey) it is clear that Capitalist
Social Relations of Production were absolutely central to these subjects’ neoliberal ideological
outlook in general, and lies at the foundation of the other four ideologies, including their support
for both Privatization of Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector and Shock Therapy or rapid
privatization (King 2003).
I was also heavily indebted to Harvey’s conception of neoliberal utopian ideology (p.19),
which, indirectly support or serve to rationalize neoliberal capitalist social relations of production.
Harvey argues that utopian neoliberal ideology serves to mask the “successful [neoliberal] project
for the restoration of ruling-class power,” (p.203) “primarily work[ing] as a system of justification
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and legitimation for whatever needed to be done to achieve this goal” (p.19). The Invisible Hand
of the Market and The Self-Regulating Market are both important examples of neoliberal utopian
ideology that emerged in this study and there is great overlap between the two concepts. And
finally, Social Darwinism is a harsh dehumanizing neoliberal rationalization (Harvey 2005:157;
see also Giroux 2011; Leyva 2009; Ruff 2005) that was fairly widespread in this study.

Capitalist Social Relations of Production
There were no exceptions among the capitalists in this study concerning their support for
capitalist social relations of production. They adamantly believed in a free-labor market in which
the government should not intervene on behalf of workers to protect their wages other than
establishing a nation-wide minimum wage. Workers would be entirely free to accept or reject any
wage offers and capitalists would be free to propose any wage levels being only subject to the
labor market notwithstanding any minimum wage.
Q: Is it fair if an owner lowers workers’ wages to increase profits?
Tony: “Yes, …If the workers agree to accept low wages, then it is fair. There
is a contract between the owner and the worker. If the worker agrees then it is fair”
Yes, it is possible to cut salaries to increase his profits. Both are free individuals. If the
owner does not pay enough the worker can leave for a different owner. Everyone is free.
This is not a problem (Pavel)
Unlike the workers in this study, the capitalists (and some of the middle-class subject)
adamantly rejected any notion of a “fair wage” and only recognized the market rate. Furthermore,
the capitalists in this study (as well as some of the middle-class subjects) strongly believed that the
capitalist must be free to fire or layoff any workers if this would increase profits. Obviously, this
contradicts the workers’ moral economy in which the workers, almost universally, believed that
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the capitalist owner of a private enterprise must be required to pay a “fair wage” and be forbidden
from laying off any workers merely to increase profits.
Universally, among the proponents of neoliberalism, capitalist social relations of
production were sacrosanct.
It’s none of the worker’s damn business how much money the factory owner makes. They
agreed to a contract which says how much money is paid for this kind of work. It is not a

collective farm! When I hire a worker, he needs to do the work and go home and it is none
of his business how much profits I am making or what I plan on doing with the profits. He
either agrees or disagrees to the wages that I am offering for the work (Pavel).

Privatization
All of the capitalists in this study adamantly supported the privatization of Belarus’ state-

owned industrial sector. (However, Anna, 58-year-old manager of a food production factory, who
supported many aspects of neoliberal ideology, believed that the major factories should remain
under state control.) Support for privatization was, among other reasons, closely linked to the
utopian neoliberal ideology of The Invisible Hand.

The Invisible Hand

This utopian neoliberal ideology was supported universally among the capitalist and
middle-class proponents of neoliberal ideology. Vlad (the owner of an automotive parts plant with
over 600 workers) in his argument in support of privatization summed up the basic concept of the
invisible hand fairly well:
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I think when the government owns factories it makes them very inefficient because
[private] owners make companies more efficient because all of the profits belong to the
private owner. But a state factory has a director who has other interests than a real owner.
There are several variations of the Invisible-Hand Ideology such as the ideology of TrickleDown economics as well as the ideology of the Rising-Tide-Lifts-All-Ship, which also merely serve
as rationalizations for capitalist domination (Harvey 2005). These variations were ubiquitous
among the supporters of neoliberalism, including Anna, who was the least radical proponent of
neoliberalism, in that she did not support privatization of Belarus’ heavy industry.
Rich people, when they work in an economically healthy environment with clear laws,
create many job opportunities. If rich people are getting richer helping poor people to
become rich as well — that’s great, even if the gap between them is getting bigger (Anna).
The capitalists in this study believed that capitalist development would lead to higher
wages, and better living standards for workers. Furthermore. It would uplift the entire society
increasing the tax base benefiting the poor, improving hospitals etc. Stas explained:
The richest investors are not coming to Belarus now. The policy should be ‘come and earn
whatever you want and whatever you earn will be yours.’ That would be better for the poor
in the future. They [the investors] will pay taxes for good hospitals, schools, etc. The
state should struggle for these investors and they should be from every country. No pain,
no gain

Shock Therapy (Rapid Privatization)
While support for Shock Therapy was not as strong as for Privatization in general, there
was actual support for shock therapy among some of the capitalists and middle class. For example,
Boris, a 48-year-old middle-class IT manager openly and explicitly supported shock therapy and
saw it as a necessary stage in Belarus’ economic development. He literally described it as the
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primitive accumulation phase. Similarly, Vlad, though he stated he was against it, clearly supports
it as it would create mass unemployment that would be very profitable for his automotive parts
factory. Though he did not use the terminology, Vlad is describing Marx’s reserve army of labor,
which is closely related to primitive accumulation, a necessary condition for capitalist social
relations of production and the maintenance of a flexible free-labor market.

The Self-Regulating Market (Extreme Market Fundamentalism)
The neoliberal utopian ideology of the self-regulating market was embraced universally by
proponents of neoliberalism in this study. Namely, all of the capitalists and a significant segment
of the middle class embraced the self-regulating market, as opposed to the workers in this study
who utterly rejected the notion. Some neoliberal proponents, such as Stas and Boris, had such
faith in the self-regulating market that they opposed any anti-monopoly/restraint-of-trade
legislation and could not foresee any situation in which the market would not self-regulate for the
benefit of all. The workers in this study—like the workers in Thompson’s study—bitterly rejected
these notions and found them utterly baffling.
Among the capitalists in this study and a significant portion of the middle-class subjects,
support for the abstract notion of “the market” was powerful and central to their ideology.

The market must be free…. The market determines everything….
We only have one king. That is the market. (Vlad)
In this way, the capitalists in this study were very similar to grain traders and political
economists in Thompson’s study. They all believed in this inviolate abstract notion of “the
market.” This conception of “the market” was bitterly rejected by the workers in my study as well
as in Thompson’s, however, it must be noted that the workers in Thompson’s study did not wholly
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reject the notion of the market or a market economy, but believed in the notion of a “fair price.”
(The conflicts in Thompson’s study were incited by grain trader charging higher prices in times of
shortage that poor workers could not afford.) In general, the workers in my study were similar,
they also did not wholly reject the notion of “the market” but believed in the notion of a “fair
wage.”
In Thompson’s study, the “free market” had real consequences for poor workers in times

of shortage in the form of malnutrition and starvation. And though the workers in Belarus might
not face quite as dire circumstances, some of the proponents of neoliberal ideology in this study
were more than willing to create massive social dislocation in the name of the free market. This
concept is directly tied to what I have called Shock Therapy or Shock Therapy Privatization. What
I would call a fanatical commitment to privatization regardless of the social costs. This is not
merely my interpretation. Some of the subjects openly discussed this. For example, I brought up

the massive immigration in Latvia in response to shock therapy privatization with Vlad:
Q: “You think Lithuania and Latvia are better than Belarus. But many people had to
migrate abroad? For example, 37% of Latvians have left?
Vlad: “That is their choice. They are making more money and enjoying higher living
standards. This is what Belarus will have to do to grow and develop.”
Q: “What about the right of Belarussians to live in Belarus their homeland?”
Vlad: “We have to develop. We have to follow the market. The market determines
everything.”
What is ironic, if not outright contradictory, is that Vlad is very patriotic about Belarus.
He wants to preserve the Belarussian language and culture, and what it means to be Belarussian.
We [Belarussians] don’t have our own native language. No one speaks Belarussian. We
don’t have a national identity—I regret!
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It would seem that a Belarussian identity would at least mean that a Belarussian should be
able to live and work in Belarus. However, a few times during our interview Vlad said that
Belarussian workers must be willing to go abroad to find work—and this is especially true for
young workers! Whatever Vlad’s commitment to a Belarussian national identity or patriotism
might be, it is quickly sacrificed on the altar of neoliberalism and the international capitalist labor
market.

I do not believe Vlad is simply an outlier, as Boris spoke openly in defense of shock therapy
privatization and the massive social dislocation that it would entail:
I support shock therapy. Why not? Yes, there were many problems, [however] on the
other hand it will be a cemetery [if we do not privatize everything]
Q: “Wasn’t it a disaster in Russia?”
It was. [However], The first capital13 was gained unlawfully in America too. The same

for the former-Soviet republics. I think it is alright. It will be hard but we need to do it.
Like Vlad, Boris admitted that “Belarussians would have to leave the country and move to
Russia and the Ukraine” to find jobs.14 These hardships would be worth it in the end as Belarus’
economy and workers’ living standards would be much better:
The experience of our neighbors shows us, shock therapy will be worth it, the Baltic states,
the Ukraine, Russia, Poland…especially the Baltic states and Poland.

While it is not clear whether Boris is familiar with Marx, here he is talking about Marx’s concept of the ‘primitive
accumulation of capital’ or the social dispossession of wealth that allows the capitalist class to develop and allows for
the creation of a propertyless working class (Das 2017b). Boris is arguing that in Russia in the 1990’s, the rapid
privatization of state properties and the accumulation of this capital in the private hands of the oligarchs, was a
necessary stage in the development of capitalism in Russia. This rapid accumulation of state properties in private
hands is needed to transform the former-socialist economy into a capitalist one—also known as ‘shock therapy’ (King
2003).
13

14

Vlad, a business owner in the upper-class section also supported the need for Belarussians to migrate abroad to find
work.
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Even among the capitalists who did not speak candidly about the social dislocation
neoliberal transition would entail there is a sense that the transition would be disastrous for
ordinary Belarussians. For example, Stas, who used the phrase “No pain—no gain” to describe
Belarus transition:
Q: “But in other republics, like the Baltic states, the factories were all privatized or closed?”
Stas: “No, uncompetitive factories were closed. They were closed since they were not
competitive with international firms. They could not compete and had to be closed. [Now]
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia all have higher standards of living than Belarus. Their
pensions are much higher. Their salaries are much higher. The average Lithuanian salary
is 600 Euros a month! Lukashenka mesmerized Belarussians with this propaganda that
destroying non-competitive companies is wrong. No! It is a good thing. It is development.
Belarussians look at this [closing factories] as a tragedy, when in reality is an opportunity
to grow and develop. It is a challenge.”
Among the proponents of neoliberalism in this study, there was an almost religious

conviction that neoliberal transition, especially privatization would lead to massive economic
growth and prosperity, not only for the capitalist class but for the working class and poor. If only
Belarussians put their faith in the free market embracing privatization, everything would be great.
Stas, Boris and Vlad all said this explicitly. They believe that if only Belarussians would embrace
privatization, Belarussian workers too could enter the neoliberal promised land as Lithuanian
workers have. No doubt it would be very hard and ordinary Belarussians would admittedly have

to make many sacrifices. However, once the neoliberal transformation would be complete, Belarus
would be a paradise for workers and the poor. Obviously, ordinary Belarussians adamantly reject
this ideology, and do not believe it is true. I will discuss Lithuania as a neoliberal narrative in
greater detail shortly.
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Social Darwinism
Social Darwinism was fairly widespread in this study among capitalists and the middleclass, much of it in line with Spencer’s Social Darwinism (Leyva 2009; Ruff 2005; Harvey 2005).
Stas’ examples were particularly harsh. Throughout my interview Stas, he was very elitist and
harshly judgmental against the working-class. For example, when I asked about the word “Soviet”
he said:
A meeting of workers. These people are illiterate and they only decide what they can take
or divide. They only think about getting money how they can divide….When a worker
owns a share of a joint stock his culture does not allow him to control it effectively.15
This is a strong example of Social Darwinism (Vila-Henninger 2019:240-41; Giroux
2011:591 Leyva 2009; Ruff 2005; Harvey 2005). The workers are not merely in a lower economic
class but are actually in a lower caste due to some cultural inferiority, a “‘pathological condition’

rather than a reflection of structural injustice –a ‘pathological dysfunction’ of those who are poor,
rather than the structural dysfunction of an economic system that generates and reproduces
inequality’ (Bauman, 2010:66)” (Giroux 2011:591). Social Darwinism is an inevitable outgrowth
of neoliberal ideology.
If conditions among the lower classes deteriorated, this was because they failed, usually
for personal and cultural reasons, to enhance their own human capital (through dedication
to education, the acquisition of a Protestant work ethic, submission to work discipline and
flexibility, and the like). Particular problems arose, in short, because of lack of competitive
strength or because of personal, cultural, and political failings. In a Darwinian neoliberal

15

Ironically, in this passage, Stas was arguing against voucher privatization, a rapid means of privatizing state
enterprises by giving vouchers or shares of the enterprise to its workers and managers. This served as a key strategy
for implementing shock therapy rapid privatization in the 1990’s and was critical for transforming socialist property
relations into capitalist relations rapidly and permanently (King 2003). Voucher privatization is still promoted today
for Belarus by the renowned neoliberal proponent Anders Aslund (2020).
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world, the argument went, only the fittest should and do survive (Harvey 2005:157; see
also Giroux 2011; Leyva 2009; Ruff 2005).

Post-Transition Lithuania and Latvia as Neoliberal Narratives
Throughout this study neoliberal proponents promoted several post neoliberal-transition
countries as successful examples of neoliberal transition, especially Lithuania and Latvia. These

countries served as important narratives showing the great benefits of neoliberal transition for
ordinary Belarussians.
I briefly attempted to explore whether this position was actually true: Do Lithuanian and
Latvian workers enjoy significantly higher living standards than Belarussian workers? And though
this is a complicated question to investigate and certainly beyond the scope of this study, after
reading the literature and attempting to make comparisons, it was far from obvious that this
position is factually true.
Unfortunately, there are not a lot of statistics available that directly compare Lithuanian
and Belarussian workers’ wages, pensions, and living standards—however, statistics on the
poverty levels between the two countries is readily available. According to the World Bank, today
“20.6%” of the Lithuanian population live in poverty, while in Belarus only “4.8%” of the
population live in poverty.16 The fact that over thirty years into Lithuania’s neoliberal transition
20.6 percent of the population lives in poverty is a strong indictment of neoliberalism’s failure to
lift people out of poverty and the various neoliberal utopian ideologies. This failure is even more
stark, when compared to Belarus, who, rejecting neoliberalism, has, according to the World Bank,

According to the World Bank, “Poverty head-count ratio at national poverty lines (percent of population) Belarus
and Lithuania”, (The World Bank, “Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population) - Belarus,
Lithuania,” 2020, (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC?locations=BY-LT).
16
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astonishingly, decreased its poverty level from 41.9 percent in 2000 to 4.8 in 2020.17 And while
there is a lack of direct comparison of Belarus and Lithuania, there is no shortage of criticism of
Lithuania’s harsh neoliberal order in the literature.
Lithuania’s welfare state is characterised by low welfare spending, predominant meanstested welfare entitlements, modest benefits, low levels of decommodification and high
levels of poverty and income inequality (Atlas 2018:741).
…
Lithuania remains one of the poorest countries in Europe. In 2013 around 30% of the
population (over 900 thousand people or every third person) in the country was
experiencing risk of poverty and social exclusion (Eurostat, 2013). In the heat of the Greek
bailout turmoil, it was brought to the public’s attention that Lithuania was significantly
‘Poorer than Greece’ (Rerniauskas and Raudseps, 2015). Indeed, even during the best times
people in Lithuania were poorer than their Greek, and many other European, counterparts.
The residents of the country have been receiving astonishingly low levels of employment
related earnings. In fact, Lithuania has some of the lowest wages and pensions in the whole
of the EU, which only exceed the rates of the younger European members, namely
Romania and Bulgaria (Figure 1). To make matters worse, Lithuania also has one of the
highest proportions of low-wage earners in the EU. Such socio-economic conditions
largely reflect the dominating ideological discourse and policies implemented in the
country during the last two decades (Atlas 2018:729; see also Aidukaite 2014; 2011; 2009;
2003; Woolfson 2010; Haynes and Husan 2002; Stiglitz, 1999; Reardon 1996).
Unlike the capitalists, and some of the middle-class subjects in this study, Atas (2018), and
the others, paint a very different picture of Lithuania’s neoliberal transformation:
In a relatively short period of time, one part of the population lost their essential life-long
security and were pushed into poverty, while the other financially thrived on the ruins of
the former system, benefiting from a distorted process of privatization (Atlas 2018:735-

17

Ibid.
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736; see also Aidukaite 2014; 2011; 2009; 2003; Woolfson 2010; Haynes and Husan 2002;
Stiglitz, 1999; Reardon 1996).
According the literature, Lithuania’s transition rather than benefitting the working class
and poor was at their detriment—certainly no workers’ paradise. The situation in Latvia is
similar—if not worse (Kesane 2021; Dzenovska 2020; Ozolina 2019, 2016; Aidukaite 2014; 2011;
2009; 2003; Juska and Woolfson 2015; Sommers and Hudson 2013; Woolfson 2010).

Under neoliberal transformation both Lithuania and Latvia have seen a massive decrease
in their populations. Lithuania is becoming known as a “country of emigration” (2018:740).
Since independence over 600,000 people have left the country, quite a significant number
for a state with a total population of 3 million (Atlas 2018:740).
Lithuanians are leaving due to poor labor market conditions, low wages, “poor working
conditions, limited career opportunities, lack of justice and social security, low self-realisation

opportunities and generally difficult living conditions” (Atlas 2018:741). Migration abroad is even
worse in Latvia.
Latvia, a disappearing nation (Sander 2018).
Since 1990 Latvia’s population has decreased by 789,218. That is a decrease of almost 30
percent (29.6) (Worldmeter 2021; Denovska 2020).
In 2000, Latvia’s population stood at 2.38 million. At the start of this year [2018], it was
1.95 million. No other country has had a more precipitous fall in population — 18.2 percent
according to U.N. statistics. Only Latvia’s similarly fast-shriveling neighbor, Lithuania,
with a 17.5 percent decrease, and Georgia, with a 17.2 percent drop, come close (Sander
2018).
Atis Sjanits, a Latvian diplomat said:
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At this rate, in 50 years or so, Latvia may cease to be a nation (Sander 2018).
In spite of reality, the false narrative of Lithuania and Latvia’s transition improving
conditions for the poor and working class continues to serve as important neoliberal utopian
ideology to rationalize and justify capitalist dominance.

A New Neoliberalism?
Although many aspects of the neoliberal ideology that emerged in this study were in line
with neoliberal ideology in general, such as support strong support for capitalist social relations of
production and privatization, other aspects of their ideological outlook were not in line with
neoliberal ideology in general. The most important difference is that, all of the subjects that I have
been calling neoliberal proponents, supported welfare state programs (state pensions, free
education and healthcare, etc.) that neoliberal ideology typically radically opposes.

These subjects accept the moral foundations of the welfare state or at least key programs
that many welfare states provide (free medicine, healthcare, education, public pensions,
unemployment, paid maternity leave, welfare). They are not, however, Keynesian, as they do not
want the state to interfere in the economy. They support a laissez-faire economy and believe that
the market must be free. Their welfare state is more limited than Keynes’ and is far less regulatory
(Reinarman 1987). Unlike Keynes they do not support full employment.
Their outlook does, however, have a conception of the ‘public good’—which is not in line
with pure Hayek-Friedman neoliberalism—however, that conception of the public good is limited
mainly to what have been historically considered public services in Soviet Belarus: healthcare,
medicine, education, public pensions, etc. These social obligations are a part of their outlook and
are not subject to the market and not to be commodified.
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As much as they hated and rejected the Soviet Union, their outlooks have been shaped by
it. Though they rejected Soviet socialism and the Soviet attempt to ‘socialize’ production, they
accepted the Soviet Union’s commitment to public welfare. Their version of the welfare state is
‘natural’ to them. They truly believe that society is obligated to take care of the basic needs of
citizens universally. For them, certain parts of society are not to be commodified and should never
be commodified. In this way they deeply reject Hayek and Friedman’s pure neoliberalism. Hayek
and Friedman believed that society does not owe anyone anything. And although Reagan and
Thatcher are known for saying unapologetically, that “there is no such thing as society” (Giroux
2011:589), my neoliberal subjects did not go that far. They believe that society does owe a lot to
people, but for them the public sphere is limited to key public services and should never intervene
into the market.
The neoliberalism that emerged in this study is a new kind of neoliberalism without many

precedents in the literature. Possibly, Yeltsin in the 1990’s is the closest (Kumala et al. 2014:540541). Yeltsin sought to privatize industry and deregulate wages and prices, however, “‘he
embraced many elements of the Communists’ social welfare program.’”
The government raised pensions and wages and reduced wage arrears. Therefore, one could
perhaps argue that Yeltsin bought his victory with generous welfare spending, something
that his government had set out to minimize just a few years before (Kumala et al.
2014:540-541).
It seems, however, that Yeltsin’s embrace of welfare spending was merely a political
compromise in order to mitigate public anger against shock therapy (mass privatization). The
neoliberal subjects in my study had a strong commitment to welfare state programs as opposed to
Yeltsin’s more opportunistic welfare spending. Furthermore, though Yeltsin relied politically on
welfare spending to assuage public anger, under Yeltsin Russia did not emerge with the robust
welfare state programs that my subjects envision. And even after Yeltsin, under the more populist
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presidencies of Putin and Medvedev, though there were many improvements, the “Russian welfare
model [remained] highly incoherent” (Kumala et al. 2014:526), and mixing elements of
neoliberalism and statism (p.528) and creating “major welfare policies [that] have only benefited
selected groups of people” (p.533), for example for mothers, families, foster care and orphans in
order to increase Russia’s birthrate (p. 535-6) while in general “largely withdrawing from [social
welfare] responsibilities (p.546).

Atas’ (2018) concept of a “neoliberal welfare state” (2018) might be a good description for
the neoliberalism that emerged in my study. Atlas described the Lithuanian as a “neoliberal
welfare state”. Economically, the Lithuanian model is what my subjects envision. A privatized
laissez-faire economy. However, welfare spending in Lithuania is very low and much of the
welfare state has been eliminated (Atas 2018). My subjects’, however, support more of a
commitment to public welfare than what actually exists in Lithuania.
My subjects’ neoliberalism is not as an “aggressive” and “straightforward neoliberalism”
since they support key welfare provisions (Atlas 2018:741). Is their neoliberalism “‘embedded
neoliberalism’ (a softer social liberal model of development)”? (Atlas 2018:741). I do not think
their conception of the market is ‘embedded’ enough to fit into this model neatly. For example, in
the United States, the market is far more embedded than my subjects’ ideal vision (Karger 2014).
Even today, after the Reagan Revolution, the U.S. government still plays a somewhat active
Keynesian role stimulating and regulating the economy (Karger 2014).
My neoliberal subjects, however, also supported welfare provisions that far exceed the U.S.
model. They support free healthcare, medicine, education, public pensions even paid maternity
leave. In the past there was free higher education in the U.S. In fact, New York’s free higher
education was one of the first victims of neoliberalism during the mid-seventies’ financial crisis.
In the past the U.S Social Security program was a decent public pension but it no longer is enough.
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If the program were revitalized and more people could live off it, then it would be closer to my
subjects’ ideal.
It is hard to fit the neoliberalism that emerged in my study neatly into anything in the
literature. The middle-class and capitalist subjects who supported neoliberalism tended to support
an aggressive straightforward neoliberalism when it came to the ‘economy’, however, they also
supported fairly robust welfare state programs. Neoliberalism combined with the key aspects of

the Soviet welfare state. They accept the social guarantees of the Soviet Union, but utterly reject
its socialism or public ownership of the means of production. They reject Karl Marx’s notion that
production is a “social” activity and see production purely as a “private” activity. In the sphere of
production their thinking is in line with the standard neoliberal ideology (Harvey 2005), however,
their conception of non-commodified non-market based social guarantees and obligations
contradicts the standard neoliberal ideology (Karger 2014; Giroux 2011; Harvey 2005).
These neoliberal subjects truly seem to believe in their vision: a laissez faire economy
coupled with robust welfare state programs. However, it does not seem to have come to fruition
in any of the other former-socialist countries in the region that have embraced a neoliberal
transformation such as Lithuania (Atas 2018) Latvia (Ozolina 2019; 2016) Poland (Rek-Wozniak
et al. 2017), the Ukraine (Klimina 2015) and Russia (Kulmala et al 2014).
While I cannot fit this version of neoliberalism neatly into the literature, it should not have
come as such a surprise to me that key aspects of the proponents of neoliberal ideology did not fit
into the standard understanding of neoliberalism (Harvey 2005:115-116). Neoliberal ideology is
not monolithic throughout the world and is implemented differently in different countries with
different cultures and economic situations and class configurations (Harvey 2005:115-116). For
example, although some major changes took place in Sweden with the implementation of
neoliberalism (such as weakening unions, lowering wages, privatizing pensions and increasing
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inequality), overall, Sweden’s neoliberal transition was not as extreme as it was in other countries,
especially Great Britain (Harvey 2005:112-115). Even though “[e]mbedded liberalism was
eroded” in Sweden, it was “by no means fully dismantled
The public still remained broadly attached to its welfare structures. Inequality certainly
increased, but by no means to the levels seen in the US or the UK. Poverty levels remained
low and levels of social provision remained high. Sweden is an example of what might be
called ‘circumscribed neoliberalization’, and its generally superior social condition reflects
that fact (p.115).
Notwithstanding support for unemployment insurance benefits, there was broad consensus
among all of the subjects in this study, in support of several welfare-state programs, including free
health care and medicine, free education, public administered pensions, public transportation,
assistance for the poor and disabled, maternity leave and others.
President Lukashenka and Belarus’ Economic Model are a Reflection of Moral Economy
of Ordinary Belarussians (and Not the Other Way Around)
This is one of the most important conclusions of my study and builds on the work of
Yarashevich (2014) and Ioffe (2014, 2004; see also Ioffe and Yarashevich 2011:755 Matsuzato
2004:255-56; Furman 1999). Although none of these researchers used the term “moral economy,”
often referring to the “mentality” of ordinary Belarussians (Ioffe 2014:114; Yarashevich
2014:1726; Matsuzato 2004:255), or the “preferences” (Ioffe 2014:114) of ordinary Belarussians
instead, it is clear that they believe that President Lukashenka’s policies and Belarus’ socioeconomic model are a reflection of the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians. For example,
Yarashevich argued:
By denying neo-liberal reforms pushed elsewhere in the region, Lukashenka denied the
whole concept of the market-based democratic order. But at the end of the day, he has done
so because most Belarusians, represented by workers and other nonentrepreneurial groups,
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apparently do not want to bear the social costs of the transformation—all too obvious in
neighbouring Russia, Ukraine, and elsewhere in the region. And as Lukashenka lacked
external sympathy for his politics, he could only rely on internal grass-roots support to
remain in power, which explains both his choice of political economy model and survival
through most difficult times, including the current macroeconomic distress (p.1731).
An important thesis throughout Ioffe’s (2014) book is that President Lukashenka and
Belarus’ socio-economic model are a reflection of the moral economy ordinary Belarussians—and

not the other way around. For example, Ioffe is critical of Marin who argues that Belarusian
mentality “is essentially top-down, that is ‘deriving from Lukashenka’s neo-Soviet leadership
[that] durably affects [the] sociology and preferences of the Belarussian population’” (p.114;
parentheses in original). Ioffe argues instead:
That this could actually be bottom-up, with Belarusian preferences having much deeper
historical roots and, in fact, shaping Lukashenka’s worldview (which is why he was elected
president in the first place and stayed in power this long) does not occur to Marin (p.114).
…
[F]ollowing the disarray and frustrations of the early 1990s, Lukashenka evinced a subtle
understanding of the exact kind of order Belarusians wanted and the kind they did not want,
and he proceeded to reestablish the desired kind of order (p.189).
My study strongly supported Yarashevich and Ioffe. President Lukashenka and Belarus’
socio-economic model were a reflection of the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians and not
the other way around. The main reason that I reached this conclusion was that opposition to
privatization by ordinary Belarussians was far more principled and uncompromising than
President Lukashenka’s views on privatization. This was the case even among workers who
opposed him or voted for Svetlana Tikhanovskaya.
Though there is no doubt that President Lukashenka has fiercely resisted mass
privatization, he is not, however, categorically against privatization. Belta reported:
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Aleksandr Lukashenko stressed: ‘Great Deng Xiaoping would say: whatever [color] the
cat may be, as long as it can catch mice, it is a good cat. Therefore, it does not matter what
form of ownership is used. It is important that an enterprise can manufacture good products,
pay good salaries to workers without forgetting to pay taxes.18
This position, however, would be bitterly rejected by the overwhelming majority of
workers in my study—they categorically rejected privatization. As I have said, even many of the
workers who were harsh critics of President Lukashenka categorically rejected privatization, as
well as most of the middle-class subjects.

One subject Lena, would not even talk about

privatization hypothetically “I am categorically against privatization.” Masha was also
categorically against privatization, in fact, she wanted Belarus to renationalize smaller formerstate enterprises that were either privatized or closed. And although I did not pose President
Lukashenka’s statement invoking Deng Xiaoping to her, it is clear that she rejected it. For
example, Masha, while discussing socially-oriented privatization, said, “You will never get private
owners to follow the laws properly and protect workers’ rights.”
I am against privatization! It is better for a company to stay owned by the state since the
director will be more responsible. The private owner will only care about himself!
No doubt, Lena and Masha (who both strongly support President Lukashenka) have strong
views against privatization and were clearly the most hostile to the private ownership and the
private sector, however, the views against privatization among the workers who did not support
the President were also strong and their opposition to privatization was also more principled than
President Lukashenka’s. They also would also have rejected President Lukashenka’s statement
invoking Deng Xiaoping. Simply put, even though they are more tolerant of the private sector

President of the Republic of Belarus, “Aleksandr Lukashenko holds government session on privatization”, March
30, 2012, (https://president.gov.by/en/events/alexander-lukashenko-holds-government-session-on-privatization-73).
18
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than Lena and Masha (begrudgingly tolerant), they do not see public ownership and private
ownership as equivalent or equally desirable. For example, Dennis harshly rejected privatization
of any large state enterprises:
Q: Do you support privatization?
Dennis: “Sell to private hands?”
Q: “Yes”
Dennis: “I am against that. Because there are risks. Private owners could ruin the factory

and the government will not be able to help you…. I think that all large companies must
be controlled by the government…In private hands the director of the factory is a Tsar or
God without any control by the government. The government must control the factories.”
Tanya and Svetlana’s views were similar (Note, both Tanya and Svetlana voted for
Svetlana Tikhanovskaya and Svetlana also participated in several opposition protests).
Q: Should the state-owned sector be privatized?

Tanya: “I think that could be bad because if the government sells these companies the new
owner might fire people. Or might divide the companies into smaller parts and close some
of the factories. I think the government should protect the state-owned factories. Our
economy depends on them a lot. The government should play a big role protecting the
state-owned factories so that the people who work there know they are safe and protected.”
I am against this [privatization]. I am not sure why but I don’t think it is a good idea. If
they privatize them, you don’t know what will happen next. If they [private investors] buy
these companies they will do whatever they want. They will set up new rules. They can
fire people. They can change the schedules, change [workers’] specializations and people
will have to do two jobs for the same money. This can be really bad for the workers.
Svetlana, in spite of supporting the opposition and participating in several protests, had
views similar to the other workers concerning privatization, including Lena and Masha. Svetlana
defended the state industrial sector, wanted to maintain it at its current size, and adamantly opposed
privatization. She was definitely against making it smaller not only “because [of the loss] of
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people’s jobs” but it would “damage the economy and the government itself.” Svetlana was also
against privatization and feared privatization would lead to many workers being fired unfairly and
arbitrarily. And though she never used the word “despotism” that seemed to be at the heart of her
fears as she talked about one of the large private enterprises in her city in which the director is
always firing workers baselessly.
many people believe that government companies are more stable since they cannot
fire you without a good reason…simple workers cannot be fired without any basis.
Svetlana, like the others, also feared privatization would lead to much more corruption as
the private owners will “find ways around the law” while “government companies follow the law
more carefully without dark spots.”
Furthermore, support for the position that ordinary workers’ opposition to privatization is
broader and more principled than President Lukashenka’s can be seen during public discussions
of the new constitution before it was ratified. Many workers during these meetings specifically
requested that the new constitution explicitly forbid the privatization of Belarus’ major state-owned
factories—especially large factories that are the main industry of a city.19
They [the workers] also ask[ed] about items related to the preservation of health. By the
way, people have asked to prescribe in the Constitution a ban on the privatization of large
city-forming enterprises. For many, it is important that the factories remain owned by the
country20
The new constitution that was ratified in 2022, however, did not contain such prescriptions
against privatization of state enterprises as these workers had supported. And it should be noted

[In Russian] SB Tendency, “Constructive Ideas? Propose (them)” “Конструктивная идея? – Предлaгай!” No. 7,
(26400) Thursday, January 13, 2020, Page 2, (The article might be available online on SB’s website, www.sb.by).
19

Ibid. The original Russian passage read: “Спрашивают и про пункты, связанные с сохранением здоровья.
Кстати, люди попросили прописать в Конституции запрет на приватизацию крупных градообразующих
предприятий. Для многих важно, чтобы заводы оставались в собственности страны.”
20
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that these workers’ concerns were not published in an oppositional source, but were published in
the largest state-owned newspaper SB ––formally known as Soviet Belorussia—which promotes
the president’s policies (Marples 2021:288).
Based on the literature, it should really come as no surprise that the majority of ordinary
Belarussians are more principally opposed to privatization than President Lukashenka. A major
part of this confusion is that the opposition, the Western-media, and opposition-oriented academic
researchers and policy analysts have effectively created a “neo-Soviet” (Ioffe 2014:114) and
Stalinist (Matsuzato 2004:244) caricature of President Lukashenka. The truth is that the moral
economy of ordinary Belarussians was always far broader and much more hostile to free-market
ideology than President Lukashenka’s outlook. Knowing some basic historic facts about President
Lukashenko make this very clear.
Alexander Lukashenka, as the director of a state farm in the 1980’s, was the first to apply

free-market principles to a state farm in the Soviet Union “assigning a certain amount of land to
crop farmers and establishing a direct link between pay and output - something that had not existed
on collective and state farms prior to Perestroika” (Ioffe 2014:123-124). Alexander Lukashenka’s
economic innovations won him a position on a 1987 Moscow delegation for innovation in the
agricultural sphere in which Alexander Lukashenka gained the attention of Gorbachev (p.124).
Far from being a Stalinist Soviet hardliner, Alexander Lukashenka was a pro-Gorbachev
market-reformer (p.125-26), who in June 1991, “headed a group of 33 MPs that called itself
‘Communists of Belarus for Democracy’…[which] criticized the command system in the
economy” (p.125). Again, far from being a Stalinist hardliner:
Together with this group, Lukashenka denounced the abortive Moscow coup of 19-21
August 1991 and voiced support for Gorbachev. He also demanded the resignation of the
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chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus, who declared his support for the coup
organization (p.125).
Besides supporting market reforms, Alexander Lukashenka’s opposition to the 1991 coup,
put him at odds with the majority of Belarussians, who actually supported the coup (Ioffe
2004:108; see also Potocki 2002:146).

(In fact, Belarus has been called the “Vendee of

perestroika” (p.108) after the region of France that rejected the 1789 French Revolution and
remain loyal to the monarchy).
By 1992, however, Alexander Lukashenka, “[i]dentifying with the public’s viewpoints”
had “decided to distance himself from market reforms, including privatization and to grant his
support to Viacheslev Kebich, who was bent on slowing down market reforms, restoring economic
and political ties with Russia, and even reviving, if possible, the extinct Soviet Union” (p.126).
(In 1994, two years later, Alexander Lukashenka, would go on to beat Viacheslav Kebich in the

1994 presidential election)
Many might dismiss Alexander Lukashenka’s “drastic” social and political transformation
in the early 1990’s as mere opportunism, however, Valery Karbalevich, a Lukashenka biographer
and one of the harshest critics of President Lukashenka, does not (p.126).
Karbalevich writes that, since 1992 ‘Lukashenka has rejected the idea of forming opinions
on any issue whatsoever without considering what the people think about that issue’

(p.126).
(In fact, even today President Lukashenka often discusses important matters with ordinary
Belarussians before reaching a decision (Ioffe 2014).
According to Ioffe, “In other words, Lukashenka finessed his ability to identify with the
general mood of the public.”
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Karbalevich admits that ‘under democracy a politician cannot be faulted for following the
mass consciousness. After all, the public function of a politician is to reflect the interests
and attitudes of the electorate (p.126).
Furthermore, Alexander Lukashenka’s political transformation took place from 1991 to
1992 during a time of great chaos and severe economic crisis in what was “usually tranquil and
orderly Minsk” (p.126).
In early 1992, all major industrial plants cut their workweeks to three to four days, and
ration cards were introduced for goods of first necessity sold in the state-run
stores…Furniture, refrigerators, and TV sets were also rationed…And this was
immediately after roughly the 20-year period during which living standards in Belarus had
been higher than anywhere else in the Soviet Union except Estonia and Lithuania (p.126).
Knowing the history of Belarus and President Lukashenka’s background, one would
understand why President Lukashenka is less hostile to free-market ideology than the majority of

ordinary Belarusians. Knowing this, one would also see that President Lukashenka’s policies and
Belarus’ socially-oriented economic model are clearly reflections of the moral economy of
ordinary Belarussians. My study strongly supported this position. However, many academic
researchers and policy analysts promote a distorted image of Belarussian society and a caricature
of President Lukashenka, who imposes his will upon the hapless Belarussian people (Ioffe 2014,
2004). This view is strongly supported by Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021, 2019), Bedford (2021),
Glod (2020) and Leshchenko (2008). These researchers tend to ignore ordinary Belarussians or
the importance that they play in shaping Belarus’ socio-economic model. For example,
Leshchenko argues that “President Lukashenka’s authority is sustained on the basis of national
ideology, which he uses to drive his economic, social and foreign policies” (p.1419; italics added).
However, based on the literature and my study, the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians would
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be at the very heart of any national ideology. In fact, Leshchenko even vaguely acknowledges
this, and recognizes this phenomenon.
The values and attitudes upheld by national ideology are not new to Belarusian society
after 70 years of Soviet rule. The achievement of President Lukashenko, however, has
been to refocus those collectivist values from the communist ideology onto the post-Soviet
Belarusian state and present them in national terms (p.1430).
These “values and attitudes” Leshchenko is referring to, are, in fact, the moral economy of
ordinary Belarusians. And while there is no doubt that President Lukashenko’s policies helped
“refocus the collectivist values from the communist ideology onto the post-Soviet Belarussian
state.” It was, however, these deeply held “collectivist values” (moral economy) that shaped
President Lukashenka’s policies in the first place.

Like Ioffe’s critique of Marin above,

Leshchenko also describes as top-down what is actually a bottom-up phenomenon. If I may, she
puts the cart before the horse. This can clearly be seen in her discussion of Belarus’ state-owned
industrial sector in which she argues “that the state-owned economy itself is made possible through
its justification in terms of collectivist national interest” (p.1430). Leshchenko is simply wrong.
The overwhelming majority of ordinary Belarussians have consistently supported the state-owned
economy for numerous decades. They supported it while Alexander Lukashenka was a proGorbachev market reformer in the 1980’s and still support it today. As my study has shown,
ordinary Belarussians support for the state-owned economy—and their opposition to
privatization—is far more categorical and principled than President Lukashenka’s. Ordinary
Belarussians certainly do not need any national ideology introduced by President Lukashenka to
garner their support for the state-owned economy.
Bedford (2021:810-811), Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021:165) and Glod (2020:4) also see
President Lukashenka’s relationship with ordinary Belarussians as top-down as opposed to bottomup: a “paternalistic relationship that Lukashenka has imposed on it for years” (Glod 2020:4). A
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key problem in their analyses is that they all rely on the concept of the “social contract” and argue
that President Lukashenka relies on the “social contract” in order to manipulate ordinary
Belarussians. For example, Bedford views the social contract in Belarus as a form of “Popular
Cooption” or “a kind of co-option” in which President Lukashenka employs a “Soviet-style social
contract” in which he guarantees citizens “stability, order, and financial security in exchange for
their loyalty (810-811). Similarly, Moshes and Nizhnikau explain how the “regime…enter[ed]
into a Soviet-style ‘social contract’ with Belarussian society, providing a certain level of economic
stability in exchange for citizens’ non-involvement in politics” (p.165; see also Glod 2020:4, who
position is very similar).

Social Contract vs Moral Economy
The concept of the social contract was widely used in Soviet Studies (see for example,
Cook 1993,1992; Hewett 1988; Hauslohner 1987; Lapidus 1983). The Soviet social contract was
generally understood to be a tacit agreement in which the Soviet working class was guaranteed
certain economic benefits and security in exchange for “their political compliance and
acquiescence” (Cook 1992:37). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a similar conception of
social contract has been widely applied to Belarus (Haiduk et al. 2009).
The concepts of the social contract and moral economy are no doubt related. In fact,
Reinarman, to whom I am indebted sociologically, preferred calling moral economy “the social
charter,” which is a “grant or guarantee of rights, franchises, privileges, from the sovereign power
of the state” (p.18). This concept is very similar to the concept of “the social contract,” which is
“‘an implicit agreement between the state and the main social groups, in which parties are more or
less aware of the costs and benefits of their behavior” (Haiduk et al. 2009:9). Be that as it may,
however, in spite of Reinarman’s preferring the term “social charter,” (which he thought
“provide[d] a more accessible handle on what [he has] been calling the state-market relation and
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the moral economy), and the overlap between the concepts of the social contract and moral
economy, there are important differences between moral economy and social contract. The most
important difference is moral economy’s bottom-up focus to understanding society, which is at the
heart of Thompson’s research. This is in stark contrast to social contract’s top-down analysis.
Unlike moral economy, social-contract theory, especially as it is applied to Belarus, implies
ordinary people are generally passive and play little role in shaping society. Unlike moral
economy, social-contract theory implicitly begins with the ruler at the very foundation of society,
who merely garners “compliance and acquiescence” (Cook 1992:37) or “Popular Cooption” of
ordinary people (Bedford 2021:810). It does not occur to social-contract researchers in the case
of Belarus, that the fundamental aspects of the very social contract itself, might actually begin with
the “preferences” of ordinary Belarussians (Ioffe 2014:114). And, beyond merely “providing a
certain level of socio-economic stability” (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:165), the social contract
is based on deeply-held beliefs about “justice” and “fairness” in the economy of ordinary
Belarussians (Manaev 2011:95, 99; Matsuzato 2004:242, 255). Furthermore, even more than
notions of “justice” and “fairness,” ordinary Belarussians promote a “vision” of how to organize
the economy, and what role the state should play in the economy (see Reinarman 1987:18),
especially in terms of their support for the state-owned industrial sector and opposition to
privatization.

Certainly, this goes well-beyond merely “acceptable living standards” (Glod

2020:4), which are the main aspect of the Belarussian social contract according to Bedford
(2021:801), Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021:165), and Glod (2020:4).
In other words, according to Bedford, Moshes and Nizhnikau, and Glod, the social
contract would not contain something as broad, complex, and philosophical, as the state’s pledge
to preserve the state-owned industrial sector and, typically, this would be true in the broader
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Belarussian and Soviet social-contract literature (see for example Cook 1992:37;21 Haduik et al.
2009). Moreover, even if pledging to preserve Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector were
considered an integral part of the social contract in the sense that these researchers are using the
term, it is clear, based on the literature and this study, that that notion began with ordinary
Belarussians and is an important part of their moral economy. This is one of the strongest
arguments against social-contract theory and its rigid and clumsy top-down approach to
understanding Belarussian society, as opposed to moral economy, and its dynamic bottom-up
approach.
In conclusion, notwithstanding the important role social-contract theory might have
played in Soviet Studies, according to my study, moral economy—both conceptually and
methodologically—provides a more accurate sociological lens for understanding the important
role ordinary Belarussians play in shaping Belarussian society.

Neoliberalism vs. Democracy.
This question is at the very heart of this study and at the heart of moral economy in general.
No doubt the concept of democracy is complex (Korosteleva 2003:526) and a full investigation of
the concept of democracy is beyond the scope of this study. I will, however, briefly discuss
neoliberalism’s hostility to democracy as it pertains to my study and Belarus in general.
Many researchers and analysts do not consider Belarus a democracy. Glod (2020:3), for
example recently compared Belarus to the former-socialist countries of eastern Europe:
Belarus is undergoing a pro-democracy velvet revolution of the type that swept across
Central Europe in the late 1980s (p.3).

21

Cook (1992:37) for example, defined the Soviet social contract under Brezhnev as a tacit agreement of the regime
to provide workers with “secure employment, egalitarian wage policies and lax performance pressures in industry,
state-controlled and heavily subsidised retail prices for essential goods, and socialised human services (i.e., education,
medical care, child etc.). In return for…. political compliance and quiescence.
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However, unlike the former-socialist states of eastern Europe Belarus has elections. In
fact, it was only possible for Alexander Lukashenka to enter politics and later become president
due to the democratic reforms toward the end of the end of the Soviet Union (Ioffe 2014). Had
the Soviet Union remained unreformed, Alexander Lukashenka would have had little chance to
have ever become a national leader as he was not accepted by the ruling Soviet nomenklatura
(Ioffe 2014). I imagine his situation would have been similar in the eastern bloc as well.
And although the official results of President Lukashenka’s first election “81.1 %” are
widely accepted (see for example, Eke and Kuzio 2000:16-17; Manaev 2014:208; Silitski 2005:3;
Furman 1999:13), all subsequent election results have been challenged by the opposition, the West
and many researchers. Examining this question was an important part of this study and it is clear
that in spite of claims of vote-rigging, it is uncontroversial that President Lukashenka actually won
every subsequent election by a majority (2001, 2006, 2010 and 2015) and that he won in 2001,
2006 and 2010 by massive majorities (I’ll discuss the 2020 later in this chapter). Knowing this
fact, one has to question the critics who claim Belarus is not a democracy—even calling it a
dictatorship. Some pro-opposition researchers and analysts, however, speak rather openly that the
problem is not that Belarussian voters do not have an opportunity to vote, but that these researchers
do not approve of whom Belarussian voters have chosen to vote for. Potocki’s (2002) discussion
of the 2001 presidential election campaign is rather insightful. First, he said that:
Belarus was the most Sovietized and conservative of the USSR’s republics (p.146).
Potocki then went on to say:
Producing a high turnout [for the opposition candidate] was a major goal. With their
ingrained Soviet habits and the regime’s encouragement, Lukashenka’s supporters—older,
heavily rural, and often with less formal schooling—were sure to vote (p.147; paratheses
added).
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This ties directly into my moral economy study. Potocki clearly does not like the moral
economy of ordinary Belarussians who are “Sovietized,” with their “ingrained Soviet habits.” It
is not that Potocki believes Belarus is not democratic enough, but rather that Belarus is too
democratic. In spite of accusations of “dictatorship” (p.145), Potocki acknowledges that “it is
clear that a substantial number of Belarusians vote for him [President Lukashenka]” (p.145). In
fact, according to US State Department research, “‘61% say they voted for him in the September
2001 election” (Korosteleva 2003:530, 533). Furthermore, Potocki acknowledges that the “turnout
was clearly high. More Belarussians went to the polls in 2001 than did in 1994” (p.150), which
undeniably22 means that either over 70 percent of voters came out to vote in 2001, or over 79
percent came out to vote in 2001 (as the 1994 election had two rounds (Furman 1999:7) and it is
not clear which one Potocki is referring too). Even if we took the lower bar of 70 percent turnout,
that would mean that the undeniable 2001 election turnout of over 70 percent, it would easily beat
the record turnout of the 2020 US election in which about 61.7 percent or 66.2 percent turned out
to vote depending on the metric.23 Furthermore, past US elections have seen much lower turnouts
such as in 2016, which only had a turnout of 55.72 percent24 far lower than even 70 percent.
In general, far from Belarussian “citizens’ non-involvement in politics” (Moshes and
Nizhnikau 2021:165), relying on official statistics,25 Belarussian citizens usually have much higher

22

This is undeniable since it is based on the 1994 official election results, which are widely accepted as accurate (Eke
and Kuzio 2000:16-17; see also Manaev 2014:208; Silitski 2005:3; Furman 1999:13) —even Potocki recognizes it
(p.143).
Pew Research Center, “Turn out soared in 2020 as nearly two thirds of eligible U.S. voters cast ballots for president,”
January 28, 2021, by Drew Desilver, (https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/01/28/turnout-soared-in-2020-asnearly-two-thirds-of-eligible-u-s-voters-cast-ballots-for-president/).
23

Pew Research Center, “In past elections, U.S. trailed most developed countries in voter turnout”, NOVEMBER 3,
2020, by DREW DESILVER (https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/03/in-past-elections-u-s-trailed-mostdeveloped-countries-in-voter-turnout/)
Other than Potocki (2002), saying the 2001 official turnout of “84 percent cannot be considered reliable”—though he
did acknowledge that the 2001“turnout was clearly high” (p.150)—there is little in the literature arguing, or even
claiming, that official voter turnout statistics are inaccurate. For example, Marples, (2006) a harsh critic of President
Lukashenka did not question the reliability of an even higher official voter turnout of 93 percent in his careful analysis
of the 2006 election, which included a rather detailed discussion of the Belarussian electorate (p. 352-353; see also
Potocki 2011).
24
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participation in elections than what is seen in the West, especially when comparing voter turnout
in relation to voting age population, in which Belarus is a world leader 26
Returning to Potocki, as I said earlier in this section, it is clear that the main problem
Belarus faces is not too little democracy, but too much democracy. Potocki clearly does not like
the democratic choices that ordinary Belarussian make. Potocki has utter contempt for ordinary
Belarussians or the working class. He deeply resents that they have relied on a democratic process
(voting), to build a socio-economic model that protects their interests.
It is no secret that Potocki shares the same neoliberal capitalist ideology as some of the
subjects in my study did (see Potocki 2011). In fact, many Belarus researchers share the same
neoliberal ideology, especially their extreme hostility toward Belarus’ state-owned industrial
sector and they insist on its privatization (see for example Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:171, 2019;
Bedford 2021:811; Glod 2020:5). Furthermore, all of these researchers embrace the same
neoliberal utopian ideology in support of privatization and also embrace the neoliberal utopia that
is right around the corner awaiting Belarussian if only they would embrace privatization.
While some researchers are more outright than others in promoting hostility toward
democracy, all of them, by virtue of embracing the ideology of neoliberal ideology, are hostile to
democracy. This is true of the neoliberal proponents in my study as well. Ultimately, at the heart
of my study and at the heart of understating Belarus is the hostility of neoliberal ideology toward

Concerning the 2010 election, Potocki (2011:55-56) did not challenge the voter turnout in his analysis of 2010 election
although the election turnout was also very high at 90.6 percent.
25

Finally, concerning the 2015 election, Crabtree et al. (2016:3) did not question the reliability of the voter turnout
(87.2 percent) in their analysis of the 2015 (p.3). (I will address the 2020 election separately later in this chapter)
Pew Research Center, “In past elections, U.S. trailed most developed countries in voter turnout”, NOVEMBER 3,
2020, by DREW DESILVER (https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/03/in-past-elections-u-s-trailed-mostdeveloped-countries-in-voter-turnout/)
26
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democracy. The conflict between free-market ideology and the common good (moral economy).
This conflict in its early stage can already be seen in Thompson’s study.
Although, in general, our modern concept of “democracy” did not play a very important
role among the crowds of poor workers in Thompson’s ([1971]) study, the idea of “the
community,” the common good (p.188, 253) and the “public good” (p.201) were absolutely
essential to these workers’ moral economy. Thompson’s workers saw grain traders who raised
prices during shortages as rapaciously greedy, “Man-haters, opposite to the Common good”
(p.253).
They bitterly rejected the “supposed liberty of every farmer to do as he likes with his own”
as deeply anti-social and an offense against society:
It cannot then be said to be the liberty of a citizen, or of one who lives
under the protection of any community; it is rather the liberty of a
savage; therefore he who avails himself thereof, deserves not that
protection, the power of Society affords (p.198).
Thompson’s crowds saw greedy individuals unfairly and illegitimately taking advantage
of the masses of poor people of which they were a part. In a sense, we could say the crowd was
acting in the interest of “democracy” in that they represented the will of the people against a tiny
minority, however, Thompson’s crowds did not see the conflict in those terms.
Even though Thompson’s workers did not see the conflict in such terms as “democracy,”
or a democratic struggle, what played out during those conflicts was a private individual,
embracing free-market ideology to exploit the public and the public good. At the heart of those
struggles was the irreconcilable conflict between free-market ideology and the common good, or
in other words, the irreconcilable conflict between free-market ideology and moral economy.
The riots and upheavals in Thompson’s study, were the early manifestations of what
Reinarman called “the tension between liberty and equality” in Rousseau’s “The Social Contract
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(1761)” (p.7). As societies modernized the conflict between free-market ideology and moral
economy took different forms. In the West, the battle ground was over the democracy and the
welfare state (Reinarman p.8-9). Belarus’ history was very different, however, upon independence
and introducing regular elections, the conflict between free-market ideology and the moral
economy in Belarus mainly takes place through electoral politics in which ordinary Belarussians
have a tremendous advantage due to their size and active participation in elections. However, just
as Thompson’s crowds were seen as lawless mobs by the grain traders and millers, so too, do
proponents of neoliberalism, in a similar way, see ordinary Belarussians. Potocki’s contempt for
ordinary Belarussians discussed above was clear. The opposition readily dismisses ordinary
Belarussians for their “wrong views” (Manaev 2014:229) calls them offensive names (Ioffe
2014:190), even “cattle” (Ioffe 2004:109). (In my study, Olga and Stas both referred to ordinary
Belarussians as “illiterate.”) The Belarussian opposition is “elitist and out of touch with the
despised ‘masses’” (Ioffe 2004:109).
Contempt for ordinary Belarussian is not limited to the opposition. Many academic
researchers have also displayed contempt for ordinary Belarussians. For example, Anais Marin
(2012:10), writing for the European Union, has called ordinary Belarussians “brain washed.” Eke
and Kuzio (2000:4) have criticized their “entrenched Soviet mentality.” Silitski (2006:48) has also
called them “Sovietized.” Furman (1999:12) said they were “aspiring… away from freedom.”
Leshchenko (2008:1424) has said ordinary Belarussians are incapable of “forming and advancing
their own interests,” Glod (2020:5) has called them the “traumatized Soviet-era population” (see
also Miazhevich 2007:1334)
Like Potocki, these researchers do not believe Belarus is not democratic enough, but rather
too democratic. Furman (1999), a harsh critic of President Lukashenka made this very clear:
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In Belorussia the people defeated the elite, and Lukashenko’s policy was based on real
majority support. But this is precisely a popular triumph and not a triumph of democracy
(p.12).
At the heart of Furman’s critique, and the critique of Belarus’ social-economic model in
general, is neoliberal capitalism’s deep hostility toward democracy (Harvey 2005). According to
neoliberal ideology, democracy, meaning ordinary people having a say over their lives, is
unacceptable, when it restrains private property. In fact, Friedrich Hayek, the founder of modern
neoliberal capitalist ideology, was incredibly hostile toward democracy—and even supported the
brutal dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in Chile (Filip 2018; Selwyn 2015; Farrant et al. 2012).
Margaret Thatcher, whose neoliberal policies devasted the British working class in the 1980’s, was
even personal friends with the dictator27 and the US Central Intelligence admits, “its deep
involvement in Chile, where it dealt with coup-plotters, false propagandists and assassins.”28
Although Hayek’s support for dictatorship flows directly from neoliberal ideology, Harvey
(2005) warns, rather than being understood as a coherent ideology, neoliberalism in essentially a
capitalist ruling class political project:
[A] political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore
the power of economic elites…
Neoliberalization has not been very effective in revitalizing global capital accumulation,
but it has succeeded remarkably well in restoring, or in some instances (as in Russia and China)
creating, the power of an economic elite” (p.18).

The Guardian, “Thatcher sent Pinochet finest scotch during former dictator's UK house arrest”, October 4, 2019,
by Mat Youkee (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/04/margaret-thatcher-pinochet-chile-scotch-maltwhisky).
27

TNI, “CIA Acknowledges Involvement in Allende's Overthrow”, September 19, 2000
(https://www.tni.org/es/node/13624).
28
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Within Harvey’s framework Belarus can be seen as a special example among the former
socialist and former Soviet republics in which neoliberal capitalism has been consistently resisted
for decades, especially since the first election of President Lukashenka in 1994. It is my conclusion
that the foundation of that resistance to neoliberalism, is the moral economy of ordinary
Belarussians, with its notions of fairness and justice and vision of how to organize the economy,
specifically their support for Belarus’ state-owned industrial sectors and adamant opposition to
privatization.

And although President Lukashenka is usually the main focus, President

Lukashenka and his socially-oriented policies must be seen as a reflection of the moral economy
of ordinary Belarussians.

Belarus’ 2020 Post-Election Uprising was not a Democratic Uprising.
The 2020 election protest movement was not a “democratic uprising” or democratic

revolution (see Way 2020:17 see also Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:160; Glod 2020:3) but rather a
neoliberal capitalist counterrevolution in which, for the first time, segments of Belarus’ domestic
capitalist class, especially in IT played a significant role (see Chapter 14). This fact distinguished
the 2020 uprising from Belarus’ previous three post-election uprisings, in 2001, 2006, and 2010
and was an important factor contributing to the greater size of the 2020 mobilization and the extent
of the mobilizations which lasted about three months (see Radnitz 2010). Another important factor

that contributed to the 2020 uprising’s size and extent, was the large population of IT workers in
Minsk that also played a prominent role as participants in the protest movement.
Unlike previous post-election uprisings, in 2020, President Lukashenka’s perceived
mishandling of COVID enraged the middle class, which increased the size and extent of the
mobilizations. (However, President Lukashenka’s handling of COVID did not enrage the working
class. My subjects were not angered by this nor was the issue raised among three protesting
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workers who led protests and strikes at major enterprises). Another important factor that fueled
the size and extent of the mobilization was the police’s heavy-handed crackdown on the protests
and the beating and physical abuse of arrested protestors in police custody. All four of these
factors, which were all new, all contributed to the larger size, scope, and duration of the 2020 postelection protest movement.

Another Color Revolution?
While the previous three post-electoral uprisings are all considered attempted color
revolutions in the literature (see Chapter 10), it is my position, however, that they were actually
attempts at Western-imposed neoliberal capitalist counterrevolution (see Chapter 12) and that the
West, especially the United States, as well as the European Union, is deeply committed to
fomenting a neoliberal capitalist counterrevolution in Belarus (see Chapter 12). Furthermore, it is
my position that the West’s neoliberal agenda in Belarus takes precedence over the West’s longterm geopolitical strategy against Russian (see Chapter 13).
Although I think it is more theoretically accurate to look at the post-election uprisings in
Belarus as attempted neoliberal capitalist counterrevolutions as opposed to color revolutions, the
color-revolution literature is of vital importance as the post-election uprisings in Belarus—
including 2020—all follow the tactics, patterns, and strategies of color revolution very closely.
Furthermore, there is no doubt that there was Western involvement in the 2020 uprising, especially
from the United States.

Russian Involvement in the 2020 Uprising
Another important difference between the 2020 uprising and the others, is that there was
likely significant Russian involvement (see Chapter 11). None of the potential candidates were
hostile to Moscow and all had connections to Moscow. Viktor Babaryka, the former head of
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Russian-owned Gazprom Bank’s Belarussian division certainly has ties to Moscow and the
Russian capitalist class. This Russian involvement, along with the other factors discussed earlier,
might have contributed to the size and duration of the protest movement.

Beyond Neoliberal Encirclement
In spite of much talk today about the end of the neoliberal order by the economist Joseph
Stiglitz and others,29 neoliberalism was alive and well in my study. A harsh neoliberal capitalist
ideology emerged in my study among the capitalist subjects and a segment of the middle-class
subjects. A similar neoliberal ideology dominates Western policy toward Belarus as well as much
of the Belarus academic research. Not only does Belarus’ socio-economic model face a serious
neoliberalism internally and from the West, the most serious threat, however, comes from Russia
(Ioffe 2014). It is not clear how the recent war will affect the delicate relationship Belarus has
with Russia. On the one hand, due to the Belarus’ isolation from the West, it might face more
neoliberal pressure from Russia. However, by the same token, Russia is very isolated and depends
on Belarus very much now. It might not make sense for Russia to alienate its only ally in the entire
region.

Countering the Popular Narrative
It is true that the 2020 mobilization against President Lukashenka was larger in size, scope
and duration than the previous post-election uprisings. No doubt 2020 was “unprecedented,”
(Melyantsou 2020), however, Belarus’ previous two post-election uprisings were also

Social Europe, “The end of neoliberalism and the rebirth of history”, November 26, 2019, by Joseph E Stiglitz
(https://socialeurope.eu/the-end-of-neoliberalism-and-the-rebirth-of-history);
The Guardian, “The age of neoliberalism is ending in America. What will replace it?”, June 28, 2021, by Gary Gerstle
(https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/jun/28/age-of-neoliberalism-biden-trump);
The Nation, “Has Neoliberalism Really Come to an End?”, April 13, 2022, by Daniel Steinmetz-Jenkins
(https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/neoliberalism-gary-gerstle/).
29

525

unprecedented. There is no doubt the 2010 and 2006 post-election uprisings were unprecedented.
The 2010 post-election uprising had “the largest number of protestors in any demonstration” in
twenty years (Kulakevich 2014:887). According to Kulakevich “about forty thousand people came
out to protest the rigged elections” in 2010 (p.887,896). As far as 2006’s post-election uprising,
Silitski (2006:145) literally used the term “unprecedented” to describe the 2006 uprising.
Far from being a “‘spontaneous popular revolt’” (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:160), the
2020 uprising followed Belarus’ familiar color-revolution script, in which opposition cries
“‘Foul’” in response to losing the election to a very popular president who undoubtedly won by a
massive majority (Silitski 2006:138). And in spite of President Lukashenka’s undoubtedly
winning 2001, 2006, and 2010 with massive majorities, the opposition relied on this familiar script,
and succeeded in mobilizing more protesters— “to protest the rigged elections,” after each
successive election (Kulakevich 2014:895-896). Another important feature of color revolutions
that was applied in 2020, was the use of “various forms of election monitoring and parallel vote
counts” (Way 2008:56), which have been employed in previous Belarussian elections (see for
example, Potocki 2002:147). It is in this context that the 2020 post-election uprising must be
understood.

The 2020 Election
There is no compelling evidence that Svetlana Tikhanovskaya actually won the August 9,
2020 election.

The surveys cited by Glod (2020) were deeply methodologically flawed

underrepresenting would-be Lukashenka supporters. Moshes and Nizhnikau (2020) did not even
bother citing any evidence in support of their claim of a “fraudulent election” (p.160) and “blatant
falsifications of electoral results” (p.173). The largest opposition protest on Sunday, August 16,
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2020 had around 50,000.30 Even if we doubled the size of the estimate, it would not indicate that
Svetlana Tikhanovskaya won the election. The total number of verified Tikhanovskaya ballots of
the Golos parallel election platform are below the official number of Tikhanovskaya ballots.
Furthermore, I argued that Golos’ verified Tikhanovskaya ballots actually proves the validity of
|Tikhanovskaya’s official results since the two numbers, which are fairly close to one another, (and
are not independent of each other) and could not have wound up that way merely by chance. Either
the election board knew Golos’ results ahead of time (which is doubtful) and chose a result for
Tikhanovskaya just above the Golos number—or the official results for Tikhanovskaya are indeed
accurate. Moreover, Golos’ 2020 Tikhanovskaya results line up very well with the total number
of opposition ballots from the 2015 election. This proves that Tikhanovskaya’s official results are
indeed accurate.
Based on the fact that the opposition lied about the election results in order to mobilize the
last three31 post-election uprisings (2010, 2006, & 2001) it should really come as no surprise that
the opposition did the same thing again in 2020. No doubt lied is a strong word. On some level,
the opposition and most opposition supporters, truly believe that no one supports President
Lukashenka. It is deeply ideological. The “Sasha 3%” campaign is strong proof of how powerful
this ideology is32 (Melyantsou 2020). Subjects in my study insisted that no one supports President
Lukashenka. Anyone familiar with Belarus would come across this viewpoint. For example,

The New York Times, “Belarus Protests Eclipse Rally in Defense of Defiant Leader,” August 16, 2020, by Ivan
Nechepurenko and Anrewq Higgins, (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/16/world/europe/belarus-protestslukashenko.html).
30

31

Note, there was no post-election uprising after the 2015 election (Crabtree et al. 2016), since this election took place
during a brief thawing when the West was not trying to overthrow President Lukashenka (Seddon 2015). It also took
place right after the violent and destabilizing Maidan color revolution, after which few Belarussians were in the mood
to protest mood (Seddon 2015).
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Sasha 3%? Belarusians Poke Fun At President's Slipping Support”, June 25,
2020, by Tony Wesolowsky, (https://www.rferl.org/a/belarusians-poke-fun-at-president-slippingsupport/30690561.html).
32
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I know one person in my circle who voted for him [Alexander Lukashenko]. That’s his
position, I do not blame him. This is his position. This is one of hundreds of people whom
I’m in touch with. Out of hundreds! We even argued with him, recruited all our friends –
no one voted for Lukashenka. We sat around, calling everyone all evening, no one voted
for him. Well, how does that happen?33

Unprecedented Worker Protests and Strikes
The worker protests and strikes during 2020 distinguished the 2020 uprising, not only from
Belarus’ previous post-election uprisings, but from all previous color revolutions in the region
(Artiukh 2021:51). Sociologically, the fact that these worker protests and strikes took place tended
to challenge the main thesis of my dissertation. Namely, that Belarussian workers have a moral
economy in support of Belarus’ socio-economic model, especially the state-owned industrial
sector. The fact that the very workers who work at the state-enterprises were protesting and going
on strike, tends to call into question the main finding of my dissertation. However, after a very
careful and a systematic investigation of the worker protests and strikes, I conclude that my thesis
holds (see Chapter 15). I based this conclusion on two arguments:
First, “in reality only a small portion of all workers was involved in the protests”
(Melyantsou 2020).

Second, these protesting workers, though they were against President

Lukashenka, they did not make social or economic demands and there is little evidence to believe
that they opposed Belarus’ socio-economic model.
The workers did not voice any economic demands during the protests, their welfare
(especially at Belaruskali and in oil refining) being quite far from deplorable by Belarusian
standards (Melyantsou 2020:9; italics added)
…

Open Democracy, “Strike, exile, arrest: what happened to Belarusian workers?”, June 23, 2021, by Alexey Shuntov,
(https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/strike-exile-arrest-what-happened-belarusian-workers/).
33
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Another issue of concern is the lack of any socioeconomic demands in most of the strike
petitions, most of which are focused exclusively on the general political demands of the
opposition (Ishchenko 2020:4).
I also relied heavily on the in-depth interviews of three protesting workers, who organized
protest and strikes at three of Belarus’ major state enterprises published in Open Democracy,34 as
well as interviews with similar oppositional workers in my study. And while I could not ask any
questions to the workers in the article, I had spoken at length with the oppositional workers in my
study and found that although they were against President Lukashenka, they were defended the
state-owned industrial sector and very adamantly opposed private property.
In conclusion, the protesting and striking workers are oppositional and are opposed to
President Lukashenka. However, they are not against Belarus’ socio-economic model; in general,
they support Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector and oppose its privatization. I agree with
Volodymyr Ishchenko (2020), that the worker protests were protests of “anti-Lukashenko citizens
who just happen to be located at the strategic positions of economic production (p.3; see also
Kassabov 2020:6). The fact that these protests took place does not challenge the main findings of
my moral economy study.
A more specific question, that requires further research is: what is the extent of the support
for President Lukashenka among the overwhelming majority of non-protesting workers at Belarus’
major state enterprises? No doubt, based on this study, I am very confident that they support
Belarus’ socio-economic model. However, this study was not designed to determine what
percentage of workers support President Lukashenka. I would recommend further qualitative
research at specific state enterprises, especially ethnographies and in-depth interviews with lifehistories. Survey research would not give valid results as many workers, especially Lukashenka

34

Ibid.
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supporters, would refuse to participate, creating a very biased sample in favor of the opposition.
Ethnography (and in-depth interviews) would afford the researcher more freedom to get a good
“lay of the land” and see what the social landscape is really like even if numerous workers refuse
to participate.
If I were to speculate, I would assume support for President Lukashenka is high among
workers at the major state enterprises based in part on my interviews and conversations with many
workers, but mainly in response to my own experience at Oleg’s state-owned grocery store, in
which the overwhelming majority supported President Lukashenka and voted for him. I am very
wary about generalizing here though, since according to the literature, support for President
Lukashenka is strongest among “‘the least qualified’ urban workers” (Yarashevich 2014:1718; see
also Ioffe 2014:190), which would include low-paid low-skilled retail workers. There might be
important differences between them and the highly-paid highly skilled workers at state industrial
enterprises. Therefore, more research is needed to answer this question.
Before going on to the next section, I briefly want to introduce a preliminary conclusion I
reached concerning the protesting workers. As I have just mentioned these workers represent a
small part of the segment of the highest-paid and most skilled workers in Belarus. It is my position,
at least preliminarily, that the protesting workers, due to their integration into the middle class are
more exposed to anti-Lukashenka ideology, which is dominant among the middle class (see Halle
1984). Second, these high-paid high skilled workers might actively embrace anti-Lukashenka
ideology in order to bolster their status as middle class (see Bourdieu 1990).

Non-Economic Ideological Hegemony
Ideology played an important role in this study. At the very heart of the study, was the
conflict between the neoliberal ideology of the capitalists and a segment of the middle class, and
the moral economy of ordinary Belarussians. Though there are differences between the various
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neoliberal capitalist ideologies that emerged in this study, (for example I classified some as
utopian), I consider all of them economic ideologies. These economic ideologies played an
important role in the consciousness of the capitalists and some of the middle-class subjects in this
study. However, there are also important non-economic ideologies that emerged in this study.
These non-economic ideologies, though they are not directly economic, support the neoliberal
economic ideologies, especially so in the political sphere in which the conflict between neoliberal
ideology and the moral economy of the workers take place. The two most important non-economic
ideologies that emerged in this study broadly speaking democracy and disparaging President
Lukashenka as a peasant or kolkhoznik. Although democracy is bigger and broader, I will start
with disparaging President Lukashenka as a peasant or kolkhoznik.
Disparaging President Lukashenka as a peasant or kolkhoznik by the middle class is well
known (Ioffe 2014:138, 166, 170) and is an example of what Pierre Bourdieu (1984) called habitus.
Mocking President Lukashenka’s “peasant accent” is also well known (p.166, 170), which
sociologists consider “linguistic ideology” (Woolard 2020). Along with habitus
Language ideology can turn some participants’ practices into symbolic capital that brings
social and economic rewards and underpins social domination by securing what Bourdieu
called the misrecognition of the fundamental arbitrariness of its value (see Bourdieu,
Pierre). Through the alchemy of linguistic ideology, the linguistic capital of dominant
groups is endowed with distinction that seems inherent in the language’s essence rather
than historical accident, leading subordinated speakers to endorse the superior value of a
form they do not control themselves (Woolard 2020:2)
In the unique context of Belarus this phenomenon is reversed, as it is the President who is
perceived as being culturally and socially inferior. In this way, habitus and linguistic ideology
serve the interests of the capitalist class, which is aspiring toward political supremacy. Although
these ideologies are, in principle, unrelated to economic interests, in reality they mobilize support
for the capitalists’ neoliberal agenda. In fact, they can mobilize political support even among
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Belarussians who would not benefit economically from changing Belarus’ socio-economic model.
In my study, Olga was a good example of this. Other than her utter disgust over President
Lukashenka’s peasant background, mannerisms, and speech, as an administrator at a public
hospital, and supporter of Belarus’ state-owned industrial sector, her real economic interests would
not be served by replacing President Lukashenka. By derisively mocking President Lukashenka
as a peasant, Olga and other members of the middle class, gain symbolic capital and bolster their
social status, however, by doing so, they misrecognize their real economic interests.
The other powerful non-economic ideology that emerged in this study is democracy and
broadly includes the narrative that President Lukashenka is an unelected dictator who only stays
in power by rigging elections. This ideology is far broader than disparaging President Lukashenka
as a peasant and is available to members of the working class, who would not disparage the
president as a peasant as many of them have peasant backgrounds (Ioffe 2014:170). They also
would not mock President Lukashenka’s peasant accent “because this is how many of them talk
and this is how their parents or grandparents do or used to.” (p.170).
The “Sasha-3%” meme, is a good example of this ideology. Namely, no one supports
President Lukashenka. The ideology assumed that the election would be rigged. The “Sasha-3%”
meme captures this ideology well, and in spite of opinions to the contrary,35 much of the opposition
and opposition supporters actually believe this (Melyantsou 2020:3; Zahorski 2020:3). For
example, an oppositional metal worker (Pavel Magidov) said this during a meeting with the plant’s
director in August 2020:
We asked what was going on; why there were falsifications of votes,” Magidov recalls. “I
know one person in my circle who voted for him [Alexander Lukashenko]. That’s his

For example, the title of Radio Free Europe’s article was “Sasha 3%? Belarusians Poke Fun At President's Slipping
Support” (June 25, 2020, by Tony Wesolowsky, (https://www.rferl.org/a/belarusians-poke-fun-at-president-slippingsupport/30690561.html), implying that it is simply a funny meme.
35
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position, I do not blame him. This is his position. This is one of hundreds of people whom
I’m in touch with. Out of hundreds! We even argued with him, recruited all our friends –
no one voted for Lukashenka. We sat around, calling everyone all evening, no one voted
for him. Well, how does that happen?36
This passage really shows the power of this ideology. First, Magidov’s claim — at least
on its face — is that even fewer than 3% support President Lukashenka, since Magidov only knows
one out of hundreds. If by hundreds, Magidov means 200 people, then only 0.5% support
President Lukashenka and if he means 300, then it would be 0.3%. Obviously, Magidov’s position
is deeply ideological to put it mildly.
Just as the middle class has access to habitus and linguistic ideology to gain symbolic
capital thereby bolstering their own status, by embracing democracy as an ideology or the Sasha3% meme, the middle class and others—including members of the working class—have access to
symbolic capital and can bolster their status as middle class.

No doubt, however, they

misrecognize their real economic interests by embracing this ideology.

The Future of Belarus’ Socio-Economic Model
Although the 2020 uprising was challenging, Belarus got through it more or less alright.
In 2021 Belarus faced a wave of Western sanctions which did not seem to have had such a
detrimental effect due to high levels of growth as Belarus benefitted from the lack of production
in response to COVID (see Chapter 9). In response to the Russian invasion of the Ukraine in
February 2022, Belarus has faced additional Western sanctions. To date, (July 2022), it does not
seem that these sanctions are very detrimental.

Open Democracy, “Strike, exile, arrest: what happened to Belarusian workers?”, June 23, 2021, by Alexey Shuntov,
(https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/strike-exile-arrest-what-happened-belarusian-workers/).
36

533

Also in February 2022, Belarussians ratified a new constitution, which in principle took
tremendous power away from the executive branch. However, in spite of these reforms, the
opposition and opposition-oriented researchers have been very critical of the new constitution,
especially allowing President Lukashenka to run for president two more times as the term limits
only begin with the ratification of the new constitution. They are also angry over enshrining the
All-Belarussian People’s Congress with constitutional powers—even the ability to invalidate
elections and impeach a sitting president (see Chapter 9).
It is clear that President Lukashenka’s motivation for the constitutional reforms was to limit
the executive power to prevent a future president from undoing Belarus’ socio-economic model
(Chapter 9). So, for example, in principle, even if an oppositional president came to power, it
would be hard for him to undo the socio-economic model. For example, a new president would
not have the authority to privatize Belarus’ state-enterprises.

Lukashenko will not last forever, and we do not know who my successor will be: maybe,
a dictator or an authoritarian leader – no one knows. This is the main reason why we have
resorted to amending the Constitution.37
President Lukashenka is trying to shift Belarus from charismatic authority to rational-legal
authority (Weber 2009). Overall, however, Belarus’ socio-economic system is already very
formalized and structured. The problem I foresee is what will be the effect on Belarus losing its
charismatic leader.
I agree with Ioffe (2014), that Lukashenka’s charismatic authoritarian political style
resonated with the ordinary Belarussians, however, that will not help create stability and prosperity

37

https://eng.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-in-favor-of-preserving-strong-presidential-authority-1386052021/; see also (https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/publication/how-lukashenko-internationalises-belarusian-crisis)
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once Lukashenka is no longer the president. Will Belarus’ socio-economic model be able to
function without Lukashenka?
Although President Lukashenka is trying to limit future presidents’ power to prevent the
dismantling of the socio-economic system, the role of future presidents will still be important and
will still deeply affect the future direction Belarus takes socially, economically and politically.

The Future of President Lukashenka
At this point in time (July 2022), it is not clear what President Lukashenka’s plans are, or
whether he plans to run in the next presidential election in 2025. In March 2021 President
Lukashenka named two possible successors “former Interior Minister Yuri Karayev and former
Health Minister Vladimir Karanik.”38 Though it is not clear how serious Lukashenka is about
them.39 On Monday August 9, 2021, President Lukashenka announced that “he was ready to move
on – ‘very soon’ – and had identified 15 or 20 possible successors, all of whom resembled him “in
some way.”40 However, since this article in August 2021, there has been little talk about President
Lukashenka’s plans for the future or potential replacements. Possibly, following the 2021 migrant
crisis and now with the political turmoil of the Ukraine war, President Lukashenka thinks that it is
inappropriate to talk about leaving office. Constitutionally, President Lukashenka is permitted to
run again in the next presidential election scheduled for 2025 and as I have said earlier it is not
clear what his plans are at this time.

Reuters, “Belarus president names two former ministers as possible successors”, MARCH 19, 2021, by Matthias
Williams; Editing by Frances Kerry (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-belarus-election-lukashenkoidUSKBN2BB23Q); “Reuters reported that former Interior Minister Karayev is controversial as he “was
instrumental in launching a violent crackdown on mass protests against Lukashenko’s rule last year [August
2020].””
38
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Ibid.
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The Next Election
In principle, the next presidential election will be in 2025. Had the Ukraine war not
happened, I would have predicted that the opposition and the West would attempt a repeat of the
2020 post-election uprising relying on the same strategies, especially claiming the election was
rigged. Belarus has taken measures to prevent or minimize another uprising of that scale, however,
such as shutting down many NGO’s that are believed to be conduits or front groups for the welldeveloped Western regime-change apparatus.41 Belarus has also made efforts to prevent strikes
from occurring again at major state enterprises, including “suppressing the strike committees that
sprung up in late summer 2020,”42 and taking legal action “to dissolve” the independent
oppositional trade unions,43 which played a crucial role at some of the most notable strikes during
the 2020 uprising:
Strike committees have actively worked with trade unions, the most notable case being
Belaruskali, where the Independent Miners’ Union was at the frontline of struggle
(Belaruskali workers account for the second largest share—12%—of all protest events,
second only to the Minsk Tractor Plant with 14% (Artiukh 2021:56; parentheses in
original).
Another factor that would diminished the size and effect of the next possible post-election
uprising is the fact that numerous IT workers have left Belarus in response to President

Belta, “Lukashenko explains why some NGOs were shut down in Belarus”, November 22, 2021
(https://eng.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-explains-why-some-ngos-were-shut-down-in-belarus-1454272021/); Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Belarus Shuts Down More NGOs Amid Continued Crackdown”, July
23, 2021 (https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-shuts-down-ngos/31374183.html).
41

Atlantic Council, “Belarus dictator targets trade unions amid fears over anti-war mood”, June 13, 2022, by Hanna
Liubakova, (https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/belarusalert/belarus-dictator-targets-trade-unions-amid-fearsover-anti-war-mood/).
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“The move is seen by many as an indication of regime concerns over possible industrial action after union leaders
spoke out against the war in Ukraine and called for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Belarus (Ibid.).
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Lukashenka’s re-election and his reaction to the protests and a second wave has left in response to
the Ukraine war out of fear of being drafted (Chapter 9).
The migration of young IT workers will tend to diminish the potency of any post-election
protests or uprising. Recall it was the large IT sector that was a crucial factor contributing to the
2020 uprising’s size and duration.

Furthermore, the migration of young IT workers also

contributes to Belarus’ demographic problem, which has plagued Belarus’ oppositional movement
for years (see Marple 2006:353).
Making predictions about Belarus in the context of the war in the Ukraine is complicated
as the entire political landscape in the regions is unpredictable. At this point, however, I would
predict that in this post-war climate, the potency of the next post-election uprising would be
significantly diminished by the West’s (self-imposed) isolation from Belarus. For example, the
United States has shut its embassy in Minsk,44 numerous Western countries and companies are
boycotting Belarus, and in addition there are US and EU sanctions (Chapter 9). All of these actions
will tend to diminish the effect of the next post-election uprising. First, things such as not having
a working embassy in Belarus will weaken the effect of the United States’ powerful regime-change
apparatus. Second, isolating Belarus—and therefore Belarussians—from the West will generally
dimmish the “Westernization” of Belarussians and their outlook that would ultimately strengthen
the pro-Western opposition (see Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:166; Kulakevich 2014; Manaev
2014).

Reuters, “U.S. shuts embassy in Belarus, OKs evacuation from embassy in Moscow”, February 28, 2022 , by
Katharine Jackson, (https://www.reuters.com/world/us-halts-operations-embassy-belarus-oks-evacuation-usembassy-moscow-2022-02-28/).
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Final Thoughts
What Can We Learn from Belarus’ Socio-Economic Model?
Belarus’ political economy model has neither been acknowledged or appreciated in the
West… (Yarashevich 2014:1731).
Why isn’t the West trying to learn from Belarus’ socio-economic model instead of trying
to destroy it? I have attempted to answer that question in this study (see also Chapter 12 and13).
Simply put, the rulers of the West are deeply hostile to the socialist aspects of Belarus’ system,
especially its state-owned industrial sector. These rulers, however, are only a very small minority,
and if the West truly believes in democracy, wouldn’t we have the right to implement the positive
features of Belarus’ model—and certainly to talk about the model freely, openly, and honestly
without being inundated with propaganda? Even staying well-within the general confines of
capitalism, many countries would greatly benefit from nationalizing important industries
(although there is an important difference between nationalizing and socializing (Korsh et al.
1975). These new nationalized industries could help create good jobs and the “profits” could be
“re-invested into society” as Lena said about Belarus’ system.
I understand that there is not the political will to do this in many countries right now,
especially in United States. Currently, neoliberal ideology dominates the discourse, especially in
terms of its hostility to public or state-ownership. This ideology is perceived as common sense
(Harvey 2005) among Americans broadly across the political spectrum. It is even a mantra of freemarket ideologues, “Show me where socialism works?” Why not answer, “It works in Belarus.
Let’s take a serious look at Belarus.” If we could get this far in the debate, we would have to deal
with the many Belarus-detractors and their narratives. In the past, the most important narrative to
detract from Belarus’ social-model was that Belarus’ industry was merely subsidized by cheap
Russian oil and gas and while an investigation of this question is beyond the scope of this study,
this narrative is not accepted by all researchers. For example, Yarashevich (2014:1704) rejects this
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narrative answering “that there are more fundamental forces at work,” and credits Belarus’ success
“foremost” on Belarus’ “distinctive” socio-economic model.
Briefly, I can quickly disprove the cheap-Russian-oil-and-gas narrative easily as follows.
Rutland (2013), a defender of neoliberalism, argues that Belarus only survived the “post-Soviet
recession” so well, “largely due to…cheap Russian oil and gas”
Belarus … rejected neoliberal reforms and they seem to have experienced a smaller postSoviet recession. The case of the economic 'miracle' was largely due to continued subsidies
in the form of cheap Russian oil and gas (p.345).
However, Belarus has long lost those preferential oil and gas prices—where’s the total
economic collapse? No doubt Belarus’ economy did suffer after losing those preferential prices
for Russian oil and gas, but the economic problems Belarus faced after that cannot be compared
to the immense degree of human suffering of ordinary Russians, (Keskula 2014) Ukrainians
(Klimina 2014), and Lithuanians (Atas 2018), after the breakup of the Soviet Union—there is
simply no comparison. Even without the preferential oil and gas prices Belarus is doing rather
well, especially compared to other countries in the region. Among other things, the utter lack of
economic demands by the protesting workers during the 2020 uprising strongly supports this
position.
The success or failure of Belarus’ socio-economic model will continue to be debated—and
I hope it is in a fair and objective way—whatever the politics of the researcher. Based on the
literature, my study, and living here for many years, I am convinced Belarus’ model works well
and we should be looking at it to see what aspects of it could be applied in other countries. In fact,
Chinese sociologists are beginning to take serious interest in Belarus’ model of “market socialism”
as an alternative to “China’s Socialist Market Economy” (Li and Cheng 2020:428). That is an
important endorsement of Belarus’ social model.
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Most importantly, I hope the success of Belarus’ socio-economic model can serve to
counter the neoliberal capitalist orthodoxy, which is “common sense” in the West. Belarus’ model
can challenge the utopian ideologies that serve to rationalize the continued domination of the
capitalist class.
There is no doubt many will challenge the Belarus’ socio-economic model as undesirable,
accusing it of being based on political authoritarianism and deviating too far from the accepted
models of Western pluralist democracy (see Yarashevich 2014:1731; although these criticisms
themselves are not without class bias45). If these concerns are genuine, then we should look to
apply the key aspects of Belarus’ socio-economic model respecting Western conceptions of
democracy. This has been done before to a large extent. For example, in the past, most of heavy
industry of Great Britain was nationalized. Even in the United States, the bankrupt Penn-Central
Railroad along with five others were nationalized and restructured as “Conrail” in 1976.46 After
Conrail had become profitable again, it was privatized in 1987 “and returned to the private sector
in what was then the largest initial public offering in US history, raising 1.9 billion”47 (see Ang
and Boyer 2006 for a more in-depth discussion of Conrail).

45

Although beyond the scope of this study, Western democratic norms such as separation of powers, etc. do not
represent pure democracy, but evolved as the most effective forms for the maintenance of capitalism. Furthermore,
class bias can clearly be seen when comparing the harsh criticism of President Lukasehka’s authoritarianism, to the
West’s treatment of Boris Yeltsin, who disbanded the Russian Parliament and shelled it with tanks. Both created
authoritarian political systems in which enormous power was conentrated in the executive. Yeltsin did so, however,
in order to force neoliberal shock therapy upon ordinary Russians, while President Lukashenka did so to protect
ordinary Belarussians from neoliberalism (Furman 1999).
46

Conrail, “Brief History of Consolidated Rail Corporation” (https://conrail.com/about-conrail/history/).

Ibid. Although Conrail’s success serves as a powerful counter example to neoliberal ideology, as it achieved its
success as a nationalized enterprise (Ang and Bower 2006), the example of Conrail could not be considered
socialism as Conrail was run “close to a privatized firm in many respects, e.g., management, governance, etc.”
(p.19), engaged in massive layoffs (p.14), as well as wage freezes, (see for example, UPI, “Conrail wants Unions to
OK wage freezes,” September 29, 1981, (https://www.upi.com/Archives/1981/09/29/Conrail-wants-unions-to-OKwage-freeze/1069370584000/)).
47
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Unfortunately, few academic researchers have shown any interest in trying to apply
Belarus’ socio-economic model based on state-ownership in a non-authoritarian context. The truth
is, however, for many researchers Belarus’ socio-economic model is in itself inherently
authoritarian—with or without President Lukashenka. This neoliberal bias is usually implicit, but
still very obvious (see Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021:171, 2019, Bedford 2021:811; Glod 2020:45; Potocki 2011;56,61 Leshchenko 2008:1424). They simply believe that state-ownership is
inherently undemocratic and that democracy would only be possible if Belarus were to privatize
its state-owned industrial sector. It is no wonder few researchers are looking at applying the
Belarus’ model in other political contexts.

The Importance of Thompson’s Conception of Moral Economy
The unique moral economy of ordinary Belarussians is at the very foundation of Belarus’
unique socio-economic model. This has important implications, as it shows that ordinary people
bear a great deal of responsibility for determining the kind of society that they live in.
Thompson’s notion of moral economy is relatively under-utilized in sociology (Ibrahim
2014:82)
Sociologically, Thompson’s conception of moral economy has been absolutely invaluable
to me. This study, and the insights I have gained into understanding Belarussian society, would
have been impossible without Thompson’s class-based economic conception of moral economy. I
hope this study encourages others to use Thompson’s conception of moral economy in sociology
as well.
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